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I. The “entry doctrine”
A. History lesson
1. Before the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), the decision as to whether an alien
was subject to deportation proceedings or exclusion proceedings was based on
whether or not the alien had made an “entry” into the U.S.  An alien who had
made an entry was entitled to a deportation hearing and the greater procedural
safeguards it provided.  An alien who had not made an entry was placed in
exclusion proceedings.  Former section 101(a)(13) of the Act defined entry as
“any coming of an alien into the U.S. from a foreign port or place.”  The
Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) formulated a more precise definition
of entry so as to better distinguish between exclusion and deportation in 
Matter of Pierre, 14 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 1973),  Matter of Phelisna, 18 I&N
Dec. 272 (BIA 1982), and  Matter of G-, 20 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1993).  All of
this came to be known as “the entry doctrine.”
2. An exception also arose for lawful permanent residents (“LPR”s) returning to
the U.S. after a brief, casual, and innocent departure.  The Supreme Court held
that such a departure would not constitute an “entry” within the meaning of
former section 101(a)(13). Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).  This
became known as the “Fleuti Doctrine.”
3. These two doctrines caused a great deal of litigation over the issue of whether
certain aliens were properly placed in exclusion proceedings.  They were
rather time consuming and, since they dealt with the issue of whether or not
the alien was in the proper proceeding, delayed the addressing of the ultimate
issues in the cases, i.e. the issues of excludability and eligibility for relief.
4. In the IIRIRA, Congress sought to simplify things by creating removal
proceedings which are applicable to aliens admitted to the United States,
aliens applying for admission, and aliens present in the United States without
being inspected and admitted.  It also made the difference dependent simply
on whether the alien had been admitted or not.
B. Applicants for admission
1. Section 235(a)(1) of the Act provides that “An alien present in the United
States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether
or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to
the United States after having been interdicted in international or United
States waters) shall be deemed for purposes of this Act an applicant for
admission.”
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2. The term “arriving alien” means an alien who seeks admission to or transit
through the United States, as provided in 8 C.F.R. § 1235.1, at a port of entry,
or an alien who is interdicted in international or United States waters and
brought into the United States by any means, whether or not to a designated
port-of-entry, and regardless of the means of transport.  8  C.F.R. § 1001.1(q).
3. An arriving alien remains such even if paroled pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of
the Act.  8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(q).
4. An alien who leaves the U.S. to seek refugee status in Canada, and then
returns to the U.S. after the application was denied in Canada, is deemed to be
seeking admission to the U.S.  Therefore, such an alien is deemed to be an
arriving alien.  Matter of R-D-, 24 I&N Dec. 221 (BIA 2007).
C. Admission or admitted
1. Section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act, as amended by section 301 of the IIRIRA,
provides that the terms “admission” and “admitted” mean the lawful entry of
an alien into the U.S. after inspection and authorization by an immigration
officer.
2. An alien who has not been admitted to the United States is subject to the
inadmissibility grounds under section 212(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). 
Pursuant to 237(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a), an alien (including an alien
crew member) in and admitted to the United States is subject to the
deportation grounds under that section.  Under section 237(a)(1)(A) of the
Act, deportable aliens includes any alien who was inadmissible at the time of
entry or adjustment of status.
3. The Board held that an alien who initially entered the U.S. without inspection,
but whose conviction for an aggravated felony was subsequent to her
adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident under section 245A
of the Act, is deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act as an alien
who was convicted of an aggravated felony “after admission.”  Matter of
Rosas, 22 I&N Dec. 616 (BIA 1999).
D. Parole and crewmen
1. An alien who is paroled under section 212(d)(5) of the Act or permitted to
land temporarily as a crewman shall not be considered to have been admitted. 
INA § 101(a)(13)(B).
E. Lawful permanent residents
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1. Section 101(a)(13)(C) of the Act provides that an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the
U.S. unless the alien:
a. has abandoned or relinquished LPR status [INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(i)];
b. has been absent from the U.S. for a continuous period in excess of 180
days [INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(ii)];
c. has engaged in illegal activity after departing the U.S. [INA §
101(a)(13)(C)(iii)];
d. has departed from the U.S. while under legal process seeking removal of
the alien from the U.S., including removal proceedings and extradition
proceedings [INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(iv)];
e. has committed an offense identified in section 212(a)(2) of the Act,
unless since such offense the alien has been granted relief under section
212(h) or 240A(a) [INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(v)];
f. is attempting to enter at a time or place other than as designated by
immigration officers or has not been admitted to the U.S. after
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer [INA §
101(a)(13)(C)(vi)].
(1) The Board has held that the Fleuti doctrine, which required the
admission of a LPR returning from a brief, casual, and innocent
departure, did not survive the amendment of section 101(a)(13) of
the Act by IIRIRA.  Matter of Collado, 21 I&N Dec. 1061 (BIA
1998).  In that same decision, the Board held that an LPR described
in section 101(a)(13)(i)-(vi) of the Act is to be regarded as “seeking
an admission into the U.S. for purposes of the immigration laws,”
without further inquiry into the nature and circumstances of a
departure from and return to the U.S.
2. In order to establish that a returning lawful permanent resident alien is to be
treated as an applicant for admission to the United States, the Department of
Homeland Security has the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that one of the six exceptions to the general rule for lawful
permanent residents set forth at section 101(a)(13)(C) of Act applies. Matter
of Rivens, 25 I&N Dec. 623 (BIA 2011).
II. Inspection and credible fear review
A. Inspection
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1. All aliens (including alien crewmen) who are applicants for admission or
otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the U.S. shall
be inspected by immigration officers.  INA § 235(a)(3).
2. Parolees and aliens formerly considered to have entered without inspection. 
Section 235(a)(1) of the Act provides that an alien present in the U.S. who has
not been admitted or who arrives in the U.S. (whether or not at a designated
port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the U.S. after having
been interdicted in international or U.S. waters) shall be deemed an applicant
for admission.
3. Statements.  An applicant for admission may be required to state under oath
any information sought by an immigration officer regarding the purposes and
intentions of the applicant in seeking admission to the U.S., including the
applicant's intended length of stay and whether the applicant intends to remain
permanently or become a U.S. citizen, and whether the applicant is
inadmissible.  INA § 235(a)(5).
B. Withdrawal of application for admission
1. An alien applying for admission may, in the discretion of the Attorney General
and at any time, be permitted to withdraw the application for admission and
depart immediately from the U.S.  INA § 235(a)(4).
C. Summary removal
1. An immigration officer shall order an alien removed from the United States
without further hearing or review if: (1) the alien is not an alien described at
section 235(b)(1)(F); and (2) the alien is arriving in the United States; or (3)
the alien is described at section 235(b)(1)(A)(iii); and (4) the alien is
inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7); unless (5) the alien
indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section 208 or a fear of
persecution.  INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i).
D. Stowaways
1. An arriving alien who is a stowaway is not eligible to apply for admission or
to be admitted and shall be ordered removed upon inspection by an
immigration officer unless the alien indicates an intention to apply for asylum
or a fear of persecution.  INA § 235(a)(2).
E. Credible Fear Interview
1. An alien who indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section
208 or a fear of persecution shall be referred for an interview by an asylum
officer.  INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii).
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a. If the officer determines at the time of the interview that an alien has a 
credible fear of persecution, the alien shall be detained for further
consideration of the application for asylum.  INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii).
(1) A credible fear of persecution means that there is a significant
possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements
made by the alien in support of his claim and such other facts as
are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for
asylum under section 208.  INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(v).
b. If the officer determines that the alien does not have a credible fear of
persecution, the officer shall order the alien removed from the U.S.
without further hearing or review.  INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I).  The
officer shall prepare a written record of a determination.  INA §
235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II).  Such record shall include a summary of the
material facts as stated by the applicant, such additional facts (if any)
relied upon by the officer, and the officer's analysis of why the alien has
not established a credible fear of persecution.  Id.  A copy of the officer's
interview notes shall be attached to the written summary.  Id.  The
Attorney General shall provide by regulation and upon the alien’s
request for prompt review by an IJ of the determination that the alien
does not have a credible fear of persecution.  INA §
235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III). Such review shall include an opportunity for the
alien to be heard and questioned by the IJ either in person or by
telephonic or video connection.  Id.  Review shall be concluded, if
possible, within 24 hours, but in no case later than 7 days after the date
of the asylum officer’s determination. Id.  Such alien shall be detained
pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if
found not to have such a fear, until removed.  INA §
235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
F. Inspection of other aliens
1. Except for an alien described above [inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)
or 212(a)(7) of the Act], an alien who is a crewman, or an alien who is a
stowaway, if the examining officer determines that an alien seeking admission
is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be
detained for a proceeding under section 240 of the Act.  INA § 235(b)(2)(A)-
(B). 
2. Aliens arriving from foreign contiguous territory.  In the case of an alien
arriving on land (whether or not at a designated port of arrival) from a foreign
territory contiguous to the U.S., the Attorney General may return the alien to
that territory pending a proceeding under section 240 of the Act. INA §
235(b)(2)(C).
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3. Challenge of decision.  The decision of the examining immigration officer, if
favorable to the admission of any alien, shall be subject to challenge by any
other immigration officer and such challenge shall operate to take the alien
whose privilege to be admitted is so challenged, before an IJ for a proceeding
under section 240 of the Act.  INA § 235(b)(3).
G. Removal of aliens inadmissible on security and related grounds
1. If an immigration officer or an IJ suspects that an arriving alien may be
inadmissible under section 212(a)(3)(A) [other than clause (ii)], (B), or (C),
the officer or judge shall order the alien removed, report the order of removal
to the Attorney General, and not conduct any further inquiry or hearing until
ordered by the Attorney General.  INA § 235(c)(1).  Section 235(c)(3) of the
Act provides that the alien or the alien’s representative may submit a written
statement and additional information for consideration by the Attorney
General.
2. If the Attorney General is satisfied on the basis of confidential information
that the alien is inadmissible under the portions of section 212(a)(3) of the Act
listed above and after consulting with appropriate security agencies concludes
that disclosure of the information would be prejudicial to the public interest,
safety, or security, the Attorney General may order the alien removed without
further inquiry or hearing by an IJ.  INA § 235(c)(2)(B).  If the Attorney
General does not order the alien removed, the Attorney General shall specify
the further inquiry or hearing that shall be conducted in the case. INA §
235(c)(2)(C).
III. Bond and custody under IIRIRA
A. Background
1. Section 236(a) of the Act provides that on a warrant issued by the Attorney
General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether
the alien is to be removed from the U.S.  In a custody redetermination under
section 236(a), where an alien must establish to the satisfaction of the IJ that
he or she does not present a danger to others, a threat to national security, or a
flight risk, the IJ has wide discretion in deciding the factors that may be
considered.  Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006).
2. Transition Period Custody Rules.  The TPCR were a temporary “stop-gap”
measure invoked after the IIRIRA’s enactment to address the lack of detention
space necessary to immediately implement the mandatory detention rule of
section 236(c)(1) of the Act.  Under the TPCR, IJs had retained discretionary
authority to release certain criminal aliens upon a demonstration that they did
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not present a danger to the community or a flight risk.  That discretion ended
with the TPCR’s expiration on October 8, 1998.
B. Arriving aliens
1. An IJ has no authority to redetermine or set bond for an arriving alien. 8
C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(1)(i)(B).
2. An alien who arrives in the U.S. pursuant to a grant of advance parole is an
“arriving alien” as that term is defined in the regulations.  Matter of Oseiwusu,
22 I&N Dec. 19 (BIA 1998).   According to the regulations, an IJ has no
authority over the apprehension, custody, and detention of arriving aliens and
is therefore without authority to consider the bond request of an alien
returning pursuant to a grant of advance parole.  Id.  
C. Detention of criminal aliens
1. Section 236(c)(1) of the Act provides that the Attorney General shall take into
custody any alien who is inadmissible by reason of having committed any
offense covered in section 212(a)(2), is deportable by reason of having
committed any offense covered in section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C),
or (D), is deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) on the basis of an offense
for which the alien has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least 1
year, or is inadmissible under section 212(a)(3)(B) or deportable under section
237(a)(4)(B) when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is
released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to
whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.
2. Constitutionality.  The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section
236(c)(1) of the Act.  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
3. The Ninth Circuit has held that authorization for detention under INA
section 236(c) ends when the Board of Immigration Appeals affirms the
removal order.  Casas-Castrillon v. DHS, 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008). 
“Thereafter, the Attorney General’s detention authority rests with [the general
discretionary authority to detain under section 236(a)] until the alien enters his
‘removal period,’ which occurs only after we have rejected his final petition
for review or his time to seek such review expires.”  Id.  at 948.  The Ninth
Circuit further ruled that “the government may not detain a legal permanent
resident . . . for a prolonged period without providing him a neutral forum in
which to contest the necessity of his continued detention.”  Id. at 949.
 
4. In Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit held
that an individual facing prolonged immigration detention under section
241(a)(6) of the Act, is entitled to be released on bond unless the government
establishes the individual is a flight risk or a danger to the community.  The
 On March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ceased to exist as an agency under the U.S.1
Department of Justice and became a part of the newly-formed Department of Homeland Security.  In this outline, the
Department of Homeland Security will continue to be referred to as the DHS or, where appropriate, the INS, the
Service, or alternatively, the Government.
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court reasoned that individuals detained under section 241(a)(6) of the Act are
entitled to the same procedural safeguards against prolonged detention as
individuals detained under section 236(a) of the Act, including an
individualized bond hearing before an IJ.  Id. at 1085.  The court
acknowledged that it was extending its holding in Casas-Castrillon v. DHS,
535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008). See page 20 below for discussion of appeals of
bond decisions.
5. “When released”
a. In a decision regarding the Transition Period Custody Rules (“TPCR”)
which became effective on October 9, 1996, the Board held that the
“when released” clause did not describe a class of aliens, but rather was
an instruction to the Attorney General as to when the alien was to be
taken into custody.  Matter of Noble, 21 I&N Dec. 672 (BIA 1997).
Therefore, the rules applied irrespective of how or when the alien came
into Service  custody.  Id.  However, the INS later reversed its position1
on this issue and, in a later decision, the Board held that section 236(c)
of the Act does not apply to aliens whose most recent release from
custody by an authority other than the INS occurred prior to the
expiration of the TPCR on October 8, 1998.  Matter of Adeniji, 22 I&N
Dec. 1102 (BIA 1999).  Custody determinations of aliens in removal
proceedings who are not subject to the provisions of section 236(c) of
the Act are governed by the general custody provisions at section 236(a)
of the Act.  Id.  However, by virtue of 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), a criminal
alien in a custody determination under section 236(a) of the Act must
establish to the satisfaction of the IJ and the Board of Immigration
Appeals that he or she does not present a danger to property or persons. 
Id.  In Matter of Garcia-Arreola, 25 I&N Dec. 267 (BIA 2010), the
Board modified its decision in Matter of Adeniji and held that section
236(c) of the Act requires mandatory detention of a criminal alien only if
he or she is released from non-DHS custody after the expiration of the
TPCR and only where there has been a post-TPCR release that is directly
tied to the basis for detention under sections 236(c)(1)(A)–(D) of the
Act.
(1) The Board had previously ruled in Matter of Saysana, 24 I&N Dec.
602 (BIA 2008) that the mandatory detention provision in
section 236(c)(1) “does not support limiting the non-DHS custodial
setting solely to criminal custody tied to the basis for detention
under that section.”  The Board’s decision in Matter of Garcia-
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Arreola specifically overruled Matter of Saysana. But see Saysana
v. Gillen, 590 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2009) (disagreeing with the Board’s
reading of the mandatory detention provision and finding that the
text of the statute is clear that the “when released” language applies
to an alien who has been detained criminally for one of the
activities listed in the statute, rather than any release from any non-
DHS custody).
b. A criminal alien who is released from criminal custody after the
expiration of the Transition Period Custody Rules is subject to
mandatory detention pursuant to section 236(c) of the Act even if the
alien is not immediately taken into custody by the Service when released
from incarceration.  Matter of Rojas, 23 I&N Dec. 117 (BIA 2001).
c. The Board has also held that the use of the words “release” or “released”
in section 303 of the IIRIRA consistently appears to refer to a form of
physical restraint. Matter of West, 22 I&N Dec. 1405 (BIA 2000).
Therefore, the mandatory detention provisions of section 236(c) of the
Act do not apply to an alien who was convicted after the expiration of
the Transition Period Custody Rules, but who was last released from the
physical custody of state authorities prior to the expiration of those rules
and who was not physically confined or restrained as a result of that
conviction, i.e. sentenced to probation or given a suspended sentence. Id.
d. In Matter of West, 22 I&N Dec. 1405 (BIA 2000), the Board stated that
the word “released” can also refer to release from physical custody
following arrest, not just a sentence.
e. The Board held in Matter of Kotliar, 24 I&N Dec. 124 (BIA 2007), that
an alien apprehended at home while on probation for criminal
convictions is subject to the provisions of section 236(c)(1), provided it
can be ascertained that he was released from criminal custody after the
expiration of the Transition Period Custody Rules.  
6. Danger to property or persons
a. In bond proceedings under the Transition Period Custody Rules, the
standards set forth in Matter of Drysdale, 20 I&N Dec. 815 (BIA 1994),
apply to the determinations of whether the alien’s release from custody
during deportation proceedings will pose a danger to the safety of
persons or of property and whether the alien is likely to appear for any
scheduled proceeding.  Matter of Melo, 21 I&N Dec. 883 (BIA 1997). 
In Matter of Drysdale, the Board found that the statutory framework
under former section 242(a)(2)(B) of the Act involved a two-step
analysis.  If the alien cannot demonstrate that he is not a threat to the
community, he should be detained in the custody of the Service. 20 I&N
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Dec. 815. If the alien rebuts the presumption that he is a threat to the
community, then the likelihood that he will abscond becomes relevant. 
This finding was based on the statutory language that the alien must
show he is “likely” to appear for any scheduled hearing, rather than a
showing that he “will appear.”  Unlike the standard for determining if
there is a danger to the community, this language allowed for flexibility
since the likelihood of appearance could vary from none to great. 
Therefore, if an alien overcomes the presumption that he is a threat to
the community, the IJ should set a bond according to his assessment of
the amount needed to motivate the respondent to appear in light of the
considerations deemed relevant to bond determinations.
(1) In Matter of Urena, 25 I&N Dec. 140 (BIA 2009), the Board
emphasized that the IJ should only set a bond if the alien meets his
burden of proof that his release would not pose a danger to
property or persons. Only after the alien has met that burden of
proof can the IJ determine the flight risk posed by the alien and the
amount of bond appropriate to ensure the alien’s presence at future
proceedings. Id. at 141.
b. The phrase “is deportable” as used in the Transition Period Custody
Rules does not require that an alien have been charged and found
deportable on that deportation ground.  Matter of Melo, 21 I&N Dec.
883 (BIA 1997).  See also Matter of Kotliar, 24 I&N Dec. 124 (BIA
2007) (holding that an alien need not be charged with the ground that
provides the basis for mandatory detention to be considered “deportable”
on that ground).
c. The Transition Period Custody Rules do not limit "danger to the safety
of persons or of property" to the threat of direct physical violence. Matter
of Melo, 21 I&N Dec. 883 (BIA 1997). The risk of continued narcotics
trafficking also constitutes a danger to the safety of persons. Id.
d. The Transition Period Custody Rules expired in 1998.  However, the law
regarding danger to the safety of persons or property appears to remain
applicable.
7. Section 236(c)(2) provides that the Attorney General may release an alien
described above only if the Attorney General decides pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3521 that release of the alien from custody is necessary to provide protection
to a witness, a potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation
into major criminal activity, or an immediate family member or close
associate of a witness, potential witness, or person cooperating with such an
investigation, and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will
not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to
appear for any scheduled proceeding.  A decision relating to such release shall
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take place in accordance with a procedure that considers the severity of the
offense committed by the alien.
8. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i) provides that upon the expiration of the Transition
Period Custody Rules, an IJ may not redetermine conditions of custody
imposed by the Service with respect to the following classes of aliens:
a. Aliens in exclusion proceedings;
b. Arriving aliens in removal proceedings, including aliens paroled after
arrival pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Act;
c. Aliens described in section 237(a)(4) of the Act;
d. Aliens in removal proceedings subject to section 236(c)(1) of the Act;
and
e. Aliens in deportation proceedings subject to section 242(a)(2) of the Act
as in effect prior to April 1, 1997.
9. However, 8 C.F.R. §  1003.19(h)(2)(ii) provides that “Nothing in this
paragraph shall be construed as prohibiting an alien from seeking a
redetermination of custody conditions by the Service in accordance with part
1235 or 1236 of this chapter.  In addition, with respect to paragraphs
(h)(2)(i)(C), (D), and (E) of this section, nothing in this paragraph shall be
construed as prohibiting an alien from seeking a determination by an
immigration judge that the alien is not properly included within any of those
paragraphs.”
a. For purposes of determining the custody conditions of a lawful
permanent resident under section 236 of the Act, and 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.19(h)(2)(ii), a lawful permanent resident will not be considered
“properly included” in a mandatory detention category when an IJ or the
Board of Immigration Appeals finds, on the basis of the bond record as a
whole, that it is substantially unlikely that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service will prevail on a charge of removability specified
in section 236(c)(1) of the Act.  Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA
1999).
b. Although a conviction document may provide the Service with sufficient
reason to believe that an alien is removable under one of the mandatory
detention grounds for purposes of charging the alien and making an
initial custody determination, neither the IJ nor the Board is bound by
the Service’s decisions in that regard when determining whether an alien
is properly included within one of the regulatory provisions that would
deprive the IJ and the Board of jurisdiction to redetermine the custody
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conditions imposed on the alien by the Service.  Matter of Joseph, 22
I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999).
c. When an IJ’s removal decision precedes the determination, pursuant to 8
C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(ii), whether an alien is “properly included” in a
mandatory detention category, the removal decision may properly form
the basis for that determination.  Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 799
(BIA 1999).  When an IJ bases a bond determination on evidence
presented in the underlying merits case, it is the responsibility of the
parties and the IJ to ensure that the bond record establishes the nature
and substance of the specific factual information considered by the IJ in
reaching the bond determination.  Matter of Adeniji, 22 I&N Dec. 1102
(BIA 1999).
d. In assessing whether an alien is “properly included” in a mandatory
detention category during a bond hearing taking place early in the
removal process, the IJ must necessarily look forward to what is likely to
be shown during the hearing on the underlying removal case. Matter of
Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999). Thus, for example, the failure of
the Service to possess a certified copy of a conviction record shortly
after taking an alien into custody would not necessarily be indicative of
its ability to produce such a record at the merits hearing. Id.
10. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(4) provides that a determination by a district director
(“DD”) or other designated official regarding the exercise of authority under
section 303(b)(3)(B)(ii) of Pub. L. 104-208 (concerning release of aliens who
cannot be removed) is final, and shall not be subject to redetermination by an
IJ.
11. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(1) provides that the Board has the authority to stay the
custody order of an IJ when the Service appeals the custody decision and the
Service is entitled to seek an emergency stay from the Board in connection
with such an appeal at any time.
12. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) provides that in any case in which the DHS
determined that an alien should not be released and has set a bond of $10,000
or more, any order of the IJ authorizing release (on bond or otherwise) shall be
stayed upon the DHS’s filing of a Notice of Service Intent to Appeal Custody
Redetermination (Form EOIR-43), with the Immigration Court within one
business day of the order, except as otherwise provided in 8 C.F.R. §
1003.6(c), and shall remain in abeyance pending decision of the appeal by the
Board of Immigration Appeals.  The stay shall lapse upon failure of the
Service to file a timely notice of appeal in accordance with 8 C.F.R. §
1003.38.
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a. An automatic stay of an IJ’s release order that has been invoked by the
Service pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) is extinguished by the
Board’s decision in the Service’s bond appeal from that release order. 
Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999).
D. Detention of aliens certified as terrorists - Section 236A of the Act
1. Section 412 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56 (“USA Patriot Act”) added section 236A to the Act.
2. Section 236A provides that the Attorney General shall take into custody any
alien who is certified under section 236A(a)(3).  INA § 236A(a)(1).
3. Section 236A(a)(3) provides that the Attorney General may certify an alien
under this paragraph if the Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe
that the alien is described in
a. Section 212(a)(3)(A)(i) - an alien seeking to enter the U.S. to engage
in espionage or sabotage.
b. Section 212(a)(3)(A)(iii) - an alien seeking to enter the U.S. to engage
in any activity a purpose of which is the
overthrow of the government of the U.S. by
force, violence, or other unlawful means.
c. Section 212(a)(3)(B) - an alien engaged in terrorist activity
d. Section 237(a)(4)(A)(i) - engaged in espionage or sabotage.
e. Section 237(a)(4)(A)(iii) - an alien engaged in any activity a purpose of
which is the overthrow of the government of
the U.S. by force, violence, or other
unlawful means.
f. Section 237(a)(4)(B) - an alien engaged in terrorist activity.
g. Or is engaged in any other activity that endangers the national security of
the U.S.
4. Section 236A(a)(4) of the Act provides that the Attorney General may
delegate the authority provided under paragraph 3 only to the Deputy Attorney
General.  The Deputy Attorney General may not delegate such authority.
E. Mass migrations and national security interests
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1. In determining whether to release on bond undocumented aliens who arrive in
the U.S. by sea seeking to evade inspection, it is appropriate to consider
national security interests implicated by the encouragement of further
unlawful mass migrations and the release of undocumented alien migrants into
the U.S. without adequate screening.  Matter of D-J-, 23 I&N Dec. 572 (A.G.
2003).  The Attorney General stated that it is reasonable to assume that the
release on bond of mass migrants would come to the attention of others in
their country and encourage future surges in illegal migration. Id. Encouraging
such  unlawful mass migrations is inconsistent with sound immigration policy
and important national security interests.  Id. Surges in illegal migration injure
national security by diverting resources from counterterrorism and homeland
security responsibilities. Id.
2. Where the Government offers evidence from sources in the Executive Branch
with relevant expertise establishing that significant national security interests
are implicated, IJs and the Board shall consider such interests.  Matter of D-J-,
23 I&N Dec. 572 (A.G. 2003).
3. Considering national security grounds applicable to a category of aliens in
denying an inadmitted alien’s request for release on bond does not violate any
due process right to an individualized determination in bond proceedings
under section 236(a) of the Act.  Matter of D-J-, 23 I&N Dec. 572 (A.G.
2003).
4. NOTE: On November 13, 2002, the Commissioner designated for expedited
removal under 8 C.F.R. § 1235.3(b)(1)(ii) all aliens (other than crewmen,
stowaways, Cuban citizens or nationals, and aliens who arrive at U.S. ports-
of-entry) who arrive in the U.S. on or after November 13, 2002 by sea who are
not admitted or paroled and who have not been physically present in the U.S.
for 2 years immediately prior to the determination of inadmissibility by an
immigration officer.  8 C.F.R. § 1235.3(b)(2)(iii) provides that an alien whose
inadmissibility is being considered under the expedited removal procedures of
8 C.F.R. § 1235.3(b)(1)(ii) or who has been ordered removed pursuant to that
regulation shall be detained pending determination and removal, but may be
allowed parole by the immigration authorities.  Therefore, such an alien is not
eligible for a bond redetermination by an IJ.
F. Aliens subject to expedited removal
1. 8 C.F.R. § 1235.3(b)(2)(iii) provides that an alien whose inadmissibility is
being considered under the expedited removal procedures of 8 C.F.R. §
1235.3(b)(1)(ii) or who has been ordered removed pursuant to that regulation
shall be detained pending determination and removal, but may be allowed
parole by the immigration authorities.  Therefore, such an alien is not eligible
for a bond redetermination by an IJ.
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G. All other, non-criminal, non-terrorist, aliens
1. Pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the U.S., the
Attorney General may continue to detain the arrested alien, and may release
the alien on a bond of at least $1,500 or conditional parole but may not
provide the alien with work authorization unless the alien is a LPR or
otherwise would be provided such authorization. INA § 236(a). 
a. Note: An alien who is initially screened for expedited removal under
section 235(b)(1)(A) of the Act, as a member of a class of aliens
designated pursuant to the authority in section 235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the
Act, but who is subsequently placed in removal proceedings under
section 240 of the Act, following a positive credible fear determination,
is eligible for a custody redetermination hearing before an IJ unless the
alien is a member of any of the listed classes of alien who are
specifically excluded from the custody jurisdiction of IJs pursuant to 8
C.F.R. §  1003.19(h)(2)(i).  Matter of X-K-, 23 I&N Dec. 731 (BIA
2005).
2. The purpose of a bond in deportation proceedings is to insure that the
respondent will appear for the deportation hearing.  But neither section 236(a)
of the Act nor the applicable regulations confer on an alien the right to release
on bond.  Matter of D-J-, 23 I&N Dec. 572 (A.G. 2003).
a. In determining a respondent’s reliability as a bail risk and the amount of
bond to be required, these factors may properly be considered:
(1) respondent’s employment history and its stability;
(2) respondent’s length of residence in the community;
(3) respondent’s family ties in the U. S. and whether they are such that
they may entitle the respondent to reside permanently in the U. S.
at a future date;
(4) respondent’s record of nonappearance at court proceedings;
(5) respondent’s previous or pending criminal violations and the
seriousness of the charges;
(6) the effect such criminal violations may have upon eligibility for
relief from deportation;
(7) evidence of respondent’s disrespect for the law;
(8) evidence which adversely reflects upon respondent’s character;
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(9) respondent’s previous immigration violations;
(10) respondent’s manner of entry into the United States.
b. The Board of Immigration Appeals’ decisions on bonds which discuss
the above are:
(1) Matter of Patel, 15 I&N Dec. 666 (BIA 1976) superseded by statute
as stated in Matter of Valdez-Valdez, 21 I&N Dec. 703 (BIA
1997);
(2) Matter of San Martin, 15 I&N Dec. 167 (BIA 1974);
(3) Matter of Spiliopoulos, 16 I&N Dec. 561 (BIA 1978);
(4) Matter of Shaw, 17 I&N Dec. 177 (BIA 1979);
(5) Matter of Andrade, 19 I&N Dec. 488 (BIA 1987).
c. The following factors may not be considered in redetermining an alien’s
custody status:
(1) The potential difficulties that the INS may face in executing an
order of deportation because of conditions in the alien’s country. 
Matter of P-C-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 432 (BIA 1991).
(2) The determination of bond in a deportation case is independent of
the bond proceedings in any criminal case in which the respondent
has been involved and it is inappropriate for the IJ to speculate as
to the possible rationale for a low bond set in a pending criminal
case and to find that the low criminal bond weighs in favor of a
larger bond in the deportation case.  Matter of Shaw, 17 I&N Dec.
177 (BIA 1979).
(3) An alien’s early release from prison and transition to a parole status
do not necessarily reflect rehabilitation for one may receive an
early release for other reasons.  Matter of Andrade, 19 I&N Dec.
488 (BIA 1987). Therefore, such facts do not carry significant
weight in determining whether the alien is a good bail risk for
immigration purposes. Id.
d. An alien subject to criminal proceedings for alleged terrorist activities in
the country to which the INS seeks to deport him is appropriately
ordered detained without bond as a poor bail risk.  Matter of Khalifah,
21 I&N Dec. 107 (BIA 1995).
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e. An IJ’s jurisdiction includes the authority to increase the amount of bond
initially set by the DD.  Matter of Spiliopoulos, 16 I&N Dec. 561 (BIA
1978).
f. Even though a respondent has had a bond redetermination hearing before
an IJ, if later there is a change of circumstances affecting his reliability
as a bail risk, the DD has authority to increase the amount of bond. 
Matter of Sugay, 17 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1981).  (Of course, the new
bond amount is subject to redetermination by an IJ.)
H. Procedure in bond proceedings
1. The initial decision on custody is made by the DD or his delegate. 8 C.F.R. § 
1236.1(d)(1).
a. In order to make a proper custody determination, the INS must have
custody of the respondent.  A respondent who is in the custody of a State
or agency other than the INS is not in the custody of the INS.  Matter of
Sanchez, 20 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA 1990).
b. Even if INS has placed a detainer on a respondent held in the custody of
another agency, the detainer does not entitle the respondent to have a
bond set by the DD.  Matter of Lehder, 15 I&N Dec. 159 (BIA 1975);
Matter of Sanchez, 20 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA 1990).  A detainer is merely
an administrative mechanism to insure that a person subject to
confinement will not be released until the party requesting the detainer
has an opportunity to act. Matter of Sanchez, 20 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA
1990).
2. Former 8 C.F.R. § 3.18(b) [now 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(b)] and former 8 C.F.R. § 
242.2(d) [now 8 C.F.R. §  1236.1(d)(1)] provide authority for an IJ to
redetermine custody status only upon application by the respondent or his
representative.  An IJ may not redetermine custody status on his own motion. 
Matter of P-C-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 432 (BIA 1991).
a. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1) provides authority to the IJ to review and modify
the conditions placed on the alien’s release from DHS custody. Matter of
Garcia-Garcia, 25 I&N Dec. 93 (BIA 2009). 
b. Where the respondent is still in custody, the respondent may file an
application for amelioration of the conditions under which he may be
released at any time. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1) (2011). Custody means
actual physical restraint or confinement within a given space and does
not include electronic monitoring or home confinement. Matter of
Aguilar-Aquino, 24 I&N Dec. 747, 752-53 (BIA 2009). Where the
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respondent has been released from custody, the respondent must file an
application for amelioration of the terms of release within 7 days of
release.  8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1).  If the application for amelioration
occurs after 7 days from release, the IJ lacks authority to redetermine
custody status. Aguilar-Aquino, 24 I&N Dec. at 753.
3. Former 8 C.F.R. §  242.2(d) [now 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1)] provides that an IJ
only acquires jurisdiction over bond after the DD's initial determination of
bond under 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(c)(2).  Therefore, a respondent who is in the
custody of a State or other agency other than INS is not subject to having a
bond set by the DD under 8 C.F.R. §  242.2(c)(2) or reviewed by an IJ under 8
C.F.R. §  242.2(d).  Matter of Sanchez, 20 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA 1990).
a. Even if a respondent is in the actual physical custody of the INS, it is
arguable that an IJ does not acquire jurisdiction over bond until the DD
makes the initial bond determination under the regulations.  The Board
found it unnecessary to determine in Matter of Sanchez if an IJ may
assume that a DD’s inaction in setting bond is the equivalent of setting
no bond.  In such a situation, the respondent may be required to seek an
order from a Federal Judge requiring the DD to set bond.
4. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(5) provides that an IJ may not exercise bond
redetermination authority with respect to:
a. A criminal alien subject to section 303(b)(3)(A)(ii) or (iii) of Div. C. of
Pub. L. 104-208, if the alien has been sentenced, including in the
aggregate, to at least 2 years imprisonment and the alien:
(1) Is described in section 237(a)(2)(D)(i) or (ii) of the Act [espionage
and sabotage] or has been convicted of a crime described in section
101(a)(43)(A), (C), (E)(i), (H), (I), (K)(iii) or (L) [select aggravated
felonies];
(2) Is described in section 237(a)(2)(A)(iv) of the Act [high speed
flight]; or
(3) Has escaped or attempted to escape from the lawful custody of a
local, State or Federal prison, agency or officer within the United
States.
5. Immigration judges do not have authority to redetermine the conditions of
custody imposed by DHS with respect to aliens who have not been issued and
served with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) in relation to removal proceedings
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1240. Matter of Werner, 25 I&N Dec. 45 (BIA 2009).
Therefore, an alien admitted to the U.S. pursuant to the Visa Waiver Program
who has not been served with an NTA pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1240 is not
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entitled to a custody hearing before an IJ. Id. (acknowledging that Matter of
Gallardo, 21 I&N Dec. 210 (BIA 1996) has been superseded by regulation).
6. An IJ loses jurisdiction to redetermine bond when an order of removal
becomes administratively final.  8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d).
7. Although aliens present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled are
charged under the grounds of inadmissibility listed in section 212(a) of the
Act, they are not arriving aliens and may have their bond redetermined by an
IJ.
8. An IJ’s jurisdiction includes the authority to increase the amount of bond
initially set by the DD. Matter of Spiliopoulos, 16 I&N Dec. 561 (BIA 1978).
9. Even though a respondent has had a bond determination hearing before an IJ,
if later there is a change of circumstances affecting his reliability as a bail risk,
the DD has authority to increase the amount of bond.  Matter of Sugay, 17
I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1981).  (Of course, the new bond amount is subject to
redetermination by an IJ.)
10. The background investigations and security checks requirement at 8 C.F.R. §
1003.47(g) does not apply to proceedings seeking the redetermination of
conditions of custody.  However, in scheduling an initial custody
redetermination hearing, the IJ shall, to the extent practicable consistent with
expedited nature of such cases, take account of the brief initial period of time
needed for the Department of Homeland Security to conduct the automated
portions of its identity, law enforcement or security examinations or
investigations with respect to aliens detained in connection with immigration
proceedings.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(k).
I. Requests for additional or subsequent bond redeterminations
1. The Board has held that because the bond regulations do not specifically
address motions to reopen, bond proceedings are not subject to the technical
requirements of former 8 C.F.R. § 242.2 regarding motions to reopen.  Matter
of Uluocha, 20 I&N Dec. 133 (BIA 1989).  Bond proceedings are not really
“closed” as long as a respondent is subject to a bond. Id.  Therefore, IJs may
further consider requests to modify bonds by detained aliens without a formal
motion to reopen. Id. Such requests should be considered on the merits. Id.
However, if there are no changed circumstances shown, the IJ may decline to
change the prior bond decision. Id.  This decision implies that there is no limit
to the number of times a detained respondent may request a bond
redetermination hearing. Id.
2. Following this decision, many detained respondents submitted multiple
requests for bond redetermination hearings.  This became burdensome and
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clogged IJs’ dockets.  In 1992, 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(e) [now 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e)]
was amended to read as follows:  “After an initial bond redetermination, an
alien’s request for a subsequent bond redetermination shall be made in writing
and shall be considered only upon a showing that the alien’s circumstances
have changed materially since the prior bond redetermination.”
3. An IJ maintains continuing jurisdiction to entertain requests by an alien for
subsequent bond redeterminations even after the timely filing of an appeal
with the Board from a previous bond redetermination decision. Matter of
Valles, 21 I&N Dec. 769 (BIA 1997).  If, after a bond appeal has been filed by
an alien, the IJ grants a request for a subsequent bond redetermination, the
appeal is rendered moot and the Board will promptly return the record to the
Immigration Court.  Id.
J. Appeals of bond decisions
1. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(3) provides that an appeal to the Board may be filed as
follows:
a. Within 30 days by either the alien or the Service from a decision of an IJ.
b. Within 10 days by the alien from a decision of a DD once the IJ has lost
jurisdiction, i.e. 7 days after posting bond or when an order of removal
becomes administratively final.
(1) The Board has jurisdiction over an appeal from a DD’s custody
determination that was made after the entry of a final order of
deportation or removal, regardless of whether the alien formally
initiated the review or the DD made the review sua sponte.  Matter
of Saelee, 22 I&N Dec. 1258 (BIA 2000).
(2) An alien subject to a final order of deportation based on a
conviction for an aggravated felony, who is unable to be deported,
may be eligible for release from detention after the expiration of
the 90 day removal period provided in section 241(a)(3) of the Act.
INA §  241(a)(6).  Matter of Saelee, 22 I&N Dec. 1258 (BIA
2000).
(3) However, where an alien seeking review of a DD’s post-final-order
custody determination failed to demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that the release would not pose a danger to the
community pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(a) (1999), the DD’s
decision to continue detention was sustained. Matter of Saelee, 22
I&N Dec. 1258 (BIA 2000).
IV. Grounds of inadmissibility in removal proceedings
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A. Health-related grounds - Section 212(a)(1)
1. For available waivers, see section 212(g) of the Act.
2. Communicable disease.  Section 212(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Act provides that any
alien who is determined in accordance with regulations by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to have a communicable disease of
public health significance is inadmissible.
3. Vaccinations.  Section 212(a)(1)(A)(ii) provides that any alien who seeks
admission as an immigrant, or who seeks adjustment of status, who has failed
to present documentation of having received vaccination against vaccine-
preventable diseases, including those listed in the section is inadmissible.
4. Mental disorder.
a. Section 212(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I) of the Act provides that any alien who is
determined in accordance with regulations by the Secretary of HHS in
consultation with the Attorney General to have a physical or mental
disorder and a history of behavior associated with the disorder that has
posed or may pose a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the alien
or others is inadmissible.
b. Section 212(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II) of the Act provides that any alien who is
determined in accordance with regulations by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services in consultation with the Attorney General to have
had in the past a physical or mental disorder and a history of behavior
associated with the disorder which behavior has posed a threat to the
property, safety, or welfare of the alien and which behavior is likely to
recur or to lead to other harmful behavior is inadmissible.
5. Drug abusers.  Section 212(a)(1)(A)(iv) provides that any alien determined in
accordance with regulations by the Secretary of HHS to be a drug abuser or
addict is inadmissible.
B. Crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”)
1. Section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) provides that any alien convicted of, or who admits
having committed, or admits committing acts which constitute the essential
elements of a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political
offense or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime) is inadmissible. 
Moral turpitude refers generally to conduct that is inherently base, vile or
depraved and contrary to the accepted rules of morality in general.  Matter of
Franklin, 20 I&N Dec. 867 (BIA 1994), aff’d 72 F.3d 571 (8  Cir. 1995). th
Moral turpitude does not depend on felony or misdemeanor distinction. 
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Matter of Short, 20 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1989).  Nor does the seriousness of a
criminal offense or the severity of the sentence imposed determine whether a
crime involves moral turpitude.  Matter of Serna, 20 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA
1992). See pages 49-53 below for discussion of CIMT as ground of
deportability and pages 240-247 below for discussion of defenses to charge of
CIMT.
2. HISTORY LESSON - Before 1990, excludability for a CIMT was covered in
section 212(a)(9) of the Act.  In 1990, the Act was reorganized and that
subject came under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  In 1996, it stayed under that
section number.  Many cases on this subject from before 1990 involve section
212(a)(9) as the ground of inadmissibility.
3. The concept of admitting the commission of a CIMT or acts which constitute
the essential elements of a CIMT (rather than actually being convicted of a
CIMT).
a. The concept of admitting the commission of a crime goes back to at least
the Immigration Act of 1917.  The Board interpreted the phrase “admits
the commission of” an offense to include, in addition to the admission of
facts or specific acts,  an admission of the legal conclusion that the alien
had committed a specific criminal offense.
b. In Matter of J-, 2 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 1945), the Board set forth the
following rules to establish that an alien admits commission of a felony
or other crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude: 
(1) It must be clear that the conduct in question constitutes a crime or
misdemeanor under the law where it is alleged to have occurred.
(2) The alien must be advised in a clear manner of the essential
elements of the alleged crime or misdemeanor.
(3) The alien must clearly admit conduct constituting the essential
elements of the crime and that he committed the offense, i.e. he
must admit the legal conclusion that he is guilty of the crime.
(4) It must appear that the crime admitted actually involves moral
turpitude, although it is not required that the alien himself concede
the element of moral turpitude.
(5) The admissions must be free and voluntary.
c. The Immigration and Nationality Act, which became effective in 1952,
added to former section 212(a)(9) a provision that an alien would also be
excludable who admits committing acts which constitute the essential
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elements of a CIMT.  The provisions of former section 212(a)(9) were
held to be applicable to offenses committed before as well as after the
effective date of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  Matter of R-R-, 6
I&N Dec. 55 (BIA 1953, 1954, A.G. 1955).  The Attorney General
specifically stated that he did not decide whether the admission of the
acts must take place before or after the effective date of the Act.
d. In light of the amendment, the requirement that the alien must admit the
legal conclusion that he is in fact guilty of the specific crime was deleted
in Matter of E-V-, 5 I&N Dec. 194 (BIA 1953).  That decision
specifically stated that the other requirements set forth in Matter of J-
still prevail.
e. The Board later held that to sustain a finding of inadmissibility under
former section 212(a)(9) as one who has admitted acts constituting the
essential elements of a CIMT, the alien must have been furnished with a
definition of such crime in understandable terms.  Matter of G-M-, 7
I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 1955, A.G. 1956).  In Matter of K-, 7 I&N Dec. 594
(BIA 1957), the Board stated that the rule concerning the furnishing of
an adequate definition is not a specific statutory requirement but has
evolved for the purpose of insuring a fair hearing and to preclude a later
claim of unwitting entrapment. 
f. In determining whether an alien has admitted acts which constitute the
essential elements of a CIMT, court decisions defining, explaining, or
interpreting a statute may be considered in addition to the statute itself to
determine if those acts constitute essential elements of the crime.  Matter
of W-, 5 I&N Dec. 578 (BIA 1953).
g. The “admission”  does not have to be made in the course of the
exclusion (now removal) hearing.  It might be made in a sworn statement
given to INS officers or in a proceeding held in a different tribunal.  In
cases involving a plea of guilty in a criminal proceeding, the INS sought
to use the plea of guilty as an “admission” of either the commission of a
CIMT or acts constituting the essential elements of a CIMT.
(1) The Board has held that a plea of guilty in a criminal prosecution
may be regarded as an “admission” within the meaning of the
immigration laws.  Matter of K-, 9 I&N Dec. 143 (BIA 1959, A.G.
1961); Matter of P-, 4 I&N Dec. 373 (BIA 1951).  However, where
a plea of guilty results in something less than a conviction, the
plea, without more, is not tantamount to an admission of
commission of the crime for immigration purposes.  Matter of
Seda, 17 I&N Dec. 550 (BIA 1980) (treated under a first offender
statute), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N
Dec. 546 (BIA 1988), superseded by statute as stated in Matter of
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Devison-Charles, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000); Matter of
Winter, 12 I&N Dec. 638 (BIA 1967, 1968) (no sentence imposed
and case placed “on file”).
(2) The Board also held that an alien is not excludable when he admits
committing acts which constitute the essential elements of a CIMT
if such admission relates to the same crime for which he was
previously convicted and for which he obtained a pardon.  Matter
of E-V-, 5 I&N Dec. 194 (BIA 1953).
(3) Even in a case involving a foreign conviction (rather than an
admission of commission of a CIMT or acts constituting the
essential elements of a CIMT), the Board has held that an
adjudication of juvenile delinquency is not a conviction for a crime
in the U.S. and one so convicted may not be excludable unless it is
determined that the applicant was not dealt with as a juvenile by
the foreign court.  Matter of Ramirez-Rivero, 18 I&N Dec. 135
(BIA 1981); Matter of De La Nues, 18 I&N Dec. 140 (BIA 1981). 
Therefore, in determining inadmissibility as an alien who admits
the commission of a CIMT or the commission of acts constituting
the essential elements of a CIMT, the age of the applicant at the
time he committed the acts should be considered.
h. In an exclusion proceeding where there was reason to believe, by the
applicant’s own admissions or otherwise, that there has been a
conviction (not merely an admission of commission of a crime or
admission of acts constituting the essential elements of a crime) and that
the underlying crime involved moral turpitude, the burden was on the
applicant for admission to establish that he was not inadmissible.  Matter
of Doural, 18 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 1981), modified on other grounds,
Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682 (BIA 1988); Matter of B-, 3 I&N
Dec. 1 (BIA 1947).  A finding of excludability in such a case need not be
supported by a record of conviction; Matter of Doural, 18 I&N Dec. at
37.   [A similar finding in a deportation (now removal) proceeding where
the Service bears the burden to establish both the conviction and that it is
for a CIMT might not be appropriate.  See e.g., Matter of B-,3 I&N Dec.
1 (BIA 1947).]
4. Convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.  If the statute of conviction
contains some offenses which involve moral turpitude and other which do not,
the IJ examines select conviction documents to determine whether they
unequivocally establish the respondent was convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude.  Matter of Ajami, 22 I&N Dec. 949 (BIA 1999); Matter of
Short, 20 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1989).
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5. Purely political offense exception.  In order for an offense to qualify for the
“purely political offense” exception to the ground of inadmissibility under
INA section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), based on an alien’s conviction for a CIMT, the
offense must be completely or totally “political.”  Matter of O’Cealleagh, 23
I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 2006).
6. Petty offense exception
a. Section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act provides that section
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one
crime if:
(1) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age
and the crime was committed (and the alien released from any
confinement) more than 5 years before both the visa application
and the application for admission [INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I)]; or
(2) the maximum penalty possible for the crime did not exceed
imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such
crime, the alien was not sentenced to 6 months or more (regardless
of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed) [INA
§ 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II)].
(a) The maximum sentence possible for an offense, not the
standard sentence under sentencing guidelines, determines
the alien’s eligibility for this exception. Matter of Ruiz-
Lopez, 25 I&N Dec. 551 (BIA 2011).
b. An alien who has committed more than one petty offense is not
ineligible for the “petty offense” exception if only one crime is a CIMT. 
Matter of Garcia-Hernandez, 23 I&N Dec. 590 (BIA 2003).
C. Controlled substance offenses
1. Section 212 (a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Act provides that any alien convicted of, or
who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of, a
violation of or a conspiracy to violate any law or regulation of a State, the
U.S., or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance as defined in
section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 802) is
inadmissible.
2. History Lesson- Before 1990, excludability for a drug offense was covered in
part of section 212(a)(23) of the Act.  In 1990, the Act was reorganized and
that subject came under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).  In 1996, it stayed under
that section number.  Many cases on this subject from before 1990 involve
former section 212(a)(23) as the ground of inadmissibility.
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3. The concept of admitting the commission of a violation or of admitting the
commission of acts which constitute the essential elements of a violation was
not contained in former section 212(a)(23).  It was added by the Immigration
Act of 1990.
4. Drug Paraphernalia - An alien may be rendered inadmissible under section
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) on the basis of a conviction for possession or use of drug
paraphernalia because such possession or use is related to a controlled
substance.  Matter of Martinez-Espinoza, 25 I&N Dec. 118 (BIA 2009). See
also Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911, 915 (9th Cir. 2000), Bermudez v. Holder,
586 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2009).  An alien who is inadmissible based on a drug
paraphernalia offense may qualify for a waiver of inadmissibility under
section 212(h) if the offense “relates to a single offense of simple possession
of 30 grams or less of marijuana.”  Martinez-Espinoza, 25 I&N Dec. at 123-
26. 
 
D. Multiple criminal convictions
1. Section 212(a)(2)(B) of the Act provides that any alien convicted of 2 or more
offenses (other than purely political offenses), regardless of whether the
conviction was in a single trial or whether the offenses arose from a single
scheme of misconduct and regardless of whether the offenses involved moral
turpitude, for which the aggregate sentences to confinement actually imposed
were 5 years or more is inadmissible.
2. HISTORY LESSON - Before 1990, excludability for 2 or more offenses was
covered in section 212(a)(10) of the Act.  In 1990, the Act was reorganized
and that subject came under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  In 1996, it stayed
under that section number.  Cases on this subject from before 1990 involve
section 212(a)(10) as the ground of inadmissibility.
3. Under former section 212(a)(10) of the Act, a sentence was “actually
imposed” if a criminal court suspended the execution of a sentence, but no
sentence was “actually imposed” where the imposition of sentence was
suspended.  Matter of Esposito, 21 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1995).  However, section
101(a)(48)(B), which was added to the Act by the IIRIRA, now provides “Any
reference to a term of imprisonment of a sentence with respect to an offense is
deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a
court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of
that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.”  Thus, the relevant inquiry
is the term to which the alien was sentenced by the trial court, regardless
whether the imposition or execution of the sentence was suspended.  Matter of
S-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 900 (BIA 1997).
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4. In interpreting former section 212(a)(10), the Board held that if an alien has
been convicted of 2 counts of an offense and sentenced to serve 2 concurrent
3-year terms, the aggregate sentence is only 3 years.  Matter of Fernandez, 14
I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 1972).  Apparently the alien must be sentenced to
consecutive terms in order for the terms to be combined in determining an
aggregate sentence.  This appears to still be good law because Fernandez was
cited with approval in Matter of Aldabesheh, 22 I&N Dec. 983 (BIA 1999),
which dealt with the “aggregate sentence” of an alien convicted of two or
more aggravated felonies and sentenced to concurrent sentences of
imprisonment.  Because the aggregate sentence was less than 5 years, the
respondent was eligible for withholding of removal.
E. Trafficking in controlled substances
 
1. Section 212(a)(2)(C) provides that any alien who the consular or immigration
officer knows or has reason to believe is or has been an illicit trafficker in any
controlled substance or has been a knowing assister, abettor, conspirator, or
colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in controlled substances is
inadmissible.
2. HISTORY LESSON - Before 1990, excludability for being a drug trafficker
was covered in part of section 212(a)(23) of the Act.  In 1990, the Act was
reorganized and being a drug trafficker came under section 212(a)(2)(C).  In
1996, it stayed under that section number.  Many cases on this subject from
before 1990 involve former section 212(a)(23) as the ground of
inadmissibility.
3. The statute does not require a conviction to establish inadmissibility under this
section.  Matter of Rico, 16 I&N Dec. 181, 184 (BIA 1977).
a. The Eleventh Circuit held that an alien’s vacated guilty plea along with
hearsay statements in police reports did not amount to reason to believe
that alien trafficked in controlled substances and, therefore, the alien was
not removable under section 212(a)(2)(C).  Garces v. Att’y Gen.,  611
F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2010).  
4. In cases involving former section 212(a)(23), the Board held that a single act
will constitute a “trafficking” and it is not necessary to show a pattern or
continuous trade in drugs.  Matter of Favela, 16 I&N Dec. 753 (BIA 1979);
Matter of Rico, 16 I&N Dec. 181 (BIA 1977); Matter of P-, 5 I&N Dec. 190
(BIA 1953).  However, Matter of Rico and Matter of Favela do imply that it is
necessary to show an act of more than simple possession such as sale of drugs
or possession of such a large quantity of drugs that it could not be intended for
personal use.
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5. An alien who knowingly and consciously acts as a conduit in the transfer of
marijuana between a dealer and the customers of the dealer was excludable
under former section 212(a)(23) as an "illicit trafficker" in drugs, even though
he derived no personal gain or profit from the transaction.  Matter of R-H-, 7
I&N Dec. 675 (BIA 1958) (finding illicit trafficking where the alien on 3
occasions held marijuana cigarettes for a dealer and distributed them to
customers who either had already paid the dealer in advance or left payment
with the alien for later collection by the dealer).
6. Applicants who, at the time of arrival, were in possession of 6 marijuana
cigarettes for personal use were not excludable under former section
212(a)(23) of the Act because there had been no conviction for possession of
marijuana and their possession of a small quantity for personal use did not
constitute “trafficking.”  Matter of McDonald and Brewster, 15 I&N Dec. 203
(BIA 1975).
F. Prostitution
1. Section 212(a)(2)(D)(i) of the Act provides that any alien coming to the U.S.
solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in prostitution or who has
engaged in prostitution within 10 years of the application for a visa,
admission, or adjustment of status is inadmissible.
G. Procurers & importers of prostitutes
1. Section 212(a)(2)(D)(ii) of the Act provides that the following aliens are
inadmissible: Those who directly or indirectly procure or attempt to procure
prostitutes or persons for the purpose of prostitution, or who receive, in whole
or in part, the proceeds of prostitution.
a. The Board has ruled that a conviction under California Penal Code
§ 647(b) does not render an alien inadmissible under
section 212(a)(2)(D)(ii) for “procur[ing] . . . prostitutes or persons for
the purpose of prostitution.”  Matter of Gonzalez-Zoquiapan, 24 I&N
Dec. 549 (BIA 2008). The California statute punishes anyone “[w]ho
solicits or who agrees to engage in or who engages in any act of
prostitution,” and it states that “‘prostitution’ includes any lewd act
between persons for money or other consideration.”  Id. at 551. The
Board ruled that “the term ‘procure’ [in INA section 212(a)(2)(D)(ii)]
does not extend to an act of solicitation of a prostitute on one’s own
behalf.” Id. at 551-52. The Board further ruled that, even if INA
section 212(a)(2)(D)(ii) encompasses soliciting a prostitute on one’s own
behalf, California Penal Code section 647(b) still falls outside that
statute. Id. at 553. For this holding, the Board cited to 22 C.F.R.
§ 40.24(b), which states that, for purposes of INA section
212(a)(2)(D)(ii), “‘prostitution’ means engaging in promiscuous sexual
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intercourse for hire.  A finding that an alien has ‘engaged’ in prostitution
must be based on elements of continuity and regularity.”  Id. The Board
explained that the California statute is broader than INA section
212(a)(2)(D)(ii) because: (1) it covers “lewd act[s]” rather than simply
“sexual intercourse;” and (2) it does not require “a pattern of behavior or
deliberate course of conduct.” Id.
2. Those who have within 10 years of the application for a visa, admission, or
adjustment of status procured, attempted to procure, or to import prostitutes or
persons for the purpose of prostitution.
3. Those who receive or have received within 10 years of the application for a
visa, admission, or adjustment of status, in whole or in part, the proceeds of
prostitution. 
H. Commercialized vice
1. Section 212(a)(2)(D)(iii) of the Act provides that any alien coming to the U.S.
to engage in any other unlawful commercialized vice, whether or not related to
prostitution is inadmissible.
I. Aliens who asserted immunity from prosecution - Section 212(a)(2)(E)
1. Any alien is inadmissible who
a. has committed in the U.S. at any time a serious criminal offense as
defined in section 101(h) of the Act and
b. for whom immunity from criminal jurisdiction was exercised with
respect to that offense, and
c. who departed from the U.S. as a consequence of the offense and the
exercise of immunity, and
d. who has not subsequently submitted fully to the jurisdiction of the court
in the U.S. which has jurisdiction with respect to the offense.
2. The term “serious criminal offense”, defined in section 101(h) of the Act
means:
a. Any felony;
b. Any crime of violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16;
(1) 18 U.S.C. §  16 defines a "crime of violence" as:
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(a) An offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.
c. Any crime of reckless driving or driving while intoxicated or under the
influence of prohibited substances if the crime involves personal injury
to another.
3. A waiver is available at section 212(h) of the Act.
J. Espionage or sabotage
1. Section 212(a)(3)(A)(i) of the Act provides that any alien is inadmissible who
a consular officer or the Attorney General knows, or has reasonable ground to
believe, seeks to engage solely, principally or incidentally in:
a. any activity to violate any law of the U.S. relating to espionage or
sabotage, or
b. to violate or evade any law prohibiting the export from the U.S. of
goods, technology, or sensitive information.
2. Former section 241(a)(4)(A)(i) of the Act, which provided for the
deportability of any alien who after entry has engaged in “any activity to
violate any law of the United States relating to espionage,” does not require
evidence that the alien was either engaged in an act of espionage or was
convicted of violating a law relating to espionage.  Matter of Luis, 22 I&N
Dec. 747 (BIA 1999).
3. An alien who has knowledge of, or has received instruction in, the espionage
or counter-espionage service or tactics of a foreign government in violation of
50 U.S.C. § 851 (1994), is deportable under former section 241(a)(4)(A)(i) of
the Act.  Matter of Luis, 22 I&N Dec. 747 (BIA 1999).
K. Any unlawful activity
1. Section 212(a)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act provides that any alien who a consular
officer or the Attorney General knows, or has reasonable ground to believe,
seeks to engage solely, principally or incidentally in any unlawful activity is
inadmissible.
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L. Overthrow of the Government of the U.S.
1. Section 212(a)(3)(A)(iii) of the Act provides that any alien who a consular
officer or the Attorney General knows, or has reasonable ground to believe,
seeks to engage solely, principally or incidentally in any activity a purpose of
which is the opposition to, or overthrow of the Government of the U.S. by
force, violence, or other unlawful means is inadmissible.
M. Terrorist activities
1. The statutory language of section 212(a)(3)(B) does not allow a “totality of the
circumstances” test to be employed in determining whether an organization is
engaged in a terrorist activity, so factors such as an organization’s purposes or
goals and the nature of the regime that the organization opposes may not be
considered.  Matter of S-K-, 23 I&N Dec. 936 (BIA 2006).  The definition of
“terrorist activity” under the INA does not provide an exception for armed
resistance against military targets that is permitted under the international law
of armed conflict.  Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2009).  Section
212(a)(3)(B)(i) of the Act [amended by the REAL ID Act of 2005] provides
that any alien is inadmissible who:
a. has engaged in a terrorist activity [INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(I)];
b. a consular officer or the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland
Security knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, is engaged in or
likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity [INA §
212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II)];
c. has, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or
serious bodily harm, incited terrorist activity [INA §
212(a)(3)(B)(i)(III)];
d. is a representative of a terrorist organization or a political, social or other
group that endorses or espouses terrorist activity [INA §
212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)];
e. is a member of a terrorist organization (unless the alien can
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know and
should not reasonably have known that the organization was a terrorist
organization) [INA §§ 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(V) & (VI)];
f. endorses or espouses a terrorist activity or persecutes others to endorse
or espouse a terrorist activity or support a terrorist organization [INA §
212(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII)];
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g. has received military-type training (as defined in 18 USC § 2339D(c)(1))
from or on behalf of any organization that, at the time the training was
received, was a terrorist organization [INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(VIII)]; or
h. is the spouse or child of an alien found inadmissible under this
subparagraph, if the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible
occurred within the last 5 years [INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IX)].
2. The term “terrorist activity” is defined in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) of the Act
as any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is
committed (or which, if committed in the U.S., would be unlawful under the
laws of the U.S. or any State) and which involves any of the following:
a. The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft,
vessel, or vehicle) [INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)];
b. The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to
detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a
governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an
explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or
detained [INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II)];
c. A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in
18 U.S.C. §  1116(b)(4)) or upon the liberty of such a person [INA §
212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(III)];
d. An assassination [INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(IV)];
e. The use of any (a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon
or device, or (b) explosive or firearm (other than for mere personal
monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety
of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property
[INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)];
f. A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing [INA
§ 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(VI)].
3. The term “engage in terrorist activity” is defined in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv) of
the Act and means, in an individual capacity or as a member of an
organization
a. to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an
intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity [INA
§ 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I)];
b. to prepare or plan a terrorist activity [INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(II)];
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c. to gather information on potential targets for a terrorist activity [INA §
212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(III)];
d. to solicit funds or other things of value for a terrorist activity or a
terrorist organization (unless the solicitor can demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that he did not know and should not reasonable
have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization) [INA §
212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)];
e. to solicit any individual to engage in conduct otherwise described in this
subsection, for membership in a terrorist organization (unless the
solicitor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did
not know and should not reasonable have known, that the organization
was a terrorist organization) [INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(V)];
f. to commit an act that the actor knows or reasonable should know,
affords material support, including a safe house, transportation,
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial
benefit, false documentation or identifications, weapons (including
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives or training for
(1) the commission of a terrorist activity, (2) to any individual who the
actors knows or reasonably should know has committed or plans to
commit a terrorist activity, or (3) to a terrorist organization (unless the
actor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not
know and should not reasonable have known, that the organization was a
terrorist organization) [INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)].  Neither an alien’s
intent in making a donation to a terrorist organization nor the intended
use of the donation by the recipient is considered in assessing whether
the alien provided “material support” to a terrorist organization under
section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)VI).  Matter of S-K-, 23 I&N Dec. 936 (BIA
2006).
(1) Effective February 20, 2007, the Secretary of Homeland Security
made a determination pursuant to his discretionary authority under
section 212(d)(3)(B)(I) that section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) shall not
apply with respect to material support provided to the Chin
National Front/Chin National Army of Burma by an alien who
satisfactorily demonstrates that he or she: (a) is seeking a benefit or
protection under the Act and has been determined to be otherwise
eligible for the benefit or protection; (b) has undergone and passed
relevant background and security checks; (c) has fully disclosed, in
all relevant applications and interviews with U.S. Government
representatives and agents, the nature and circumstances of each
provision of such material support; and (d) poses no danger to the
safety and security of the U.S.  Notice of Determination, 72 Fed.
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Reg. 9957-01 (Mar. 6, 2007).  Subsequently, the Attorney General
remanded Matter of S-K- to the Board for consideration of the
effect of the Secretary’s determination.  Matter of S-K-, 24 I&N
Dec. 289 (A.G. 2007).  The Board determined that the Secretary’s
determination made the respondent eligible for asylum, and granted
relief.  Matter of S-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 475 (BIA 2008).  The
Attorney General’s remand does not affect the precedential nature
of the Board’s conclusions in the first Matter of S-K-.  Id.  
(2) Also in 2007, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security exercised his authority to waive the material support
inadmissibility bar for certain aliens if the material support was
provided under duress to an undesignated terrorist organization and
the totality of the circumstances justified the favorable exercise of
discretion.  Notice of Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 9958-01 (Mar.
6, 2007). Shortly after the first exercise of discretion, the Secretary
authorized the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”) to consider the duress exemption in cases involving
material support for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(“FARC”) and the National Liberation Army of Colombia
(“ELN”). See “Processing the Discretionary Exemption to the
Inadmissibility Ground for Providing Material Support to the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)” (September 6,
2007), USCIS; “Authorization to Process Cases Involving the
Provision of Material Support to the ELN” (December 18, 2007),
Department of Homeland Security Authorization Document.  In
addition, section 691(b) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act
(“CAA”) of 2008 named certain groups that were not to be
considered terrorist organizations based on activities prior to the
CAA’s enactment on December 26, 2007. Pub. L. 110-161, 121
Stat. 1844.  Subsequently, the Secretary exercised his authority to
state that most of the terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds
would not apply with respect to the 10 groups named in section
691(b) of the CAA, if certain conditions were met.
(3) On October 23, 2008, following interagency meetings, the
Department of Homeland Security issued a Fact Sheet announcing
its procedure for handling cases that may be considered for an
exemption afforded by section 212(d)(3)(B), in which there is an
administratively final order of removal.  Fact Sheet, Department of
Homeland Security Implements Exemption Authority for Certain
Terrorist-Related Inadmissibility Grounds for Cases with
Administratively Final Orders of Removal (Oct. 23, 2008). 
Previously, USCIS had been adjudicating the available exemptions
for cases not in removal proceedings. Under the new procedures,
certain cases involving aliens in removal proceedings can be
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referred to USCIS, if the respondent was found ineligible for relief
or a benefit solely because of a terrorism bar for which the
Secretary has exercised his exemption authority.  If USCIS grants
the exemption, the case can be reopened and relief granted.
4. The term “representative” is defined at section 212(a)(3)(B)(v) of the Act as
an officer, official, or spokesman of an organization and any person who
directs, counsels, commands or induces an organization or its members to
engage in terrorist activity.
5. The term “terrorist organization” is defined at section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi) of the
Act as an organization
a. designated under section 219 of the Act;
b. otherwise designated, upon publication in the Federal Register, by the
Secretary of State in consultation with or upon the request of the
Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, as a terrorist
organization, after finding the organization engages in terrorist activity
[INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II)];
c. that is a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not,
which engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in, terrorist activity
[INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III)].
N. Adverse effects on foreign policy
1. Section 212(a)(3)(C)(i) of the Act provides that any alien whose entry or
proposed activities in the U.S. the Secretary of State has reasonable ground to
believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences
for the U.S. is inadmissible.
2. Exception for officials.  Section 212(a)(3)(C)(ii) of the Act provides that an
alien who is an official of a foreign government or a purported government, or
who is a candidate for election to a foreign government office during the
period immediately preceding the election for that office, shall not be
excludable or subject to restrictions or conditions on entry into the U.S. solely
because of the alien’s past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or
associations, if such beliefs, statements, or associations would be lawful
within the U.S.
3. Exception for other aliens.  Section 212(a)(3)(C)(iii) of the Act provides that
an alien, other than an official described above, shall not be excludable or
subject to restrictions or conditions on entry into the U.S. because of the
alien’s past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations, if such
beliefs, statements, or associations would be lawful within the U.S., unless the
page 36 of 365
Secretary of State personally determines that the alien’s admission would
compromise a compelling U.S. foreign policy interest.
O. Communist or totalitarian party membership
1. Section 212(a)(3)(D)(i) of the Act provides that any immigrant who is or has
been a member of or affiliated with  the Communist Party or any other
totalitarian party, or subdivision or affiliate thereof, whether foreign or
domestic is inadmissible.
2. Since section 212(a)(3)(D)(i) applies only to immigrants, aliens seeking
admission as nonimmigrants are not rendered inadmissible by party
membership.
3. Exception for involuntary membership.  Section 212(a)(3)(D)(ii) of the Act
provides that section 212(a)(3)(D)(i) shall not apply to an alien because of
membership or affiliation if the alien establishes to the satisfaction of the
consular officer when applying for a visa (or to the satisfaction of the Attorney
General when applying for admission) that 
a. the membership or affiliation is or was involuntary, or
b. is or was solely when under 16 years of age, by operation of law, or for
purposes of obtaining employment, food rations, or other essentials of
living and whether necessary for such purposes.
4. Exception for past membership.  Section 212(a)(3)(D)(iii) of the Act provides
that section 212(a)(3)(D)(i) shall not apply to an alien because of membership
or affiliation if the alien establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer
when applying for a visa (or to the satisfaction of the Attorney General when
applying for admission) that the membership or affiliation terminated
a. at least 2 years before the date of such application, or
b. 5 years before the date of such application, in the case of an alien whose
membership or affiliation was with the party controlling the government
of a foreign state that is a totalitarian dictatorship as of such date, and
c. the alien is not a threat to the security of the U.S.
5. Exception for certain close family members.
a. Although the statute refers to this as an “exception”, it is actually a
waiver since it involves the exercise of discretion.
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b. Section 212(a)(3)(D)(iv) of the Act provides that the Attorney General
may, in the Attorney General’s discretion, waive the application of
section 212(a)(3)(D)(i) in the case of an immigrant who is the parent,
spouse, son, daughter, brother, or sister of a citizen of the U.S. or a
spouse, son, or daughter of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is
otherwise in the public interest if the immigrant is not a threat to the
security of the U.S.
P. Nazi persecution
1. Section 212(a)(3)(E)(i) of the Act provides that any alien who participated in
the persecution of others in connection with the Nazi government of Germany
from 1933 to 1945 is inadmissible.
Q. Genocide or Acts of Torture or Extrajudicial Killing
1. Section 212(a)(3)(E)(ii) of the Act provides that any alien who has engaged in
genocide is inadmissible.  Section 212(a)(3)(E)(iii) of the Act provides that
any alien who has committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the commission of torture or extrajudicial killing is
inadmissible.
R. Public Charge
1. Section 212(a)(4) of the Act provides that any alien who in the opinion of the
consular officer at the time of application for a visa or the Attorney General at
the time of application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely to
become a public charge is inadmissible.
2. Factors to be taken into account.
a. Section 212(a)(4)(B)(i) of the Act provides that in determining
admissibility, the consular officer or Attorney General shall at a
minimum consider the alien’s 
(1) age;
(2) health;
(3) family status;
(4) assets, resources, and financial status; and
(5) education and skills.
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b. Section 212(a)(4)(B)(ii) of the Act provides that, in addition to the
factors listed above, the consular officer or Attorney General may also
consider any affidavit of support under section 213A.
3. Section 212(a)(4)(C) of the Act provides that any alien who seeks admission
or adjustment of status under a visa number issued under section 201(b)(2) or
203(a) is inadmissible under section 212(4) unless the alien has obtained
status as a spouse or child of a U.S. citizen pursuant to clause (ii), (iii), or (iv)
of section 204(a)(1)(A), or classification pursuant to clause (ii) or (iii) of
section 204(a)(1)(B), or the person petitioning for the alien’s admission
(including any additional sponsor required under section 213A(f)) has
executed an affidavit of support described in section 213A with respect to
such alien.
4. Section 212(a)(4)(D) provides that any alien who seeks admission or
adjustment of status under a visa number issued under section 203(b) by virtue
of a classification petition filed by a relative of the alien (or by an entity in
which such relative has a significant ownership interest) is inadmissible unless
such relative has executed an affidavit of support described in section 213A
with respect to such alien.
S. No labor certification
1. Section 212(a)(5)(A) of the Act provides that any alien seeking to enter the
U.S. to perform labor who has no labor certification is inadmissible.
T. Foreign medical graduates
1. Section 212(a)(5)(B) of the Act provides that certain foreign medical
graduates who have not passed the NBME exam and who are not competent in
oral and written English are inadmissible.
U. Uncertified foreign health-care workers
1. Section 212(a)(5)(C) of the Act provides that any alien is inadmissible who
seeks to enter the U.S. as a health-care worker, other than a physician, who
does not present to the consular officer, or Attorney General if seeking
adjustment of status, a certificate from the Commission on Graduates of
Foreign Nursing Schools or its equivalent.
V. Illegal entrants and immigration violators
1. Not admitted or paroled.  Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act provides that an
alien present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in
the U.S. at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General
is inadmissible.
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a. Exception for certain battered women and children.  Section
212(a)(6)(A)(ii) of the Act provides that section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) shall not
apply to an alien who demonstrates that:
(1) the alien qualifies for immigrant status under sections
204(a)(1)(A)(iii), (A)(iv), (B)(ii), or (B)(iii) [VAWA self-
petitioner] and
(2) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a
spouse or parent, or by a member of the spouse’s or parent's family
residing in the same household as the alien and the spouse or
parent consented or acquiesced to such battery or cruelty, or
(3) the alien’s child has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty
by a spouse or parent of the alien (without the active participation
of the alien in the battery or cruelty) or by a member of the
spouse’s or parent’s family residing in the same household as the
alien when the spouse or parent consented to or acquiesced in such
battery or cruelty and the alien did not actively participate in such
battery or cruelty and
(4) there was a substantial connection between the battery or cruelty
and the alien’s unlawful entry into the U.S.
2. Failure to attend hearing.  Section 212(a)(6)(B) of the Act provides that any
alien who without reasonable cause fails or refuses to attend or remain in
attendance at a proceeding to determine the alien’s inadmissibility or
deportability and who seeks admission to the U.S. within 5 years of such
alien’s subsequent departure or removal is inadmissible.
3. Misrepresentation
a. Fraud or misrepresentation of a material fact.  Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of
the Act provides that any alien who seeks to procure, has sought to
procure, or has procured a visa, other documentation, entry into the U.S.,
or other benefit under the Act by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a
material fact is inadmissible.
(1) A waiver for this ground of inadmissibility is available under
section 212(i).
(2) A concealment or misrepresentation is material if it had the natural
tendency to influence the adjudicator.  Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N
Dec. 445, 450 (BIA 2011) (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485
U.S. 759, 772 (1988)).  It is not necessary to establish that the
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misrepresentation actually influenced the adjudicator or that but for
the misrepresentation, the alien would have been denied the benefit
he sought.  Id.
b. False claim to U.S. citizenship.  Section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) provides that
any alien who falsely represents or has falsely represented himself or
herself to be a citizen of the U.S. for any purpose or benefit under the
Act or any other Federal or State law is inadmissible. Aliens who
reasonably believed that they were citizens may be excepted under
section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(II).
(1) A waiver for this ground of inadmissibility is available under
section 212(i). INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(iii).
(2) An alien who willfully and knowingly makes a false
misrepresentation of birth in the United States on a passport
application has falsely represented herself to be a U.S. citizen.
Matter of Barcenas, 25 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2009).
4. Stowaways.  Section 212(a)(6)(D) of the Act provides that any alien who is a
stowaway is inadmissible.  The term is defined at section 101(a)(49) of the
Act.
5. Alien smugglers.  Section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) of the Act provides that any alien
who at any time knowingly has encouraged, assisted, abetted, or aided, any
other alien to enter or try to enter the U.S. in violation of law is inadmissible.
a. Section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) shall not apply in the case of an alien who is an
eligible immigrant as defined in section 301(b)(1) of the Immigration
Act of 1990, was physically present in the U.S. on May 5, 1988, and is
seeking admission as an immediate relative or under section 203(a)(2)
(including under section 112 of the Immigration Act of 1990) or benefits
under section 301(a) of the immigration Act of 1990 if the alien, before
May 5, 1988, has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only
the alien’s spouse, parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual) to
enter the U.S. in violation of law.  INA § 212(a)(6)(E)(ii).
(1) Section 301(b)(1) of the Immigration Act of 1990 defines the term
“eligible immigrant” as a qualified immigrant who is the spouse or
unmarried child of a legalized alien.
b. A waiver of inadmissiblity may also be available under section
212(d)(11).  INA § 212(a)(6)(E)(iii).
6. Violators of section 274C.  Section 212(a)(6)(F) of the Act provides that any
alien who is the subject of a final order for violation of section 274C of the
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Act is inadmissible.  Section 274C provides for a hearing before an
administrative law judge, civil fines of between $250 and $2,000 for each
document, and makes unlawful the following: to forge, attempt to use,
possess, obtain, or falsely make any document for the purpose of satisfying a
requirement of the Act; to use, attempt to use, possess, obtain, accept, or
receive or to provide any forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely made
document in order to satisfy any requirement of the Act; to use or attempt to
use or to provide or attempt to provide any document lawfully issued to a
person other than the possessor for the purpose of satisfying a requirement of
the Act; to accept or receive or to provide any document lawfully issued to a
person other than the possessor for the purpose of complying with section
274A(b).
a. A waiver may be available under section 212(d)(12).  INA §
212(a)(6)(F)(ii).
7. Student visa abusers.  Section 212(a)(6)(G) provides that an alien who obtains
the status of a nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(F)(i) and who violates a
term or condition of such status under section 214(l) is inadmissible until the
alien has been outside the U.S. for a continuous period of 5 years after the date
of the violation. This section should likely refer to current section 214(m)
rather than section 214(l) as section 214(m) refers to foreign students. See
Pub. L. 106-386, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,
§ 107(e)(2)(a).
W. Not in possession of valid, unexpired documents
1.  Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i) of the Act provides that any immigrant who, at the
time of the application for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired
immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry
document required by the Act and a valid unexpired passport or other suitable
travel document or document of identity and nationality if required by the
regulations under section 211(a), or whose visa has been issued without
compliance with the provisions of section 203 (the preferences by which
immigrant visas are issued) is inadmissible.
2. A waiver may be available under section 212(k).  INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(ii).
X. Not in possession of valid entry documents, such as visa
1. Section 212(a)(7)(B)(i)(I)  provides that any nonimmigrant who is not in
possession of a passport valid for a minimum of 6 months from the date of the
expiration of the initial period of the alien’s admission or contemplated initial
period of stay authorizing the alien to return to the country from which the
alien came or to proceed to and enter some other country during such period is
inadmissible.
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2. Section 212(a)(7)(B)(i)(II) provides that any nonimmigrant not in possession
of a valid nonimmigrant visa or a border crossing identification card is
inadmissible.
3. Waivers available
a. A waiver of both of the above is available under section 212(d)(4) of the
Act. INA § 212(a)(7)(B)(ii).
b. A waiver for certain nonimmigrant visitors to Guam is also available
under section 212(l) of the Act. INA § 212(a)(7)(B)(iii).
c. A general waiver is also available under the Visa Waiver Pilot Program
discussed in section 217 of the Act. INA § 212(a)(7)(B)(iv).
Y. Immigrants who are permanently ineligible for citizenship - Section 212(a)(8)(A)
1. The term “ineligible to citizenship” is defined at section 101(a)(19) of the Act
and refers to persons who have requested exemption from military service on
account of alienage.
2. The phrase “ineligible to citizenship” in section 212(a)(8)(A) of the Act refers
only to those aliens who are barred from naturalization by virtue of their
evasion of military service. Matter of Kanga, 22 I&N Dec. 1206 (BIA 2000). 
Therefore, an alien convicted of an aggravated felony is not thereby rendered
inadmissible under section 212(a)(8)(A) of the Act as an alien who is
permanently “ineligible to citizenship.” Id.
3. Note that section 212(a)(8)(A) is applicable only to aliens seeking to enter the
U.S. as an immigrant.  It does not apply to nonimmigrants.
Z. Draft evaders
1. Section 212(a)(8)(B) provides that any person who has departed from or
remained outside the U.S. to avoid or evade training or service in the armed
forces in time of war or national emergency is inadmissible.
2. This section states that it is not applicable to aliens who were nonimmigrants
when they departed the U.S. and who are seeking admission as
nonimmigrants.
AA. Aliens previously removed or unlawfully present
1. Section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) provides that any alien who has been ordered removed
under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240
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initiated upon the alien’s arrival in the U.S. who again seeks admission within
5 years of the date of removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or
subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an
aggravated felony) is inadmissible unless the Attorney General has consented
to the alien’s applying for readmission under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii).
2. Section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) provides that any alien not described in section
212(a)(9)(A)(i) who has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other
provision of law or departed the U.S. while an order of removal was
outstanding and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such
alien’s departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a
second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted
of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.
a. Exception.  Section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) provides that section 212(a)(9)(A)
shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to
the date of the alien’s reembarkation at a place outside the U.S. or
attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney
General has consented to the alien’s reapplying for admission.
3. Section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) provides that any alien (other than an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence) who was unlawfully present in the U.S. for
a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the
U.S. (whether or not pursuant to section 244(e)) prior to the commencement of
proceedings under section 235(b)(1) or 240, and again seeks admission within
3 years of the date of such departure or removal is inadmissible.  
4. Section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act provides that any alien (other than a
LPR) who has been unlawfully present in the U.S. for one year or more and
who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien’s
departure or removal from the U.S. is inadmissible.  To be rendered
inadmissible for 10 years pursuant to this provision, an alien must depart the
United States after having been unlawfully present in the United States for one
year or longer.  Matter of Rodarte, 23 I&N Dec. 905 (BIA 2006).  Pursuant to
IIRIRA, no period of an alien’s presence in the United States prior to April 1,
1997, may be considered “unlawful presence” for the purposes of determining
an alien’s inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act.
a. The Board has ruled that when an alien is unlawfully present for at least
1 year, then leaves the U.S. and, subsequently, seeks admission within
10 years after the departure, the alien is inadmissible under section
212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) even if the alien’s departure was not made pursuant to
an order of removal or grant of voluntary departure.  Matter of Lemus-
Losa, 24 I&N Dec. 373 (BIA 2007).
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5. “Unlawful presence” defined.  An alien is deemed to be unlawfully present in
the U.S. if the alien is present in the U.S. after the expiration of the period of
stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in the U.S. without being
admitted or paroled.  INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(ii).
a. Note: Periods of unlawful presence have been interpreted to begin on or
after April 1, 1997.  Dep’t of State Cable (no. 98-State-060539) (April 4,
1998), reprinted in 75 Interpreter Releases 543 (April 20, 1998).
b. Exceptions
(1) Minors.  No period of time in which an alien is under 18 shall be
taken into account. INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(iii)(I).
(2) Asylees.  No period of time in which an alien has a bona fide
application for asylum pending shall be taken into account unless
during such period the alien was employed without authorization in
the U.S. INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(iii)(II).
(3) Family unity.  No period of time in which the alien is a beneficiary
of family unity protection pursuant to section 301 of the
Immigration Act of 1990 shall be taken into account.  INA §
212(a)(9)(B)(iii)(III).
(4) Battered women and children.  Section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) of the Act
shall not apply to an alien who demonstrates that the alien qualifies
for immigrant status under section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii),(A)(iv),(B)(ii),
or (B)(iii) and the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme
cruelty by a spouse or parent, or by a member of the spouse’s or
parent’s family residing in the same household as the alien and the
spouse or parent consented or acquiesced to such battery or cruelty,
or the alien’s child has been battered or subjected to extreme
cruelty by a spouse or parent of the alien (without the active
participation of the alien in the battery or cruelty) or by a member
of the spouse’s or parent’s family residing in the same household
as the alien when the spouse or parent consented to or acquiesced
in such battery or cruelty and the alien did not actively participate
in such battery or cruelty and there was a substantial connection
between the battery or cruelty and the alien’s violation of the terms
of the alien’s nonimmigrant visa.  INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(iii)(IV).
(5) Victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons. Section
212(a)(9)(B)(i) of the Act shall not apply to an alien who
demonstrates that the severe form of trafficking (as that term is
defined in section 103 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of
2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102)) was at least one central reason for the
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alien’s unlawful presence in the United States. INA §
212(a)(9)(B)(iii)(V).
c. Tolling for good cause.  If an alien has been lawfully admitted or paroled
into the U.S., has filed, a nonfrivolous application for a change or
extension of status before the date of expiration of the period of stay
authorized by the Attorney General, and has not been employed without
authorization in the U.S. before or during the pendency of such
application, the calculation of the period of time unlawfully present in
the U.S. shall be tolled during the pendency of such application, but not
to exceed 120 days.  INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(iv).
d. Waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v).  The Attorney General has sole
discretion to waive section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) in the case of an immigrant
who is the spouse or son or daughter of a U.S. citizen or of a LPR if it is
established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of
admission to such immigrant would result in extreme hardship to the
citizen or LPR spouse or parent of such alien.
6. Section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act provides that any alien who (I) has been
unlawfully present in the U.S. for an aggregate period of more than 1 year or
(II) has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1), section 240, or any
other provision of the law, is inadmissible.
a. Exception.  Section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act shall not apply to an alien
seeking admission more than 10 years after the date of the alien’s last
departure from the U.S. if, prior to the alien’s reembarkation at a place
outside the U.S. or attempt to be readmitted from a foreign contiguous
territory, the Attorney General has consented to the alien’s reapplying for
admission.  INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(ii).  However, an alien who reenters the
United States without admission after having previously been removed is
inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II), even if the alien obtained
the Attorney General’s permission to reapply for admission prior to
reentering lawfully.  Matter of Torres-Garcia, 23 I&N Dec. 866 (BIA
2006); see Gonzalez-Balderas v. Holder, 597 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2010)
(upholding Matter of Torres-Garcia).
(1) In Sarango v. Att’y Gen., 651 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third
Circuit held that IJs lack jurisdiction to consider requests for
consent to reapply for admission under section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii)
because the plain language of that section authorizes the Secretary
of Homeland Security, not the Attorney General, to consider these
requests.  
b. Waiver. The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the application
of section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) in the case of an alien who is a VAWA self-
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petitioner if there is a connection between the alien’s battering or
subjection to extreme cruelty and the alien’s removal, departure from the
United States, or reentry or reentries into the United States; or attempted
reentry into the United States. INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(iii).
BB. Polygamists
1. Section 212(a)(10)(A) of the Act provides that any immigrant coming to the
U.S. to practice polygamy is inadmissible.
2. Note that this section is applicable only to aliens seeking to enter the U.S. as
an immigrant.  It does not apply to nonimmigrants.
CC. Guardian required to accompany helpless alien
1. Section 212(a)(10)(B) makes inadmissible any alien accompanying another
alien who is inadmissible and certified under section 232(c) to be helpless
from infancy, sickness, or mental or physical disability if the accompanying
alien's protection or guardianship is required by the inadmissible alien.
DD. International child abductors
1. Section 212(a)(10)(C)(i) involves the custody of U.S. citizen children and
makes inadmissible aliens who, after a court order granting custody to a U.S.
citizen of a child having a lawful claim to U.S. citizenship, detain or withhold
custody outside the U.S. from the citizen granted custody.
2. This ground of inadmissibility exists only until the child is surrendered to the
U.S. citizen. See INA § 212(a)(10)(C)(ii).
3. However, section 212(a)(10)(C)(iii) provides that sections 212(a)(10)(C)(i)-
(ii) shall not apply: 
a. to a government official of the United States who is acting within the
scope of his or her official duties; 
b. To a government official of any foreign government if the official has
been designated by the Secretary of State at the Secretary’s sole and
unreviewable discretion; or
c. So long as the child is located in a foreign state that is a party to the
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, done
at The Hague on October 25, 1980.
EE. Unlawful voters
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1. Section 212(a)(10)(D)(i) provides that any alien who has voted in violation of
any Federal, State, or local constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, or
regulation is inadmissible. An exception may be available for those who
reasonably believed that they were U.S. citizens. See INA § 212(a)(10)(D)(ii).
FF. Former citizens who renounced citizenship to avoid taxation
1. Section 212(a)(10)(E) provides that any alien who is a former citizen of the
U.S. who officially renounces U.S. citizenship and who is determined by the
Attorney General to have renounced U.S. citizenship for the purpose of
avoiding taxation by the U.S. is inadmissible.
V. Grounds of deportability in removal proceedings
A. Inadmissible at time of entry or adjustment of status
1. Section 237(a)(1)(A) provides that any alien who at the time of entry or
adjustment of status was within one or more of the classes of aliens
inadmissible by the law existing at such time is deportable.
2. A waiver is available under section 237(a)(1)(H) for those who are
inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i).
B. Present in violation of law
1. Section 237(a)(1)(B) provides that any alien who is present in the U.S. in
violation of this Act or any other law of the U.S. is deportable.
C. Violated nonimmigrant status
1. Section 237(a)(1)(C)(i) provides that any alien who was admitted as a
nonimmigrant and who has failed to maintain the nonimmigrant status in
which the alien was admitted or to which it was changed under section 248, or
to comply with the conditions of any such status, is deportable.
D. Violators of conditions of entry
1. Section 237(a)(1)(C)(ii) provides that any alien whom the Secretary of Health
and Human Services certifies has failed to comply with the terms, conditions,
and controls that were imposed under section 212(g) is deportable.
E. Termination of conditional permanent residence
1. Section 237(a)(1)(D)(i) provides that any alien with permanent residence on a
conditional basis under section 216 or section 216A who has had such status
terminated under such respective section is deportable.
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a. Exception.  Section 237(a)(1)(D)(ii) provides that section
237(a)(1)(D)(i) shall not apply in the cases described in section 216(c)(4)
(relating to certain hardship waivers).
F. Alien smuggling
1. Section 237(a)(1)(E)(i) provides that any alien who (prior to the date of entry,
at the time of any entry, or within 5 years of the date of any entry) knowingly
has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or
to try to enter the U.S. in violation of law is deportable.
2. Section 237(a)(1)(E)(i) does not require a conviction.
a. Because section 237(a)(1)(E)(i) does not require a conviction, an IJ is
not limited by cases which prohibit looking to the factual basis of a
conviction, but may consider the underlying facts. Matter of Martinez-
Serrano, 25 I&N Dec. 151, 155 (BIA 2009).
3. A conviction for transporting an illegal alien within the U.S. (rather than
smuggling across the border) was not a deportable offense under former
section 241(a)(13) of the Act.  Matter of I-M-, 7 I&N Dec. 389 (BIA 1957).
4. A conviction for aiding and abetting other aliens to evade and elude
examination and inspection by immigration officers in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(a) (2006) and 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2) (2006) renders the convicted alien
removable under section 237(a)(1)(E)(i). Matter of Martinez-Serrano, 25 I&N
Dec. at 154-55.
5. Special rule in the case of family reunification.  Section 237(a)(1)(E)(ii)
provides that section 237(a)(1)(E)(i) shall not apply in the case of an alien who
is an eligible immigrant (as defined in section 301(b)(1) of the Immigration
Act of 1990), was physically present in the U.S. on May 5, 1988, and is
seeking admission as an immediate relative or under section 203(a)(2)
(including under section 112 of the Immigration Act of 1990) or benefits
under section 301(a) of the immigration Act of 1990 if the alien, before May
5, 1988, has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only the alien's
spouse, parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual) to enter the U.S. in
violation of law.
6. Waiver.  Section 237(a)(1)(E)(iii) provides that the Attorney General may, in
the exercise of discretion for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or
when it is otherwise in the public interest, waive application of section
237(a)(1)(E)(i) in the case of any alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence if the alien has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only
page 49 of 365
an individual who at the time of the offense was the alien's spouse, parent,
son, or daughter (and no other individual) to enter the U.S. in violation of law.
G. Marriage fraud
1. Section 237(a)(1)(G)(i) provides that an alien shall be considered deportable
as having procured a visa or other documentation by fraud (within the
meaning of section 212(a)(6)(i)) and to be in the U.S. in violation of this Act
(within the meaning of section 237(a)(1)(B)) if the alien obtains any admission
into the U.S. with an immigrant visa or other documentation procured on the
basis of a marriage entered into less than 2 years prior to such admission of the
alien and which, within 2 years subsequent to any admission of the alien in the
U.S., shall be judicially annulled or terminated, unless the alien establishes to
the satisfaction of the Attorney General that such marriage was not contracted
for the purpose of evading any provisions of the immigration laws.
2. Section 237(a)(1)(G)(ii) provides that an alien shall be considered deportable
as having procured a visa or other documentation by fraud (within the
meaning of section 212(a)(6)(i)) and to be in the U.S. in violation of this Act
(within the meaning of section 237(a)(1)(B)) if it appears to the satisfaction of
the Attorney General that the alien has failed or refused to fulfill the alien’s
marital agreement which in the opinion of the Attorney General was made for
the purpose of procuring the alien’s admission as an immigrant.
H. CIMT w/in 5 years of admission
1. Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) provides that any alien who is convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude committed within 5 years (or 10 years in the case of
an alien provided LPR status under section 245(j)) after the date of admission,
and is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be
imposed is deportable. See pages 21-25 above for discussion of CIMT as
ground of inadmissibility and pages 240-247 below for discussion of defenses
to charge of CIMT.
2. History lesson- Before 1988, deportability for conviction of a CIMT was
covered in section 241(a)(4) of the Act.  In 1988, when the concept of an
aggravated felony was introduced, deportability for being convicted of one
was placed under section 241(a)(4)(B).  Conviction for a CIMT was
redesignated as section 241(a)(4)(A).  In 1990, the Act was reorganized and
conviction of a CIMT came under section 241(a)(2)(A)(i).  In 1996, it was
again moved to section 237(a)(2)(A)(i).  Therefore, many cases from before
1996 involve these various sections of the Act as the ground of deportability.
3. Also, prior to 1996, an alien convicted of a  CIMT was deportable only if he
was sentenced to confinement or confined for one year or longer.  The IIRIRA
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changed the statute to read “for which a sentence of one year or longer may be
imposed.”  See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).
4. Under earlier sections, the alien’s first entry or any subsequent entry could be
used as a basis for a deportation charge relating to the alien’s conviction of a
CIMT committed within 5 years of entry.  Matter of A-, 6 I&N Dec. 684 (BIA
1955).  Under current section 237(a)(2)(A)(i), an alien is removable if the
crime was committed within 5 years after the date of the admission by virtue
of which the alien was present in the United States when he committed the
crime. Matter of Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA 2011) (overruling in part
Matter of Shanu, 23 I&N Dec. 754 (BIA 2005)). The 5-year clock is not reset
by a new admission from within the United States through adjustment of
status because that admission merely extends the alien’s presence. Id. at 406-
07.  However, if an alien adjusts status after entering the United States without
inspection, the date of adjustment would be the date of admission for purposes
of section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) because that date would have commenced the
alien’s period of presence in the United States following an admission. Id. at
408 n.9. An alien who commits a CIMT while in the United States after
entering without inspection is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and
section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), not deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i), even
if he had been admitted to the United States at some point in the past, because
the past admissions are not tied to the period of presence during which he
committed the crime. Id. at 406, 406 n.5.
5. The “date of admission” for an alien who adjusted status pursuant to section 1
of the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of November 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
732, 80 Stat. 1161, is the date referred to in section 1 of that Act: “a date thirty
months prior to the filing of [the application for permanent residence] or the
date of his last arrival into the United States, which ever date is later.” Matter
of Carrillo, 25 I&N Dec. 99 (BIA 2009).
6. An IJ cannot go behind the records of the criminal court to determine the guilt
or innocence of an alien.  Matter of Khalik, 17 I&N Dec. 518 (BIA 1980);
Matter of McNaughton, 16 I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 1978); Matter of Fortis, 14
I&N Dec. 576 (BIA 1974); Matter of Sirhan, 13 I&N Dec. 592 (BIA 1970).
7. A waiver is available at section 237(a)(2)(A)(vi).
I. Two CIMTs
1. Section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) provides that any alien who at any time after
admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not
arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether
confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single
trial, is deportable. See pages 21-25 above for discussion of CIMT as ground
of inadmissibility, pages 49-50 above for discussion of CIMT within five
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years of admission as ground of deportability, and pages 240-247 below for
discussion of defenses to charge of CIMT.
2. The concept of “a single scheme of criminal misconduct.”
a. The normal inference to be drawn from different crimes committed at
different times against different persons is that they were separate and
distinct crimes and were not part of a common scheme or plan unless
there is evidence to the contrary.  Matter of S-, 9 I&N Dec. 613 (BIA
1962), rev’d on other grounds by Sawkow v. INS, 314 F.2d 34 (3d Cir.
1963).
b. When an alien has performed an act which, in and of itself, constitutes a
complete, individual and distinct crime, then he becomes deportable
when he again commits such an act, provided he is convicted of both.
Matter of D-, 5 I&N Dec. 728 (BIA 1954). The fact that one may follow
the other closely, even immediately, in point of time is of no moment. Id.
Equally immaterial is the fact that they may be similar in character or
that each distinct and separate crime is a part of an over-all plan of
criminal misconduct. Id. The “single scheme” exception in section
241(a)(4)(A) of the Act relates to a situation where there are two
separate and distinct crimes but morally the transaction constitutes only a
single wrong. Id.
c. Simply because an alien commits a crime and later repeats the offense, it
does not follow that the offenses were part of a single scheme, even
though the crimes were similar.  Matter of J-, 6 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA
1954). If each criminal act was a complete and distinct offense for which
the alien was convicted, repetition of the particular crime would
generally not constitute a single scheme. Id.
d. Criminal precedents in U.S. law make it clear that charges combined in
one indictment or information under separate counts constitute distinct
crimes. Matter of J-, 6 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA 1954).  Coupling in a single
indictment or information is only a matter of convenience.  Id.
e. A respondent’s testimony regarding his crimes will not establish a single
scheme of misconduct if the records of conviction show separate and
distinct offenses.  Matter of O’Gorman, 11 I&N Dec. 6 (BIA 1965).
f. In Matter of Adetiba, 20 I&N Dec. 506 (BIA 1992), the Board adopted
the analysis in Pacheco v. INS, 546 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977) which states that to be a “single scheme,”
the scheme must take place at one time, meaning there must be no
substantial interruption that would allow the participant to disassociate
himself from his enterprise and reflect on what he has done.  The Board
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also refused to conclude that Congress intended by the “single scheme”
language to insulate from deportability individuals who formulate a plan
at one time for criminal behavior involving multiple separate crimes,
while making deportable those who commit only two such crimes
without a plan and held that the statutory exception refers to acts, which
although separate crimes in and of themselves, were performed in
furtherance of a single criminal episode, such as where one crime
constitutes a lesser offense of another or where two crimes flow from
and are the natural consequence of a single act of criminal misconduct.
Id. Under this analysis, it is of no consequence that the alien’s separate
crimes (such as forgery or unauthorized use of a credit card) were
committed pursuant to an elaborate plan and that the modus operandi
was the same in each instance. Id. The Board focused on the alien’s
actual receipt of money from a victim as accomplishing the criminal
objective. Id. With each act, the alien accomplished a specific criminal
objective when he obtained things of value.  Id.  After each act, the alien
had the opportunity to disassociate himself from the enterprise and
reflect on what he had done and the commission of additional acts to
obtain things of value did not flow from and was not a natural
consequence of the first act of criminal misconduct. Id.
g. The statutory language of a “single scheme of criminal misconduct” was
meant to distinguish cases where there are separate and distinct crimes,
but they are performed in furtherance of a single criminal episode, such
as where two crimes flow from and are the natural consequence of a
single act of criminal misconduct.  Matter of Adetiba, 20 I&N Dec. 506
(BIA 1992).
h. A single scheme of criminal misconduct would be present, if in the
performance of one unified act of criminal misconduct several offenses
are committed, such as breaking and entering followed by larceny or an
attempt to escape after an assault.  Matter of J-, 6 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA
1954).
3. No single scheme was found in the following cases:
a. Robbery involving separate persons at different times.  Matter of A-, 5
I&N Dec. 470 (BIA 1953).
b. Obtaining money by false pretenses involving distinct offenses.  Matter
of D-, 5 I&N Dec. 728 (BIA 1954).
c. Two counts of income tax evasion with each count relating to a separate
year.  Matter of J-, 6 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA 1954).
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d. Forgery and uttering of different checks at different times even though
both checks were made payable to the same person.  Matter of Z-, 6 I&N
Dec. 167 (BIA 1954).
e. Passing forged checks on two different occasions within 10 days
notwithstanding a general criminal intent to continue to defraud victims. 
Matter of B-, 8 I&N Dec. 236 (BIA 1958).
f. Using credit cards in the names of different people, with intent to
defraud, and obtaining things of value with the cards, notwithstanding
that the crimes were committed pursuant to an elaborate plan and the
modus operandi was the same in each instance. Matter of Adetiba, 20
I&N Dec. 506 (BIA 1992).
4. Some Circuit Courts interpret the phrase “single scheme of criminal
misconduct” differently than the Board.  The Board stated that it will not
follow a more expansive interpretation outside the respective circuits. Matter
of Adetiba, 20 I&N Dec. 506 (BIA 1992).
a. Decisions of Circuit Courts on this point
(1) The First Circuit agrees with the Board. Pacheco v. INS, 546 F.2d
448 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied 430 U.S. 985 (1977). 
(2) The Second Circuit disagrees with the Board. Nason v. INS, 394
F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968).
(3) The Third Circuit disagrees with the Board. Sawkow v. INS, 314
F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1963).
(4) The Fifth Circuit agrees with the Board. Iredia v. INS, 981 F.2d
847 (5th Cir. 1993) cert. denied 510 U.S. 872 (1993); Animashaun
v. INS, 990 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 995
(1993).
(5) The Ninth Circuit disagrees with the Board. Gonzalez- Sandoval v.
INS, 910 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1990).
(6) The Tenth Circuit agrees with the Board. Nguyen v. INS, 991 F.2d
621 (10th Cir. 1993).
5. A waiver is available at section 237(a)(2)(A)(vi).
J. Convicted of an aggravated felony
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1. Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) provides that any alien who is convicted of an
aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable. A waiver is
available at section 237(a)(2)(A)(vi). See pages 299-327 below for a full
discussion of aggravated felonies.
2. An alien who initially entered the U.S. without inspection but whose
conviction for an aggravated felony was subsequent to her adjustment of status
to that of a lawful permanent resident under section 245A of the Act is
deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act as an alien who was
convicted of an aggravated felony “after admission.”  Matter of Rosas, 22 I&N
Dec. 616 (BIA 1999).
K. Convicted of high speed flight
1. Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iv) provides that any alien convicted of a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 758 (relating to high speed flight from an immigration checkpoint) is
deportable. A waiver is available at section 237(a)(2)(A)(vi).
L. Failure to register as a sex offender
1. Section 237(a)(2)(A)(v) provides that any alien who is convicted under 18
USC § 2250 is deportable. (Pursuant to the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act of 2006).
M. Controlled substance conviction 
1. Section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) provides that any alien who at any time after
admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to
violate) any law or regulation of a State, the U.S., or a foreign country relating
to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §  802)), other than a single offense involving
possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.
2. History Lesson - Before 1990, deportability for conviction of drug offenses
was covered in section 241(a)(11) of the Act.  In 1990, the Act was
reorganized and drug offenses came under section 241(a)(2)(B)(i).  In 1996, it
was again moved to section 237(a)(2)(B)(i).  Therefore, many cases from
before 1990 involve section 241(a)(11) as the ground of deportability.
3. Former section 241(a)(11) did not contain the word “attempt.”  However, the
Board has long held that an alien convicted of an attempt to commit a drug
offense is deportable.  Matter of G-, 6 I&N Dec. 353 (BIA 1954); Matter of
Bronsztejn, 15 I&N Dec. 281 (BIA 1974).
4. The exception for a single offense of possession for one's own use of 30 grams
or less of marijuana also was not included in former section 241(a)(11).  This
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exception does not apply to an alien convicted under a statute that has an
element requiring that possession of the marijuana be in a prison or other
correctional setting.  Matter of Moncada, 24 I&N Dec. 62 (BIA 2007).
5. A sentence to confinement was not necessary for an alien to be deportable
under former section 241(a)(11).  Matter of L-R-, 8 I&N Dec. 269 (BIA 1959),
overruled in part by Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988),
superseded by statute as recognized by Matter of Devison-Charles, 22 I&N
Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000); see also Chabolla-Delgado v. INS, 384 F.2d 360 (9th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 865 (1968); Gutierrez v. INS, 323 F.2d 593
(9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 910 (1964).  No sentence is required
under the present law.  INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i).
6. Even if the imposition (rather than the execution) of sentence was suspended,
the alien is still deportable.  Matter of Tucker, 15 I&N Dec. 337 (BIA 1975);
Matter of Wong, 12 I&N Dec. 721 (BIA 1968); Matter of Gonzalez de Lara,
12 I&N Dec. 806 (BIA 1968); Matter of Johnson, 11 I&N Dec. 401 (BIA
1965).
7. Former section 241(a)(11) of the Act made deportable aliens convicted of
selling a substance other than a narcotic pursuant to an agreement to sell
narcotics.  Matter of T-C-, 7 I&N Dec. 100 (BIA 1956).  Section
237(a)(2)(B)(i) appears to be subject to the same interpretation.
8. Where the record of conviction is silent as to the controlled substance
involved, an alien’s conviction in a state court was not a ground of
deportabilty under former section 241(a)(11) because the conviction could
have involved a substance defined as a narcotic under state law which was not
a narcotic drug within the meaning of the immigration laws.  Matter of Paulus,
11 I&N Dec. 274 (BIA 1965).  The same appears true for section
237(a)(2)(B)(i).
a. In a case involving a CIMT rather than a drug offense, the Board held
that recourse could not be had to the remarks of the State’s Attorney to
the court at the time of sentencing in order to determine if the crime
involved moral turpitude where the respondent was convicted under a
broad, divisible statute which enumerated several acts, the commission
of which may or may not involve moral turpitude, and the record of
conviction merely referred to the section of law involved.  Matter of
Cassisi, 10 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1963).
b. The Board later determined that the remarks of the defendant may be
considered and held that the transcript from court proceedings which
resulted in a conviction for possession of controlled substances at which
the respondent, under questioning by the judge as part of the guilty plea,
admitted possession of heroin, with knowledge that the substance was
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heroin, can be considered as part of the “record of conviction”, and a
finding of deportability under former section 241(a)(11) can be based on
it. Matter of Mena, 17 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 1979).
c. The Ninth Circuit has held that the plain language of section
237(a)(2)(B)(i) requires the government to prove that the substance
underlying an alien’s state law conviction for possession is one that is
covered by section 102 of the Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”). See
Cheuk Fung S-Yong v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2010),
Ruiz-Vidal v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1072, 1076-78 (9th Cir. 2007). 
9. Before the 1986 amendment to section 241(a)(11) changed its applicability to
a violation of “any law or regulation relating to a controlled substance,”
section 241(a)(11) applied only to convictions “relating to the illicit
possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs or marijuana.”  During that time, the
Board held that a conviction for misprision of a felony (failure to report the
commission of a felony) did not subject an alien to deportation even though
the felony was possession of marihuana with intent to distribute.  The Board
concluded that this offense did not relate to the “illicit possession of or traffic
in narcotic drugs or marihuana.”  Matter of Velasco, 16 I&N Dec. 281 (BIA
1977).
10. A conviction for a violation of 21 U.S.C. §  843(b).  The unlawful use of a
communication facility to facilitate commission of the felony of conspiracy to
import a quantity of cocaine, a felony under 21 U.S.C. §  963, was held to be a
conviction of a crime relating to the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs as described
in former section 212(a)(23) of the Act.  Matter of Chang, 16 I&N Dec. 90
(BIA 1977).
11. Because of the 1986 amendment to section 241(a)(11) by the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, an alien convicted of unlawful use (rather than possession
or trafficking) of a controlled substance was held to be deportable.  Matter of
Hernandez-Ponce, 19 I&N Dec. 613 (BIA 1988). The wording of section
237(a)(2)(B)(i) on this point is the same, so this should continue to be good
law.
12. Since its 1986 amendment, former section 241(a)(11) of the Act made
deportable an alien convicted of use or being under the influence of a
controlled substance.  Matter of Esqueda, 20 I&N Dec. 850 (BIA 1994).  The
argument that the amendment was only to include “designer” drugs by
eliminating the list of prohibited drugs and refer instead to the Controlled
Substances Act was rejected.  See also Matter of Hernandez-Ponce, 19 I&N
Dec. 613 (BIA 1988).
13. The Ninth Circuit recognized an incongruity in including in the statute an
exception to deportability for a single offense of possession for one’s own use
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of 30 grams or less of marijuana but omitting a similar exception for actual
use of marijuana. Flores-Arellano v. INS, 5 F.3d 360 (9th Cir. 1993).
Nevertheless, the court determined that the plain language of the phrase “any
law . . . relating to a controlled substance” is unambiguous and that its
ordinary meaning includes laws proscribing use or being under the influence
of a controlled substance. Id.
14. An alien convicted of aiding and abetting the sale of cocaine was deportable
under former section 241(a)(11).  Londono-Gomez v. INS, 699 F.2d 475 (9th
Cir. 1983).  Section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) appears to be subject to the same
interpretation.
15. An alien convicted of facilitation (providing another with the means or
opportunity and aiding in commission of an offense) of the sale of cocaine was
also deportable.  Matter of Del Risco, 20 I&N Dec. 109 (BIA 1989).  Section
237(a)(2)(B)(i) appears to be subject to the same interpretation.
16. A conviction for solicitation (an attempt to conspire) to commit a crime
relating to a controlled substance rendered an alien deportable under former
section 241(a)(11).  Matter of Beltran, 20 I&N Dec. 521 (BIA 1992).  Section
237(a)(2)(B)(i) appears to be subject to the same interpretation in all
jurisdictions but the Ninth Circuit. Matter of Zorilla-Vidal, 24 I&N Dec. 768
(BIA 2009).
17. A conviction for misprision of a felony (the felony being possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute) was held not to be a conviction of a law
“relating to the illicit possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs or marijuana”
and therefore did not render a respondent deportable under former section
241(a)(11).  Matter of Velasco, 16 I&N Dec. 281 (BIA 1977).
18. An alien convicted under 18 U.S.C. §  924(c) of unlawful carrying of a firearm
during the commission of a felony was once held not to be deportable under
former section 241(a)(11) of the Act even though the underlying felony was
possession of heroin because 18 U.S.C. §  924(c) was an offense separate and
distinct from the underlying felony and not “a law relating to the illicit
possession of a narcotic drug.”  Matter of Carrillo, 16 I&N Dec. 625 (BIA
1978).  18 U.S.C. §  924(c) was amended in 1986 to apply to use of a firearm
during a drug trafficking crime or a crime of violence.  The Board later held
that an alien convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) for use of a firearm during
a drug trafficking crime is deportable under former section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of
the Act as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.  Matter of K-L-, 20 I&N
Dec. 654 (BIA 1993).  Since a drug related aggravated felony would also be an
offense relating to controlled substances, an alien convicted of use of a firearm
during a drug trafficking crime should also be deportable under section
237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act.
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19. The Ninth Circuit has held that a conviction under the Travel Act (18 U.S.C. §
1952) for traveling in interstate commerce with the intention of distributing
the proceeds derived from the unlawful distribution of drugs in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1952 (a)(1) is a conviction “relating to a controlled substance.” 
Johnson v. INS, 971 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1992). 
N. Drug abusers and addicts
1. Section 237(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that any alien who is, or at any time after
admission has been, a drug abuser or addict is deportable.
O. Firearm offenses
1. Section 237(a)(2)(C) provides that any alien who at any time after admission
is convicted under any law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale,
exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying, or of attempting or
conspiring to purchase, sell, offer for sale, exchange, use, own, possess, or
carry, any weapon, part, or accessory which is a firearm or destructive device
(as defined in 18 U.S.C. section 921(a)) in violation of any law is deportable.
2. History lesson - Before 1990, deportability for conviction of firearm offenses
was covered in section 241(a)(14) of the Act.  In 1990, the Act was
reorganized and firearm offenses came under section 241(a)(2)(C).  In 1996, it
was again moved to section 237(a)(2)(C).  Therefore, many cases from before
1996 involve former section 241(a)(2)(C) as the ground of deportability.
3. Prior statutes and retroactivity.  Former section 241(a)(14) originally made
deportable only aliens convicted of possessing or carrying any weapon which
either shoots automatically or semiautomatically more than one shot by a
single function of the trigger or a sawed-off shotgun.  Section 7348 of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 amended former section 241(a)(14) to include
convictions for possessing or carrying any “firearm or destructive device...or
any revolver.”  However, these amendments were effective only against aliens
convicted on or after the effective date of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
[November 18, 1988].  Former section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act represented the
enactment of a new statutory provision rather than a change of the numerical
designation of former section 241(a)(14) because it increased the number of
weapons offenses that render an alien deportable.  Former section
241(a)(2)(C) of the Act completely superceded all former versions of that
deportation ground and was not limited regarding the date when a conviction
must take place.  Therefore, aliens were deportable who were convicted before
the enactment of former section 241(a)(2)(C) as well as after.  Matter of
Chow, 20 I&N Dec. 647 (BIA 1993), aff'd sub nom. Chow v. INS, 9 F.3d
1547 (5th Cir. 1993).  Present section 237(a)(2)(C) would also appear to also
include aliens convicted before 1996.
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4. Definition of “firearm” - 18 U.S.C. §  921(a)(3) defines a firearm as:
a. any weapon which will or may be converted to expel a projectile by
explosive action;
b. the frame or receiver of any such weapon;
c. any firearm muffler or silencer;
d. any destructive device, but
e. the definition does not include an antique firearm.
5. Definition of  “destructive device” - 18 U.S.C. §  921(a)(4) defines a
destructive device as:
a. any bomb, grenade, rocket (having a propellant charge of more than 4
ounces), missile (having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than
1/4 ounce), mine, or similar device which is explosive, incendiary, or
contains poison gas;
b. any weapon (other than shotguns or shotgun shells for sporting use)
which will or may be converted to expel a projectile by explosive or
other propellant and which has a barrel with a bore of more than ½ inch
in diameter;
c. any combination of parts from which a destructive device may be
assembled.
6. A conviction for an attempted firearms offense would not support a charge of
deportability under former section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act.  Matter of Hou, 20
I&N Dec. 513 (BIA 1992), superseded by statute as recognized in Matter of
St. John, 21 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1996).  Apparently to legislatively overrule
Matter of Hou, section 203(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994 amended former section 241(a)(2)(C) to include both
an attempt and a conspiracy.  Section 203(c) provided that the amendment
applies to convictions occurring before, on, or after the effective date.
7. After the enactment of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, an alien remains
convicted for immigration purposes notwithstanding a subsequent state action
purporting to erase the original determination of guilt through a rehabilitative
process.  Matter of Roldan, 22 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1999) review granted,
order vacated by Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000),
overruled by Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc);
but see Matter of Salazar, 23 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA 2002) (recognizing an
exception for controlled substances convictions arising in the Ninth Circuit
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pursuant to Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000)).  In
Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), the Ninth
Circuit vacated its decision in Lujan-Armendariz, but held that its decision
should be applied prospectively only, and that such prospective application
meant that the instant petition would be decided under the Lujan-Armendariz
holding. 
8. The antique firearm exception to the definition of “firearm” in 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(3) is an affirmative defense that must be sufficiently raised by an alien
charged under section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Act.  Matter of Mendez-Orellana,
25 I&N Dec. 254 (BIA 2010).  Where the government has presented evidence
that an alien has been convicted of an offense involving a firearm, it has met
its burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence of deportability, and
the burden then shifts to the respondent to show that the weapon was, in fact,
antique.  Id. 
9. A conviction for improper delivery of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(e)
qualifies as a firearms offense under section 237(a)(2)(C), despite the fact that
the enumerated list does not mention delivery.  Malilia v. Holder, 632 F.3d
598 (9th Cir. 2011). 
10. Sentence enhancement or element of the offense
a. The sentence enhancement provision of section 12022(a) of the
California Penal Code, which allows for the imposition of an additional
and consecutive term of imprisonment upon a person convicted of a
felony where any one of the principals was armed with a firearm, does
not create a separate offense, but rather imposes additional punishment,
and therefore does not constitute a conviction under California law.
Matter of Rodriguez-Cortes, 20 I&N Dec. 587 (BIA 1992). Therefore, an
alien who was convicted of 5 counts of attempted murder in the second
degree and whose sentence under one count was enhanced pursuant to
section 12022(a) of the California Penal Code because a codefendant
was armed with a firearm in the attempted commission of the felony has
not been convicted of a firearm offense under California law and is not
deportable under former section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act. Id.
b. A conviction for assault in the third degree under section
9A.36.031(1)(f) of the Revised Code of Washington is not a firearm
offense where use of a firearm is not an element of the offense and a
respondent so convicted is not deportable under former section
241(a)(2)(C) of the Act.  Matter of Perez-Contreras, 20 I&N Dec. 615
(BIA 1992).  In this case, no element of the crime to which the
respondent entered a plea of guilty related to the use of a weapon. 
Although the criminal information stated that the respondent used a
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pistol in the assault, he was not charged with use of a pistol; and did not
plead guilty to such use.
c. A respondent convicted of assault with a firearm, in violation of
California Penal Code section 245(a)(2), has been convicted of a
firearms violation and is deportable under former section 241(a)(2)(C) of
the Act.  Matter of Montenegro, 20 I&N Dec. 603 (BIA 1992),
superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Matter of Blake,
23 I&N Dec. 722 (BIA 2005) review granted, cause remanded by Blake
v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007).  Although the case primarily
involved eligibility for a waiver under former section 212(c) of the Act
and the Board did not discuss at length the issue of deportability, it
seems that the respondent was deportable under section 241(a)(2)(C)
because the use of a firearm was an element of the offense specifically
stated in the statute.  The Board also rejected an argument that because
the respondent's conviction for assault with a firearm could also render
him excludable under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act as an alien
convicted of a CIMT, he should be allowed to apply for a waiver under
section 212(c).
d. An alien convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) for use of a firearm
during a drug trafficking crime  is deportable under former section
241(a)(2)(C) of the Act as an alien convicted of a firearm violation as
well as under former section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act as an alien
convicted of an aggravated felony.  Matter of K-L-, 20 I&N Dec. 654
(BIA 1993).  In this case, the Board distinguished its decision in Matter
of Rodriguez-Cortes, 20 I&N Dec. 587 (BIA 1992) and held that 18
U.S.C.§  924(c)(1) creates an offense separate from the underlying
offenses and is not merely a sentence enhancement.
e. An alien convicted of the first degree felonies of armed burglary and
robbery with a firearm under sections 810.02 and 812.13 of the Florida
Statutes was convicted of firearm offenses and therefore deportable
under former section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act because the use of a
firearm was an essential element of the crimes, i.e. the use of a firearm
elevated the crimes to first degree felonies and triggered a mandatory
minimum sentence as distinguished from a statutory sentence
enhancement.  Matter of P-F-, 20 I&N Dec. 661 (BIA 1993).
f. Although section 775.087 of the Florida Statutes is, on its face, a penalty
enhancement provision designed to raise the penalty for conviction of a
felony (actually the degree of the felony) where the felony is committed
with the use of a firearm, under Florida case law, use of a firearm
becomes an element of the substantive offense of first degree murder
with a firearm where the elements of murder under section 782.04 of the
Florida Statutes and use of a firearm under section 775.087 of the
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Florida Statutes are charged and proven. Matter of Lopez-Amaro, 20
I&N Dec. 668 (BIA 1993), aff'd Lopez-Amaro v. INS, 25 F.3d 986 (11th
Cir. 1994). Therefore, a conviction for first degree murder in violation of
sections 782.04 and 775.087 of the Florida Statutes constitutes a
firearms offense under former section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act because
the use of a firearm is deemed to be an element of the substantive
offense. Id.
11. Before a circuit court, the alien argued that for his conduct to trigger former
section 241(a)(2)(C), the alien contends that he not only need have made false
statements in connection with a firearms purchase, he must also have been the
individual doing the buying. Hall v. INS, 167 F.3d 852 (4th Cir. 1999). The
court, in dismissing the appeal, held that nothing on the face of former section
241(a)(2)(C), limits the statute to the actual purchaser of the firearm. Id.
12. The First Circuit has held that the offense of “control” of a firearm in violation
of Rhode Island section 11-47-7 constitutes constructive possession of a
firearm. Aybar-Alejo v. INS, 230 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2000).
13. Evidence
a. Where the statute under which an alien was convicted encompasses
offenses that constitute firearms violations and offenses that do not, the
Board looks to the record of conviction, and to other documents
admissible as evidence in proving a criminal conviction, to determine
whether the specific offense of which the alien was convicted constitutes
a firearms violation within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(C) of the
Act.  Matter of Teixeira, 21 I&N Dec. 316 (BIA 1996); Matter of
Madrigal, 21 I&N Dec. 323 (BIA 1996); Matter of Pichardo, 21 I&N
Dec. 330 (BIA 1996).
b. A police report, standing alone, is not part of a “record of conviction,”
nor does it fit any of the regulatory descriptions found at 8 C.F.R. §
1003.41 for documents that are admissible as evidence in proving a
criminal conviction, and it therefore should not be considered in
determining whether the specific offense of which an alien was
convicted constituted a firearms violations. Matter of Teixeira, 21 I&N
Dec. 316 (BIA 1996).  Although a police report concerning
circumstances of arrest that is not part of a record of conviction is
appropriately admitted into evidence for the purpose of considering an
application for discretionary relief, it should not be considered for the
purpose of determining deportability where the Act mandates a focus on
a criminal conviction, rather than on conduct. Id.
c. The transcript from the respondent’s plea and sentence hearing, during
which he admitted possession of a firearm, is part of the record of
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conviction and, consequently, was sufficient to establish that the
respondent had been convicted of a firearms offense and was deportable
under former section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act. Matter of Madrigal, 21
I&N Dec. 323 (BIA 1996).
d. Where the only criminal court document offered into the record to prove
an alien’s deportability under former section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act
consists of a Certificate of Disposition which fails to identify the
subdivision of the statute under which the alien was convicted or the
weapon that he was convicted of possessing, deportability has not been
established, even where the alien testifies that the weapon in his
possession at the time of his arrest was a gun, since it is the crime that
the alien was convicted of rather than a crime that he may have
committed which determines whether he is deportable.  Matter of
Pichardo, 21 I&N Dec. 330 (BIA 1996).
P. Miscellaneous crimes
1. Section 237(a)(2)(D) provides that an alien is deportable who at any time has
been convicted (the judgment on such conviction becoming final) of, or has
been so convicted of a conspiracy or attempt to violate:
a. any offense under chapter 37 (relating to espionage), chapter 105
(relating to sabotage), or chapter 115 (relating to treason and sedition) of
title 18, United States Code, for which a term of imprisonment of 5 or
more years may be imposed;
b. any offense under 18 U.S.C. § 871 or 960;
c. a violation of any provision of the Military Selective Service Act (50
U.S.C. App 451 et seq. or the Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C.
App. 1 et seq.); or
d. a violation of section 215 or 278 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Q. Crimes of domestic violence, stalking, and child abuse
1. Section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) provides that any alien who at any time after entry is
convicted of a crime of domestic violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of
child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment is deportable.
2. Definition of  “a crime of domestic violence.” Section 237(a)(2)(E)(i)
provides “For purposes of this clause, the term ‘crime of domestic violence’
means any crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, United States
Code) against a person committed by a current or former spouse of the person,
by an individual with whom the person shares a child in common, by an
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individual who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the person as a
spouse, by an individual similarly situated to a spouse of the person under the
domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction where the offense occurs,
or by any other individual against a person who is protected from that
individual’s acts under the domestic or family violence laws of the United
States or any State, Indian tribal government, or unit of local government.”
a. “Crime of Domestic Violence.”  The Ninth Circuit has held that to
determine whether the victim of the crime is one described in section
237(a)(2)(E)(i), the IJ must first look to the fact of the statute of
conviction.  Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 2004).  When it
is not clear from the statute that the victim is a person described in
section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act, the IJ may look to selected conviction
documents.  Id.  (applying Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)). 
In removal proceedings arising within the jurisdiction of the Ninth
Circuit, the offense of domestic battery in violation of sections 242 and
243(e)(1) of the California Penal Code does not presently qualify
categorically as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2000), such
that it may be considered a “crime of domestic violence” under section
237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act.  Matter of Sanudo, 23 I&N Dec. 968 (BIA
2006).
(1) The Seventh Circuit held that a second conviction for domestic
battery under Illinois law for intentionally causing bodily harm to a
family member qualified as a “crime of violence” and thus an
aggravated felony barring cancellation of removal. DeLeon
Castellanos v. Holder, 652 F.3d 762 (7th Cir. 2011).
b. Child abuse.  Child abuse is not defined in the Act.  However, the Board
of Immigration Appeals has recognized that child abuse encompasses a
broad range of activity, including any form of cruelty to a child’s
physical, moral or mental well-being.  Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez,
22 I&N Dec. 991 (BIA 1999).  The Board subsequently held that the
term “crime of child abuse” means any offense involving an intentional,
knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent act or omission that
constitutes maltreatment of a person under 18 years old or that impairs
such a person’s physical or mental well-being, including sexual abuse or
exploitation.  The Board also held that whether a person is removable
based on a conviction for a “crime of child abuse” is determined by the
elements of the alien’s offense, as reflected in the statutory definition of
the crime or admissible portions of the conviction record.  Matter of
Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 2008).
(1) However, the term “crime of child abuse” is not limited to offenses
requiring proof of injury to the child. Matter of Soram, 25 I&N
Dec. 378, 381 (BIA 2010). The phrase “an act or omission that
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constitutes maltreatment of child” is sufficiently broad to
encompass endangerment-type crimes, including a crime in
violation of section 18-6-401(1)(a) of the Colorado Revised
Statutes. Id. at 383.
(2) The Ninth Circuit held that a conviction for child endangerment, in
violation of California Penal Code section 273a(b), is not
categorically a crime of child abuse within the meaning of section
237(a)(2)(E)(i) because it reaches conduct that creates only
potential harm to a child and does not require actual injury. 
Fregozo v. Holder, 576 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2009), but see Matter
of Soram, 25 I&N Dec. 378 (BIA 2010). 
(3) The Ninth Circuit held that a felony conviction for child
molestation in the third degree under Revised Code of Washington
section 9A.44.089, which prohibits a person from having sexual
contact with a minor who is 14 or 15 years of age when the
perpetrator is at least forty-eight months older than the minor,
constitutes a crime of child abuse within the meaning of section
137(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act. Jimenez-Juarez v. Holder, 635 F.3d
1169 (9th Cir. 2011). 
R. Violators of protection orders
1. Section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) provides that any alien who at any time after entry is
enjoined under a protection order issued by a court and whom the court
determines has engaged in conduct that violates the portion of a protection
order that involves protection against credible threats of violence, repeated
harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection
order was issued is deportable.
2. Section 237(a)(E)(ii) requires that an alien violate part of the protection order
that “involves protection against violence, threats, or harassment” not that the
alien actually engage in violent, threatening, or harassing behavior.  Szalai v.
Holder, 572 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2009); Hoodho v. Holder, 558 F.3d 184
(2d Cir. 2009).  See Matter of Strydom, 25 I&N Dec. 507 (BIA 2011).
S. Failure to register
1. Section 237(a)(3)(A) provides that an alien who has failed to comply with the
provisions of section 265 is deportable, unless the alien establishes to the
satisfaction of the Attorney General that such failure was reasonably excusable
or was not willful.
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a. Section 265 requires certain aliens to notify the Attorney General in
writing of each change of address and new address within 10 days of a
change of address.
2. Conviction for failure to register or falsification of documents.  Section
237(a)(3)(B) provides that any alien is deportable who at any time has been
convicted:
a. under section 266(c) of the Act or under section 36(c) of the Alien
Registration Act, 1940,
b. of a violation of, or an attempt or a conspiracy to violate, any provision
of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. §  611 et
seq.), or
c. of a violation of, or an attempt or a conspiracy to violate, 18 U.S.C. § 
1546 (relating to fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other entry
documents).
T. Document fraud
1. Section 237(a)(3)(C)(i) provides that an alien who is the subject of a final
order for violation of section 274C is deportable.
2. Waiver.  Section 237(a)(3)(C)(ii) provides that the Attorney General may
waive section 237(a)(3)(C)(i) in the case of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence if no previous civil money penalty was imposed against
the alien under section 274C and the offense was incurred solely to assist, aid,
or support the alien’s spouse or child (and no other individual).
U. Falsely claiming citizenship
1. Section 237(a)(3)(D)(i) provides that any alien who falsely represents, or has
falsely represented, himself to be a citizen of the U.S. for any purpose or
benefit under the Act (including section 274A) or any Federal or State law is
deportable. A false representation of United States citizenship for the purpose
of obtaining employment from a private employer is considered to be done for
a “purpose or benefit” under the Act.  Ferrans v. Holder, 612 F.3d 528 (6th
Cir. 2010); Theodros v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2007); Kechkar v.
Gonzales, 500 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007).  
2. An alien who reasonably believed that he was a citizen may fall under an
exception at section 237(a)(3)(D)(ii).
V. National security and related grounds
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1. Section 237(a)(4)(A) provides that any alien is deportable who has engaged, is
engaged, or at any time after admission engages in:
a. any activity to violate any law of the U.S. relating to espionage or
sabotage or to violate or evade any law prohibiting the export from the
U.S. of goods, technology, or sensitive information,
b. any other criminal activity which endangers public safety or national
security, or
c. any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control or
overthrow of, the Government of the U.S. by force, violence, or other
unlawful means.
W. Terrorist activities
1. Section 237(a)(4)(B) of the Act [as amended by the REAL ID Act of 2005]
provides that any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after
admission engages in any terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B),
(F)) is deportable.
X. Adverse foreign policy consequences
1. Section 237(a)(4)(C)(i), former section 241(a)(4)(C)(i), of the Act provides
that an alien whose presence or activities in the U.S.  the Secretary of State has
reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign
policy consequences for the U.S. is deportable.
2. In order to establish deportability under former section 241(a)(4)(C)(i) of the
Act, the INS has the burden of proving by clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence that the Secretary of State has made a facially reasonable and bona
fide determination that an alien’s presence or activities in the United States
would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the
United States.  Matter of Ruiz-Massieu, 22 I&N Dec. 833 (BIA 1999).  A
letter from the Secretary of State conveying the Secretary’s  determination that
an alien’s presence in this country would have potentially serious adverse
foreign policy consequences for the United States, and stating facially
reasonable and bona fide reasons for that determination, is presumptive and
sufficient evidence that the alien is deportable under former section
241(a)(4)(C)(i) of the Act, and the Service is not required to present additional
evidence of deportability.  Id.
3. The Government is not required to permit an alien who is deemed to be
deportable under former section 241(a)(4)(C)(i) of the Act to depart the United
States voluntarily prior to the initiation of  deportation proceedings where the
alien’s presence is pursuant to his voluntary decision to enter or seek
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admission to this country. Matter of Ruiz-Massieu, 22 I&N Dec. 833 (BIA
1999), distinguishing Matter of Badalamenti, 19 I&N Dec. 623 (BIA 1988),
Matter of Yam, 16 I&N Dec. 535 (BIA 1978), and Matter of C-C-, 3 I&N
Dec. 221 (BIA 1948).
4. Extradition proceedings are separate and apart from any immigration
proceeding and the Government’s success or failure in obtaining an order of
extradition has no effect on deportation proceedings. Matter of McMullen, 17
I&N Dec. 542, 548 (BIA 1980), rev’d on other grounds, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th
Cir. 1981), on remand, Matter of McMullen, 19 I&N Dec. 90 (BIA 1984),
aff’d, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled in part on other grounds by
Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2005); Matter of Ruiz-Massieu,
22 I&N Dec. 833 (BIA 1999).  The Board pointed out that the standards of
proof for the two proceedings are different. McMullen, 17 I&N Dec. at 548.
Also, the existence of criminal charges is not the only possible basis for a
determination that the respondent’s presence may have adverse foreign policy
consequences.  Id.
5. Exceptions.  Section 237(a)(4)(C)(ii) provides that the exceptions described in
clauses (ii) and (iii) of section 212(a)(3)(C) shall apply to deportability under
section 237(a)(4)(C)(i) in the same manner as they apply to inadmissibility
under section 212(a)(3)(C)(i).
Y. Assisted in Nazi persecution or engaged in genocide
1. Section 237(a)(4)(D) provides that any alien described in clause (i) or (ii) of
section 212(a)(3)(E) is deportable.  See Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445
(BIA 2011).
Z. Public Charge
1. Section 237(a)(5) provides that any alien who, within 5 years after the date of
entry, has become a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to
have arisen since entry is deportable.
AA. Unlawful voters
1. Section 237(a)(6)(A) provides that any alien who has voted in violation of any
Federal, state, or local constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, or
regulation is deportable. An alien who reasonably believed that he was a U.S.
citizen may fall under an exception at section 237(a)(6)(B).
BB. Deportation of certain nonimmigrants prohibited without approval
1. Section 237(b) provides that an alien admitted as a nonimmigrant under the
provisions of either section 101(a)(15)(A)(i) or 101(a)(15)(G)(i), and who fails
page 69 of 365
to maintain a status under either of those provisions, shall not be required to
depart from the U.S. without the approval of the Secretary of State, unless
such alien is subject to deportation under section 237(a)(4).
CC. Waiver under section 237(c) for special immigrants
1. Section 237(c) provides that the following grounds of deportability shall not
apply to a special immigrant described in section 101(a)(27)(J) [an immigrant
declared dependent on a juvenile court] based upon circumstances that existed
before the date the alien was provided such special immigrant status:
a. Section 237(a)(1)(A) - inadmissible at time of entry for grounds of
inadmissibility other than:
(1) Section 212(a)(2) - criminal & related grounds, and
(2) Section 212(a)(3) - national security, terrorist activity, & related
grounds.
b. Section 237(a)(1)(B) - in the U.S. in violation of law.
c. Section 237(a)(1)(C) - violated nonimmigrant status or condition of
entry.
d. Section 237(a)(1)(D) - termination of conditional residence.
e. Section 237(a)(3)(A) - failure to report change of address.
VI. Procedure in removal proceedings
A. Notice to the alien
1. The charging document: Notice to Appear (“NTA”).  Section 239(a)(1)
provides that in removal proceedings under section 240, written notice
(referred to as a notice to appear) shall be given in person to the alien or, if
personal service is not practicable, through service by mail to the alien or the
alien's counsel of record and shall specify the following: the nature of the
proceedings against the alien; the legal authority under which the proceedings
are conducted; the acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of the law; the
charges against the alien and the statutory provisions alleged to have been
violated; the right to be represented by counsel; the requirement that the alien
must immediately provide the Attorney General with a written record of any
address and telephone number (if any) at which the alien may be contacted;
the requirement that the alien must provide the Attorney General immediately
with a written record of any change of the alien's address or telephone number;
the consequences under section 240(b)(5) of failure to provide address and
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telephone information; the time and place at which the proceeding will be
held; the consequences under section 240(b)(5) of the failure, except under
exceptional circumstances, to appear at such proceedings.
2. Section 239(a)(2)(A) provides that in the case of any change or postponement
in the time and place of such proceedings, a written notice shall be given in
person to the alien (or, if personal service is not practicable, through service
by mail to the alien or to the alien's counsel of record, if any) specifying the
new time or place of the proceedings and the consequences under section
240(b)(5) of failing, except under exceptional circumstance, to attend such
proceedings.
a. Exception: Section 239(a)(2)(B) provides that in the case of an alien not
in detention, a written notice shall not be required if the alien has failed
to provide the address required.
3. Securing of counsel.  Section 239(b)(1) provides that in order that an alien be
permitted the opportunity to secure counsel before the first hearing date in
proceedings under section 240, the hearing date shall not be scheduled earlier
than 10 days after the service of the notice to appear, unless the alien requests
in writing an earlier hearing date.
a. Current lists of counsel.  Section 239(b)(2) provides that the Attorney
General shall provide lists (updated not less often than quarterly) of
persons who have indicated their availability to represent pro bono aliens
in proceedings under section 240.
b. Rule of construction.  Section 239(b)(3) states that nothing in section
239(b) may be construed to prevent the Attorney General from
proceeding against an alien pursuant to section 240 if the 10 days has
elapsed and the alien has failed to secure counsel.
c. All of the above would lead to the conclusion that the alien has only 10
days in which to acquire counsel.  However 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1)
provides that an IJ shall advise a respondent of the right to be
represented and to determine if the alien desires representation.  If the
alien desires representation, the hearing is to be continued to allow him
to seek counsel.  See Matter of Michel, 21 I&N Dec. 1101 (BIA 1998).
d. In Picca v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit held
that, under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a), an IJ has an affirmative duty to notify
the alien in proceedings that free legal services are available, and to
ascertain that the alien has received a list of such services.  No showing
of prejudice is required for remand if an IJ fails to comply with 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.10(a). Id. at 79. In addition, the mailing of a list of free legal
service providers to an alien does not satisfy 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a), as
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“it is the IJ who must advise immigrants of the availability of free legal
services,” and “appending a list of legal service organizations to a Notice
to Appear cannot substitute for the requirement that the IJ ascertain that
the respondent has received a list of such programs.” Id.
e. In Ram v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth
Circuit ruled that, for a waiver of counsel to be valid, “an IJ must
generally: (1) inquire specifically as to whether petitioner wishes to
continue without a lawyer; and (2) receive a knowing and voluntary
affirmative response.”
4. Prompt initiation of removal.  Section 239(d)(1) provides that in the case of an
alien who is convicted of an offense which makes the alien deportable, the
Attorney General shall begin any removal proceeding as expeditiously as
possible after the date of the conviction.  However, section 239(d)(2) provides
that section 239(d)(1) shall not be construed to create any substantive or
procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party against the
U.S. or its agencies or officers or any other person.
5. Termination of parole.  The Board held that exclusion proceedings could not
be instituted against a paroled alien who is entitled by regulation to written
notice of the termination of parole until the alien receives such written notice. 
Matter of O, 16 I&N Dec. 344 (BIA 1977).  No definition of the term “parole”
is contained in the Act, the regulations, or any judicial or administrative
decision.  Id.  At the time this decision was made, it appears that the
regulations provided for written notice to all paroled aliens.  The current
regulations provide for termination of parole as follows:
a. Automatic termination under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1)(i) & (ii). Parole is
automatically terminated without written notice:
(1) Upon the paroled alien’s departure from the U.S., or
(2) At the expiration of the time for which parole was authorized.
b. Termination on notice under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2). In all cases not
covered above, parole must be terminated upon written notice to the
alien:
(1) Upon accomplishment of the purpose for which parole was
authorized has been accomplished (apparently upon the happening
of an event rather than upon the expiration of a period of time), or
(2) When the DD or Chief Patrol Agent in charge of the area where the
alien is located determines that neither humanitarian reasons nor
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public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the
U.S.
(3) However, 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i) provides that when a charging
document is served on the alien, the charging document will
constitute written notice of termination of parole, unless otherwise
specified.
(4) 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(ii) also provides that an alien granted parole
into the United States after enactment of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”) for other than the specific
purpose of applying for adjustment of status under section 245A of
the Act shall not be permitted to avail himself of the privilege of
adjustment thereunder.  Failure to abide by this provision through
making such an application will subject the alien to termination of
parole status and institutions of proceedings under sections 235 and
236 (should read 239 and 240) without the written notice of
termination required by 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i).
B. Service of the NTA
1. Section 239(a)(1) provides that in removal proceedings under section 240,
written notice (the NTA) shall be given in person to the alien or, if personal
service is not practicable, through service by mail to the alien or the alien’s
counsel of record.
2. Persons confined.  8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(c)(2)(i) provides that if a person is
confined in a penal or mental institution or hospital and is competent to
understand the nature of the proceedings initiated against him, service shall be
made both on him and the person in charge of the institution or hospital.  If the
confined person is not competent to understand, service shall be made only on
the person in charge of the institution or hospital and such service will be
deemed service on the confined person.
3. Incompetents and minors.  8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(c)(2)(ii) provides that in case of
mental incompetency, whether or not confined in an institution, and in the
case of a minor under 14 years of age, service shall be made upon the person
with whom the incompetent or minor resides.  Whenever possible, service
shall also be made on the near relative, guardian, committee, or friend. 
Nolasco v. Holder, 637 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2011).
a. The Board has reaffirmed that service on an adult is only required when
the minor is under 14 years of age. Matter of Cubor-Cruz, 25 I&N Dec.
470 (BIA 2011).
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b. When a minor is detained by the Service, his residence is the particular
setting in which he is detained because that setting is the alien’s actual
dwelling place. Matter of Amaya, 21 I&N Dec. 583 (BIA 1996).
Therefore, service of an OSC was held to be properly made on the
director of the facility in which the minor is detained. Id.
c. A minor respondent, who could not be expected to attend immigration
proceedings on her own, was properly notified of her hearing, through
proper mailing of a Notice to Appear (Form I-862) to the last address
provided by her parent, with whom she was residing.  Matter of Gomez-
Gomez, 23 I&N Dec. 522 (BIA 2002).  Although the headnote states that
the NTA was served by mail, the decision indicates it was personally
served and the notice of the hearing was served by mail.
d. The regulations governing service of a NTA on a minor respondent do
not explicitly require service on the parent or parents in all
circumstances. Matter of Mejia-Andino, 23 I&N Dec. 533, 536 (BIA
2002). If a minor respondent’s parents are not present in the U.S., service
on an uncle or other near relative accompanying the child may suffice. Id
However, when it appears that the minor child will be residing with her
parents in the U.S., the regulation requires service on the parents,
whenever possible, in addition to service that may be made on an
accompanying adult or more distant relative. Id. Therefore, removal
proceedings against a minor under 14 years of age were properly
terminated because service of the NTA failed to meet the requirements
of 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(c)(2)(ii), as it was served only on a person
identified as the respondent’s uncle, and no effort was made to serve the
notice on the respondent’s parents, who apparently live in the U.S.  Id.
(1) Note: The Ninth Circuit has held that when the Government
releases a minor alien into an adult’s custody pursuant to its
juvenile release and notice regulations, it must serve notice of the
alien’s rights and responsibilities upon that adult if the alien is
under 18.  Flores-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.
2004); but see Matter of Cubor-Cruz, 25 I&N Dec. 470 (BIA
2011).  
(2) Note: The Second Circuit has held that when DHS fails to properly
serve the NTA pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(c)(2)(ii), that failure
implicates a minor’s fundamental rights only where the minor was
prevented from receiving notice of the NTA and a meaningful
opportunity to participate in the minor’s removal proceedings.
Nolasco v. Holder, 637 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2011).
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4. Section 239(c) provides that service by mail of the NTA shall be sufficient if
there is proof of attempted delivery to the last address provided by the alien in
accordance with section 239(a)(1)(F).
5. The violation of former 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(c) which requires that the contents of
an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) be explained to an alien under certain
circumstances when the OSC is served, does not necessarily result in prejudice
to the alien. Matter of Hernandez, 21 I&N Dec. 224 (BIA 1996). The
explanation requirement of the regulation is not jurisdictional. Id. at 226. As
long as the statutory requirements regarding the OSC and notice of deportation
proceedings are satisfied and the alien appears for the scheduled hearing,
service of the OSC without explanation of its contents by INS is sufficient to
confer the IJ with jurisdiction over the alien. Id. Where an alien raises the
issue of violation of the explanation requirements of the regulation and the IJ
finds that the alien was prejudiced by such violation, the IJ, where possible,
can and should take corrective action short of termination of the proceedings.
Id. at 228.
C. Cancellation of the NTA, motions to dismiss and remand, and termination by the IJ
1. Cancellation of the NTA
a. 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(a) provides that any officer authorized by 8 C.F.R. §
239.1(a) to issue a NTA may cancel such notice prior to jurisdiction
vesting with the IJ provided the officer is satisfied that:
(1) The respondent is a national of the U.S.;
(2) The respondent is not deportable or inadmissible under
immigration laws;
(3) The respondent is deceased;
(4) The respondent is not in the U.S.;
(5) The NTA was issued for the respondent’s failure to file a timely
petition as required by section 216(c) of the Act, but the failure to
file was excused in accordance with section 216(d)(2)(B) of the
Act;
(6) The NTA was improvidently issued; or
(7) Circumstances of the case have changed after the NTA was issued
to such an extent that continuation is no longer in the best interest
of the government.
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b. A decision by the INS to institute removal or other proceedings, or to
cancel a NTA or other charging document before jurisdiction vests with
the IJ, involves the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and is not a
decision that the IJ or the Board may review.  Matter of G-N-C-, 22 I&N
Dec. 281 (BIA 1998).
2. Motion to dismiss.  8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c) provides that after commencement of
proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14, the Service may move for dismissal of
the matter on the grounds set forth above.  Dismissal of the matter shall be
without prejudice to the alien or the Service.
a. Once the charging document is filed with the Immigration Court and
jurisdiction is vested in the IJ, the Service may move to dismiss the
proceedings, but it may not simply cancel the charging document. 
Matter of G-N-C-, 22 I&N Dec. 281 (BIA 1998).
b. The IJ is not required to terminate proceedings upon the Service’s
invocation of prosecutorial discretion but rather must adjudicate the
motion on the merits.  Matter of G-N-C-, 22 I&N Dec. 281 (BIA 1998).
3. Motion for remand.  8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(d) provides that after commencement
of the hearing, the Service may move for remand of the matter to district
jurisdiction on the ground that the foreign relations of the U.S. are involved
and require further consideration.  Remand of the matter shall be without
prejudice to the alien or the Service.
4. Termination by IJ.  8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) provides that an IJ may terminate
removal proceedings to permit the alien to proceed to a final hearing on a
pending application or petition for naturalization when the alien has
established prima facie eligibility for naturalization and the matter involves
exceptionally appealing or humanitarian factors; in every other case, the
removal hearing shall be completed as promptly as possible notwithstanding
the pendency of an application for naturalization during any state of the
proceedings.
a. The Board held that: (1) because the Board and the IJs lack jurisdiction
to adjudicate applications for naturalization, removal proceedings may
only be terminated pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) where DHS has
presented an affirmative communication attesting to an alien’s prima
facie eligibility for naturalization; and (2) an adjudication by DHS on the
merits of an alien’s naturalization application while removal proceedings
are pending is not an affirmative communication of the alien’s prima
facie eligibility for naturalization that would permit termination of
proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f).  Matter of Acosta Hidalgo, 24
I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2007). But see Perriello v. Napolitano, 579 F.3d 135
(2d Cir. 2009).
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D. Hearing in removal proceedings
1. Section 240(a)(1) provides that an IJ shall conduct proceedings for deciding
the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.
2. Charges.  Section 240(a)(2) provides that an alien placed in removal
proceedings may be charged with any applicable ground of inadmissibility
under section 212(a) or any applicable ground of deportability under section
237(a).
3. Exclusive procedures.  Section 240(a)(3) provides that, unless otherwise
specified in the Act, removal proceedings under section 240 shall be the sole
and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to
the U.S. or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the U.S. 
However, nothing in section 240(a)(3) shall affect proceedings conducted
pursuant to section 238 (expedited removal).
4. Authority of IJ.  Section 240(b)(1) provides that the IJ shall administer oaths,
receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and
any witnesses.  The IJ may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses
and presentation of evidence.  The IJ shall have authority (under regulations
prescribed by the Attorney General) to sanction by civil money penalty any
action (or inaction) in contempt of the IJ’s proper exercise of authority.
a. For information regarding subpoenas, see 8 C.F.R. § 1287.4.
b. Regulations regarding contempt power have yet to be enacted.
c. The IJ has authority to set filing deadlines for applications and related
documents and an application or document that is not filed within the
time established by the IJ may be deemed waived.  8 C.F.R. §
1003.31(c).  Where an application is timely filed but related documents
are not timely filed, the proper course for the IJ is to deem the alien’s
opportunity to file these documents waived and to determine what effect
the failure to present them had on his ability to meet his burden of
establishing that he is eligible for the relief sought.  Matter of Interiano-
Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264 (BIA 2010).  The regulations do not permit an IJ
to deem a timely filed application abandoned for failure to file
supplemental documents within a specified time.  Id. 
5. Form of proceeding.  Section 240(b)(2)(A) provides that the proceeding may
take place in person, where agreed upon by the parties in the absence of the
alien, through video conference, or through telephone conference.  However,
section 240(b)(2)(B) provides that an evidentiary hearing on the merits may
only be conducted through a telephone conference with the consent of the
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alien involved after the alien has been advised of the right to proceed in person
or through video conference.
6. Presence of alien.  Section 240(b)(3) provides that if it is impracticable by
reason of an alien’s mental incompetency for the alien to be present at the
proceeding, the Attorney General shall prescribe safeguards to protect the
rights and privileges of the alien.  See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 474
(BIA 2011).
7. Alien’s rights in proceeding.  Section 240(b)(4) provides that in proceedings
under section 240, under regulations of the Attorney General, the alien shall
have the privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by
counsel of the alien’s choosing who is authorized to practice in such
proceedings, the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the
evidence against  the alien, to present evidence on the alien’s own behalf, and
to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government but these rights shall
not entitle the alien to examine such national security information as the
Government may proffer in opposition to the alien’s admission to the U.S. or
to an application by the alien for discretionary relief.
8. Record.  Section 240(b)(4)(C) provides that a complete record shall be kept of
all testimony and evidence produced at the hearing.
9. Pleading by respondent.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c) provides that the IJ shall
require the respondent to plead to the NTA by stating whether he admits or
denies the factual allegations and his removability under the charges contained
in the NTA.
a. If the respondent admits the factual allegations and his removability
under the charges and the IJ is satisfied that no issue of law or fact
remain, the IJ may determine that removability as charged has been
established by the admissions of the respondent.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c).
b. The IJ shall not accept an admission of removability from an
unrepresented respondent who is incompetent or under the age of 18 and
is not accompanied by an attorney or legal representative, a near relative,
legal guardian, or friend; nor from an officer of an institution in which a
respondent is an inmate or patient.  When the IJ does not accept an
admission of removability, he shall direct a hearing on the issues.  8
C.F.R. § 1240.10(c).
(1) The Board established standards regarding incompetency in
removal proceedings in Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 474 (BIA
2011). The Board held that aliens in proceedings are presumed to
be competent and that, “[a]bsent indicia of mental incompetency,
an Immigration Judge is under no obligation to analyze an alien’s
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competency.” Id. at 477. The Board established that the test for
determining whether an alien is competent to participate in
immigration proceedings is (1) whether he or she has a rational and
factual understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings,
(2) whether he or she can consult with the attorney or
representative if there is one, and (3) whether he or she has a
reasonable opportunity to examine and present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses. Id. at 479. “When there are indicia of
incompetency, an Immigration Judge must take measures to
determine whether a respondent is competent to participate in
proceedings.” Id. at 480. The IJ may do this by modifying the
questions posed, asking about medications, arranging for a mental
competency evaluation, permitting a family member to assist the
respondent, or manage cases to facilitate the respondent’s ability to
obtain treatment or representation. Id. at 480-81. If the IJ
determines that the respondent lacks sufficient competency to
proceed with the hearing, the IJ shall determine which safeguards
are appropriate. Id. at 481-82.
(2) Minors.  Although an IJ could not accept an admission to a charge
of deportability from an unaccompanied and unrepresented minor,
the Board held that an IJ is not precluded from accepting a minor's
admissions of factual allegations, which may properly form the
sole basis of a finding that such a minor is deportable.  Matter of
Amaya, 21 I&N Dec. 583 (BIA 1996).  However, when an
unaccompanied and unrepresented minor admits to the factual
allegations made against him, the IJ must take into consideration
the minor’s age and pro se status in determining whether the
minor’s testimony is reliable and whether he understands the facts
that are admitted so that his deportability is established by clear,
convincing, and unequivocal evidence.  Id.
(3) The Immigration and Naturalization Service met its burden of
establishing a minor respondent’s deportability for entry without
inspection by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence, where
(1) a Record of Deportable Alien (Form I-213) was submitted,
documenting the respondent’s identity and alienage; (2) the
respondent, who failed without good cause to appear at his
deportation hearing, made no challenge to the admissibility of the
Form I-213; and (3) there were no grounds for a finding that the
admission of the Form I-213 would be fundamentally unfair. 
Matter of Ponce-Hernandez, 22 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 1999).
10. Country of removal
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a. In general.  The term “country” means a foreign place with “territory” in
a geographical sense and a “government” in the sense of a political
organization exercising power over people subject to its jurisdiction.
Matter of Linnas, 19 I&N Dec. 302 (BIA 1985). Therefore, an alien may
not designate an office of his government that is within the U.S. Id.
b. Arriving aliens
(1) Section 241(b)(1)(A) of the Act provides that an alien who arrives
at the U.S. and against whom removal proceedings were initiated at
the time of arrival shall be removed to the country in which the
alien boarded the vessel or aircraft on which the alien arrived in the
U.S.
(2) Section 241(b)(1)(B) of the Act provides that if the alien boarded
the vessel or aircraft in a foreign territory contiguous to the U.S.,
an island adjacent to the U.S., or an island adjacent to a foreign
territory contiguous to the U.S., and the alien is not a native,
citizen, subject, or national of, or does not reside in, the territory or
island, removal shall be to the country in which the alien boarded
the vessel that transported the alien to the territory or island.
(3) Section 241(b)(1)(C) of the Act provides that if the government of
the country designated in sections 241(b)(1)(A) or (B) is unwilling
to accept the alien into its territory, removal shall be to the
following countries, as directed by the Attorney General:
(a) The country of which the alien is a citizen, subject, or
national;
(b) The country in which the alien was born;
(c) The country in which the alien has a residence;
(d) A country with a government that will accept the alien if
removal to each country above is impracticable, inadvisable,
or impossible.
c. All other aliens
(1) Section 241(b)(2)(A) of the Act provides that an alien who has
been ordered removed and who is not an arriving alien (section
241(b)(1)) may designate one country to which he wants to be
removed and the Attorney General shall remove the alien to the
country designated.
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(2) 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(f) provides that the IJ shall notify the alien that
if he is finally ordered removed, the country of removal will in the
first instance be directed pursuant to section 241(b) to the country
designated by the alien, unless section 241(b)(2)(C) applies, and
shall afford him the opportunity then and there to make such
designation.
(3) Section 241(b)(2)(B) of the Act provides that an alien may
designate a foreign territory contiguous to the U.S., an adjacent
island, or an island adjacent to a foreign territory contiguous to the
U.S. only if the alien is a native, citizen, subject, or national of, or
has resided in, that designated territory or island.
(4) Section 241(b)(2)(E) permits the Attorney General to remove an
alien to any of the following countries:
(a) The country from which the alien was admitted to the United
States;
(b) The country in which is located the foreign port from which
the alien left for the United States or for a foreign territory
contiguous to the United States;
(c) A country in which the alien resided before the alien entered
the country from which the alien entered the United States;
(d) The country in which the alien was born;
(e) The country that had sovereignty over the alien’s birthplace
when the alien was born;
(f) The country in which the alien’s birthplace is located when
the alien is ordered removed;
(g) If impracticable, inadvisable or impossible to remove the
alien to these countries, another country whose government
will accept the alien into that country.
(h) Note: The Supreme Court has held that section 241(b)(2)(E)
permits an alien to be removed to a country without advance
consent of that country’s government, except as provided in
section 241(b)(2)(E)(vii).  Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335 (2005).
d. Foreign contiguous territory and adjacent islands.  Foreign contiguous
territory is, of course, Canada and Mexico.  The term “adjacent islands”
(defined in section 101(b)(5) of the Act) includes:
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(1) Saint Pierre
(2) Miquelon
(3) Cuba
(4) the Dominican Republic
(5) Haiti
(6) Bermuda
(7) the Bahamas
(8) Barbados
(9) Jamaica
(10) the Windward & Leeward Islands
(11) Trinidad
(12) Martinique
(13) other British, French, & Netherlands territory in or bordering on
the Caribbean Sea.
11. Motion to Continue
a. In Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785 (BIA 2009), the Board
articulated five factors that an IJ should consider when determining
whether to continue proceedings to afford the respondent an opportunity
to apply for adjustment of status premised on a pending family-based
visa petition. The factors are: “(1) the DHS response to the motion; (2)
whether the underlying visa petition is prima facie approvable; (3) the
respondent’s statutory eligibility for adjustment of status; (4) whether the
respondent’s application for adjustment [of status] merits a favorable
exercise of discretion; and (5) the reason for the continuance and other
procedural factors.” 24 I&N Dec. at 790.  The Board made clear that
where DHS does not oppose the continuance, “the proceedings
ordinarily should be continued by the Immigration Judge in the absence
of unusual, clearly identified, and supported reasons for not doing so.”
Id. at 791.  In holding that the decision to grant a continuance was a
discretionary one, the Board noted that “[f]actors relevant to determining
whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted include, but are
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not limited to, the existence of family ties in the United States; the length
of the respondent's residence in the United States; the hardship of
traveling abroad; and the respondent's immigration history, including any
preconceived intent to immigrate at the time of entering as a
nonimmigrant.”  Id. at 793.
b. In Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127 (BIA 2009) the Board articulated
the factors an IJ should consider in determining whether good cause
exists to continue removal proceedings to allow adjudication of an
employment-based visa petition or labor certification.  In determining
whether good cause exists to continue proceedings, the IJ should
determine the alien’s place in the adjustment of status process and
consider and balance the factors identified in Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N
Dec. 785 (BIA 2009) (see above) and any other relevant considerations.
Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. at 130.  An alien’s unopposed motion to continue
ongoing removal proceedings to await adjudication of a pending
employment-based visa petition should generally be granted if approval
of the visa petition would render him prima facie eligible for adjustment
of status.  Id.  However, the pendency of a labor certification is generally
not sufficient to warrant a grant of a continuance.  Id. at 137.
12. Decision.  Section 240(c)(1)(A) provides that at the conclusion of the
proceeding the IJ shall decide whether an alien is removable from the U.S. 
The IJ’s determination shall be based only on the evidence produced at the
hearing.  Section 240(c)(1)(B) provides that if a medical officer or civil
surgeon or board of medical officers has certified under section 232(b) that an
alien has a disease, illness, or addiction which would make the alien
inadmissible under section 212(a)(1), the IJ’s decision shall be based solely
upon such certification.
a. A summary decision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12(b) may properly be
issued by an IJ in removal proceedings in lieu of an oral or written
decision only when the respondent has expressly admitted to both the
factual allegations and the charges of removability; and, either the
respondent’s ineligibility for any form of relief is clearly established on
the pleadings; or, after appropriate advisement of and opportunity to
apply for any form of relief for which it appears from the pleadings that
he or she may be eligible, the respondent chooses not to apply for relief
or applies only for, and is granted, the relief of voluntary departure. 
Matter of A-P-, 22 I&N Dec. 468 (BIA 1999).
b. A remand of the record for issuance of a full and separate decision
apprising the parties of the legal basis of the IJ’s decision is not required
under Matter of A-P-, 22 I&N Dec. 468 (BIA 1999), where the
respondent had notice of the factual and legal basis of the decision and
had an adequate opportunity to contest them on appeal, the uncontested
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facts established at the hearing are dispositive of the issues raised on
appeal, and the hearing was fundamentally fair.  Matter of Rodriguez-
Carillo, 22 I&N Dec. 1031 (BIA 1999).
c. Section 240(c)(5) provides that if the IJ decides that the alien is
removable and orders the alien to be removed, the IJ shall inform the
alien of the right to appeal that decision and of the consequences for
failure to depart under the order of removal, including civil and criminal
penalties.
d. The Board has held that, if an IJ includes an attachment to a decision,
“particular care must be taken to insure that a complete record is
preserved.”  Matter of Kelly, 24 I&N Dec. 446, 447 (BIA 2008).  In
particular, (1) the attachment should include the respondent’s name and
A-number, and the decision date; (2) the attachment should be appended
to the written memorandum summarizing the oral decision (which
should reflect that there is an attachment); (3) the IJ should state on the
record at the time of the oral decision that he or she will append an
attachment to the decision; (4) a copy of the attachment should be
provided to the parties; and (5) the parties should be given the
opportunity to make any objections to the use of an attachment. Id.
Finally, the Board noted that “it is the [IJ’s] responsibility to insure that
the decision in the record is complete.”  Id.
E. Failure to appear - in absentia hearings
1. INTRODUCTION - The Due Process Clause protects aliens in removal
proceedings and includes the right to a full and fair hearing.  Notice of
proceedings is an important component of any legal process.  An elementary
and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprize interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections. The notice must be of such nature as
reasonably to convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable
time for those interested to make their appearance.  Matter of M-D-, 23 I&N
Dec. 540 (BIA 2002) (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)).
a. Personal service clearly is adequate notice.  Matter of M-D-, 23 I&N
Dec. 540 (BIA 2002).
2. History lesson - Prior to 1992, the Act provided only that “the alien shall be
given notice, reasonable under all the circumstances, of the nature of the
charges against him and of the time and place at which the proceedings will be
held.”  Former INA § 242(b)(1).
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a. The Act was amended in 1990 by adding section 242B, governing
deportation proceedings.  Effective as to any Order to Show Cause
served after June 13, 1992, section 242B stated that with regard to both
an Order to Show Cause and a notice of the time and place of
proceedings, “written notice shall be given in person to the alien (or, if
personal service is not practicable, such notice shall be given by certified
mail to the alien or to the alien’s counsel of record, if any).” Therefore,
at that time, certified mail was made the required method of notification
if personal service was not practicable (and it remains so for deportation
proceedings).  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13.
b. The Board determined that under former section 242B(a)(1) of the Act
(effective on June 13, 1992), if personal service is not practicable, an
OSC must be served by certified mail and the certified mail receipt must
be signed by the respondent or a responsible person at the respondent’s
address.  Matter of Grijalva, 21 I&N Dec. 27 (BIA 1995) (citing Matter
of Huete, 20 I&N Dec. 250 (BIA 1991), superseded by statute as stated
in Nibagwire v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 2006), for a similar
requirement prior to the enactment of section 242B(a)(1)). With regard
to the notice of hearing under section 242B(a)(2), Matter of Grijalva
found no requirement that the certified mail return receipt be signed, so
long as there was proof of attempted delivery. It also established a
presumption that the Postal Service has, in fact, attempted to deliver
certified mail, even in cases where the item is returned unclaimed. Thus,
in deportation proceedings under section 242B, attempted delivery by
certified mail is sufficient to meet the notice requirements of the Act.  Id. 
Furthermore, the presumption of effective service can only be overcome
by the affirmative defense of nondelivery or improper delivery by the
Postal Service if the respondent presents substantial and probative
evidence demonstrating that there was improper delivery.  Id.  
3. PRESENT LAW - The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) changed the procedures with regard to
notification of proceedings. In removal proceedings, the statute now provides
that “written notice . . . shall be given in person to the alien (or, if personal
service is not practicable, through service by mail to the alien or to the alien’s
counsel of record, if any).”  Section 239(c) of the Act provides that service by
mail under this section shall be sufficient if there is proof of attempted
delivery to the last address provided by the alien in accordance with section
239(a)(1)(F) of the Act.  No particular method of mailing is specified.
Although the Act no longer requires that notice be sent by certified mail,
service by certified mail is not expressly disapproved.  The applicable
regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13 state, in part: “Service means physically
presenting or mailing a document to the appropriate party or parties; except
that an Order to Show Cause or Notice of Deportation Hearing shall be served
in person to the alien, or by certified mail to the alien or the alien’s attorney
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and a Notice to Appear or Notice of Removal Hearing shall be served to the
alien in person, or if personal service is not practicable, shall be served by
regular mail to the alien or the alien’s attorney of record.”
a. Under section 240(b)(5)(A) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.26(c), an IJ
is required to order an alien removed in absentia if the Service
establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the alien
is removable and that written notice of the time and place of proceedings
and of the consequences of failure to appear were provided to the alien
or to counsel of record.  Written notice is considered sufficient if it was
provided at the most recent address given by the alien.
b. In Perez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit
held that an alien “who arrives late for his immigration hearing, but
while the IJ is still in the courtroom, has not failed to appear for that
hearing.”  The petitioner, who had been ordered removed in absentia,
was scheduled for a 9:00 hearing but arrived at 11:00, at which time the
IJ was “still on the bench.”
c. In Hamazaspyan v. Holder, 590 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth
Circuit held that, under INA section 239, it is insufficient to serve a
hearing notice on an alien, but not the alien’s counsel of record. The
court further held that an in absentia order of removal must be rescinded
if the government sent notice of the time and place of the removal
hearing by mail to an address provided by the alien but, (1) there is not
proof the alien received actual notice; (2) the alien proved he is
represented by counsel who filed a notice of appearance as counsel of
record with the immigration court before such notice was sent; and (3)
the government did not prove that it sent notice to the alien’s counsel of
record.  
d. In Matter of Munoz-Santos, 20 I&N Dec. 205 (BIA 1990), the Board
found that notice of the hearing was properly served by regular mail
where the regulation did not require any particular form of service and
notice was sent to the last known address provided by the unrepresented
respondent. On the other hand, in  Matter of Peugnet, 20 I&N Dec. 233
(BIA 1991), the Board held that a deportation hearing could not proceed
in absentia where the Order to Show Cause was sent to the alien’s
address by regular mail, but the alien failed to appear for the hearing or
to acknowledge that she received the OSC, which was not re-served by
personal service, as required by 8 C.F.R.  § 242.1(c) (1990).  NOTE: The
regulations no longer require personal service if the alien is served by
regular mail and fails to appear.
(1) That decision also adopted, for purposes of deportation
proceedings, a definition of personal service that was applicable to
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proceedings before Service officers under 8 C.F.R. §
103.5a(a)(2)(iv) (1990), which included certified mail as a form of
personal service. The Board stated that it has not adopted this
definition for purposes of removal proceedings.
e. In removal proceedings, the Board held that an in absentia order may
only be entered where the alien has received, or can be charged with
receiving, a Notice to Appear informing him or her of the consequences
of failing to provide a current address under section 239(a)(1)(F) of the
Act.  Matter of G-Y-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 181 (BIA 2001).  In that case the
issue turned on whether the NTA, which was sent to the respondent by
certified mail and returned unclaimed, constituted constructive notice
where the address was obtained from an asylum application that was
several years old. The Board concluded that it was improper to rely on
an old address obtained in another proceeding, and that it was
inappropriate to enter an in absentia order of removal where the record
reflected that the alien did not receive, or could not be charged with
receiving, the NTA.
f. In Matter of M-D-, 23 I&N Dec. 540 (BIA 2002), the Board
distinguished Matter of G-Y-R- as follows: “Unlike the present case,
Matter of G-Y-R- involved a situation where there was a dispute over
whether the notice had been mailed to the correct address.  Matter of G-
Y-R-, however, is instructive for making the point that the alien need not
personally receive, read, and understand the NTA for the notice
requirements to be satisfied. As we noted in Matter of G-Y-R-, ‘An alien
can, in certain circumstances, be properly charged with receiving notice,
even though he or she did not personally see the mailed document. If, for
example, the Notice to Appear reaches the correct address but does not
reach the alien through some failure in the internal workings of the
household, the alien can be charged with receiving proper notice, and
proper notice will have been effected.’  The case before us is similar to
Matter of G-Y-R- in that the respondent was served by certified mail at
an address obtained from an asylum application. Importantly, however,
there is no dispute here regarding the correct address. The respondent
had provided the address only a few weeks before the hearing, and he
admits that he was living at that address when the Notice to Appear was
mailed. Unlike our decision in  Matter of G-Y-R-, the issue in the
present case is whether the respondent can be charged with receiving the
Notice to Appear.”  23 I&N Dec. at 545 (emphasis in original).
g. The statute only generally provides for the use of “service by mail.”
Although the Board interpreted the statute to allow service by regular
mail, it did not read the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 3.13 (now 8 C.F.R. §
1003.13) as conferring on an alien a right to require the use of regular
mail instead of certified mail. The regulation provides for the use of
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regular mail as a convenience to the Service, not as a mandate to use
regular mail instead of certified mail. The Service and the Immigration
Courts routinely use certified mail instead of regular mail in many
instances, although the degree of the use of certified mail varies from
region to region. The Board declined to hold that the use of certified
mail in such instances is not allowed by the language of 8 C.F.R. § 3.13
(now 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13) when the Act does not specify one form of
mailing over another.  Matter of M-D-, 23 I&N Dec. 540 (BIA 2002).
h. As a general matter, the law recognizes a presumption that “[a] letter
properly addressed, stamped and mailed is presumed to have been duly
delivered to the addressee.”  Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Schaffer, 731
F.2d 1134, 1137 n.6 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting C. McCormick,
McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 343 (1972)).
Moreover, the presumption is especially strong when the delivery is by
certified mail, and clear and convincing evidence is required to
overcome the presumption.  Id. at 1137 n.6. Certified mail has always
carried inherent reliability, and its use by other Federal Government
agencies has been upheld. E.g., Patmon and Young Professional Corp. v.
Commissioner, 55 F.3d 216 (6th Cir. 1995); Eschweiler v. United States,
946 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1991).  Proof that the notice was sent by certified
mail creates a rebuttable presumption of adequate notice, which an alien
may overcome through evidence that the Post Office had not attempted
delivery or had conducted delivery improperly.  Fuentes-Argueta v. INS,
101 F.3d 867 (2d Cir. 1996); Arrieta v. INS, 117 F.3d 429, 431 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that certified mail is sufficient even if no one signs for
it.)  It is not reasonable to allow the respondent to defeat service by
neglecting or refusing to collect his mail.  However, the Second, Third,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have held that where a respondent actually
initiates a proceeding to obtain a benefit, appears at an earlier hearing,
and has no motive to avoid the hearing, a sworn affidavit from the
respondent that neither she nor a responsible party residing at her
address received the notice should ordinarily be sufficient to rebut the
presumption of delivery and entitle the respondent to an evidentiary
hearing to consider the veracity of her allegations.  Lopes v. Mukasey,
517 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2008); Santana Gonzalez v. Att’y Gen., 506 F.3d
274 (3d Cir. 2007); Ghounem v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2004);
Salta v. INS, 314 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2002).  The Ninth Circuit went
further in Sembiring v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2007),
holding that “a sworn affidavit was not required to establish that [the
petitioner] did not receive notice,” given that “[t]he test for whether an
alien has produced sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of
effective service by regular mail is practical and commonsensical rather
than rigidly formulaic.”  
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i. In Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I&N Dec. 665 (BIA 2008), the Board held that
when an NTA or hearing notice is properly addressed and sent by regular
mail according to normal office procedures, there is a presumption of
delivery, but it is weaker than the presumption that applies to documents
sent by certified mail.  The Board stated that when an IJ adjudicates a
motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order of removal based on a
claim that a notice sent by regular mail to the most recent address
provided was not received, all relevant evidence submitted to overcome
the weaker presumption of delivery must be considered. Id.  In the case
at issue, the Board held that the respondent overcame the presumption of
delivery of a hearing notice that was sent by regular mail where he
submitted affidavits indicating that he did not receive the notice, had
previously filed an asylum application and appeared for his first removal
hearing, and exercised due diligence in promptly obtaining counsel and
requesting reopening of the proceedings. Id.
j. In Matter of C-R-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 677 (BIA 2008), the Board elaborated
on the standard it announced in Matter of M-R-A-.  In Matter of C-R-C-,
the Board remanded from the denial of the respondent's motion to reopen
to rescind an in absentia order in a case where the respondent failed to
appear at an Immigration Court hearing after a Notice to Appear was
sent by regular mail. Id. In ruling that the respondent overcame the lower
presumption of delivery of Matter of M-R-A-, the Board cited the
following facts as relevant: (1) “the respondent submitted an affidavit
alleging that he did not receive the Notice to Appear;” (2) the respondent
had affirmatively applied for asylum with DHS, “thereby initiating a
proceeding to obtain a benefit, which would give him an incentive to
appear;” (3) the respondent had “complied with his Fingerprint
Notification;” and (4) “the respondent immediately sought assistance
from his current counsel after receiving the Immigration Judge’s in
absentia order of removal, and he promptly filed a motion to reopen.” Id.
at 680.
4. Section 240(b)(5)(A) provides that any alien who, after written notice required
under section 239(a)(1) or (2) has been provided to the alien or alien's counsel
of record, does not attend a proceeding under section 240, shall be ordered
removed in absentia if the Service establishes by clear, unequivocal, and
convincing evidence that the written notice was so provided and that the alien
is removable.  The written notice by the Attorney General shall be considered
sufficient if provided at the most recent address provided under section
239(a)(1)(F).  Section 240(b)(5)(B) provides that no written notice shall be
required under section 240(b)(5)(A) if the alien has failed to provide the
address required under section 239(a)(1)(F).
a. When an alien fails to appear at removal proceedings for which notice of
the hearing was served by mail, an in absentia order may only be entered
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where the alien has received, or can be charged with receiving, a Notice
to Appear informing the alien of the statutory address obligations
associated with removal proceedings and of the consequences of failing
to provide a current address, pursuant to section 239(a)(1)(F) of the Act. 
Matter of G-Y-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 181 (BIA 2001).  Entry of an in absentia
order of removal is inappropriate where the record reflects that the alien
did not receive, or could not be charged with receiving, the Notice to
Appear that was served by certified mail at an address obtained from
documents filed with the Service several years earlier.  Id.
b. A minor respondent, who could not be expected to attend immigration
proceedings on her own, was properly notified of her hearing, through
proper mailing of a Notice to Appear (Form I-862) to the last address
provided by her parent, with whom she was residing.  Matter of Gomez-
Gomez, 23 I&N Dec. 522 (BIA 2002).  Although the headnote states that
the NTA was served by mail, the decision indicates it was personally
served and the notice of the hearing was served by mail.  The Board also
stated, “we believe it is implicit in the statute and regulations dealing
with notice that an adult relative who receives notice on behalf of a
minor alien bears the responsibility to assure that the minor appears for
the hearing, as required.” Id. at 528.
5.  Recission of a removal order rendered in absentia
a. An in absentia order of removal may be rescinded only at any time upon
a showing of lack of notice or that the alien was in Federal or State
custody.  A motion to reopen and rescind an in absentia order may be
filed within 180 days after the date of the order of removal if the alien
demonstrates that the failure to appear was because of exceptional
circumstances.  INA § 240(b)(5)(C)(i). See pages 348-350 below for
discussion of motions to reopen and rescind in absentia order. 
6. Aliens in contiguous territory. Section 240(b)(5)(E) provide that the notice and
in absentia provisions of section 240 shall apply to all aliens placed in
proceedings under section 240, including any alien who remains in a
contiguous foreign territory pursuant to section 235(b)(2)(C).  This provision
appears to change the conclusion reached in Matter of Sanchez, 21 I&N Dec.
444 (BIA 1996).
7. Limitation on discretionary relief for failure to appear.  Section 240(b)(7)
provides that any alien against whom a final order of removal is entered in
absentia and who, at the time of the notice described in section 239(a)(1) or
(2) was provided oral notice, either in the alien’s native language or in another
language the alien understands, of the time and place of the proceedings and
of the consequences of failing, other than because of exceptional
circumstances, to attend a proceeding under section 240, shall not be eligible
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for relief under section 240A, 240B, 245, 248, or 249 for a period of 10 years
after the date of the entry of the final order of removal.
F. Stipulated removal
1. The Attorney General shall provide by regulation for the entry by an IJ of an
order of removal stipulated to by the alien (or the alien's representative) and
the service. INA § 240(d).  A stipulated order shall constitute a conclusive
determination of the alien's removability from the U.S.  Id.
G. Methods of removal not involving an IJ
1. Expedited removal of aliens convicted of aggravated felonies.  Section 238(b)
of the Act provides for the removal of aliens who are not LPRs and who have
been convicted of aggravated felonies.
a. The procedure for such removal is set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1238.1.
2. Expedited removal of other aliens.  8 C.F.R. 1235.3(b)(1) provides that the
expedited removal procedure shall apply to the following classes of aliens:
a. Arriving aliens inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) and section
212(a)(7) except for citizens of Cuba arriving at a U.S. port-of-entry by
aircraft.
b. Subject to designation by the Commissioner, aliens arriving, attempting
to enter, or who have entered the U.S. without being admitted or paroled
by an immigration officer who have not established to the satisfaction of
the immigration officer that they have been physically present in the U.S.
for 2 years immediately prior to the determination of inadmissibility.
(1) On November 13, 2002, the Commissioner designated all aliens
who arrive in the U.S. on or after November 13, 2002 by sea who
are not admitted or paroled and who have not been physically
present in the U.S. for 2 years immediately prior to the
determination of inadmissibility by an immigration officer.  The
Commissioner’s designation does not apply to aliens who arrive at
U.S. ports-of-entry, alien crewmen or stowaways, and Cuban
citizens or nationals who arrive by sea.
3. Reinstatement of removal orders against aliens illegally reentering.  Section
241(a)(5) of the Act provides that if the Attorney General finds that an alien
has reentered the U.S. illegally after having been removed or having departed
voluntarily under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated
from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the
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alien is not eligible for and may not apply for any relief under the Act, and the
alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after reentry.
a. The procedure for reinstatement of removal orders and the exception for
withholding of removal are discussed in 8 C.F.R. § 1241.8.
b. Immigration judges and the Board lack jurisdiction to review a decision
of the Service to reinstate a prior order of removal pursuant to section
241(a)(5) of the Act.  Matter of G-N-C-, 22 I&N Dec. 281 (BIA 1998).
c. The Supreme Court held that section 241(a)(5) of the Act applies to
aliens who reentered the United States before the effective date of
IIRIRA and does not retroactively affect any right of, or impose any
burden, on such aliens.  Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30
(2006).
d. An IJ has no authority to reinstate a prior order of deportation or removal
pursuant to section 241(a)(5), and an alien subject to reinstatement of an
order under section 241(a)(5) has no right to a hearing before an IJ. 
Matter of W-C-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 118 (BIA 2007).  The IJ may properly
terminate proceedings as improvidently begun where the respondent is
subject to reinstatement of a prior order.  Id.  
e. Knowingly using another person’s passport to reenter the United States
following removal constitutes illegal reentry into the United States for
purposes of reinstatement of the prior order of removal. Beekhan v.
Holder, 634 F.3d 723 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 
4. Judicial removal.  Section 238(c)  of the Act provides that a U.S. District2nd
Judge shall have jurisdiction to enter a judicial order of removal at the time of
sentencing an alien who is deportable, if such an order has been requested by
the U.S. Attorney with the concurrence of the Commissioner and if the court
chooses to exercise such jurisdiction.
a. The procedure for judicial removal is set forth in section 238(c) (2) of2nd
the Act.
VII. Relief from Removal
A. Background and Security Investigations in Proceedings Before an IJ
1. In no case shall an IJ grant an application for immigration relief that is subject
to the conduct of identity, law enforcement, or security investigations or
examinations until the Department of Homeland Security has reported to the
IJ that the appropriate investigations or examinations have been completed
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and are current and the Department has reported any relevant information
from the investigations or examinations to the IJ.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(g).
2. Covered forms of relief:
a. Asylum under section 208 of the Act;
b. Adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident under section
209 or 245 of the Act, or any other provision of law;
c. Waiver of inadmissibility or deportability under section 209(c), 212, or
237 of the Act, or any other provision of law;
d. Permanent resident status on a conditional basis or removal of the
conditional bases of permanent resident status under sections 216 or
216A of the Act, or any other provision of law;
e. Cancellation of removal or suspension of deportation under section
240A or former section 244 of the Act, or any other provision of law;
f. Relief from removal under former section 212(c) of the Act;
g. Withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Act or under the
United Nations Convention Against Torture;
h. Registry under section 249 of the Act;
i. Conditional grants relating to the above, such as for applications seeking
asylum pursuant to section 207(a)(5) of the Act, or cancellation of
removal in light of section 240A(e) of the Act.
3. Voluntary Departure is not subject to the background investigations and
security checks requirement.  However, the Department of Homeland Security
may seek a continuance in order to complete pending investigations and the IJ
may grant additional time in the exercise of discretion.
B. Voluntary departure - Section 240B
1. Introduction.  Voluntary departure is a relief from removal which may be
granted by both the INS and by IJs.  If granted, voluntary departure allows the
respondent to depart the U.S. at his own expense and, if he departs within the
time allowed, he is not considered to have been removed.  An alien departing
voluntarily may travel to any country of his choice.  It is not necessary that he
go to the country designated for removal.
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2. Supreme Court decision.  In Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 5 (2008), the
Supreme Court ruled that, when an alien is granted voluntary departure and
then seeks to file a motion to reopen, “the alien must be permitted to
withdraw, unilaterally, a voluntary departure request before expiration of the
departure period, without regard to the underlying merits of the motion to
reopen.”  Here, two days before his voluntary departure period expired, the
petitioner filed a motion to reopen (along with a motion to withdraw his
request for voluntary departure), with the intention of applying for adjustment
of status.  The Board denied the motion to reopen, on the grounds that the
petitioner had overstayed his voluntary departure period and thus was
statutorily barred from adjustment of status.  The Court rejected the
government’s argument that, in the Court’s words, “by requesting and
obtaining permission to voluntarily depart, the alien knowingly surrenders the
opportunity to seek reopening.”  Id. at 14. The Court also rejected the
petitioner’s argument that the voluntary departure period should be tolled
while the motion to reopen is pending. 
3. Motion to reopen or reconsider.  Effective January 20, 2009, a grant of
voluntary departure is automatically terminated upon the filing of a post-
decision motion to reopen or reconsider with the Immigration Court or the
Board within the voluntary departure period, or upon the filing of a petition
for review in a federal court of appeals.  8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.26(b)(3)(iii),
(c)(3)(iii), (e)(1), and (i).  Although the alien no longer has the benefit of
voluntary departure with the filing of a post-decision motion to reopen or
reconsider or a petition for review, the alien is also not subject to the penalties
for failure to depart voluntarily under INA section 240B(d).  8 C.F.R.
§§ 1240.26(b)(3)(iii), (e)(1), and (i).
4. Pre-Conclusion Voluntary Departure - Section 240B(a)
a. In general.  The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to
depart the U.S. at the alien’s own expense in lieu of being subject to
proceedings under section 240 or prior to the completion of such
proceedings, if the alien is not deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)
[convicted of an aggravated felony] or section 237(a)(4)(B) [engaged in
terrorist activities]. INA § 240B(a)(1).
b. When to apply.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)(1)(i)(A) states that the request for
voluntary departure must be made prior to or at the master calendar
hearing at which the case is initially calendared for a merits hearing.
(1) In Matter of Ocampo, 22 I&N Dec. 1301 (BIA 2000), the Board
stated in footnote 2: “We are cognizant that, although the
respondent clearly indicated his interest in voluntary departure at
his first appearance before the Immigration Judge, he did not
actually request that relief until his hearing reconvened at a later
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date.  We do not find this circumstance problematic, however,
because the rescheduling was treated by the parties and the
Immigration Judge as a continuation of the master calendar
hearing.”
c. Voluntary Departure Period.  Permission to depart voluntarily under
section 240B(a)(1) shall not be valid for a period exceeding 120 days.
INA § 240B(a)(2).
d. Bond.  The Attorney General may require an alien permitted to depart
voluntarily under section 240B(a)(1) to post a voluntary departure bond,
to be surrendered upon proof that the alien has departed the U.S. within
the time specified.  Section 240B(a)(3).  However, a bond is not
required.  Matter of Ocampo, 22 I&N Dec. 1301 (BIA 2000).
e. Applicability to aliens arriving in the U.S.  In the case of an alien who is
arriving in the U.S. and with respect to whom proceedings under section
240 are (or would otherwise be) initiated at the time of such alien’s
arrival, section 240B(a)(1) regarding voluntary departure shall not apply.
INA § 240B(a)(4).  However, this shall not be construed as preventing
such an alien from withdrawing the application for admission in
accordance with section 235(a)(4).  Id.
f. Effective April 1, 1997, an alien may apply for voluntary departure
either in lieu of being subject to removal proceedings or before the
conclusion of the proceedings under section 240B(a) of the Act, or at the
conclusion of the proceedings under section 240B(b) of the Act.  An
alien who applies for voluntary departure at the conclusion of removal
proceedings pursuant to section 240B(b) of the Act must demonstrate,
inter alia, both good moral character for a period of 5 years preceding the
application for relief and the financial means to depart the United States,
but an alien who applies before the conclusion of the proceedings
pursuant to section 240B(a) is not subject to those requirements.  Matter
of Arguelles, 22 I&N Dec. 811 (BIA 1999).
g. Although an alien who applies for voluntary departure under either
section 240B(a) or 240B(b) of the Act must establish that a favorable
exercise of discretion is warranted upon consideration of the factors set
forth in Matter of Gamboa, 14 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1972), modified on
other grounds by Matter of Torre, 19 I&N Dec. 18 (BIA 1984), which
governed applications for voluntary departure under the former section
244(e) of the Act, the IJ has broader authority to grant voluntary
departure in discretion before the conclusion of removal proceedings
under section 240B(a) than under section 240B(b) or the former section
244(e).  Matter of Arguelles, 22 I&N Dec. 811 (BIA 1999).  An alien
who had been granted voluntary departure five times pursuant to former
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section 244(e) of the Act and had returned each time without inspection
was eligible to apply for voluntary departure in removal proceedings
under section 240B, because the restrictions on eligibility of section
240B(c), relating to aliens who return after having  previously been
granted voluntary departure, only apply if relief was granted under
section 240B.  Matter of Arguelles, 22 I&N Dec. 811 (BIA 1999).
h. Appeal.  In order to qualify for voluntary departure under section
240B(a), an alien must waive appeal of all issues.  8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.26(b)(1)(i)(D). See also Matter of Ocampo, 22 I&N Dec. 1301
(BIA 2000).
(1) It is necessary for IJs to advise respondents, on the record, that the
right to appeal must be waived as a precondition to receiving
voluntary departure under section 240B(a).  The only instance in
which an IJ might safely forego such an oral notification is when
the record contains a written stipulation or comparable
documentary evidence wherein the respondent, or the respondent’s
counsel, expressly waives appeal as part of establishing that all the
regulatory requirements for this form of voluntary departure have
been satisfied.  Accordingly, the Board holds that, without an oral
notice regarding the waiver of the right to appeal or a written
attestation reflecting the respondent’s awareness of this
requirement, an IJ lacks the authority to grant voluntary departure
prior to the completion of proceedings under section 240B(a) of the
Act.  Matter of Ocampo, 22 I&N Dec. 1301 (BIA 2000).
i. Additional advisals.  Effective January 20, 2009, the IJ must advise the
respondent that if he or she files a post-decision motion to reopen or
reconsider during the voluntary departure period: (1) the grant of
voluntary departure is terminated automatically; (2) the alternate order of
removal takes effect immediately; and (3) the penalties for failure to
depart voluntarily under section 240B(d) shall not apply.  8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.26(b)(3)(iii). 
5. Voluntary Departure at the conclusion of proceedings - Section 240B(b)
a. Under section 240B(b)(1), the Attorney General may permit an alien
voluntarily to depart the U.S. at the alien's own expense if, at the
conclusion of a proceeding under section 240, the IJ enters an order
granting voluntary departure in lieu of removal and finds that:
(1) the alien has been physically present in the U.S. for a period of at
least one year immediately preceding the date the notice to appear
was served under section 239(a) [INA § 240B(b)(1)(A)];
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(2) the alien is, and has been, a person of good moral character for at
least 5 years immediately preceding the alien’s application for
voluntary departure [INA § 240B(b)(1)(B)];
(3) the alien is not deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)
[convicted of an aggravated felony] or section 237(a)(4) [security
violations, terrorist activities, etc.] [INA § 240B(b)(1)(C)]; and
(4) the alien has established by clear and convincing evidence that the
alien has the means to depart the U.S. and intends to do so [INA §
240(b)(1)(D)].
b. The Eleventh Circuit held that an alien who has not sought pre-
conclusion voluntary departure may, for the first time, request post-
conclusion voluntary departure at the end of a removal proceeding, after
the IJ issues an oral decision ordering the alien's removal from the
United States.  Alvarado v. Att’y Gen., 610 F.3d 1311, 1318 (11th Cir.
2010). 
c. Bond.  An alien permitted to deport voluntarily under section 240B(b)(1)
shall be required to post a voluntary departure bond, in an amount
necessary to ensure that the alien will depart, but in no case less than
$500, to be surrendered upon proof that the alien has departed the U.S.
within the time specified.  INA § 240B(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(3). 
Effective January 20, 2009, if an alien does not post the bond within the
time required, the alien is still obligated to depart within the period
allowed and is not exempted from the consequences for failure to depart. 
8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(4).  This overrules Matter of Diaz-Ruacho, 24
I&N Dec. 47 (BIA 2006).  In addition, the failure to post bond may be
considered as a negative discretionary factor with respect to any
discretionary form of relief.  If the alien waived appeal of the IJ’s
decision, the failure to timely post the voluntary departure bond means
that the alternative order of removal takes effect immediately, except
that an alien granted post-conclusion voluntary departure will not be
deemed to have departed under an order of removal if the alien: (1)
departs the U.S. no more than 25 days after the failure to post bond; (2)
provides to DHS such evidence of departure as the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Field Office Director may require; and
(3) provides evidence DHS deems sufficient that the alien remains
outside the U.S.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(4).
(1) The voluntary departure regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(4) do
not apply retroactively. Matter of Velasco, 25 I&N Dec. 143 (BIA
2009). If an IJ granted voluntary departure before January 20, 2009
and the alien failed to post the voluntary departure bond required
by INA section 240B(b)(3), the former regulatory scheme, as
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interpreted in Matter of Diaz-Ruacho, remains applicable and the
penalties imposed by section 240B(d)(1) for failure to depart
within the voluntary departure period do not apply. Id. at 146.
Under Matter of Diaz-Ruacho, the Board held that an alien who
has not timely posted the required voluntary departure bond is not
subject to the penalties in INA section 240B(d)(1) because the
statute stated that the voluntary departure order automatically
vacated upon failure to post the bond within the required period of
time. 24 I&N Dec. at 51.
d. Opportunity to decline.  Effective January 20, 2009, upon setting the
bond and conditions of voluntary departure, the IJ must provide the alien
the opportunity to accept the grant of voluntary departure or to decline
voluntary departure if he or she is unwilling to accept the amount of the
bond or other conditions.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(3).
e. Aliens not eligible.  The Attorney General shall not permit an alien to
depart voluntarily under section 240B(b)(1) if the alien was previously
permitted to so depart after having been found inadmissible under
section 212(a)(6)(A) [present in the U.S. without being admitted or
paroled, or who arrived in the U.S. at any time or place other than as
designated by the Attorney General].  INA § 240B(c).
f. Advisals.  Effective January 20, 2009, before granting post-conclusion
voluntary departure, the IJ must advise the alien: (1) of any conditions
the IJ set beyond those specifically enumerated by regulation; and (2) of
the bond amount that will be set and the duty to post bond with the ICE
Field Office Director within 5 business days of the order granting
voluntary departure.  Upon granting post-conclusion voluntary departure,
the IJ must advise the alien: (1) of the requirement to provide to the
Board, within 30 days of filing an appeal, sufficient proof of having
posted the voluntary departure bond with the Department of Homeland
Security; (2) that the Board will not reinstate the voluntary departure
period in its final order if the alien does not submit timely proof to the
Board that the voluntary departure bond has been posted; and (3) that if
the alien files a post-decision motion to reopen or reconsider during the
voluntary departure period, the grant of voluntary departure is terminated
automatically and the alternate order of removal takes effect
immediately.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(3). See Matter of Gamero, 25 I&N
Dec. 164 (BIA 2010) (remanding the record where IJ failed to provide
all the advisals and alien failed to submit timely proof to the Board that
bond had been posted and ordering grant of new period of voluntary
departure with all required advisals).
6. Additional conditions.  The Attorney General may by regulation limit
eligibility for voluntary departure under section 240B for any class or classes
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of aliens and no court may review any such regulation.  INA § 240B(e).  The
IJ may require that the alien be detained until his departure from the U.S. as a
condition of a grant of voluntary departure. Matter of M-A-S-, 24 I&N Dec.
762 (BIA 2009).
7. Civil penalty for failure to depart.  If an alien is permitted to depart voluntarily
under section 240B and fails to depart the U.S. within the time specified, the
alien shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $1,000 and not more
than $5,000, and be ineligible for a period of 10 years for any further relief
under sections 240B (voluntary departure), 240A (cancellation of removal),
245 (adjustment of status), 248 (change of nonimmigrant classification), and
249 (registry).  The order permitting the alien to depart voluntarily shall
inform the alien of these penalties.  INA § 240B(d).  Effective January 20,
2009, there is a rebuttable presumption of a civil penalty of $3,000 if the alien
fails to depart within the voluntary departure period, but the IJ may set a
higher or lower amount as permitted by section 240B(d)(A)(A).  At the time
of granting voluntary departure, the IJ shall advise the alien of the amount of
the civil penalty.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(j).
a. The Board of Immigration Appeals lacks authority to apply an
“exceptional circumstances” or other general equitable exception to the
penalty provisions for failure to depart within the time period afforded
for voluntary departure under section 240B(d)(1).  Matter of Zmijewska,
24 I&N Dec. 87 (BIA 2007).  An alien has not voluntarily failed to
depart the United States under section 240B(d)(1) of the Act when the
alien, through no fault of his or her own, was unaware of the voluntary
departure order or was physically unable to depart within the time
granted.  Id.
8. Extension of time to depart.  Authority to extend the time within which to
depart specified initially by an IJ or the Board is within the sole jurisdiction of
the DD. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f).
9. Reinstatement of Voluntary Departure.  An IJ or the Board may reinstate
voluntary departure in a removal proceeding that has been reopened for a
purpose other than solely making an application for voluntary departure if
reopening was granted prior to the expiration of the original period of
voluntary departure. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(h).
a. In no event can the total period of time, including any extension, exceed
120 days or 60 days as set forth in section 240B of the Act. 8 C.F.R. §
1240.26(h).
C. Withdrawal of application for admission
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1. History lesson. - Until the passage of the IIRIRA, neither the statute nor the
regulations directly  provided for the withdrawal of an application for 
admission. The Board held that an IJ,  in his discretion, may permit an alien in
exclusion proceedings to withdraw his application for admission.  An alien
could not withdraw his application as a matter of right.  Matter of Vargas-
Molina, 13 I&N Dec. 651 (BIA 1971).  He had to satisfy the IJ that “justice
would best be served” by permitting the withdrawal. Id. In order to withdraw
an application for admission, the alien had to demonstrate that he had the
intent to depart the U.S., he had the means to depart immediately, and that
justice would be ill served if an order of exclusion was entered.  Matter of
Gutierrez, 19 I&N Dec. 562 (BIA 1988).  The Board held that it was never
contemplated that withdrawal of an application for admission would become a
nonstatutory form of “relief” for which an applicant could apply after
excludability was determined. Id. at 565. Therefore, the Board held that once
an exclusion hearing has been conducted and the issue of excludability has
been resolved, the  applicant should only be allowed to withdraw his applica-
tion for admission with the concurrence of the INS. Id.  By directing an
applicant for admission to return to Mexico after being served with a form I-
122, INS in effect consented to the alien’s withdrawal of that application when
the alien elected not to appear before an IJ to pursue his application for
admission. Matter of Sanchez, 21 I&N Dec. 444 (BIA 1996).  If an IJ allowed
an alien to withdraw his application for admission, the IJ could not set the
time limit within which the alien was allowed to depart. Matter of Lepofsky,
14 I&N Dec. 718 (BIA 1974).  To do so would infringe on the DD's parole
power. Id. The time and conditions of departure were up to the DD.  Id.
2. Withdrawal of application for admission under IIRIRA
a. An alien applying for admission may, in the discretion of the Attorney
General and at any time, be permitted to withdraw the application for
admission and depart immediately from the U.S.  INA § 235(a)(4).
b. 8 C.F.R. § 1235.4 provides that the Attorney General may, in the
exercise of discretion, permit any alien applicant for admission to
withdraw his application for admission in lieu of removal proceedings
under section 240 or expedited removal under section 235(b)(1).
c. 8 C.F.R. § 1235.4 also provides that the alien’s decision to withdraw the
application for admission must be made voluntarily, but that shall not be
construed to give an alien the right to withdraw the application for
admission.
d. 8 C.F.R. § 1235.4 also provides that an alien permitted to withdraw an
application for admission should normally remain in carrier or Service
custody pending departure, unless the DD determines that parole of the
alien is warranted.
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e. 8 C.F.R. § 1235.4(b) also provides that permission to withdraw an
application for admission should not normally be granted unless the
alien intends and is able to depart the United States immediately.
D. Citizenship
1. Derivative Citizenship.  The Board ruled that, to obtain derivative citizenship
under former section 321(a), an alien must acquire LPR status “while he or
she is under 18 years of age.”  Matter of Nwozuzu, 24 I&N Dec. 609 (BIA
2008).
  
a. A child who has satisfied the statutory conditions of former section
321(a), before the age of 18 years has acquired U.S. citizenship,
regardless of whether the naturalized parent acquired legal custody of the
child before or after the naturalization.  Matter of Baires, 24 I&N Dec.
467 (BIA 2008). 
b. Under former section 321(a) of the Act, a child remains “under the age
of eighteen years” up until the time of his birth on his eighteenth
birthday. Duarte-Ceri v. Holder, 630 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that
if the alien was born in the evening and his mother was naturalized in the
morning on the same day 18 years later, he was still under the age of
eighteen years when his mother was naturalized).
c. A person born outside the United States cannot derive United States
citizenship under section 320(a) by virtue of his or her relationship to a
nonadoptive stepparent. Matter of Guzman-Gomez, 24 I&N Dec. 824
(BIA 2009).
2. Legitimation.  Under Jamaican law, the sole means of legitimation of a child
born out of wedlock is the marriage of the child’s natural parents.  Matter of
Hines, 24 I&N Dec. 544 (BIA 2008).  If an individual’s parents never marry,
paternity is not established “by legitimation” pursuant to former section
321(a)(3). Id.
E. Cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents under section 240A(a) and
for certain nonpermanent residents under section 240A(b)
1. Aliens ineligible for relief.  Section 240A(c) provides that the provisions of
sections 240A(a) and 240A(b)(1) shall not apply to any of the following
aliens:
a. an alien who entered the U.S. as a crewman subsequent to June 30, 1964
[INA § 240A(c)(1)]; Matter of G-D-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 82 (BIA 2009);
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b. an alien who was admitted to the U.S. as a nonimmigrant exchange alien
as defined in section 101(a)(15)(J), or has acquired the status of such a
nonimmigrant exchange alien after admission, in order to receive
graduate medical education or training, regardless of whether or not the
alien is subject to or has fulfilled the two-year foreign residence
requirement of section 212(e) [INA § 240A(c)(2)];
c. an alien who was admitted to the U.S. as a nonimmigrant exchange alien
as defined in section 101(a)(15)(J) or has acquired the status of such a
nonimmigrant exchange alien after admission other than to receive
graduate medical education or training, is subject to the two-year foreign
residence requirement of section 212(e), and has not fulfilled that
requirement or received a waiver thereof [INA § 240A(c)(3)];
d. an alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(3) [espionage,
sabotage, etc., terrorist activities, adverse foreign policy consequences,
immigrant membership in totalitarian party, participants in Nazi
persecutions or genocide], or deportable under section 237(a)(4)
[national security violations, terrorist activities, adverse foreign policy
consequences, assisted in Nazi persecution or engaged in genocide]
[INA § 240A(c)(4)];
e. an alien who is described in section 241(b)(3)(B)(i) [participated in the
persecution of others] [INA § 240A(c)(5)]; 
f. an alien whose removal has previously been cancelled under section
240A, whose deportation was suspended under (former) section 244(a),
or who has been granted relief under (former) section 212(c) as such
sections were in effect before the date of enactment of IIRIRA [INA §
240A(c)(6)].
2. Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent Residents, section 240A(a). 
The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is
inadmissible or deportable from the U.S. if the alien: (1) has been an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years, (2) has
resided in the U.S. continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any
status, and (3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.
a. The period of an alien’s residence in the U.S. after admission as a
nonimmigrant may be considered in calculating the 7 years of
continuous residence required to establish eligibility for cancellation of
removal.  Matter of Blancas, 23 I&N Dec. 458 (BIA 2002).
b. An alien in removal proceedings who at one time was a lawful
permanent resident and held that status for at least five years but who
later lost that status is no longer statutorily eligible for cancellation of
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removal.  Padilla-Romero v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2010).  The
Ninth Circuit also held that neither an approved I-130 nor a grant of
employment authorization confers admission status on an undocumented
alien for purposes of establishing 7 years’ continuous residence “after
having been admitted in any status” for purposes of section 240A(a)(2). 
See Vasquez de Alcantar v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2011);
Guevara v. Holder, 649 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2011).
c. An alien who acquired permanent resident status through fraud or
misrepresentation has never been “lawfully admitted for permanent
residence” and is therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal under
section 240A(a) of the Act.  Matter of Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. 548
(BIA 2003).
d. A parent’s lawful permanent resident status cannot be imputed to a child
for purposes of calculating the 5 years of lawful permanent residence
required for cancellation of removal.  Matter of Escobar, 24 I&N Dec.
231 (BIA 2007).  
(1) The Ninth Circuit rejected the reasoning in Matter of Escobar, and
held that, for purposes of satisfying the five years of lawful
permanent residence required under section 240A(a)(1), a parent’s
status as a lawful permanent resident is imputed to the
unemancipated minor children residing with that parent.  Mercado-
Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009).  
e. A parent’s period of residence in the United States cannot be imputed to
a child for purposes of calculating the 7 years of continuous residence
required to establish eligibility for cancellation of removal under section
240A(a)(2).  Matter of Ramirez-Vargas, 24 I&N Dec. 599 (BIA 2008);
Cervantes v. Holder; 597 F.3d 229, 236-37 (4th Cir. 2010) (rejecting
alien’s argument that parents’ residence should be imputed for purposes
of TPS eligibility); Deus v. Holder, 591 F.3d 807 (5th Cir. 2009);
Augustin v. Att’y Gen., 520 F.3d 264, 271 (3d Cir. 2008) (distinguishing
between statutory terms “domicile” and “residence”).  But see Mercado-
Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that a parent’s
period of residence could be imputed to a minor child). 
3. Cancellation of removal and adjustment of status for certain nonpermanent
residents under section 240A(b)
a. History lesson - Prior to the IIRIRA, a comparable relief from
deportation existed in the form of suspension of deportation.  In order to
qualify for this relief, an alien had to establish physical presence in the
U.S. for 7 years (3 years if a battered spouse or child and 10 years if
deportable under certain criminal grounds), good moral character for all
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of that period, and that deportation would result in extreme or
exceptionally unusual hardship to the alien or to a qualifying relative
(exceptionally unusual hardship if subject to the 10 year statutory
period).
b. PRESENT LAW - Section 240A(b)(1).  The Attorney General may
cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable
from the U.S. if the alien:
(1) has been physically present in the U.S. for a continuous period of
not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such
application; 
(a) Voluntary departure under the threat of deportation breaks an
alien’s continuous physical presence.  Matter of Romalez-
Alcaide, 23 I&N Dec. 423 (BIA 2002).  The Second Circuit
accorded deference to Matter of Romalez-Alcaide in finding
that an alien’s arrest and conviction for illegal entry, followed
by his departure to Mexico, interrupted his period of
continuous physical presence.  Ascencio-Rodriguez v.
Holder, 595 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2010).
(b) The Eighth Circuit held that under the REAL ID Act, an IJ
can require an alien to corroborate his otherwise credible
testimony with further evidence as to his date of entry into
the United States.  Sanchez-Velasco v. Holder, 593 F.3d 733
(8th Cir. 2010).  The court held that the alien’s parents were
reasonably available to testify as to his entry date, even
though they feared being placed in removal proceedings.  Id. 
(denying alien’s appeal of denial of his application for
cancellation of removal.)
(c) See pages 108-112 below for discussion of special rules
regarding continuous presence.
(2) has been a person of good moral character (“GMC”) during such
period; 
(3) has not been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2)
[CIMT; 2 or more offenses for which the aggregate sentences to
confinement actually imposed were 5 years or more; illicit
traffickers in controlled substances; prostitution and
commercialized vice; aliens involved in serious criminal activity
who have asserted immunity from prosecution] (This bar may not
be overcome by a waiver under section 212(h) of the Act.  Matter
of Bustamante, 25 I&N Dec. 564 (BIA 2011)), section 237(a)(2)
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[CIMT within 5 years of entry for which a sentence of one year or
longer may be imposed; 2 CIMTs not arising out of a single
scheme of criminal misconduct; aggravated felony; high speed
flight; controlled substances; firearms or destructive devices;
miscellaneous crimes; crimes of domestic, violence, stalking, and
crimes against children; violators of protection orders]; or section
237(a)(3) [failure to report change of address; failure to register or
falsification of documents; document fraud; falsely claiming U.S.
citizenship]; and 
(a) The Board held that an alien whose conviction precedes the
October 1, 1996, effective date of section 237(a)(2)(E) has
not been “convicted of an offense” under section 237(a)(2)(E)
and, therefore, is not barred by section 240A(b)(1)(C) from
establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal.  Matter of
Gonzalez-Silva, 24 I&N Dec. 218 (BIA 2007).
(b) In Obi v. Holder, 558 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2009), the Seventh
Circuit upheld the IJ’s determination that the alien was barred
from cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents
because his 1996 marriage fraud conviction rendered him
“convicted of an offense under . . . section 237(a)(3).” The
alien argued that he was eligible for relief because Congress
did not intend for the section 240A(b)(1)(C) bar to apply to
convictions preceding the effective date of IIRIRA (April 1,
1997). He relied on Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.
244 (1994), which established a two-prong test for assessing
whether a law could be applied retroactively. Citing Lara-
Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d 934, 945 (7th Cir. 2001), the court held
that Congress clearly intended to apply IIRIRA's cancellation-
of-removal provisions to all proceedings brought after April
1, 1997, regardless of when an alien committed a
disqualifying crime. 
(c) The Ninth Circuit held that the petty offense exception under
section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii) is not available with respect to a
conviction rendering an alien ineligible for cancellation of
removal under section 240A(b) because the petty offense
exception does not reference section 237(a)(2) or section
240A(b) and there is no other statutory basis for applying the
exception.  Vasquez-Hernandez v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1053
(9th Cir. 2010). 
(4) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent or child, who is a
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citizen of the U.S. or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.
(a) Stepparents and stepchildren. A stepchild who meets the
definition of a “child” under section 101(b)(1)(B) is a
qualifying relative for purposes of cancellation of removal
under section 240A(b)(1)(D). Matter of Portillo-Gutierrez, 25
I&N Dec. 148 (BIA 2009).  A stepparent who meets the
definition of a “parent” under section 101(b)(2) is a
qualifying relative for purposes of cancellation of removal
under section 240A(b)(1)(D). Matter of Morales, 25 I&N
Dec. 186 (BIA 2010).
(b) To establish “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”,
an applicant for cancellation of removal under section
240A(b) of the Act must demonstrate that his or her citizen or
lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, or child would
suffer hardship that is substantially beyond that which would
ordinarily be expected to result from the alien’s deportation,
but need not show that such hardship would be
“unconscionable.”  Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA
2001).
(c) Although many of the factors that were considered in
assessing “extreme hardship” for suspension of deportation
should also be considered in evaluating “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship”, an applicant for cancellation of
removal must demonstrate hardship beyond that which has
historically been required in suspension of deportation cases
involving the “extreme hardship” standard.  Matter of
Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 2001).
(d) In establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal, only
hardship to qualifying relatives, not to the applicant himself
or herself, may be considered, and hardship factors relating to
the applicant may be considered only insofar as they might
affect the hardship to a qualifying relative. Matter of
Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 2001).
(e) The Board found it appropriate and useful to look to the
factors considered in assessing “extreme hardship” for
purposes of suspension of deportation as set forth in Matter
of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 1976), such as the age
of a respondent, both at the time of coming to the U.S. and at
the time of the application, family ties in the U.S. and abroad,
length of residence in the U.S., the health of the respondent
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and qualifying family members, the political and economic
conditions in the country of return, the possibility of other
means of adjusting status in the U.S., the alien's involvement
and position in his or her community, and his or her
immigration history, but observed that some of the factors set
forth in that case may relate only to the applicant for relief
and those cannot be considered under the cancellation statute
where only hardship to qualifying relatives, and not to the
applicant, may be considered. Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N
Dec. 56, 63 (BIA 2001). Factors relating to the applicant can
only be considered insofar as they may affect the hardship to
a qualifying relative. Id.  For cancellation of removal, the
Board would consider the ages, health, and circumstances of
qualifying lawful permanent resident and U.S. citizen
relatives. Id. The Board stated that an applicant who has
elderly parents in the U.S. who are solely dependent upon
him for support might have a strong case. Id.  Another strong
applicant might have a qualifying child with very serious
health issues or compelling special needs in school. Id.  The
Board said a lower standard of living or adverse country
conditions in the county of return are factors to consider only
insofar as they may affect a qualifying relative, but generally
will be insufficient in themselves to support a finding of
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Id.  As with
extreme hardship, all hardship factors should be considered
in the aggregate when assessing exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship. Id. at 63-64.  The Board also cited Matter
of Kao and Lin, 23 I&N Dec. 45 (BIA 2001) and Matter of
Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996).
(f) An unmarried mother of 2 U.S. citizen children (a 6 year old
and an 11 year old) did not establish that her children would
suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship upon her
removal to Mexico in spite of the poor economic conditions
and diminished educational opportunities in Mexico and the
fact that the respondent is unmarried and has no family in
Mexico to assist in her children’s adjustment to life there. 
Matter of Andazola, 23 I&N Dec. 319 (BIA 2002).  In that
case, the Board stated, “In assessing hardship, we should not
consider the fact that the respondent’s extended family is (in
the U.S.) illegally, rather than in Mexico, as a factor that
weighs in her favor.”  Id. at 323. The Board also noted that
the respondent and her children may face some special
difficulties in Mexico, because she is an unmarried mother
and may encounter some discrimination as such. Id. at 324.
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(g) The Board distinguished  Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56
(BIA 2001) and  Matter of Andazola, 23 I&N Dec. 319 (BIA
2002) and granted cancellation of removal in Matter of
Recinas, 23 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 2002).  The factors
considered in assessing the hardship to the respondent’s
United States citizen children included the heavy burden
imposed on the respondent to provide the sole financial and
familial support for her six children if she is deported to
Mexico, the lack of any family in her native country, the
children’s unfamiliarity with the Spanish language, and the
unavailability of an alternative means of immigrating to this
country.  Recinas, 23 I&N Dec. 467.  The Board stated that
the hardship standard is not so restrictive that only a handful
of applicants, such as those who have a qualifying relative
with a serious medical condition, will qualify for relief. Id. at
470. However, the Board also stated, “We consider this case
to be on the outer limit of the narrow spectrum of cases in
which the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship
standard will be met.” Id.
(h) An unborn child is not a “child” under section 101(b)(1) for
purposes of acting as a qualifying relative for cancellation of
removal.  Partap v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 
c. Special rule for battered spouse or child - Section 240A(b)(2).  The
Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is
inadmissible or deportable from the U.S. if the alien demonstrates that:
(1) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty in the
U.S. by a spouse or parent who is a U.S. citizen or LPR (or is the
parent of a child of a U.S. citizen or LPR and the child has been
battered or subjected to extreme cruelty in the U.S. by such citizen
or permanent resident parent);
(a) In Lopez-Birrueta v. Holder, 633 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2011),
the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Board that the petitioner
failed to show that the beating of her two U.S. citizen
children by the children’s LPR father constituted battery for
purposes of VAWA special rule cancellation.  The court
examined the definition of “battery or extreme cruelty” in 8
C.F.R. §§ 204.2(c)(1)(vi), (e)(1)(vi), noting that the sections
are identical but for the last sentence, depending on whether
the petitioner is a spouse (§ 204.2(c)) or a child (§ 204.2(e)).
After deciding that the regulatory definitions do not address
petitioner’s situation because 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi)
requires the abuse take place during the self-petitioner’s
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marriage and 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(e)(1)(vi) applies to a petition
from a child, the court nonetheless concluded the Board
permissibly extended the use of the definitions.  The court
held that the statute does not indicate that battery or extreme
cruelty is defined differently depending on the marital status
of the petitioner. 
(2) the alien has been physically present in the U.S. for a continuous
period of not less than 3 years immediately preceding the date  of
such application;
(3) the alien has been a person of GMC during such period; 
(4) the alien is not inadmissible under sections 212(a)(2) or (3), is not
deportable under section 237(a)(I)(G) involving marriage fraud, or
sections 237(a)(2) through (4), and has not been convicted of an
aggravated felony; and 
(5) the removal would result in extreme hardship to the alien, the
alien's child or (in the case of an alien who is a child) to the alien's
parent.
(6) In acting on applications under this paragraph, the Attorney
General shall consider any credible evidence relevant to the
application.  INA § 240A(b)(2).  The determination of what
evidence is credible and the weight to be given that evidence shall
be within the sole discretion of the Attorney General. Id.
(7) As reflected by the plain language of the statute and legislative
history, a lawful permanent resident who qualifies as a battered
spouse may apply for cancellation of removal pursuant to section
240A(b)(2). Matter of A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2009).
d. Adjustment of status of aliens whose removal is canceled.  Section
240A(b)(3) provides that the Attorney General may adjust to the status
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence any alien who the
Attorney General determines meets the requirements of sections
240A(b)(1) and 240A(b)(2).  The number of adjustments shall not
exceed 4,000 for any fiscal year.  The Attorney General shall record the
alien's lawful admission for permanent residence as of the date of the
Attorney General’s cancellation of removal or determination.
4. Special rules relating to continuous residence or physical presence - Section
240A(d)
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a. Termination of continuous period.  Pursuant to section 240A(d)(1) of the
Act, commonly known as the “stop-time” rule, any period of continuous
residence or continuous physical presence in the U.S. shall be deemed to
end when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 239(a) or
when the alien has committed an offense referred to in section 212(a)(2)
that renders the alien inadmissible to the U.S. under section 212(a)(2) or
removable from the U.S. under section 237(a)(2) or 237(a)(4), whichever
is earliest.  INA § 240A(d)(1).
(1) Termination by service of Notice to Appear
(a) In a deportation case involving the respondent’s eligibility for
suspension of deportation, the Board found that the
continuous physical presence clock does not start anew after
the service of an Order to Show Cause so as to allow an alien
to accrue the time required to establish eligibility for
suspension of deportation after the service of an Order to
Show Cause.  Matter of Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I&N Dec.
1236 (BIA 2000).
(2) Termination by commission of an offense
(a) The period of continuous residence required for relief under
section 240A(a) commences when the alien has been
admitted in any status, which includes admission as a
temporary resident.  Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 689 (BIA
1999).
(b) Continuous residence or physical presence for cancellation of
removal purposes is deemed to end on the date that a
qualifying offense has been committed, even if the offense
was committed prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA of 1996.
Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 689 (BIA 1999), reaff’d Matter
of Robles, 24 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 2006). See also Baraket v.
Holder, 632 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2011). But see Sinotes-Cruz v.
Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2006); Bakarian v.
Mukasey, 541 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2008).  An alien need not be
charged in the NTA with the alleged criminal conduct to
terminate the alien’s continuous residence.  Matter of Jurado,
24 I&N Dec. 29 (BIA 2006).
(c) Pursuant to section 240A(d)(1) of the Act, an offense must be
one “referred to in section 212(a)(2)” of the Act to terminate
the period of continuous residence or continuous physical
presence required for cancellation of removal. Matter of
Campos-Torres, 22 I&N Dec. 1289 (BIA 2000).  A firearms
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offense that renders an alien removable under section
237(a)(2)(C) of the Act is not one “referred to in section
212(a)(2)” and thus does not stop the further accrual of
continuous residence or continuous physical presence for
purposes of establishing eligibility for cancellation of
removal.  Id.
(d) An alien who has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude that falls within the “petty offense” exception in
section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act is not ineligible for
cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the
Act because he “has not been convicted of an offense under
section 212(a)(2)” of the Act.  Matter of Garcia-Hernandez,
23 I&N Dec. 590 (BIA 2003). Similarly, an alien’s
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude does not
render him ineligible for cancellation of removal under
section 240A(b)(1)(C) if his crime is punishable by
imprisonment for a period of less than one year and qualifies
for the petty offense exception.  Matter of Pedroza, 25 I&N
Dec. 312 (BIA 2010). 
(e) However, an alien who has been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude for which a sentence of a year or
longer may be imposed has been convicted of an offense
“described under” section 237(a)(2) and is therefore
ineligible for cancellation of removal under section
240A(b)(1)(C), regardless of the alien’s eligibility for the
petty offense exception under section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). 
Matter of Cortez, 25 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 2010).
(f) A conviction for a single crime of moral turpitude that
qualifies as a “petty offense” conviction does not trigger the
“stop time” rule in section 240A(d)(1).  Matter of Garcia, 25
I&N Dec. 332 (BIA 2010).
(g) An alien who has committed a crime involving moral
turpitude that falls within the “petty offense” exception is not
ineligible for cancellation of removal under section
240A(b)(1)(B) of the Act, because commission of a petty
offense does not bar the offender from establishing good
moral character under section 101(f)(3) of the Act.  Matter of
Garcia-Hernandez, 23 I&N Dec. 590 (BIA 2003).
(h) A respondent, who was convicted of two misdemeanor
crimes involving moral turpitude is not precluded by the
provisions of section 240A(d)(1)(B) of the Act from
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establishing the requisite 7 years of continuous residence for
cancellation of removal under section 240A(a)(2), because
his first crime, which qualifies as a “petty offense” under
section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act, did not render him
inadmissible, and he had accrued the requisite 7 years of
continuous residence before the second offense was
committed.  Matter of Deanda-Romo, 23 I&N Dec. 597 (BIA
2003).
(i) Once an alien has been convicted of an offense that stops the
accrual of the 7-year period of continuous residence, that
residence cannot restart simply because the alien departs from
and then returns to the United States. Matter of Nelson, 25
I&N Dec. 410 (BIA 2011). Where the alien was convicted of
an offense that stopped the accrual of the 7-year period and
the charge of removability was based on the commission of
that offense, he could not restart his period of residence after
returning to the United States from a two-day trip to Canada.
See id. However, if the alien were not charged with
removability on the basis of the commission of his crime or if
he had received a waiver in relation to the offense, the
departure and return may have restarted his residence. See id.
at 414-15.
(3) Treatment of certain breaks in presence
(a) Section 240A(d)(2) of the Act is not the exclusive rule
respecting all departures.  Matter of Avilez-Nava, 23 I&N
Dec. 799 (BIA 2005).
(b) A departure under threat of deportation constitutes a break in
the accrual of continuous physical presence. Matter of
Romalez-Alcaide, 23 I&N Dec. 423 (BIA 2002).
(c) Mere refusal to admit at a land border of entry, without any
formal or documented process, does not interrupt continuous
physical presence. Matter of Avilez-Nava, 23 I&N Dec. 799
(BIA 2005). See Vasquez v. Holder, 635 F.3d 563 (1st Cir.
2011) (holding that the  Board reasonably interpreted the Act
in finding that the expedited removal proceedings constituted
formal, documented process and, therefore, that those
proceedings interrupted the alien’s period of continuous
physical presence).
b. Section 240A(d)(2) provides that an alien has not established continuous
physical presence in the United States if the alien has departed from the
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United States for any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods in
the aggregate exceeding 180 days.  
(1) This section does not mean that any departure of 90 days or less is
forgiven and an alien’s continuous physical presence is deemed to
end at the time the alien is removed or compelled to depart the U.S.
under threat of the institution of deportation or removal
proceedings (voluntary departure granted by the Service under
former section 242(b) of the Act), even if the absence is for only
one day. Matter of Romalez-Alcaide, 23 I&N Dec. 423 (BIA
2002).
(2) Where an alien departed the United States for a period less than
that specified in section 240A(d)(2) of the Act and unsuccessfully
attempted reentry at a port of entry before actually reentering,
physical presence continued to accrue for purposes of cancellation
of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(A) unless, during that
attempted reentry, the alien was formally excluded or made subject
to an order of expedited removal, was offered and accepted the
opportunity to withdraw an application for admission, or was
subjected to some other formal, documented process pursuant to
which the alien was determined to be inadmissible to the United
States.  Matter of Avilez-Nava, 23 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 2005).
(3) Service of the NTA or OSC stops time forever as compared to a
break in time under section 240A(d)(2) which is considered just a
break where time can be counted again after break.  Matter of
Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I&N Dec. 1236 (BIA 2000).
c. Continuity not required because of honorable service in Armed Forces
and presence upon entry into service.  The requirements of continuous
residence or continuous physical presence in the U.S. under sections
240A(a) and 240A(b) shall not apply to an alien who has served for a
minimum period of 24 months in an active-duty status in the Armed
Forces of the U.S. and, if separated from such service, was separated
under honorable conditions, and at the time of the alien's enlistment or
induction was in the U.S.  INA § 240A(d)(3).
d. The Ninth Circuit held that erroneous advice from a third-party, who
stated that the Mexican aliens were eligible for lawful permanent
resident status, did not warrant equitable tolling of cancellation of
removal’s 10-year continuous-presence requirement, even though the
aliens were only one-month short of continuous presence requirement
and may not have come to the attention of immigration authorities if they
had not taken the third party’s bad advice.  Hernandez v. Holder, 633
F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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5. Annual limitation.  The Attorney General may not cancel the removal and
adjust the status under this section, nor suspend the deportation and adjust the
status under (former) section 244(a) of a total of more than 4,000 aliens in any
fiscal year.  This applies regardless of when an alien applied for such
cancellation and adjustment and whether such alien had previously applied for
suspension under (former) section 244(a).  INA § 240A(e).
6. In addition to satisfying the statutory eligibility requirements, an applicant for
cancellation of removal must establish that he or she merits such relief as a
matter of discretion.  Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. 7 (BIA 1998).  The
general standards developed in Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581 (BIA 1978),
clarified by Matter of Edwards, 20 I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1990), for the exercise
of discretion under section 212(c) of the Act, which was the predecessor
provision to section 240A(a), are applicable to the exercise of discretion under
section 240A(a).  Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. 7 (BIA 1998).
a. However, an applicant for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a)
of the Act need not meet a threshold test requiring a showing of “unusual
or outstanding equities” before a balancing of the favorable and adverse
factors of record will be made to determine whether relief should be
granted in the exercise of discretion. Matter of Sotelo, 23 I&N Dec. 201
(BIA 2001), clarifying Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. 7 (BIA 1998). 
The Board stated that in any balancing test, various factors, whether
positive or negative, are accorded more weight than others according to
the specific facts of the individual case. Id. at 203. More serious
misconduct necessarily weighs more heavily against an exercise of
discretion than does less serious misconduct. Id. Therefore, an alien must
present “additional offsetting favorable evidence” to counterbalance an
adverse factor such as serious criminal activity. Id. In Matter of C-V-T-,
the Board questioned whether the requirement of presenting outstanding
or unusual equities had any continuing viability in view of the expanded
definition of the term “aggravated felony”. 22 I&N Dec. at 11 n.4. It
observed that in each of the precedent decisions where it required a
showing of “unusual or outstanding equities,” the alien would now be
considered ineligible for relief because of a conviction for an aggravated
felony, without any need to reach the issue of discretion. Id.  In Matter of
Edwards, 20  I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1990), the Board clarified that its
decision in Matter of Buscemi, 19 I&N Dec. 628 (BIA 1988), did not
require an alien to satisfy a threshold test of showing “unusual or
outstanding equities” before it would apply a balancing test to consider
whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. The Board
specifically stated that it found the reference to a threshold test in Matter
of Buscemi to be “misleading, as it might be read to imply that a full
examination of an alien’s equities can somehow be pretermitted” and
emphasized that a “complete review of the favorable factors” in the case
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is required. 20 I&N Dec. at 196 n.3. Consistent with the clarifying
statements in Matter of Edwards, 20 I&N Dec. at 196, the Board
reiterated that it will not apply a threshold test in cancellation of removal
cases. Sotelo, 23 I&N Dec. at 204. Instead, the Board will weigh the
favorable and adverse factors to determine whether, on balance, the
“totality of the evidence before us” indicates that the “respondent has
adequately demonstrated that he warrants a favorable exercise of
discretion and a grant of cancellation of removal under section 240A(a)
of the Act.” Id.
(1) Matter of Marin and other cases dealing with the exercise of
discretion are discussed below in the section dealing with 212(c)
waivers.
F. A waiver under former section 212(c)
1. INTRODUCTION - Former section 212(c) provided for a waiver for certain
grounds of exclusion for LPRs who had departed and were seeking re-entry to
the United States.  Former section 212(c) stated: “Aliens lawfully admitted for
permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not
under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful
unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the
discretion of the Attorney General, without regard to the provision of
subsection (a) of the section[.]”  A waiver, if granted, caused a ground of
exclusion to be overlooked in considering the alien’s excludability.  The alien
was returned to the same LPR status previously held.  Matter of Przygocki, 17
I&N Dec. 361 (BIA 1980).  Strictly speaking, this is different from a “relief,”
but is usually referred to as one of the forms of relief available from both
exclusion and deportation.
2. History lesson
a. A provision similar to section 212(c) dates back to 1917.  The 7th
proviso to section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917 (usually referred to
as “The Seventh Proviso”) allowed the Attorney General, in his
discretion, to admit aliens returning  after a temporary absence to an
unrelinquished U.S. domicile of 7 consecutive years.  In the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, Congress replaced the 7th Proviso with
section 212(c) and limited its availability to aliens lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.
b. Section 212(c) was originally applied only as a waiver of excludability
available to LPRs who sought to re-enter the U.S. after a temporary
absence or to obtain an advance waiver in contemplation of a future
absence.  It was judicially expanded to also include those aliens who had
not departed the U.S.  Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2nd Cir. 1976). 
page 115 of 365
The court found that the statute created 2 classes of aliens identical in
every respect except that one class had departed and returned to the U.S.
and held that to limit the 212(c) waiver to those who departed and
returned deprived those who had not departed of equal protection of the
laws under the Fifth Amendment.  The Board accepted this interpretation
in Matter of Silva, 16 I&N Dec. 26 (BIA 1976) and section 212(c) has
since been available as relief in deportation proceedings as well as in
exclusion proceedings.  However, in a 2009 en banc decision, the Ninth
Circuit decided that section 212(c) only provides relief from
inadmissibility, not deportation.  Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th
Cir. 2009).  In Pascua v. Holder, 641 F.3d 316 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth
Circuit clarified its decision in Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam), noting that section 212(c) relief
remains available as a remedy from deportation, as well as
inadmissibility.  Although portions of Abebe suggest that section 212(c)
allows relief only from inadmissibility, id. at 1205, 1207, the Ninth
Circuit stated that Abebe did not “undermine the validity of DHS
regulations that extend the remedy of deportation.”  Id. See also
Gallegos-Vasquez v. Holder, 636 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that
an alien in removal proceedings was eligible for section 212(c) relief). 
c. In Gallegos-Vasquez v. Holder, 636 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth
Circuit held that for purposes of eligibility for section 212(c) relief, the
alien’s testimony constituted sufficient evidence that his convictions
were pursuant to guilty pleas, even in the absence of criminal conviction
records.  The Ninth Circuit further held that the alien had a settled
expectation of the availability of section 212(c) relief at the time he pled
guilty to his deportable offense in September 1989, despite the facts that
he was not yet a lawful permanent resident at the time and his third
misdemeanor conviction gave the Attorney General the discretionary
authority to terminate his temporary resident status.  Id. 
d. Section 511(b) of the Immigration Act of 1990 (“IMMACT 1990”),
effective on November 29, 1990, amended section 212(c) to provide that
its benefits were unavailable to an alien who had been convicted of one
or more aggravated felonies and had served a term of imprisonment of at
least five years for such felony or felonies.
e. Section 440(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (“AEDPA”), effective on April 24, 1996, replaced IMMACT 1990
to preclude section 212(c) relief to all aliens who were deportable by
reason of having committed any criminal offense covered in former
section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by
former section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses were
covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act.
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f. Then the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), repealed section 212(c) and specifically eliminated
it in all cases commencing on or after April 1, 1997.  IIRIRA also
reduced the potential sentence required for a conviction to be considered
an aggravated felony from 5 years to 1 year.
(1) Section 309(c)(3) of IIRIRA permits aliens in deportation
proceedings who would have been eligible for a waiver under
former section 212(c) but for AEDPA section 440(d) and who
would be eligible for cancellation of removal under section
240A(a), to seek termination of the deportation proceedings and
initiation of removal proceedings.
g. These amendments set off a wave of litigation in the District and Circuit
courts.  
(1) The Second Circuit in Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 129-30 (2d
Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom.  Reno v. Navas, 526 U.S. 1004
(1999), concluded that the amendments made to section 212(c) of
the Act by section 440(d) of the AEDPA do not apply retroactively
to deportation proceedings pending on April 24, 1996.  The Second
Circuit specifically stated that the “traditional rules of statutory
interpretation all point in one direction: §440(d) [of the AEDPA]
should not apply retroactively.” Id. at 130.  Note: The Board
previously held that the AEDPA section 440(d) bar is inapplicable
to aliens seeking relief in exclusion proceedings.  Matter of
Fuentes-Campos, 21 I&N Dec. 905 (BIA 1997).  
(2) The Second Circuit later decided that the bars on applying for a
section 212(c) waiver enacted in section 440(d) of the AEDPA and
section 304 of the IIRIRA do not apply to an alien who entered a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere to an otherwise qualifying crime
prior to the IIRIRA’s enactment date.  St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406
(2d Cir. 2000). This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court
of the United States in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).  The
Supreme Court held that section 212(c) relief remains available for
aliens whose convictions were obtained by plea agreements and
who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible
for section 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then
in effect.  The Board has emphasized that the date of the alien’s
plea agreement, not the date of sentencing, is controlling when
determining whether the alien is eligible for a section 212(c)
waiver. Matter of Moreno-Escobosa, 25 I&N Dec. 114 (BIA 2009).
3. Since former section 212(c) has been repealed, it exists only as resurrected by
the Supreme Court in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), and its progeny.  In
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October 2004, the section 212(c) regulations were amended to conform with
the St. Cyr decision.  Note: the Circuit Courts of Appeals have various and
differing interpretations regarding of the applicability of former section 212(c)
relief.  
a. The Circuit Courts of Appeal disagree on the issue of whether the repeal
of section 212(c) can be applied retroactively to aliens whose
convictions resulted from a jury trial and not from a plea of guilty. Some
circuits have held that former section 212(c) relief under St Cyr is
limited to aliens convicted by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. See
Dias v. INS, 311 F.3d 456, 458 (1st Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S.
926, 123 S.Ct. 2574, 156 L.Ed.2d 603 (2003); Montenegro v. Ashcroft,
355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004); Armendariz-Montoya v. Sonchik,
291 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 902, 123
S.Ct. 2247, 156 L.Ed.2d 110 (2003). Other circuits have decided that the
impermissible retroactive effect identified in St. Cyr is not limited to
aliens convicted by guilty plea. See Lovan v. Holder, 574 F.3d 990, 993
(8th Cir. 2009); Atkinson v. Att’y Gen., 479 F.3d 222, 230-31 (3d Cir.
2007); Carranza-De Salinas v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 200, 206-09 (5th Cir.
2007); Hem v. Maurer, 458 F.3d 1185, 1200 (10th Cir. 2006); Restrepo
v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627, 631-40 (2d Cir. 2004).  The Fifth, Second and
Eleventh Circuits require aliens convicted after a trial to prove actual
reliance on former section 212(c) to establish eligibility for relief under
St. Cyr. Carranza-De Salinas, 477 F.3d at 205; Wilson v. Gonzales, 471
F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir.2006) (requiring “objective evidence” the alien
“almost certainly relied”); Ferguson v. Att’y Gen., 563 F.3d 1254 (11th
Cir. 2009). The Eight Circuit and Third Circuit do not require such
evidence of reliance.  Lovan, 574 F.3d at 993; Atkinson, 479 F.3d at
230-31.  The Fourth Circuit’s position seems unclear.  Compare
Chambers v. Reno, 307 F.3d 284, 290-93 (4th Cir. 2002) (“We are
presented with the very narrow question of whether the fact that
Chambers was convicted at trial rather than by guilty plea pursuant to a
plea agreement changes the result dictated by St. Cyr. We conclude that,
in Chambers’ case, it does.”), with Olatunji v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 383,
389-95 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[E]ven aliens who have not detrimentally relied
on pre-IIRIRA law can sustain a claim that IIRIRA is impermissibly
retroactive.”).
4. Jurisdiction, 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(a).  An application by an eligible alien for the
exercise of discretion under former section 212(c) of the Act (as in effect prior
to April 1, 1997), if made in the course of proceedings under section 240 of
the Act, or under former section 235, 236 or 242, shall be submitted to the IJ
by filing an Application for Advance Permission to Return to Unrelinquished
Domicile (Form I-191).
5. Substantive requirements
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a. The alien must be a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”).
(1) Section 101(a)(20) of the Act defines the term “lawfully admitted
for permanent residence” as the status of having been lawfully
accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the U.S. as an
immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status
not having changed.
(a) Therefore, an alien who has lost or abandoned his status as an
LPR is not eligible to apply for a section 212(c) waiver.  But
see, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.44 (special motions to reopen for former
section 212(c) relief). See pages 127-128 below for
discussion of special motions to reopen for former section
212(c) relief.
(2) The Board held that an alien who had resided in the U.S. for 8
years following admission as an LPR was not eligible for a section
212(c) waiver because his original entry as an LPR was not
“lawful” in that he had concealed the fact of a prior deportation
when he applied for the immigrant visa.  Matter of T-, 6 I&N Dec.
136 (BIA 1954; A.G. 1954).  This case was not cited again for 42
years.  However, the Board cited it as good law in Matter of
Garcia, 21 I&N Dec. 254 (BIA 1996). See also Segura v. Holder,
605 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2010).
(a) Since nunc pro tunc permission to reapply for admission is
available only in the limited circumstances where a grant of
such relief would effect a complete disposition of the case
(i.e. where the only ground of deportability or inadmissibility
would be eliminated or where the alien would receive a grant
of adjustment of status in conjunction with the grant of any
appropriate waivers of inadmissibility), nunc pro tunc
permission to reapply for admission is not available to an
alien who returned to the U.S. with an immigrant visa after
deportation but without obtaining advance permission to
reapply and who is also deportable because of a drug-related
conviction because he would remain deportable for the drug
conviction even if permission to reapply for admission were
granted.  Matter of Garcia, 21 I&N Dec. 254 (BIA 1996). 
Therefore, such an alien is not eligible for section 212(c)
waiver because he is not independently eligible for the waiver
as a result of his unlawful entry.  Id.
(3) Commuters.  An alien admitted to the U.S. as an LPR who later
moved to Mexico to reside and who commuted daily from his
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home in Mexico to his employment in the U.S. was found to reside
in Mexico and not the U.S., to have no domicile in the U.S. during
the time he resided in Mexico, and therefore to be statutorily
ineligible for relief under section 212(c) of the Act.  Matter of
Carrasco, 16 I&N Dec. 195 (BIA 1977); Matter of Garcia-
Quintero, 15 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1975).  The lack of domicile in
the U.S. was held to exist even though the alien commuter paid
taxes in the U.S., had a California driver's license, and registered in
the U.S. for Selective Service.  Matter of Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec.
218 (BIA 1980).  In Matter of Garcia-Quintero, 15 I&N Dec. 244
(BIA 1975), the Board conceded that the alien maintained his LPR
status during the time he commuted to the U.S. to work, thus
distinguishing the “commuter” situation from an alien who
abandoned his status as an LPR.  Therefore, it would seem that an
alien commuter who moves back to the U.S. to reside would have a
"lawful unrelinquished domicile of 7 consecutive years" after he
resided in the U.S. for 7 years.
(4) When LPR status terminates
(a) The Board held that the LPR status of an alien terminates
within the meaning of section 101(a)(20) with the entry of a
final administrative order of deportation. Matter of Lok, 18
I&N Dec. 101 (BIA 1981).  An order becomes final when the
time allotted for appeal expires, or when the Board renders its
decision on appeal or certification.  Id.  Since the LPR status
of an alien continues until the entry of a final administrative
order of deportation, an alien who enters the U.S. while in an
excludable class before accruing 7 years as an LPR does not
lose his lawful status and is eligible to apply for a section
212(c) waiver if he attains 7 years before an administratively
final order of deportation is entered.  Matter of Duarte, 18
I&N Dec. 329 (BIA 1982).  Once an order of deportation
becomes administratively final, an alien may not thereafter
establish eligibility as an LPR for relief under section 212(c)
(barring reversal on the merits of the finding of deportability
by an appellate court or an administrative order reopening
proceedings) nor may his domicile in the U.S. from then on
be considered lawful for section 212(c) purposes.  Matter of
Lok, 18 I&N Dec. 101 (BIA 1976); Matter of Cerna, 20 I&N
Dec. 399 (BIA 1991).  A respondent who was denied a
waiver under section 212(c) and who is subject to an
administratively final order of deportation cannot
successfully move to reopen deportation proceedings to offer
new evidence on his section 212(c) eligibility because such a
respondent is no longer an LPR.  Cerna, 20 I&N Dec. 399.
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An entirely opposite decision was reached in Matter of
Rodarte-Espinoza, 21 I&N Dec. 150 (BIA 1995).  The
decision did not say so explicitly, but it appears to be limited
only to cases arising in the 9th Circuit.
b. The alien must have a lawful unrelinquished domicile in the U.S. for 7
consecutive years.
(1) The Board held that the alien must have been an LPR for all of the
7 years and time spent in the U.S. in an immigration status other
than LPR does not count toward the 7 years.  Matter of Newton, 17
I&N Dec. 133 (BIA 1979); Matter of Anwo, 16 I&N Dec. 293
(BIA 1977); Matter of Lok, 15 I&N Dec. 720 (BIA 1976),
remanded, 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977); Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec.
116 (BIA 1953).  In 1991, the Attorney General effectively
codified Matter of S-, by promulgating 8 C.F.R. § 212.3(f)(2) [now
8 C.F.R. § 1212.(3)(f)(2)] which provides that any application for a
section 212(c) waiver shall be denied if the alien has not
maintained LPR status for at least 7 consecutive years immediately
preceding the filing of the application.  In a case involving whether
or not time spent as a temporary resident should count toward the 7
years, the Board held that it is bound by and will follow the
regulation absent contrary circuit court precedent.  Matter of Ponce
de Leon, 21 I&N Dec. 154 (BIA 1996). 
(2) The 7-year period begins on the effective date of LPR status.  If an
alien received a retroactive date of LPR status, (“roll-back” date),
the 7-year period begins on the roll-back date, not on the later date
when the adjustment of status was approved.  Matter of Diaz-
Chambrot, 19 I&N Dec. 674 (BIA 1988); Matter of Rivera-
Rioseco, 19 I&N Dec. 833 (BIA 1988).  
(3) A waiver of deportability under former section 241(f) of the Act
[now section 237(a)(1)(H)] waives not only the alien's deportability
but also the underlying fraud or misrepresentation and renders the
alien a LPR from the time of his initial entry in that status. 
Therefore, the waiver recipient may use the time accrued since the
initial granting of LPR status to establish the 7 years required for a
section 212(c) waiver.  Matter of Sosa-Hernandez, 20 I&N Dec.
758 (BIA 1993).
6. Grounds of inadmissibility and deportability which cannot be waived under
former section 212(c)
a. Grounds of inadmissibility which cannot be waived by former section
212(c) are as follows [8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(3)]:
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(1) Section 212(a)(3)(A) - aliens who are a threat to national security,
etc.,
(2) Section 212(a)(3)(B) - aliens engaging in terrorist activities,
(3) Section 212(a)(3)(C) - aliens having an adverse effect on U.S.
foreign policy,
(4) Section 212(a)(3)(E) - aliens participating in genocide or Nazi
persecutions,
(5) Section 212(a)(10)(C) - aliens refusing to surrender custody of
citizen children.
b. A former section 212(c) waiver is unavailable to an alien who has been
charged and found to be deportable or removable on the basis of a crime
that is an aggravated felony.  8 C.F.R. §1212.3(f)(4).
(1) An alien whose convictions for one or more aggravated felonies
were entered pursuant to plea agreements made on or after
November 29, 1990, but prior to April 24, 1996, is ineligible for
former section 212(c) relief only if he or she has served a term of
imprisonment of five years or more for such aggravated felony or
felonies [8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(4)(i)];
(2) An alien is not ineligible for former section 212(c) relief on
account of an aggravated felony conviction entered pursuant to a
plea agreement made before November 29, 1990 [8 C.F.R. §
1212.3(f)(4)(ii)].
c. A section 212(c) waiver is available in deportation proceedings only in
cases in which the ground of deportation has a comparable ground of
exclusion/inadmissiblity which may be waived by former section 212(c). 
8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5); Matter of Blake, 23 I&N Dec. 722 (BIA 2005);
Matter of Brieva, 23 I&N Dec. 766 (BIA 2005); Matter of Meza, 20 I&N
Dec. 257 (BIA 1991). 
(1) In Matter of Blake, 23 I&N Dec. 722 (BIA 2005), the Board held
that the statutory counterpart test turns on “whether Congress
employed similar language to describe substantially equivalent
categories of offenses.”  The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits have followed Matter of Blake in precedent
decisions.  See Gonzalez-Mesias v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 62 (1st Cir.
2008); Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2008);
Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2007); Vo v. Gonzales,
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482 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2007); Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d
356 (5th Cir. 2007); Valere v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 757 (7th Cir.
2007); Vue v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2007).   However,
in Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second
Circuit declined to follow Matter of Blake, ruling that the statutory
counterpart test should be based on whether the underlying offense
would render an alien excludable as well as removable, rather than
on a comparison of the language used in the Act to describe the
two categories of offenses.  The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in Judulang v. Holder, 131 S. Ct. 2093 (U.S. April 18,
2011)(reviewing Judulang v. Gonzales, 249 Fed. Appx. 499 (9th
Cir. 2007)) to resolve the lopsided circuit split.  In Judulang, the
Ninth Circuit determined that a person found removable for sexual
abuse of a minor, an aggravated felony, was not eligible for section
212(c) relief because there was no comparable ground of
inadmissibility.   
(2) In Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20  I&N Dec. 262 (BIA 1990;
A.G. 1991), aff’d, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993), the Board sought
to make a section 212(c) waiver available to any ground of
deportability except those which have a comparable ground of
excludability specifically exempted by section 212(c).  The
Attorney General disapproved the Board’s decision and held that a
section 212(c) waiver is unavailable in deportation proceedings
unless the alien is deportable under a ground of deportability for
which there is a comparable ground of excludability.
(a) Most Circuit courts have agreed that a section 212(c) waiver
is only available when the ground of deportability has a
corresponding ground of exclusion.  Campos v. INS, 961
F.2d 309 (1st Cir. 1992); Rodriguez v. INS, 9 F.3d 408 (5th
Cir. 1993); Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939 (7th Cir.
1993); Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1988);
Padron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455 (11th Cir. 1994).  Only the 2nd
Circuit takes a contrary view.  Bedoya-Valencia v. INS, 6
F.3d 891 (2d Cir. 1993).
(3) However, a waiver under section 212(c) is not unavailable in
deportation proceedings to an alien convicted of an aggravated
felony simply because there is no ground of exclusion which
recites the words, “convicted of an aggravated felony.” Matter of
Meza, 20 I&N Dec. 257 (BIA 1991).  The Board held that the 1990
amendment to section 212(c) which makes its waiver unavailable
to an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony and has
served a term of imprisonment of at least 5 years implies that
Congress intended that some aliens convicted of an aggravated
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felony are eligible for the waiver.  The specific category of
aggravated felony in the case was one involving trafficking in a
controlled substance.  Since such a conviction could also form the
basis for excludability under section 212(a)(23) [as an alien
convicted of a violation of any law or regulation relating to a
controlled substance], the Board held that the alien was not
statutorily precluded from applying for a section 212(c) waiver. 
The Board did not discuss the other categories of aggravated
felonies to determine if LPRs deportable under any other category
may qualify for a section 212(c) waiver.
(4) In Matter of Blake, 23 I&N Dec. 722 (BIA 2005), the Board held
that the aggravated felony ground of removal for sexual abuse of a
minor has no statutory counterpart on the grounds of
inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2) of the Act.  The Board has
also held that the aggravated felony ground of removal for a crime
of violence has no comparable ground of inadmissiblity.  Matter of
Brieva, 23 I&N Dec. 766 (BIA 2005).
d. A waiver under section 212(c) of the Act may be sought in conjunction
with an application for adjustment of status by an alien who is
deportable for both drug and weapons offenses.  Matter of Gabryelsky,
20 I&N Dec. 750 (BIA 1993), superseded by statute as stated in Osborne
v. Gonzales, 225 F. App’x 464 (9th Cir. 2007). See also Pascua v.
Holder, 641 F.3d 316 (9th Cir. 2011).
7. The alien must merit a favorable exercise of discretion.
a. The IJ is required to balance the adverse factors of record evidencing an
alien’s undesirability as a permanent resident against the favorable
factors and social and humane considerations to determine if the
granting of relief is in the best interest of the United States.  Among the
negative factors to be considered are the nature and underlying
circumstances of the exclusion ground at issue, the presence of
additional significant violations of this country’s immigration laws, the
existence of a criminal record and, if so, its nature, recency, seriousness,
and the presence of other evidence indicative of a respondent’s bad
character or undesirability as a permanent resident of this country. 
Favorable considerations have been found to include such factors as
family ties within the United States, residence of long duration in this
country (particularly when the inception of residence occurred while the
respondent was of young age), evidence of hardship to the respondent
and family if deportation occurs, service in this country’s Armed Forces,
a history of employment, the existence of property or business ties,
evidence of value and service to the community, proof of a genuine
rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and other evidence attesting to a
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respondent’s good character (such as affidavits from family, friends, and
responsible community representatives).  Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec.
581 (BIA 1978); Matter of Salmon, 16 I&N Dec. 734 (BIA 1978);
Matter of Khalik, 17 I&N Dec. 518 (BIA 1980).  
(1) A respondent’s lack of remorse or refusal to accept responsibility
for criminal acts may be considered as an adverse factor in the
exercise of discretion. Matter of Khalik, 17 I&N Dec. 518 (BIA
1980).
(2) While community ties, property and business holdings, or special
service to the community are to be considered in the alien’s favor,
the absence of those additional ties in themselves does not negate
the weight to be accorded the alien’s long residence in this country
which was otherwise without a criminal record and during most of
which the alien was employed. Matter of Arreguin, 21 I&N Dec.
38 (BIA 1995).
(3) Evidence of general conditions in an alien’s homeland may be
weighed as a factor in evaluating an application under section
212(c) of the Act but, since Congress has provided asylum and
withholding of deportation under sections 208 and 243(h) of the
Act as the appropriate avenues for requesting relief from
deportation on the basis of a fear of persecution, allegations and
evidence regarding a well-founded fear or clear probability of
persecution have no place in a section 212(c) application or
adjudication.  Matter of D-, 20 I&N Dec. 915 (BIA 1994).
b. The equities that an applicant for section 212(c) relief must bring
forward to establish that favorable discretionary action is warranted will
depend in each case on the nature and circumstances of the ground of
exclusion sought waived and on the presence of any additional adverse
factors. Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581 (BIA 1978). As the negative
factors grow more serious, it becomes incumbent upon the applicant to
introduce additional offsetting favorable evidence, which in some cases
may have to involve unusual or outstanding equities.  Id. Such a showing
at times may be required solely by virtue of the circumstances and nature
of the exclusion ground sought waived. Id.
(1) In Matter of Arreguin, 21 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 1995), the Board
found the existence of 2 minor dependent US citizen children to be
an outstanding equity. The Board also found 20 years of LPR status
which commenced at the age of 17 to be an unusual or outstanding
equity.
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c. In a case involving a criminal conviction, the gravity of the offense must
be examined.  Matter of Buscemi, 19 I&N Dec. 628 (BIA 1988).  The
necessity of demonstrating unusual or outstanding equities may be
required by the presence of a conviction of a single serious crime such as
an offense involving controlled substances, or it may be required
because of a succession of criminal acts which together establish a
pattern of serious criminal misconduct.  Id. The Board does not look to
what ground of deportability or inadmissibility a particular crime comes
within, but rather to the nature of the underlying crime itself in
determining the degree of equities that will be required to overcome the
crime.  Matter of Roberts, 20  I&N Dec. 294 (BIA 1991).
(1) In Matter of Roberts, 20  I&N Dec. 294 (BIA 1991), the INS
argued that an applicant for a section 212(c) waiver who has been
convicted of an aggravated felony should be required to show that
he is fully rehabilitated and that deportation would result in
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the respondent’s
U.S. Citizen or LPR spouse, parent, or child.  The Board rejected
this argument and held that the balancing test set forth in Matter of
Marin, Matter of Buscemi, and Matter of Edwards adequately
allows for determining the appropriate strength of the equities
necessary to overcome an alien’s crimes in view of their nature and
seriousness.
(2) Inquiry may be had into the circumstances surrounding the
commission of a crime in order to determine whether a favorable
exercise of discretion is warranted, but it is impermissible to go
behind a record of conviction to reassess an alien's ultimate guilt or
innocence.  Matter of Roberts, 20  I&N Dec. 294 (BIA 1991);
Matter of Edwards, 20  I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1990).
(a) An IJ may consider evidence that the respondent engaged in
criminal activity to support his drug habit.  Matter of
Edwards, 20  I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1990).
(b) An IJ may not consider evidence on the issue of entrapment,
for that issue directly relates to the question of the
respondent's ultimate guilt or innocence. Matter of Roberts,
20  I&N Dec. 294 (BIA 1991).
(3) An alien who demonstrates unusual or outstanding equities when
required merely satisfies the threshold test for having a favorable
exercise of discretion considered in his case.  Such a showing does
not compel that discretion be exercised in his favor.  Matter of
Buscemi, 19 I&N Dec. 628 (BIA 1988).  In some cases, the
seriousness of the crime may still not be overcome by the equities
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demonstrated, even though the equities are unusual or outstanding. 
Matter of Roberts, 20  I&N Dec. 294 (BIA 1991); Matter of
Buscemi, 19 I&N Dec. 628 (BIA 1988).
(a) In response to criticism by some Circuit Courts, the Board
stated that, in reviewing a discretionary determination of an
IJ, it relies upon its own independent judgment in deciding
the ultimate disposition of the case and that it has no de facto
policy of denying a section 212(c) waiver to all aliens
convicted of a serious drug offense.  Matter of Burbano, 20 
I&N Dec. 872 (BIA 1994). However, a serious drug crime
will be accorded due weight, as is consistent with the
evolution of the immigration law in this area, and may
ultimately be the determinative factor in a given case. Id.
(4) Aliens who have been convicted of a crime should make a showing
of rehabilitation before relief under section 212(c) will be
considered as a matter of discretion.  Matter of Buscemi, 19 I&N
Dec. 628 (BIA 1988); Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581 (BIA
1978).
(a) However, a clear showing of reformation is not an absolute
prerequisite to a favorable exercise of discretion and the issue
of rehabilitation should not be viewed as a “threshold test” to
be met before other factors are considered in a section 212(c)
case involving a criminal conviction.  Matter of Edwards, 20 
I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1990).
(b) A proper determination as to whether an alien has
demonstrated outstanding or unusual equities in a section
212(c) waiver application can only be made after a complete
review of the favorable factors in his case, therefore section
212(c) cases must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with
rehabilitation as a factor to be considered in the exercise of
discretion. Matter of Edwards, 20  I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1990).
(c) There is no irrebuttable presumption that a confined or
recently convicted alien can never establish either that
rehabilitation has occurred or that relief under section 212(c)
should otherwise be granted.  Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec.
581 (BIA 1978).  But the recency of a conviction and the fact
of confinement are matters relevant to the consideration of
whether an alien has demonstrated rehabilitation and whether
relief should be granted as a matter of discretion.  Id. 
Confined aliens and those who have recently committed
criminal acts have a more difficult task in demonstrating
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rehabilitation than aliens who have committed the same
offenses in the more distant past.  Matter of Silva-Rodriguez,
20  I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 1992); Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec.
581 (BIA 1978).  Dependent upon the nature of the offense
and the circumstances of confinement, it may well be that a
confined respondent will not be able to demonstrate
rehabilitation.  Id.  While the timing of the issuance of an
OSC by the Service can have a significant effect on the
circumstances relevant to the exercise of discretion, this fact
alone does not mandate that proceedings should be delayed in
order to afford an alien a better opportunity to prove
rehabilitation.  Matter of Silva-Rodriguez, 20 I&N Dec. 448
(BIA 1992); Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581 (BIA 1978). 
Therefore, an IJ did not act with “good cause” under the
regulations by granting a 1 year continuance so that the
respondent would have more time to establish rehabilitation. 
Matter of Silva-Rodriguez, 20 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 1992).
i) In Matter of Arreguin, 21 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 1995), the
Board found that an alien's acceptance of responsibility
for her crime (both during the hearing and in a
presentence investigation which resulted in a reduction
of sentence) and her achievements while in prison
(voluntarily pursuing GED studies for which she
received a letter of commendation, pursuing other
courses, having no prison infractions, and being
involved in a church ministry) were favorable indicators
of efforts at rehabilitation.
8. Special Motions to Reopen for Former Section 212(c) Relief - 8 C.F.R. §
1003.44
a. This section applies to certain aliens who formerly were lawful
permanent residents and who are subject to an administratively final
order of deportation or removal and who are eligible to apply for relief
under former section 212(c) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3 with
respect to convictions obtained by plea agreement reached prior to a
verdict at trial prior to April 1, 1997.  
b. These motions are adjudicated under the standards set forth at 8 C.F.R. §
1212.3.
c. General eligibility.  The alien has the burden of establishing eligibility
for relief, including the date on which the alien and the prosecution
agreed on the plea of guilt or nolo contendere.  The motion must
establish that the alien:
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(1) Was a lawful permanent resident and is now subject to a final order
of deportation or removal;
(2) Agreed to plead guilty or nolo contendere to an offense rendering
the alien deportable or removable, pursuant to a plea agreement
made before April 1, 1997;
(3) Had seven consecutive years of lawful unrelinquished domicile in
the United States prior to the date of the final administrative order
of deportation or removal; and
(4) Is otherwise eligible to apply for former section 212(c) relief under
the standards that were in effect at the time the alien’s plea was
made.
d. Deadline to file motion.  Such a motion must have been filed on or
before April 26, 2005.
e. Limitations on eligibility.  Aliens who have departed the United States
and who are currently outside the United States, aliens issued a final
order of deportation or removal who then illegally return to the United
States or alien who have not been admitted or paroled are not eligible to
file a special motion for former section 212(c) relief.
G. Asylum
1. Authority to apply for asylum - Section 208(a)
a. Any alien who is physically present in the U.S. or who arrives in the
U.S. (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien
who is brought to the U.S. after having been interdicted in international
or U.S. waters), irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum
in accordance with section 208 or, where applicable, section 235(b). 
INA § 208(a)(1).
2. Exceptions - Section 208(a)(2)
a. Safe third country - Section 208(a)(2)(A).  Authority to apply for asylum
under  section 208(a)(1) shall not apply to an alien if the Attorney
General determines that the alien may be removed, pursuant to a bilateral
or multilateral agreement, to a country (other than the country of the
alien’s nationality or, in the case of the alien having no nationality, the
country of the alien’s last habitual residence) in which the alien’s life or
freedom would not be threatened on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,
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and where the alien would have access to a full and fair procedure for
determining a claim to asylum or equivalent temporary protection, unless
the Attorney General finds that it is in the public interest for the alien to
receive asylum to the U.S.
(1) Safe third country agreement with Canada.  8 C.F.R. §
208.30(e)(6).
b. Time limit - Section 208(a)(2)(B). Subject to the changed circumstances
set forth in section 208(a)(2)(D), authority to apply for asylum under
section 208(a)(1) shall not apply to an alien unless the alien
demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the application has
been filed within 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United
States. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(ii)  provides that the one year period shall
be calculated from the date of the alien’s last arrival in the U.S. or April
1, 1997, whichever is later.  
(1) In Matter of F-P-R-, 24 I&N Dec. 681 (BIA 2008), the Board ruled
that, for purposes of determining whether an asylum application
was filed within one year “from the date of the alien’s last arrival
in the United States,” under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(ii), “the words
‘last arrival’ refer to an alien’s most recent coming or crossing into
the United States after having traveled from somewhere outside of
the country.”  Here, the respondent had been in the US since 1989,
but returned to Mexico on June 17, 2005.  He attempted to come
back to the US on July 20, 2005.  The IJ refused to treat July 20,
2005, as the date of the respondent’s “last arrival,” stating that
“applicants should not be able to reset the asylum clock by taking a
short excursion abroad.”  In reversing the IJ’s ruling, the Board
disagreed with Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172 (2d Cir.
2006), in which the Second Circuit stated that “the term ‘last
arrival in the United States’ should not be read to include an alien’s
return to the United States after a brief trip abroad pursuant to a
parole explicitly permitted by United States immigration
authorities.”  In addition, the Board stated that “we need not here
examine whether the regulation should be read to embody an
implicit exception in a case where it is found that an alien's trip
abroad was solely or principally intended to overcome the 1-year
time bar.”  (Emphasis in original.)
(a) In Singh v. Holder, 649 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth
Circuit held that the Board erred in imposing the
corroboration provision of section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) to the
issue of whether an alien’s asylum application was timely
filed under section 208(a)(2)(B). 
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(2) Changed circumstances- Section 208(a)(2)(D). Notwithstanding
sections 208(a)(2)(B) &(C), an application for asylum may be
considered if the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of the
Attorney General either the existence of changed circumstances
which materially affect the applicant's eligibility for asylum or
extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an
application within the 1 year time period. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)
provides that the term “changed circumstances” shall refer to
circumstances materially affecting the applicant’s eligibility for
asylum. They may include: changes in conditions in the applicant’s
country of nationality or, if the person is stateless, country of last
habitual residence or changes in objective circumstances relating to
the applicant in the U.S., including changes in applicable U.S. law,
that create a reasonable possibility that the applicant may qualify
for asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(ii) provides that the applicant
shall apply for asylum within a reasonable period given those
“changed circumstances.” An alien does not receive an automatic
one-year extension in which to file an asylum application following
“changed circumstances.” Matter of T-M-H- & S-W-C-, 25 I&N
Dec. 193 (BIA 2010). The particular circumstances related to
delays in filing the application must be evaluated to determine
whether the application was filed within a reasonable time. Id.
(3) In Vahora v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth
Circuit determined that the IJ and Board incorrectly interpreted
“changed circumstances” as requiring the applicant to show that,
prior to the change in circumstances, the applicant could not have
filed a meritorious application, and that the change in
circumstances resulted in an application that could succeed.  The
court held that the religious riots that began after the alien left India
constituted “changed circumstances” sufficient to excuse late filing
of his asylum application, even though he might previously have
had a colorable asylum claim based on mistreatment he suffered
during the prior ongoing tension between Muslims and Hindus,
because the riots were not simply a continuation of the prior unrest,
and they materially affected any claim by alien of a well-founded
fear of future persecution, particularly in light of fact that his
family’s house and farmhouse were burned, one of his brothers
vanished after being arrested, and his other brother fled after being
threatened by police. 
(4) 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5) provides that the term “extraordinary
circumstances” shall refer to events or factors beyond the alien’s
control that caused the failure to meet the 1 year deadline. Such
circumstances shall excuse the failure to file within 1 year so long
as the alien filed the application within a reasonable period  given
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those circumstances. The burden of proof is on the applicant  to
establish to the satisfaction of the asylum officer or IJ that the
circumstances were both beyond his control and that, but for those
circumstances, he would have filed within the 1 year period. These
circumstances may include: serious illness or mental or physical
disability of significant duration, including any effects of
persecution or violent harm suffered in the past, during the 1 year
period after arrival; legal disability (e.g. unaccompanied minor or
mental impairment) during the  first year after arrival; ineffective
assistance of counsel; the applicant maintained TPS, lawful
immigrant or nonimmigrant status, or was given parole, until a
reasonable period before the filing of the asylum application; the
applicant submitted an asylum application prior to the expiration of
the 1 year  deadline, but the application was rejected by the service
and was refiled within a reasonable period thereafter.
(a) An unaccompanied minor who was in the custody of the
Service pending removal proceedings during the 1-year
period following his arrival in the U.S. established
extraordinary circumstances that excused his failure to file an
asylum application within 1 year after the date of his arrival. 
Matter of Y-C-, 23 I&N Dec. 286 (BIA 2002).
(5) Previous asylum applications - Section 208(a)(2)(C). Subject to the
changed circumstances set forth in section 208(a)(2)(D), authority
to apply for asylum under section 208(a)(1) shall not apply to an
alien if the alien has previously applied for asylum and had such
application denied.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(3) provides that an
asylum application has not been denied unless denied by an IJ or
the Board.
3. Conditions for granting asylum - Section 208(b)
a. Section 208(b)(1) of the Act provides that the Attorney General may
grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum in accordance with
the requirements and procedures  established by the Attorney General if
the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the
meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A).
(1) Section 101(a)(42)(A) defines the term “refugee” as any person
who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or 
unwilling to return to, and is unable and unwilling to avail himself
or herself  of the protection of that country because of persecution
or a well founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
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nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. Section 101(a)(42)(B) also provides that for purposes of
determinations under the Act, a person who has been forced to
abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who
has been persecuted for failure or refusal  to undergo such a
procedure  or for other resistance to a coercive population control
program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of
political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he
or she would be forced to undergo such a procedure  or subject to
persecution  for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed
to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of political
opinion.
(a) Particular social group
i) “Persecution on account of membership in a particular
social group” refers to persecution that is directed
toward an individual who is a member of a group of
persons, all of whom share a common, immutable
characteristic, i.e., a characteristic that either is beyond
the power of the individual members of the group to
change or is so fundamental to their identities or
consciences that it ought not be required to be changed. 
Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985),
modified by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439
(BIA 1987).
ii) The existence of shared descriptive characteristics is not
necessarily sufficient to qualify those possessing the
common characteristics as members of a “particular
social group” for the purposes of the refugee definition
at section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act; rather, in
construing the term in keeping with the other four
statutory grounds, a number of factors are considered in
deciding whether a grouping should be recognized as a
basis for asylum, including how members of the
grouping are perceived by the potential persecutor, by
the asylum applicant, and by other members of the
society.  Matter of R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 906 (BIA 1999),
remanded, 23 I&N Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005).  An applicant
making a “particular social group” claim must make a
showing from which it is reasonable to conclude that
the persecutor was motivated to harm the applicant, at
least in part, by the asserted group membership.  Id. 
The social visibility of the members of a claimed social
group is an important consideration in determining
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whether a person qualifies as a refugee.  Matter of C-
A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951 (BIA 2006). See also Ayala v.
Holder, 640 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2011) (deferring to the
Board’s interpretation of “particular social group” and
adopting Matter of C-A-’s analysis, but affirming denial
of alien’s asylum application for failure to show a
nexus); see also Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I&N
Dec. 69 (BIA 2007).
iii) The Seventh Circuit held that the Board had not
sufficiently explained its reasoning behind the criterion
of social visibility, and its application of the concept
was inconsistent and therefore did not deserve
deference.  Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir.
2009).
iv) The Ninth Circuit takes a more expansive view of what
constitutes a particular social group, defining it as one
united by  a voluntary association, including a former
association or an innate characteristic that is so
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its
members that members either cannot or should not be
required to change it.  Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225
F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled in part by Thomas
v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005).
(b) Political opinion
i) In order for an alien to show persecution on account of
“political opinion,” it is not sufficient to show that a
persecutor’s conduct furthers his goal in a political
controversy; rather, the alien must show that it is his
own, individual political opinion that a persecutor seeks
to overcome by the infliction of harm or suffering. 
Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985),
modified by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439
(BIA 1987).
(c) Mixed motive cases.  An applicant does not need to establish
the exact motivation of a persecutor where different reasons
for actions are possible.  Matter of Fuentes, 19 I&N Dec. 658,
662 (BIA 1988), superseded by statute as stated in Ayala v.
Holder, 640 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2011). 
i) REAL ID Act of 2005.  Before the REAL ID Act, the
applicant was required to show that the persecutor was
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motivated at least in part by a protected ground.  Matter
of T-M-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 775, 778 (BIA 1997).  The
REAL ID Act arguably preserves the “mixed motive”
cases as it requires that the applicant establish that one
of the protected grounds was or will be at least one
central reason for persecuting the applicant.  INA §
208(b)(1)(B)(i) (as amended by the REAL ID Act of
2005 and applicable to only to applications for asylum
made on or after May 11, 2005).  In its first precedent
decision on the subject, the Board held that, in mixed
motive asylum cases under the REAL ID Act, the
applicant must prove that race, religion, nationality,
membership in a social group, or political opinion was
or will be at least one central reason for the claimed
persecution.  Matters of J-B-N- and S-M-, 24 I&N Dec.
208 (BIA 2007). The Board required that an applicant
show that a protected ground is more than “incidental,
tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason
for harm.”  See also Shaikh v. Holder, 588 F.3d 861
(5th Cir. 2009). 
 
ii) The Third Circuit upheld the Board’s test except for the
use of the word “subordinate.”  The Third Circuit
reasoned that the mixed motive analysis does not
depend on a hierarchy of motivations in which one is
dominant and the rest are subordinate.  Ndayshimiye v.
Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 2009).
iii) The Fourth Circuit applied Matters of J-B-N- & S-M- 
in Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159 (4th Cir.
2009), holding that although confrontations with the
gangs took place at the asylum applicant’s church,
money and personal animosity, and not religion or
political opinion, motivated the gangs to attack the
asylum applicant.  
(2) Exceptions - Section 208(b)(2).  Section 208(b)(1), relating to the
Attorney General’s authority to grant asylum, shall not apply to an
alien if the Attorney General  determines that: 
(a) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated
in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion;
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i) Before Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 129 S.Ct.
1159 (2009), the Board relied on Fedorenko v. United
States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981) to create a rule that the
voluntariness of the alien’s actions or the alien’s intent
were irrelevant in determining whether he assisted in
persecution. See Matter of Laipenieks, 18 I&N Dec.
433 (1983) (holding that in light of Fedorenko v. United
States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981),  omission of intent element
compels conclusion that intent is not relevant factor);
Matter of Fedorenko, 19 I&N Dec. 57 (BIA 1984)
(holding that motivations are immaterial to question of
whether alien assisted in persecution); Matter of
Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I&N Dec. 811 (1988) (holding
that alien’s participation or assistance in persecution
need not be of his own volition to bar relief pursuant to
persecutor bar). 
ii) In Negusie v. Holder, the Supreme Court held that there
was a statutory ambiguity regarding the relevance of
coercion or duress in determining whether an alien has
assisted in persecution. 129 S.Ct. at 1164-1165.
However, the Supreme Court found that the Board had
not exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret the
statute because it mistakenly relied on Fedorenko v.
United States to arrive at its rule regarding
voluntariness in assisting persecution. Id. at 1166-1167.
The Supreme Court held that Fedorenko was
inapplicable because it involved an interpretation of the
Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1009, which
contained a particular textual structure which the
Refugee Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 102-103, did not contain
and which was enacted for a different purpose than the
Refugee Act, namely addressing individuals who were
displaced by World War II. Id. at 1165-1166. Therefore,
the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Board to
exercise its discretion and for additional investigation or
explanation. Id. at 1167-1168.
iii) A finding of persecution requires some degree of intent
on the part of the persecutor to produce harm that the
applicant fears in order that the persecutor may
overcome a belief or characteristic of the applicant. 
Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985),
modified Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA
1987).  Thus, engaging in military actions, attacking
garrisons, burning of cars, and the destruction of other
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property by participants in a civil war is not persecution
unless it can be established that there is some degree of
intent to produce harm in order to overcome a belief or
characteristic of the victim of these actions.  Matter of
Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I&N Dec. 811 (BIA 1988).
(b) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the
community of the U.S.;
i) An alien convicted of an aggravated felony shall be
considered to have been convicted of a particularly
serious crime.  INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i).
(c) there are serious reasons for believing that the alien has
committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the U.S. prior
to the arrival of the alien in the U.S.; 
(d) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a
danger to the security of the U.S.;
i) The Ninth Circuit held that the Board applied the
appropriate standard of  “reasonable grounds, i.e.,
grounds akin to probable cause,” to find that the
petitioner posed a danger to the United States and was
precluded from asylum and withholding of removal.
Malkandi v. Holder, 576 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2009). 
(e) the alien is described in section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(I),(II), (III) or
(IV) or section 237(a)(4)(B)(relating to terrorist activity) (see
Abufayad v. Holder, 632 F.3d 623  (9th Cir. 2011) (agreeing
with a Board decision finding the alien to be “likely to
engage after entry in any terrorist activity” and denying the
alien CAT protection)), unless, in the case only of an alien
inadmissible  under section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV), the Attorney
General determines, in the Attorney General’s discretion, that
there are not reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a
danger to the security of the U.S. (see Matter of S-K-, 23 I&N
Dec. 936 (BIA 2006)); or
(f) the alien was firmly resettled in another country prior to
arriving in the U.S.
i) In Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 2011), the
Board clarified the firm resettlement determination by
establishing a four-step process. In the first step, DHS
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has the initial burden to make a prima facie showing of
an offer of firm resettlement by (1) presenting direct
evidence of an alien’s ability to stay in a country
indefinitely; or (2) when direct evidence is unavailable,
indirect evidence may be used if it has a sufficient level
of clarity and force to establish that the alien is able to
permanently reside in the country. Id. at 501-02. Direct
evidence “may include evidence of refugee status, a
passport, a travel document, or other evidence
indicative of permanent residence.” Id. at 502. Indirect
evidence may include the immigration or refugee laws
of the country of proposed resettlement, receipt of
government benefits or assistance, or other factors. Id.
“The firm resettlement inquiry ends if the DHS fails to
present prima facie evidence of an offer of firm
resettlement or the record does not otherwise establish
the existence of an offer of firm resettlement.” Id. at
503. If the DHS satisfies its initial burden, the analysis
moves on to the second step where the alien can rebut
the prima facie evidence of an offer of firm resettlement
“by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
such an offer has not, in fact, been made or that he or
she would not qualify for it.” Id. “In the third step, the
Immigration Judge will consider the totality of the
evidence presented by the parties to determine whether
an alien has rebutted the DHS’s evidence of an offer of
firm resettlement. If the Immigration Judge finds that
the alien has not rebutted the DHS’s evidence, the
Immigration Judge will find the alien firmly resettled.”
Id. In the fourth and final step, the burden shifts to the
alien to establish that an exception to firm resettlement
applies by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
ii) 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15 provides that an alien is considered 
to be firmly resettled if, prior to arrival in the U.S., he
or she entered into another nation, with or while in that
nation received, an offer of permanent resident status,
citizenship,  or some other type of permanent
resettlement unless he or she establishes that  his entry
into that nation was a necessary consequence of his
flight from persecution, that he remained in the country
only as long as was necessary to arrange onward travel,
and that he did not establish significant ties in that
nation; or that the conditions of his residence in that
nation were so substantially and consciously restricted
by the authority of the country of refuge that he was not
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in fact resettled. In making the determination, the
Asylum Officer (AO) or IJ shall consider the conditions
under which other residents of the country live, the type
of housing made available to the refugee, whether
permanent or temporary, the types and extent of
employment available to the refugee, and the extent to
which the refugee received permission to hold property
and to enjoy other rights and privileges, such as travel
documentation including a right of entry or reentry,
education, public relief, or naturalization, ordinarily
available to other residents in the country.
iii) The Board held that North Koreans who have become
citizens of South Korea can permissibly be precluded
on firm resettlement grounds from asylum, despite the
North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, which
provides that North Koreans cannot be barred from
asylum on account of any legal right to citizenship in
South Korea.  Matters of K-R-Y- & K-C-S-, 24 I&N
Dec. 133 (BIA 2007).
(3) The Attorney General may designate by regulation offenses that
will be considered to be either a particularly serious crime or a
serious nonpolitical crime.  INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(ii).
(4) The Attorney General may by regulation establish additional
limitations and conditions under which an alien shall be ineligible
for asylum under section 208(b)(2)(C).
4. Asylum procedure.  The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for the
consideration of asylum applications filed under section 208.  INA §
208(d)(1).
a. At the time of filing an application for asylum, the Attorney General
shall advise the alien of the privilege of being represented by counsel
and of the consequences of knowingly filing a frivolous application for
asylum and provide the alien a list of persons who have indicated their
availability to represent the aliens in asylum proceedings on a pro bono
basis.  INA § 208(d)(4).
b. If the Attorney General determines that an alien has knowingly made a
frivolous application for asylum and the alien has received the notice
under section 208(d)(4)(A) of the consequences of knowingly filing a
frivolous application for asylum, the alien shall be permanently
ineligible for any benefits under the Act, effective as of the date of a
final determination of such application.  INA  § 208(d)(6).
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(1) 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20 provides that, for applications filed on or after
April 1, 1997, an applicant is subject to the consequences set forth
in section 208(d)(6) only if a final order by an IJ or the Board
specifically finds that the alien knowingly filed a frivolous asylum
application.
(2) Definition of “frivolous.”  For purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20 and
section 208(d)(6) of the Act, an asylum application is frivolous if
any material elements is deliberately fabricated.  Such finding shall
only be made if the IJ or Board is satisfied that the applicant,
during the course of the proceedings, has had sufficient opportunity
to account for any discrepancies or implausible aspects of the
claim.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.20.
(3) A finding that an alien filed a frivolous asylum application does
not preclude the alien from seeking withholding of removal.  8
C.F.R. § 1208.20.
(4) Although the Board in Matter of Y-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA
2007), suggested that it might be “good practice” for an IJ who
believes that an applicant may have submitted a frivolous asylum
application to bring this issue to the attention of the applicant prior
to the conclusion of proceedings, this suggestion was not meant to
require that an IJ must provide additional warnings during the
course of the merits hearing that a frivolousness determination is
being considered.  Matter of B-Y-, 25 I&N Dec. 236, 241-42 (BIA
2010).  Sufficient notice is afforded when the IJ explains the
consequences of filing a frivolous asylum application, either at the
time the asylum application is filed or prior to commencement of
the merits hearing.  Id.
(5) The Board has held that, when making a finding of frivolousness,
an IJ must: (1) address the question of frivolousness separately and
make specific findings that the applicant deliberately fabricated
material elements of the asylum claim; (2) give the applicant
sufficient opportunity to account for discrepancies or implausible
aspects of the claim; and (3) provide cogent and convincing
reasons for determining that a preponderance of the evidence
supports a frivolousness finding, taking into account any
explanations by the applicant for discrepancies or implausible
aspects of the claim.  Matter of Y-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA
2007).
(6) In making a frivolousness determination, an IJ may incorporate by
reference any factual findings made in support of an adverse
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credibility finding, so long as the IJ makes explicit findings that the
incredible aspects of the asylum application were material and
were deliberately fabricated.  Matter of B-Y-, 25 I&N Dec. 236
(BIA 2010) (clarifying Matter of Y-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA
2007)).  
(7) In Yan Liu v. Holder, 640 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth
Circuit vacated a Board finding that the alien filed a frivolous
asylum claim, reasoning that the heightened requirements for a
frivolous finding established by Matter of Y-L- were not satisfied. 
The court held that the alien was not afforded sufficient
opportunity to account for the discrepancies and implausibilities in
the claim because the IJ announced only at the end of the hearing
that she intended to make a frivolous finding.  
(8) The Eleventh Circuit held that making intentional and material
misrepresentations on an earlier asylum application will disqualify
an alien even if he recanted the fraudulent claims in a second
application.  Barreto-Claro v. Att’y Gen., 275 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir.
2001).  In the first asylum application, the alien claimed to have
left Cuba and come directly to the U.S.  In the revised application,
he admitted that he had been granted refugee status in Costa Rica.
c. Section 208(d)(5)(A) requires that the procedure established under
section 208((d)(1) shall provide that:
(1) asylum cannot be granted until the identity of the applicant has
been checked against all appropriate records or databases
maintained by the Attorney General and by the Secretary of State,
including the Automated Visa Lookout System, to determine any
grounds on which the alien may be inadmissible to or deportable
from the U.S., or ineligible to apply for or be granted asylum;
(2) in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the initial interview or
hearing on the asylum application shall commence not later than 45
days after the date an application is filed;
(3) in the absence of exceptional circumstances, final administrative
adjudication of the asylum application, not including
administrative appeal, shall be completed within 180 days after the
date the application is filed;
(4) any administrative appeal shall be filed within 30 days of a
decision granting or denying asylum, or within 30 days of the
completion of removal proceedings before an IJ under section 240,
whichever is later; and
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(5) in the case of an applicant for asylum who fails without prior
authorization or in the absence of exceptional circumstances to
appear for an interview or hearing, the application may be
dismissed or the applicant may be otherwise sanctioned for such
failure.
(6) Section 208(d)(5)(B) states that the Attorney General may provide
by regulation for any other conditions or limitations on the
consideration of an application for asylum not inconsistent with the
Act.
5. Burden of proof.  The burden of proof is on the applicant for asylum to
establish that he or she is a refugee as defined in section 101(a)(42) of the Act. 
The testimony of the applicant, if credible, is sufficient to sustain the burden
of proof without corroboration.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a).
a. For applications made on or after May 11, 2005, the REAL ID Act of
2005 states that the testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to
sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if the
applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is
credible, is persuasive and refers to specific facts sufficient to
demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.  In determining whether the
applicant has met his or her burden, the trier of fact may weigh the
credible testimony along with other evidence of record.  Where the trier
of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that
corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be
provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot
reasonably obtain the evidence.  INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) (as amended by
the REAL ID Act of 2005).  
(1) The provisions regarding credibility determinations enacted in
section 101(a)(3) of the REAL ID Act of 2005 (codified at section
208(b)(1)(B)(iii)) only apply to applications for asylum,
withholding, and other relief from removal that were initially filed
on or after May 11, 2005, whether with an asylum officer or an IJ. 
Matter of S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 42 (BIA 2006).  Where an alien filed
his applications for relief prior to May 11, 2005, but renewed his
applications in removal proceedings before an IJ subsequent to that
date, the provisions of 208(b)(1)(B)(iii) are not applicable to
credibility determinations made in adjudicating his applications. 
Id.  
b. The Lautenberg Amendment sets forth a reduced burden of proof for
certain categories of aliens, including Evangelical Christians from the
former Soviet republics, who are seeking refugee status.  In Yakimchuck
v. INS, No. 73219477, 1999 WL 594933 (7th Cir. Aug. 6, 1999)
(unpublished), the court agreed with the IJ and the Board that the
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respondent, in seeking asylum, cannot avail himself of the lower burden
of proof established by the Lautenberg Amendment.  However, the
Board could properly consider the legislative history of the Amendment,
which may suggest that Evangelical Christians are persecuted as a group
in Ukraine.  The case was remanded to allow the IJ and Board to
determine if the Amendment is of probative value, and if so, whether the
respondent has a well-founded fear of persecution.  The Lautenberg
Amendment expired in June of 2011, and it is unclear whether it will be
reauthorized.
6. Past persecution.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) provides that an applicant shall be
found to be a refugee on the basis of past persecution if he can establish that
he has suffered persecution in the past in his country of nationality or last
habitual residence on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion, and that he is unable or unwilling
to return to or avail himself of the protection of that country owing to such
persecution.
a. The Board has held that, when evaluating an asylum application, the IJ
must make a specific finding on whether the applicant has suffered past
persecution based on a statutorily enumerated ground and then apply the
regulatory framework at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).  If past persecution is
established, then the burden shifts to the DHS to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that there are changed country conditions,
or that the applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating, and
that relocation is reasonable under the circumstances.  Matter of D-I-M-,
24 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 2008).
b. See pages 153-187 below for case law common to asylum and
withholding of removal law.
7. Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution
a. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i) provides that if it is determined that the
applicant has established past persecution, he or she shall be presumed
also to have a well-founded fear of persecution unless a preponderance
of the evidence establishes that since the time the persecution occurred
conditions in the applicant's country of nationality or last habitual
residence have changed to such an extent that the applicant no longer has
a well-founded fear of being persecuted if he were to return.
(1) Under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i), where an asylum applicant has
shown that he has been persecuted in the past on account of a
statutorily-protected ground, and the record reflects that country
conditions have changed to such an extent that the asylum
applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution from his
original persecutors, the applicant bears the burden of
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demonstrating that he has a well-founded fear of persecution from
any new source. Matter of N-M-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 312 (BIA 1998).
b. If the applicant cannot demonstrate past persecution, he may establish
his eligibility for asylum if he (1) has a fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion; (2) there is a reasonable possibility that he would
suffer such persecution if returned to his country of nationality; and (3)
he is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country based on his fear.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(A)-(C).  To
establish a well-founded fear of persecution, an applicant must present
credible testimony that demonstrates that his fear of harm is of a level
that amounts to persecution, that the harm is on account of a protected
characteristic, that the persecutor could become aware or is already
aware of the characteristic, and that the persecutor has the means and
inclination to persecute.  See Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439,
446 (BIA 1987); see also Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 226.  A well-founded
fear of persecution must be both subjectively genuine and objectively
reasonable. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-31.  An applicant may
establish a subjective fear of persecution based on credible testimony. 
See Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 221.  To meet the objective component, the
respondent must show by specific and concrete evidence in the record
that his fear of persecution is reasonable.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13; see
also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421.
c. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii) provides that an application for asylum
shall be denied if the applicant establishes past persecution but it is also
determined that he does not have a well-founded fear of future
persecution, unless it is determined that the applicant has demonstrated
compelling reasons for being unwilling to return to his country of
nationality or last habitual residence arising out of the severity of the
past persecution.  If the applicant demonstrates such compelling reasons,
he may be granted asylum unless such a grant is barred by 8 C.F.R. §
1208.13(c).
(1) An alien who has demonstrated past persecution is not separately
required by 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii) to demonstrate compelling
reasons for being unwilling to return to his or her country of
nationality or habitual residence in order to be granted asylum. 
Rather, he or she is considered to have established eligibility for
asylum both on account of the past persecution which has been
demonstrated and the well-founded fear of future persecution
which is presumed.  The need to demonstrate compelling reasons
for being unwilling to return resulting from the severity of the past
persecution suffered by the applicant only arises if the presumption
of a well-founded fear of future persecution is successfully
rebutted.  Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337 (BIA 1996). To
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overcome the regulatory presumption, the record must reflect, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that since the time the persecution
occurred, conditions in the applicant’s country of nationality or last
habitual residence have changed to such an extent that the
applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of being persecuted if
he or she were to return to that country.  As a practical matter, it
will be the Service’s burden to rebut the presumption, whether by
adducing additional evidence or resting upon evidence already in
the record.  Id. at 346.
(a) The Ninth Circuit held that the IJ’s finding of changed
country conditions because the leader of the asylum
applicant’s political party was elected president of Kenya was
improper because the IJ relied on the 2002 Department of
State Report for Kenya, which covered only one day after the
new president was sworn in and did not provide substantial
evidence that there was a fundamental change of conditions
in Kenya.  Mutuku v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2010).
(b) The Ninth Circuit held that the IJ’s finding that the
government rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear
of returning to Fiji in light of reports showing improved
country conditions was not supported by substantial evidence. 
Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2011).  The court
reasoned that the IJ and the Board failed to make an
individualized determination of how the changed country
conditions affected the alien’s specific harms and
circumstances.  The court also found that the Board erred in
denying the motion to reopen, which was based on new
evidence of a 2006 coup, because the Board did not consider
how the new evidence could have made it more difficult for
the government to rebut the presumption of a well-founded
fear of future persecution. 
 
(c) The Eleventh Circuit held that the presumption had not been
rebutted where the country report relied on by the Board
made no mention of the alien’s home province, where the
past incidents of persecution had occurred and, although there
was an indication of improvement, the report made it clear
that religious violence still occurred.  Imelda v. Att’y Gen.,
611 F.3d 724 (11th Cir. 2010).
(2) The Second Circuit found that the IJ had impermissibly shifted the
burden to the respondent to rebut the presumption of a well-
founded fear.  The alien’s temporary return trips to a country after
experiencing past persecution did not, in and of themselves, rebut
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the presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution.  See Kone
v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010).
(3) An asylum applicant who no longer has a well-founded fear of
persecution due to changed country conditions may still be eligible
for a discretionary grant of asylum under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii) only if he establishes, as a threshold matter,
compelling reasons for being unwilling to return to his country of
nationality or last habitual residence arising out of the severity of
the past persecution.  Matter of N-M-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 312 (BIA
1998); Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337 (BIA 1996).  Central to a
discretionary finding in past persecution cases should be careful
attention to compelling, humanitarian considerations that would be
involved if the refugee were to be forced to return to the country
where he or she was persecuted in the past. Matter of H-, 21 I&N
Dec. 337 (BIA 1996).  Board case law also recognizes that general
humanitarian reasons, independent of the circumstances that led to
the applicant’s refugee status, such as age, health, or family ties
should also be considered in the exercise of discretion.  Matter of
Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 467, 474 (BIA 1987), superseded by statute on
other grounds as recognized by Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033
(9th Cir. 1999).  Although the totality of circumstances and actions
of an alien in his or her flight from the country where persecution
was suffered to the United States are to be considered, the danger
of persecution should generally outweigh all but the most
egregious of adverse factors. Matter of Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 467
(BIA 1987); Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337 (BIA 1996).
(a) In Matter of Chen, 20 I&N Dec. 16 (BIA 1989), the asylum
applicant’s suffering began when he was 8 years old and
continued until his adulthood.  He endured physical,
psychological, and social harm.  He was permanently
physically and emotionally scarred.  Therefore, he was
granted asylum for humanitarian reasons, notwithstanding the
fact that there was little likelihood of future persecution.
(b) In Matter of B-, 21 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 1995), the Board
found that where the applicant had suffered 3 months
detention in KHAD facilities, 10 months detention in prison,
and 4 months involuntary military service, in addition to
suffering sleep deprivation, beatings, electric shocks, and the
routine use of physical torture and psychological abuse, the
persecution was so severe that his asylum application should
be granted notwithstanding the change of circumstances in
Afghanistan.
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(c) In Matter of N-M-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 312 (BIA 1998), the
Board acknowledged the traumatic sequence of events that
the applicant witnessed and experienced from his month-long
detention and beatings and from the disappearance and likely
death of his father.  However, given the degree of harm
suffered by the applicant, the length of time over which the
harm was inflicted, and the lack of evidence of severe
psychological trauma stemming from the harm, the Board
concluded that the applicant had not shown compelling
reasons arising out of the severity of the past persecution for
being unable or unwilling to return to Afghanistan.
(d) It is appropriate to consider in the exercise of discretion
whether an applicant, who is eligible for asylum based on a
well-founded fear of persecution, has the ability and can
reasonably be expected to relocate in his or her home country. 
Matter of R-, 20 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 1992).  Where the well-
founded fear is of a nongovernmental authority, the question
arises as to whether that authority has the ability to persecute
the applicant throughout the home country and whether the
applicant would have to pass through any unsafe part of the
country.  If the Service contends that an applicant would not
face persecution throughout the entire country, the Service
should clarify how it accomplishes the deportation of such
individuals to a protected area. Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec.
337, 349 n.7 (BIA 1996).
8. Discretion.  Statutory and regulatory eligibility for asylum, whether based on
past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, does not
necessarily compel a grant of asylum.  An applicant for asylum has the burden
of establishing that the favorable exercise of discretion is warranted.  Matter
of Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 1987), superseded by statute on other grounds
as recognized by Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 1999); Matter of
Shirdel, 19 I&N Dec. 33 (BIA 1984).  Factors which fall short of the grounds
for mandatory denial may constitute discretionary considerations.  In
exercising discretion, the Board has considered it appropriate to examine the
totality of the circumstances and actions of an alien in his or her flight from
the country where persecution is feared.  Matter of Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 467
(BIA 1987). See Junming Li v. Holder, --- F.3d ----, No. 07-71027, 2011 WL
3850050 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2011).
a. Aliens who have committed violent or dangerous crimes will not be
granted asylum, even if they are technically eligible for such relief,
except in extraordinary circumstances, such as those involving national
security or foreign policy considerations, or cases in which an alien
clearly demonstrates that the denial of relief would result in exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship.  Depending on the gravity of the alien’s
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underlying criminal offense, such a showing of exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship might still be insufficient.  Matter of Jean,
23 I&N Dec. 373 (A.G. 2002).
b. When an IJ denies asylum solely in the exercise of discretion and then
grants withholding of removal, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e) requires the IJ to
reconsider the denial of asylum to take into account factors relevant to
family unification.  Matter of T-Z-, 24 I&N Dec. 163 (BIA 2007).
9. Termination of asylum.  Section 208(c)(2) provides that asylum granted under
section 208(b) does not convey a right to remain permanently in the U.S. and
may be terminated if the Attorney General determines that:
a. The alien no longer meets the conditions described in section 208(b)(1),
i.e. being a refugee, owing to a fundamental change in circumstances.
b. the alien meets a condition described in section 208(b)(2), i.e.
particularly serious crime, etc.;
c. the alien may be removed, pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral
agreement, to a country (other than the country of the alien's nationality
or last habitual residence) in which the alien's life or freedom would not
be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion, and where the alien is
eligible to receive asylum or equivalent temporary protection;
d. the alien has voluntarily availed himself of the protection of the alien's
country of nationality or last habitual residence by returning to such
country with permanent resident status or the reasonable possibility of
obtaining such status with the same rights and obligations pertaining to
other permanent residents of that country; 
e. the alien has acquired a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the
country of his new nationality.
f. However, if the alien is eligible to adjust status under section 209 of the
Act, the IJ may adjust the respondent’s status rather than terminating his
asylee status.  Matter of K-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 661 (BIA 2004).
  
10. Adjustment of status by refugees or aliens granted asylum.
a. Aliens admitted as refugees.  
(1) Section 209(a)(1) of the Act provides that any alien who has been
admitted to the U.S. under section 207 of the Act (i.e. as a refugee)
shall, at the end of a 1 year period, return or be returned to the
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custody of INS for inspection and examination for admission to the
U.S. as an immigrant provided:
(a) The alien's admission has not been terminated by the
Attorney General [INA § 209(a)(1)(A)];
(b) The alien has been physically present in the U.S. for at least 1
year [INA § 209(a)(1)(B)];
(c) The alien has not acquired permanent resident status [INA §
209(a)(1)(C)].
(2) Any alien who is found upon inspection and examination by an
immigration officer or an IJ to be admissible as an immigrant shall
be regarded as an LPR as of the date of the alien’s arrival in the
U.S. notwithstanding any numerical limitation in the Act. INA §
209(a)(2).
(3) Aliens found inadmissible may apply for a waiver of
inadmissibility under section 209(c) of the Act discussed below.
b. Aliens granted asylum.
(1) Section 209(b) of the Act provides that not more than 10,000
refugee admissions under section 207(a) per fiscal year may be
made available by the Attorney General to adjust to LPR status any
asylee who:
(a) Applies for such adjustment,
(b) Has been physically present in the U.S. for at least one year
after being granted asylum,
(c) Continues to be a refugee as defined in section 101(a)(42)(A)
of the Act or the spouse or child of such a refugee,
(d) Is not firmly resettled in any foreign country, and
i) See pages 136-138 above for full discussion of firm
resettlement.
(e) Is admissible as an immigrant.
i) Aliens found inadmissible may apply for a waiver of
inadmissibility under section 209(c) of the Act
discussed below.
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(2) If the application is granted, the Attorney General shall establish a
record of the alien's admission as a LPR as of the date 1 year before
the approval of the application.
c. Aliens found to be inadmissible.
(1) Section 209(c) of the Act provides that in determining an alien's
admissibility under both section 209(a)(1) and section 209(b), the
following grounds of inadmissibility shall not apply:
(a) Section 212(a)(4) - an alien likely to become a public charge.
(b) Section 212(a)(5) - an alien not in possession of a labor
certification.
(c) Section 212(a)(7)(A) - an immigrant not in possession of a
valid unexpired immigrant visa or other entry document or
not in possession of a valid unexpired passport or other travel
document or whose visa has been issued without compliance
with section 203 of the Act.
(2) Except for those provisions of section 212(a) listed below, section
209(c) allows the Attorney General to waive any other provisions
of section 212(a) for the following reasons:
(a) For humanitarian reasons,
(b) To assure family unity, or
(c) When it is otherwise in the public interest.
(3) However, section 209(c) provides that the following grounds of
section 212(a) may NOT be waived:
(a) 212(a)(2)(C) - an alien who the consular or immigration
officer knows or has reason to believe is an illicit trafficker in
controlled substances;
(b) 212(a)(3)(A) - an alien who a consular officer or the Attorney
General knows or has reasonable ground to believe seeks to
enter the U.S. to violate any law of the U.S. relating to
espionage or sabotage or to violate any law prohibiting the
export of goods, technology, or sensitive information, or to
engage in any activity to overthrow the Government of the
U.S., or any other unlawful activity;
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(c) 212(a)(3)(B) - an alien who has engaged or is likely to engage
in terrorist activity;
(d) 212(a)(3)(C) - an alien whose entry or proposed activity in
the U.S. would adversely affect foreign policy;
(e) 212(a)(3)(E) - an alien who participated in persecution by the
Nazi government of Germany or its allies.
(4) An alien who previously adjusted from refugee status to that of an
LPR under section 209 of the Act, retains that status until a final
order of removal and is ineligible to readjust under section 209(b)
in conjunction with a 209(c) waiver as a form of relief from
removal. Robleto-Pastora v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010). 
d. Exercise of discretion.  In evaluating the propriety of granting an
otherwise inadmissible alien a discretionary waiver under section 209(c)
of the Act, any humanitarian, family unity preservation, or public interest
considerations must be balanced against the seriousness of the criminal
offense that rendered the alien inadmissible.  Matter of Jean, 23 I&N
Dec. 373 (A.G. 2002).
(1) Aliens who have committed violent or dangerous crimes will not
be granted a discretionary waiver under section 209(c) of the Act
except in extraordinary circumstances, such as those involving
national security or foreign policy considerations, or cases in which
an alien clearly demonstrates that the denial of adjustment of status
would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. 
Depending on the gravity of the alien’s underlying criminal
offense, such a showing of exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship might still be insufficient.  Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec.
373 (A.G. 2002).
H. Withholding of removal - Section 241(b)(3).
1. Section 241(b)(3)(A) provides that the Attorney General may not remove an
alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or
freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien's race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
a. The Board held in Matter of I-S- & C-S-, that before an IJ can issue a
decision granting withholding of removal, without a grant of asylum, he
or she must first enter an explicit removal order.  Matter of I-S & C-S-,
24 I&N Dec. 432 (BIA 2008).
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2. Exceptions.  Section 241(b)(3)(B) provides that section 241(b)(3)(A) does not
apply to an alien deportable under section 237(a)(4)(D) [assisted in Nazi
persecution or engaged in genocide] or if the Attorney General decides that:
a. the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion;
b. the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the U.S.;
(1) An alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony (or
felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate
term of imprisonment of at least 5 years shall be considered to have
committed a particularly serious crime. INA § 241(b)(3)(B).
(2) This shall not preclude the Attorney General from determining
that, notwithstanding the length of sentence imposed, an alien has
been convicted of a particularly serious crime.  INA § 
241(b)(3)(B).
(3) The Seventh Circuit ruled that, to qualify as a particularly serious
crime under section 241(b)(3)(B)(ii), an offense need not be an
aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43).  Ali v. Achim, 468
F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2006).
(4) The Third Circuit ruled that, to qualify as a particularly serious
crime under section 241(b)(3)(B)(ii), an offense must be an
aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43).  Alaka v. Att’y Gen.,
456 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2006).
(5) The Board ruled that, to qualify as a particularly serious crime
under section 241(b)(3)(B)(ii), an offense need not be an
aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43).  This holding accords
with Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2006), but contradicts
Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2006).  The Board
further ruled that, if the elements of an offense “potentially bring it
within the ambit of” a particularly serious crime, all reliable
information may be considered in determining whether the offense
is a particularly serious crime, including the conviction records,
sentencing information, and other information outside the record of
conviction.  Matter of N-A-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 336 (BIA 2007).
c. there are serious reasons for believing that the alien has committed a
serious nonpolitical crime outside the U.S. prior to the arrival of the
alien in the U.S.; or
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d. there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the
security of the U.S.
(1) An alien described in section 237(a)(4)(B) shall be considered to
be an alien with respect to whom there are reasonable grounds for
regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the U.S.  INA §
241(b)(3)(B).
3. The burden of proof is on the applicant for withholding of removal to establish
that his or her life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of
removal on account of one of the five reasons set forth above.  8 C.F.R. §
1208.16(b).  That regulation also provides that the testimony of the applicant,
if credible, may be sufficient proof without corroboration.
a. For applications made on or after May 11, 2005, the REAL ID Act of
2005 provides that in determining whether an alien has demonstrated
that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened on account of one of
the five enumerated grounds, the trier of fact shall determine whether the
alien has sustained his or her burden of proof and shall make credibility
determinations in the manner described in section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) and
(iii) (as amended by the REAL ID Act of 2005). See pages 141-142
above for comparison to asylum burden of proof.
4. The applicant’s life or freedom shall be found to be threatened if it is more
likely than not that he or she would be persecuted.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1).
5. Past persecution.  If the applicant is determined to have suffered persecution in
the past such that his or her life or freedom was threatened in the proposed
country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion, it shall be presumed that his or her
life or freedom would be threatened on return to that country unless a
preponderance of the evidence establishes that conditions in that country have
changed to such an extent that it is no longer more likely than not that the
applicant would be so persecuted.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i).  If the
applicant’s fear is unrelated to the past persecution, the applicant bears the
burden of establishing that it is more likely than not that he or she would
suffer such harm.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(iii).
6. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2) provides that in evaluating whether the applicant has
sustained the burden of proving that his or her life or freedom would be
threatened in that country on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, the AO or IJ
shall not require the applicant to provide evidence that he or she would be
singled out individually for such persecution if the applicant establishes that
there is a pattern or practice in the country of proposed removal of persecution
of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
page 153 of 365
opinion and the applicant establishes his or her own inclusion in and
identification with such group of persons such that it is more likely than not
that his or her freedom would be threatened upon return.
7. The “one central reason” in so-called mixed motive cases that applies to
asylum applications pursuant to section 208(b)(1)(B)(i) also applies to
applications for withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3)(A) of the Act. 
Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I&N Dec. 341 (BIA 2010).
I. Case law common to both asylum and withholding of removal
1. Reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the
U.S.
a. The “reasonable ground to believe” standard is akin to the “probable
cause” standard.  A “reasonable belief” may be formed if the evidence
“is sufficient to justify a reasonable person in the belief that the alien
falls within the proscribed category.”  Matter of U-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 355
(BIA 2002).
b. The addition of section 236A to the Act by section 412 of the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56
(“USA Patriot Act”), which provides for the certification of certain
aliens as terrorists by the Attorney General,  does not change the
standard employed to determine whether there is reasonable ground to
believe that an alien is engaged in, or is likely to engage in, terrorist
activity under section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, or whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that he or she is a danger to the security of
the U.S. under section 241(b)(3)(B)(iv) of the Act.  The addition of
section 236A to the Act merely adds certification as another means to
address detention of suspected terrorist aliens.  It does not indicate that
Congress wanted to change the standard of proof or make it easier for
terrorists to apply for asylum or withholding of removal.  Matter of U-
H-, 23 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2002).
2. Particularly serious crimes.
a. History lesson - The text of the current withholding of removal provision
is based on the U.S.’s accession to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, applying Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force April 22, 1954) 
(“Convention”), to all refugees, without regard to geographic or other
limitations contained in the Convention as to events occurring before
1951.  Protocol, supra, Art. 1, para. 1; see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987) (“If one thing is clear from the legislative
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history of the new definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the entire 1980
Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United
States refugee law into conformance with the . . . Protocol . . . .”). 
Article 33 of the Convention provides that “[n]o Contracting State shall
expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened,”
but that this protection “may not, however, be claimed by a refugee . . .
who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 
Convention, supra, Art. 33. The Board of Immigration Appeals
originally addressed the question of what would be a “particularly
serious crime” in Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1982),
modified by Matter of C-, 20 I&N Dec. 529 (BIA 1992) and superseded
by statute as recognized by Matter of Q-T-M-T-, 21 I&N Dec. 639 (BIA
1996).  In Matter of Frentescu, the Board held that “[i]n judging the
seriousness of a crime, we look to such factors as the nature of the
conviction, the circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction, the
type of sentence imposed, and, most importantly, whether the type and
circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the
community.” Id. at 247.  The Board stated that crimes against persons
are more likely to be categorized as particularly serious, but that there
may be instances where crimes (or a crime) against property will be
considered to be particularly serious.  Id.  Subsequently, in 1990,
Congress stated categorically that all aggravated felonies constitute
particularly serious crimes, rendering any alien convicted of an
aggravated felony ineligible for withholding of deportation.  See former
INA § 243(h); see also Matter of Q-T-M-T-, 21 I&N Dec. 639 (BIA
1996).  Congress’ declaration of this per se equation eliminated the basis
for conducting an individual analysis of the underlying facts and
circumstances of the crime in any case where the conviction was for an
aggravated felony.  See Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA
1982); see also Matter of U-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 327 (BIA 1991), aff’d,
Urbina-Mauricio v. INS, 989 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1993), modified by,
Matter of C-, 20 I&N Dec. 529 (BIA 1992).  On April 24, 1996,
Congress enacted section 413(f) of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1269
(“AEDPA”), which expressly amended section 243(h) of the Act to
provide the Attorney General discretionary authority to override the
categorical bar that designated every aggravated felony a particularly
serious crime, if the Attorney General determined it necessary to do so in
order to comply with our nonrefoulement obligation under the Protocol. 
Matter of Q-T-M-T-, 21 I&N Dec. 639 (BIA 1996).  Soon thereafter, on
September 30, 1996, Congress enacted section 305(a) of the IIRIRA,
which again amended former section 243(h) of the Act and recodified it
as section 241(b)(3) of the Act, effective on or after April 1, 1997.  In
construing the amendment of former section 243(h) in the context of a
deportation case, the Board had reasoned that section 413(f) of the
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AEDPA was best read as introducing a narrow discretionary exemption
from the surviving exception, which precluded withholding of
deportation under section 243(h)(2)(B) of the Act. See Matter of Q-T-M-
T-, 21 I&N Dec. 639 (BIA 1996).  The Board concluded that a
presumption that the existing statutory bar was in compliance with the
Protocol was necessary and appropriate because Congress did not revoke
the categorical bar to withholding that had been imposed in 1990.  At
that time, taking guidance from the new standard set by Congress in
section 305(a) of the IIRIRA, applicable to proceedings initiated after
April 1, 1997, the Board  interpreted section 413(f) of the AEDPA as
creating a “rebuttable presumption” that an alien convicted of an
aggravated felony for which a sentence of less than 5 years was imposed
has been convicted of a particularly serious crime.  Consequently, the
Board held that in assessing eligibility for withholding of deportation, it
must be ascertained “whether there is any unusual aspect of the alien’s
particular aggravated felony conviction that convincingly evidences that
his or her crime cannot rationally be deemed ‘particularly serious’” in
light of United States treaty obligations under the Protocol.  Matter of Q-
T-M-T-, 21 I&N Dec. 639, 640 (BIA 1996); see also Matter of L-S-J-,
21 I&N Dec. 973 (BIA 1997).  Congress’ most recent revision of the
“particularly serious crime” clause, in the IIRIRA, accomplished what
section 413(f) of the AEDPA had not: it eliminated the categorical
exception to withholding of removal for every alien convicted of an
aggravated felony.  Conviction of an aggravated felony no longer renders
every such conviction a “particularly serious crime” per se, and the basis
on which the Board previously established a rebuttable presumption in
Matter of Q-T-M-T-,  21 I&N Dec. 639 (BIA 1996) no longer exists.
b. Asylum.  Section 208 (b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act provides that asylum is not
available to an alien who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community. 
Section 208(b)(2)(B)(i) of the Act provides that an alien who has been
convicted of an aggravated felony shall be considered to have been
convicted of a particularly serious crime.
c. Withholding. Section 241(b)(3)(B)(ii) of the Act provides that the relief
of withholding of removal is unavailable to an alien who, having been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, is a danger
to the community of the United States.  Section 241(b)(3)(B) also
provides that an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony
(or felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term
of imprisonment of at least five years shall be considered to have
committed a particularly serious crime.  The statute goes on to state that
the “previous sentence shall not preclude the Attorney General from
determining that, notwithstanding the length of sentence imposed, an
alien has been convicted of a particularly serious crime.”
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(1) Under section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Act, a determination of whether
an aggravated felony conviction constitutes a “particularly serious
crime” per se is based on the length of sentence imposed, rather
than on the category or type of aggravated felony conviction that
resulted in the conviction.  Matter of S-S-, 22 I&N Dec. 458 (BIA
1999), distinguishing Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 692 (BIA
1988).
(2) Under section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Act, there no longer exists a
rebuttable presumption that an alien convicted of an aggravated
felony for which a sentence of less than 5 years was imposed has
been convicted of a “particularly serious crime” rendering the alien
ineligible for withholding of deportation.  Matter of S-S-, 22 I&N
Dec. 458 (BIA 1999).  Instead, the statutory language now in effect
declares that an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated
felony and is sentenced to at least 5 years imprisonment has been
convicted of a particularly serious crime, but expressly affords the
Attorney General discretion to exercise judgment as to whether the
conviction is for a particularly serious crime when an alien has
been sentenced to less than 5 years for the very same offense.  In
extending this authority to the Attorney General, Congress used
permissive language, stating that its conclusion that an alien
sentenced to at least 5 years had committed a particularly serious
crime “shall not preclude the Attorney General from determining
that, notwithstanding the length of sentence imposed, an alien has
been convicted of a particularly serious crime.”  Congress neither
imposed any presumption that an aggravated felony carrying a
sentence of fewer than 5 years is a particularly serious crime, nor
called for any blanket exercise of the Attorney General’s authority
to determine the applicability of section 241(b)(3)(B)(ii) of the Act
in such cases.  See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,  480 U.S. 421, 431
(1987) (addressing the proper construction of Congress’ use of
different language in different sections of the same act); see also
Matter of Fuentes-Campos, 21 I&N Dec. 905 (BIA 1997).
(3) Under section 241(b)(3)(B)(ii) of the Act, a determination of
whether an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and sentenced
to less than 5 years imprisonment has been convicted of a
“particularly serious crime,” thus barring the alien from
withholding of removal, requires an individual examination of the
nature of the conviction, the sentence imposed, and the
circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction.  Matter of S-
S-, 22 I&N Dec. 458 (BIA 1999); Matter of L-S-, 22 I&N Dec. 645
(BIA 1999), both of which followed Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N
Dec. 244 (BIA 1982).
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(4) An alien who was convicted of first degree robbery of an occupied
home while armed with a handgun and sentenced to 55 months
imprisonment has been convicted of an aggravated felony under
section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act, and, upon consideration of the
nature of the conviction and the sentence imposed, as well as the
underlying facts and circumstances of the conviction, has been
convicted of a “particularly serious crime” rendering the alien
ineligible for withholding of removal under section
241(b)(3)(B)(ii) of the Act.  Matter of S-S-, 22 I&N Dec. 458 (BIA
1999).
(5) An alien who was convicted of bringing an illegal alien into the U.
S. in violation of section 274(a)(2)(B)(iii) of the Act and sentenced
to 3½ months imprisonment has, upon consideration of the nature
of the conviction and the sentence imposed, as well as the
underlying facts and circumstances of the conviction, not been
convicted of a “particularly serious crime” and is eligible to apply
for withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3)(B)(ii) of the
Act.  Matter of L-S-, 22 I&N Dec. 645 (BIA 1999).
(6) The Board held that a crime need not be an aggravated felony to be
classified as “particularly serious” and bar eligibility for
withholding of removal.  Matter of N-A-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 336
(BIA 2007).  See also N-A-M v. Holder, 587 F.3d 1052 (10th Cir.
2009) (holding that a separate analysis as to whether the alien is a
danger to the community is not necessary when determining
whether a crime is particularly serious); Gao v. Holder, 595 F.3d
549 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that unlawful export of military
technology was a particularly serious crime); Anaya-Ortiz v.
Holder, 594 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that Board properly
considered the petitioner’s removal hearing testimony in holding
that his conviction for drunk driving constituted a particularly
serious crime).
(7) The Attorney General held that aggravated felonies involving
unlawful trafficking in controlled substances presumptively
constitute “particularly serious crimes” within the meaning of
section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Act and only under the most
extenuating circumstances that are both extraordinary and
compelling would departure from this interpretation be warranted
or permissible.  Matter of Y-L-, A-G-, and R-S-R-, 23 I&N Dec.
270 (A.G. 2002), overruled in part on other grounds as stated in
Rafiq v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2006).
(a) Those unusual circumstances would need to include, at a
minimum: 
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i) a very small quantity of controlled substance; 
ii) a very modest amount of money paid for the drugs in
the offending transaction;
iii) merely peripheral involvement by the alien in the
criminal activity, transaction, or conspiracy;
iv) the absence of any violence or threat of violence
implicit or otherwise, associated with the offense;
v) the absence of any organized crime or terrorist
organization involvement, direct or indirect, in relation
to the offending activity; and
vi) the absence of any adverse or harmful effect of the
activity or transaction on juveniles.
vii) Only if all of these criteria were demonstrated by an
alien would it be appropriate to consider whether other,
more unusual circumstances (e.g., the prospective
distribution was solely for social purposes, rather than
for profit) might justify departure from the default
interpretation that drug trafficking felonies are
“particularly serious crimes.” Finally, the Attorney
General stated, “I emphasize here that such
commonplace circumstances as cooperation with law
enforcement authorities, limited criminal histories,
downward departures at sentencing, and post-arrest (let
alone post-conviction) claims of contrition or innocence
do not justify such a deviation.”
3. Serious nonpolitical crime.  A serious nonpolitical crime is one in which the
common-law character of the crime outweighs the political aspect of the
offense.  INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999).  To reach this
determination, two specific inquiries must be asked: (1) whether there is a
gross disproportion between means and ends, and (2) whether atrocious acts
are involved.  Id.  Atrocious acts provide a clear indication that an alien's
offense is a serious nonpolitical crime.  However, the criminal element of an
offense may outweigh its political aspect even if none of the acts are deemed
atrocious.  Crimes directed at an unprotected civilian population are “beyond
the pale of a protectable political offense” in the context of eligibility for
withholding of deportation.  McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986),
overruled on other grounds, Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir.
2005).  However, acts of terrorism directed at military or official agencies of a
state are distinguishable from random acts of violence intended “solely to
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bring about social chaos, with the eventual demise of the state intended only
as an indirect result.”  Id.  
a. Robbery is a serious nonpolitical crime.  Matter of Rodriguez-Palma, 17
I&N Dec. 465 (BIA 1980).
b. Burglary and/or larceny is a serious nonpolitical crime; Matter of
Ballester-Garcia. 17 I&N Dec. 592 (BIA 1980).  The alien was not
armed, but the crime involved a late night entry into a building, the alien
stole a large sum of money, the crime was planned weeks in advance,
and the alien received a 15 year sentence.
c. Serious non-political crimes under former section 243(h)(2)(C) of the
Act are not the equivalent of particularly serious crimes under former 
section 243(h)(2)(B) of the Act.  A serious non-political crime may be
less serious than a particularly serious crime.  See Matter of Frentescu,
18 I&N  Dec. 244 (BIA 1982).
d. A serious non-political crime may involve crimes against property as
well as against persons; Matter of Ballester-Garcia, 17 I&N Dec. 592
(BIA 1980).
e. The Board has also held that the seriousness of a crime for purposes of
both former sections 243(h)(2)(B) and 243(h)(2)(C) does not vary from
case to case dependent upon the degree of persecution to which the
applicant may be subject.  Matter of Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I&N Dec. 208
(BIA 1985).
f. It is not necessary to determine  whether an applicant for withholding of
deportation has been convicted of, or even has actually committed, a
serious non-political crime.  The statute provides that it is only necessary
to find that there are serious reasons for considering that he has
committed such a crime.  Matter of Ballester-Garcia, 17 I&N Dec. 592
(BIA 1980).
4. What constitutes persecution?
a. Definition.  The term “persecution” means harm or suffering that is
inflicted upon an individual in order to punish him for possessing a
belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome.  Matter of
Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), modified by Matter of
Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).  Persecution encompasses
harm inflicted by the government or by persons or an organization the
government is unable or unwilling to control.  Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N
Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
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b. Criminal prosecution is not persecution unless it is politically motivated. 
Matter of Maccaud, 14 I&N Dec. 429 (BIA 1973).
(1) Where an asylum applicant violates currency laws which a
government has a legitimate right to enforce, and he suffers harsh
treatment as a result, the applicant must show that the government
in question has punished him “on account of” his political opinion
and not for violation of the currency laws.  Matter of H-M-, 20
I&N Dec. 683 (BIA 1993).
(2) Prosecution under Chinese laws forbidding citizens from providing
assistance to illegal immigrants from North Korea does not amount
to persecution unless the alien can demonstrate that the prosecution
is because of the alien’s political opinion.  Li v. Att’y Gen., 633
F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2011).  
c. The failure of a government to permit its citizens the same freedom of
speech guaranteed in the U.S. does not constitute persecution. Matter of
Surzycki, 13 I&N Dec. 261 (BIA 1969).
d. Generally harsh conditions shared by many others in a country and the
harm arising out of civil strife do not amount to persecution within the
meaning of the law.  Matter of Sanchez and Escobar, 19 I&N Dec. 276
(BIA 1985); Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211  (BIA 1985), modified
by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
e. A tax levied on all citizens of Peru who travel outside of that country is
not persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion as contemplated by the Act. 
Matter of Chumpitazi, 16 I&N Dec. 629 (BIA 1978).
f. Although kidnapping is a very serious offense, the seriousness of
conduct is not dispositive in determining persecution, which does not
encompass all treatment that society regards as unfair, unjust, or even
unlawful or unconstitutional.  Matter of V-T-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 792 (BIA
1997).  While there may be a number of reasons for a kidnapping, an
asylum applicant bears the burden of establishing that one motivation
was to persecute him on account of an enumerated ground, and evidence
that indicates that the perpetrators were motivated by the victim’s
wealth, in the absence of evidence to suggest other motivations, will not
support a finding of persecution within the meaning of the Immigration
and Nationality Act.  Id.
g. Harassment and discrimination do not generally rise to the level of
persecution contemplated by the Act (name calling, extortion of money,
payment of higher fees, rock throwing, and looting not sufficient to
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demonstrate past persecution).  Matter of A-M-, 23 I&N Dec. 737 (BIA
2005).
(1) A beating that occurs in the context of an arrest or detention may
constitute persecution.  Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 226
(2d Cir. 2006).
(2) A beating that occurs within the context of an arrest or detention
does not per se constitute persecution. Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820
(2d Cir. 2011) (finding that the Board did not err when it
concluded that Liu’s mistreatment by family planning officials
resulting in minor bruising and two-day detention did not amount
to persecution).  Past incidents of mistreatment, even if deplorable,
may not be of the degree that has been recognized as persecution. 
Mekhtiev v. Holder, 559 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding past
persecution was not established where alien was detained for only
one night, was beaten only once and his resultant injuries were not
severe).
(3) Harm, in the aggregate, may rise to the level of persecution. Matter
of O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23 (BIA 1998) (holding that alien
who suffered repeated beatings and anti-Semitic threats, whose
home was vandalized by anti-Semitic nationalists, and whose son
was subject to humiliation and intimidation on account of his
Jewish nationality suffered harm which, in the aggregate, rises to
the level of persecution); see Vincent v. Holder, 632 F.3d 351 (6th
Cir. 2011) (holding that cumulative effect of murder of alien’s son
and burning of alien’s home rises to the level of persecution).
(4) A key difference between persecution, as required to support an
asylum application, and less-severe mistreatment is that the former
is systematic while the latter consists of isolated incidents. 
Baharon v. Holder, 588 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that
violence or threats to one’s close relatives is an important factor in
deciding whether mistreatment sinks to the level of persecution).  
(5) Harms that are merely disagreeable or unpleasant do not rise to the
level of persecution. Morgan v. Holder, 634 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(holding that the Board did not err when it found that being
taunted, cut by a bottle, detained overnight, and threatened did not
amount to persecution).
(6) Rape and sexual assault are forms of persecution.  Matter of D-V-,
21 I&N Dec. 77 (BIA 1993).
(7) A victim of a criminal act is generally not considered persecuted
within the Act.  Matter of V-T-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 792 (BIA 1997).
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h. Persecution by an individual for personal reasons and not for one of the
reasons enumerated in the Act does not constitute persecution which
would qualify an alien for asylum or withholding of deportation.  Matter
of Pierre, 15 I&N Dec. 461 (BIA 1975).
i. Nonphysical forms of harm, such as the deliberate imposition of severe
economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing,
employment, or other essentials of life, may amount to persecution. 
Matter of T-Z-, 24 I&N Dec. 163 (BIA 2007).
(1) The burning of the respondent’s home on account of his political
opinion was sufficiently severe and targeted to amount to
persecution by economic deprivation. Vincent v. Holder, 632 F.3d
351 (6th Cir. 2011).
(2) The Fourth Circuit held that to establish “economic persecution,”
an asylum applicant must demonstrate that, on account of one of
the statutorily enumerated grounds, the applicant’s life or freedom
has been threatened by either (1) a deliberate and severe
deprivation of basic necessities or (2) a deliberate imposition of
severe financial disadvantage.  Mirisawo v. Holder, 599 F.3d 391
(4th Cir. 2010).  To qualify as persecution, economic deprivation
must be so severe that it threatens the person’s very life or liberty. 
Id.  
(3) The Seventh Circuit held that surveillance is a possible form of
persecution.  Ayele v. Holder, 564 F.3d 862, 871 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citing Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 697 (7th Cir. 2004)).  The
court further recognized that an inability to work may constitute
persecution.  Id.  (citing Borca v. INS, 77 F.3d 210, 216 (7th Cir.
1996) for the proposition that deliberate imposition of substantial
economic disadvantage may amount to persecution).
(4) The Sixth Circuit held that the invalidation of a medical degree
constitutes economic persecution. Stserba v. Holder, 646 F.3d 964
(6th Cir. 2011) (finding that Estonia’s discrimination against ethnic
Russians in medical field culminated in invalidation of Russian
diplomas, which was a sweeping limitation of job opportunities
that made it nearly impossible for respondent to work in her chosen
profession as pediatrician).
j. Military service.
(1) Governments have the right to require military service of their
citizens and to enforce that right with reasonable penalties.  It is
not persecution for a country to require military service or to
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punish those who have deserted or who refuse to serve.  Matter of
Vigil, 19 I&N Dec. 572 (BIA 1988); Matter of Lee, 13 I&N Dec.
236 (BIA 1969); Matter of Liao, 11 I&N Dec. 113 (BIA 1965).
(2) Absent a showing that the government of a country enacted its
conscription laws with the intent of persecuting members of a
certain religion, or that the laws are carried out in a persecutory
manner against persons with particular religious beliefs, an alien
with religious objections to military service does not establish
eligibility for asylum or withholding of deportation even though he
may be prosecuted for a refusal to perform military service.  Matter
of Canas, 19 I&N Dec. 697 (BIA 1988), remanded 970 F.2d 599
(9th Cir. 1992).
k. Nongovernmental persecution.
(1) The Board has recognized that there may be situations in which an
alien could qualify for asylum and/or withholding of deportation
even though persecution would not be by the government of a
country to which the alien is returnable but rather by an
organization or even an individual.  In order to prevail with such a
claim, however, there must be a showing that the government in
power in that country is either unable or unwilling to protect the
alien from the organization or individual. Matter of McMullen, 17
I&N Dec. 542, 548 (BIA 1980), rev’d on other grounds, 658 F.2d
1312 (9th Cir. 1981), on remand, Matter of McMullen, 19 I&N
Dec. 90 (BIA 1984), aff’d, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled
in part on other grounds by Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744
(9th Cir. 2005); Matter of Pierre, 15 I&N Dec. 461 (BIA 1975).
(a) The Ninth Circuit held that reporting of private persecution to
the authorities is not an essential requirement for establishing
government unwillingness or inability to control attackers for
purposes of asylum.  Rahimzadeh v. Holder, 613 F.3d 916
(9th Cir. 2010).  A government’s inability or unwillingness to
control violence by private parties can be established in other
ways, such as by demonstrating that a country’s laws or
customs effectively deprive the alien of any meaningful
recourse to governmental protection.  Id.; Afriyie v. Holder,
613 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2010).  However, “[w]hen an
applicant attempts to report persecution to the police or
request protection from them, the authorities’ response (or
lack thereof) to such requests may provide powerful evidence
with respect to the government's willingness or ability to
protect the requestor.”  Id. 
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(b) The Eighth Circuit held that “[A]n applicant seeking to
establish persecution by a government based on violent
conduct of a private actor must show more than difficulty
controlling private behavior. Rather, the applicant must show
that the government condoned it or at least demonstrated a
complete helplessness to protect the victims.”  Menjivar v.
Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotations and alterations omitted).  The court held that
general problems of governmental ineffectiveness and
corruption do not, alone, require a finding that the
government is “unable or unwilling” where the evidence
specific to the petitioner indicates the contrary to be true.  Id.;
Khilan v. Holder, 557 F.3d 583, 586 (8th Cir. 2009).
(2) Persecution by an individual for personal reasons and not for one
of the reasons enumerated in the Act does not constitute
persecution which would qualify an alien for asylum or
withholding of deportation. Matter of Pierre, 15 I&N Dec. 461
(BIA 1975).
l. Civil war and guerrilla activity.
(1) The term “persecution” does not encompass the harm that arises
out of civil or military strife.  Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211
(BIA 1985), modified by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439
(BIA 1987).
(2) The dangers faced by policemen as a result of that status alone
because they are viewed as extensions of the government's military
forces or because they are highly visible embodiments of the power
of the state are not dangers faced on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.  If it were held that a policeman or a guerrilla was a victim
of  “persecution” based solely on the fact of an attack by one
against the other, then it would follow that the attacker had
participated in an act of “persecution” that would bar him from
relief under both sections 208 and 243(h).  Such a broad
interpretation of the concept of persecution on account of the 5
reasons in the Act would have the actual effect of greatly
narrowing the group of persons eligible for asylum or withholding. 
Matter of Fuentes, 19 I&N Dec. 658 (BIA 1988). 
(3) Status as a former policeman is an immutable characteristic beyond
the capacity of the applicant to change and mistreatment occurring
because of such status could be found to be persecution on account
of political opinion or membership in a particular social group. 
However, although he does not bear the unreasonable burden of
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establishing the exact motivation of the persecutor where different
reasons for actions are possible, he does have the burden of
establishing facts on which a reasonable person would fear that the
danger arises on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 
Matter of Fuentes, 19 I&N Dec. 658 (BIA 1988).
(4) An alien who served as a soldier in the Guatemalan Army has not
established a well-founded fear of persecution by the guerillas on
account of one of the five grounds enumerated in section
101(a)(42)(A) of the Act where he claims that his personal file
from the army fell into the hands of the guerillas who sought to
recruit him for his artillery expertise.  Matter of C-A-L-, 21 I&N
Dec. 754 (BIA 1997).
(5) An alien has failed to establish that he has a well-founded fear of
country-wide persecution from the guerillas in Guatemala when he
was able to live for more than one year in different areas within the
country, including an area well known for its guerilla operations,
without experiencing any problems from the guerillas.  Matter of
C-A-L-, 21 I&N Dec. 754 (BIA 1997).
(6) An alien's status as a young male subject to recruitment efforts
from both sides in a civil war does not establish membership in a
persecuted social group.  Matter of Sanchez and Escobar, 19 I&N
Dec. 276 (BIA 1985).
(7) It is not persecution for the government of a country to investigate
and detain individuals suspected of aiding or of being members of
a guerrilla organization. Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, 19 I&N Dec.
509 (BIA 1988), rev’d by Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788
(9th Cir. 1989).  A respondent has not established a well-founded
fear of persecution by the Government of a country on account of
political opinion due to his involvement with a guerrilla
organization, where the Government of that country has the
legitimate right to investigate the respondent regarding his
suspected activities on behalf of the guerrillas and to criminally
prosecute and punish him under its laws for any activities found to
be illegal, and there is no evidence that the respondent has received
any threats from the Government on the grounds of political
opinion, or otherwise.  Matter of R-O-, 20 I&N Dec. 455 (BIA
1992).
(8) Forced recruitment or kidnapping of an individual by a guerrilla
force does not constitute persecution if the guerrillas seek to make
the person a member of their group rather than harm him because
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he possesses a characteristic they find offensive and wish to
overcome.  INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
(9) A guerrilla organization's attempt to coerce a person into joining
does not necessarily constitute “persecution on account of political
opinion.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992); Matter of R-
O-, 20 I&N Dec. 455 (BIA 1992).  Even one who supports the
political aims of a guerrilla movement might resist joining to
perform military combat and thus become the object of such
coercion.  INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).  A victim of
forced recruitment must show that he is being persecuted on
account of his political opinion, and that his persecution is not
solely the result of the guerrillas' aim in seeking to fill their ranks
in order to carry out their war with the Government and pursue
their political goal, their political motive being irrelevant.  Matter
of R-O-, 20 I&N Dec. 455 (BIA 1992).
(10) In order to satisfy the definition of a “refugee” in section
101(a)(42) of the Act, the persecution must be on account of the
victim’s political opinion, not the persecutor’s.  Therefore,
persecution on account of political opinion is not established by the
fact that the coercing guerrillas had political motives. Matter of R-
O-, 20 I&N Dec. 455 (BIA 1992).
(11) The threat of harm faced by a deserter from a guerrilla organization
is a result of a military policy of the guerrilla group, inherent in the
nature of the organization and a tool of discipline.  Therefore, the
threat is neither an act of persecution nor evidence of persecution
by the guerrilla organization on account of political opinion, or any
other ground set forth in the Refugee Act of 1980.  Matter of
Maldonado-Cruz, 19 I&N Dec. 509 (BIA 1988), rev’d by
Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989).
(12) It is a general rule that prosecution for an attempt to overthrow a
lawfully constituted government does not constitute persecution. 
However, this rule does not apply to countries where a coup is the
only means of effectuating political change.  Matter of Izatula, 20
I&N Dec. 149 (BIA 1990).
(13) The Shining Path’s targeting of the alien to take revenge for the
Accomarca massacre amounted to targeting the alien on account of
his membership in the proposed social group, Peruvian military
officers whose names became associated with the Accomarca
massacre. Castañeda-Castillo v. Holder, 638 F.3d 354 (1st Cir.
2011) .
m. Imputed political opinion.
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(1) Although an applicant for asylum must demonstrate that harm has
been or would be inflicted on account of one of the protected
grounds specified in the “refugee” definition, persecution for
“imputed” reasons can satisfy that definition.  Matter of S-P-, 21
I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1996).
(2) In Matter of N-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 526 (BIA 2011), the Board
addressed opposition to corruption as a political opinion or
imputed political opinion. The Board found that, “in some
circumstances, opposition to state corruption may provide evidence
of an alien’s political opinion or give a persecutor reason to impute
such beliefs to an alien.” Id. at 528. In determining the persecutor’s
motivation, the IJ should consider (1) “whether and to what extent
the alien engaged in activities that could be perceived as
expressions of anticorruption beliefs” (2) “any direct or
circumstantial evidence that the alleged persecutor was motivated
by the alien’s perceived or actual anticorruption beliefs” (3)
“evidence regarding the pervasiveness of government corruption,
as well as whether there are direct ties between the corrupt
elements and higher level officials.” Id. at 532-33.
(3) In mixed motive cases, an asylum applicant is not obligated to
show conclusively why persecution occurred or may occur;
however, in proving past persecution, the applicant must provide
evidence, either direct or circumstantial, from which it is
reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated in part by an
actual or imputed protected ground.  Matter of S-P-, 21 I&N Dec.
486 (BIA 1996).
(4) In situations involving general civil unrest, the motive for harm
should be determined by considering the statements or actions of
the perpetrators; abuse or punishment out of proportion to
nonpolitical ends; treatment of others similarly situated;
conformity to procedures for criminal prosecution or military law;
the application of antiterrorism laws to suppress political opinion;
and the subjection of political opponents to arbitrary arrest,
detention, and abuse.  Matter of S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA
1996).
(5) Whistleblowing may be an expression of political opinion when it
involves exposure of corruption in a government operation.  See
Antonyan v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 2011); Perez-Ramirez
v. Holder, 648 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2011). 
n. Clan membership/Family.
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(1) Membership in a clan can constitute membership in a “particular
social group.” Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337 (BIA 1996).  The
Marehan subclan of Somalia, the members of which share ties of
kinship and linguistic commonalities, is such a “particular social
group.”  Id.
(2) While interclan violence may arise during the course of civil strife,
such circumstances do not preclude the possibility that harm
inflicted during the course of such strife may constitute
persecution. Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337 (BIA 1996).
(3) Family may constitute a particular social group.  Gebremichael v.
INS, 10 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1993); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d
Cir. 1993); Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 235-36 (4th Cir.
2004), rehearing en banc granted (Jan 13, 2005),review withdrawn
pursuant to settlement (Jul 26, 2005); Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638
(7th Cir. 1997); Hamzehi v. INS, 64 F.3d 1240 (8th Cir. 1995);
Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated on
other grounds, 126 S.Ct. 1613 (2006).
(4) To find persecution on account of family membership, the
evidence must indicate that the family member is targeted for her
membership in the family as such and not because harming that
family member will harm another family member. Demiraj v.
Holder, 631 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 2011).
o. Participation in the Mariel Boatlift, in and of itself, does not provide a
basis for asylum or withholding of deportation. Matter of Barrera, 19
I&N Dec. 837 (BIA 1989).
p. Coercive family planning or population control.
(1) History lesson - In Matter of Chang, 20 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 1989)
superseded by statute, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-208, as recognized in
Li v. Ashcroft, 312 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2002), the BIA held that the
“one couple, one child” policy of the Chinese government is not on
its face persecutive and cannot support a claim of persecution even
though it could result in involuntary sterilization because it is
uniformly applied to the population as a whole. In order to overrule
this decision, the Attorney General enacted regulations which
stated that aliens fleeing coercive family planning policies
involving forced abortion or sterilization have a well-founded fear
of persecution.  The final asylum regulations which became
effective on October 1, 1990, inadvertently excluded this
provision.  Therefore, Matter of Chang was temporarily restored.
On November 7, 1991, the INS General Counsel issued a
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memorandum to his subordinates instructing them that valid
asylum requests based upon coercive family planning policies
should not be opposed by INS trial attorneys.  The memorandum
was not binding on EOIR so INS trial attorneys were instructed to
move to terminate any such cases in which an IJ denied asylum and
invite the respondent to apply for asylum with INS. Then the Board
held that pending a decision by the Attorney General on asylum
and withholding claims premised on coercive family planning
policies, it will continue to follow Matter of Chang as precedent in
all proceedings involving the same issues.  Matter of G-, 20 I&N
Dec. 764 (BIA 1993).  Finally, section 601(a)(1) of the IIRIRA
amended the definition of “refugee” at section 101(a)(42) to bring
about the present law on this subject.
(2) PRESENT LAW - Section 101(a)(42), as amended by section
601(a) of IIRIRA, includes in the definition of “refugee” the
following: “For purposes of determinations under this Act, a
person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo
involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or
refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a
coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have been
persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a
well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a
procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or
resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of
persecution on account of political opinion.”
(3) In Matter of X-P-T-, 21 I&N Dec. 634 (BIA 1996), the Board held
that since the amendment states that it applies not to asylum only,
but to all “determinations under this Act,” the amendment applies
to determinations of eligibility for withholding of deportation as
well as asylum.  The Board acknowledged that Matter of Chang
had been superseded and held that an alien forced to undergo
involuntary sterilization or who was persecuted for resistence to a
CPC program had suffered past persecution and was entitled to a
presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.
(4) The Attorney General has ruled that the spouse of a person who
has been physically subjected to a forced abortion or sterilization
procedure is not per se entitled to refugee status.  A person who has
not physically undergone a forced abortion or sterilization
procedure may still qualify as a refugee based on a well-founded
fear of persecution of being forced to undergo such a procedure, or
on account of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution for
failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other
resistance to a coercive population control program, or on other
grounds enumerated in the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
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Matter of J-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 520 (A.G. 2008).  The Attorney
General’s ruling reversed previous Board precedent, which held
that an alien whose spouse was forced to undergo an abortion or
sterilization procedure can establish past persecution on account of
political opinion and qualifies as a refugee within the definition of
section 101(a)(42) of the Act.  Matter of C-Y-Z-, 21 I&N Dec. 915
(BIA 1997), reversed on other grounds sub nom. Ke Zhen Zhao v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2001).  Such an alien
must have been, in fact, opposed to the spouse’s abortion or
sterilization and legally married to the spouse at the time of
sterilization.  Matter of S-L-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2006),
overruled on other grounds by Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494
F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007).  The regulatory presumption of a well-
founded fear of future persecution may not be rebutted in the
absence of changed country conditions, regardless of the fact that
the sterilization of the alien’s spouse negates the likelihood of
sterilization to the alien.  Matter of C-Y-Z, 21 I&N Dec. 915 (BIA
1997).  
(a) Prior to the Attorney General’s decision, the Second Circuit,
in Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007),
declined to follow Matter of C-Y-Z-.  Rather, the court ruled
that, when a woman undergoes a forced abortion or
sterilization, her spouse (or other male partner) does not
become a per se refugee on these grounds.  Under Lin, for a
spouse or other male partner of such an individual to be
deemed a refugee on these grounds, he must demonstrate
“other resistance” to the coercive population control program.
(b) Following Matter of J-S-, at least four Circuit Courts have
applied the Attorney General’s decision in published
opinions; no circuit appears to have rejected it. See Yu v.
Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1328, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 2009); Jin v.
Holder, 572 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir. 2009); Lin-Zheng v.
Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir.2009) (en banc); Yi Ni
v. Holder, 613 F.3d 415, 425 (4th Cir. 2010).  
(5) Where an alien has established past persecution based on the
forced sterilization of his spouse pursuant to a policy of coercive
family planning, the fact that, owing to such sterilization, the alien
and his spouse face no further threat of forced sterilization or
abortion does not constitute a “fundamental change” in
circumstances sufficient to meet the standards for a discretionary
denial under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A),  Matter of Y-T-L-, 23
I&N Dec. 601 (BIA 2003).  Note, however, that, under the
Attorney General’s decision in Matter of J-S- an alien is no longer
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deemed to be a per se refugee based on his spouse’s forced
abortion or sterilization.
(6) Unmarried applicants claiming persecution related to a partner’s
coerced abortion or sterilization may qualify for asylum if they
demonstrate that they have been persecuted for “other resistance to
a coercive population control program” within the meaning of
section 101(a)(42).  Matter of S-L-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2006).
(7) An alien seeking to reopen removal proceedings based on a claim
that the birth of a second child in the United States will result in
the alien’s forced sterilization in China cannot establish prima facie
eligibility for relief where the evidence submitted with the motion
and the relevant country conditions reports do not indicate that
Chinese nationals returning to that country with foreign-born
children have been subjected to forced sterilization in the alien’s
home province.  Matter of C-C-, 23 I&N Dec. 899 (BIA 2006)
(distinguishing Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2004)). See
Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010).
(8) An alien who has not previously been persecuted, but who has
fathered or given birth to two or more children in China, qualifies
as a refugee on this basis alone if he or she establishes that (1) the
births violated family planning policies in the alien's locality, and
(2) the current local family planning enforcement efforts would
give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution because of the
violation.  Matter of J-H-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 196 (BIA 2007).
(9) In two cases involving Chinese citizens from Changle City, Fujian
Province, both of whom had one child born in China and a second
born in the U.S., the Board rejected arguments that the respondents
would be persecuted on account of their children born outside
China.  See Matter of J-W-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 185 (BIA 2007);
Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 247 (BIA 2007). 
(10) In a case involving an asylum application based on allegedly
coercive abortions, the Board held that: (1) an abortion is forced by
threats of harm when a reasonable person would objectively view
the threats for refusing the abortion to be genuine, and the
threatened harm, if carried out, would rise to the level of
persecution; and (2) nonphysical forms of harm, such as the
deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the
deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment, or other
essentials of life, may amount to persecution.  Matter of T-Z-, 24
I&N Dec. 163 (BIA 2007).
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(11) In Matter of M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 2008), the
Board ruled as follows in a case where an IUD was forcibly
inserted into the Chinese respondent and later removed, and a
second IUD was subsequently inserted.  First, the Board ruled that
having an IUD inserted against one’s will does not constitute being
“forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary
sterilization” under section 101(a)(42).  Second, with regard to
refugee status under section 101(a)(42) for having “been
persecuted . . . for other resistance to a coercive population control
program,” the Board interpreted “other resistance” as including
“both failures and refusals to comply with China’s coercive
population control practices, but not simple grudging compliance.” 
The Board specified that qualifying resistance “would include
resistance such as removing an IUD or failing to attend a
mandatory gynecological appointment.”  Third, the Board held that
“simply requiring a woman to use an IUD, and other more routine
methods of China’s implementation of its family planning policy,
do not generally rise to the level of harm required to establish
persecution.”  Rather, for the insertion of an IUD to constitute
persecution, “the insertion . . . must involve aggravating
circumstances.”  Fourth, the Board emphasized that, to qualify as a
refugee under section 101(a)(42) due to the insertion of an IUD as
persecution for “other resistance to a [CPC] program,” the alien
must show that the IUD was “inserted or reinserted for some
resistance that the alien manifested.”  (Emphasis in original.)  By
contrast, if the IUD was reinserted “merely because reinsertion is a
standard procedure in China,” the “alien may be unable to meet her
burden of establishing” refugee status. See Huang v. Holder, 591
F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2010)(agreeing with the Board that forced
insertion of an IUD does not constitute persecution, barring other
factors such as punishment for removal of an IUD).
(12) In Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2011), the
Second Circuit held that the Board’s decision in Matter of M-F-W-
& L-G- construing the INA to require that involuntary IUD
insertion be accompanied by aggravating circumstances to
constitute persecution warranted Chevron deference. However, the
Court also found that the Board failed to adequately explain its
application of the “aggravated circumstances” test. Id. at 75-76. 
The Court remanded the case to allow the Board to articulate the
aggravating circumstances and nexus standards. See id. at 78-80.
(13) The Seventh Circuit has implied that a member of the hei haizi, a
child ineligible for registration on the hukou because he or she was
born in violation of China's population control program, may be
member of a particular social group for purposes of asylum.  Chen
v. Holder, 604 F.3d 324 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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q. Persecution on account of gender
(1) Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)
(a) The practice of FGM, which results in permanent
disfiguration and poses a risk of serious and potentially life-
threatening complications, can be a basis for a claim of
persecution. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA
1996).  Young women who are members of the Tchamba-
Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who have not been
subjected to FGM and who oppose the practice, are
recognized as members of a “particular social group.”  Id.
(b) The Ninth Circuit held that the infliction of FGM gives rise
to an unrebuttable well-founded fear of future persecution. 
The court reasoned that (1) forced sterilization gives rise to a
well-founded fear of persecution; and (2) like forced
sterilization, FGM is a “permanent and continuing” act. 
Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005).  
(c) The Board held that an alien may not establish eligibility for
asylum or withholding of removal based solely on fear that
his or her daughter will be forced to undergo female genital
mutilation upon returning to the alien’s home country. 
Matter of A-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 275 (BIA 2007).
i) In Kone v. Holder, 620 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2010),
the Seventh Circuit held that FGM of an alien asylum
applicant’s family member can constitute direct, as
opposed to derivative, persecution of the alien.  The
court did not address the Board’s decision in Matter of
A-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 275 (BIA 2007), but did cite to a
prior decision, Gatimi v. Holder, 606 F.3d 344, 349 (7th
Cir. 2010), in which it distinguished from  Matter of A-
K- based on the fact that both parents were subject to
removal, whereas in  Matter of A-K- the child had one
parent with legal status.  The Seventh Circuit cited to a
Second Circuit opinion, Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141,
143 (2d Cir. 2010), in which the Second Circuit
remanded to the Board for consideration of “whether
the mental anguish of a mother who was herself a
victim of genital mutilation who faces the choice of
seeing her daughter suffer the same fate, or avoiding
that outcome by separation from her child” would
qualify as sufficient persecution of an applicant so as to
warrant a grant of asylum. 596 F.3d at 153.  The
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Seventh Circuit also cited to a Sixth Circuit opinion,
Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2004), in
which the Sixth Circuit found that the applicant could
demonstrate persecution based on the harm she would
suffer by “being forced to witness the pain and suffering
of her daughter” if she were subjected to FGM.
  
(d) In Matter of A-T-, 24 I&N Dec. 617 (A.G. 2008), the
Attorney General vacated the Board’s decision in Matter of
A-T-, 24 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 2007).  There, the Board denied
the respondent’s application for withholding of removal, in
which she alleged that she had been subjected to female
genital mutilation.  In his decision, the Attorney General first
stated that, because FGM is sometimes inflicted more than
once on the same person, “there was no basis for the Board’s
legal conclusion that the past infliction of female genital
mutilation by itself rebuts ‘[a]ny presumption of future
[FGM] persecution.’”  The Attorney General also stated that
“the Board was wrong to focus on whether the future harm to
life or freedom that [the] respondent feared would take the
‘identical’ form–namely, female genital mutilation–as the
harm she had suffered in the past. . . .  Here, the ‘original
claim’ was not ‘[FGM] persecution,’ as the Board put it . . .
but rather persecution on account of membership in a
particular (albeit not clearly defined) social group.”  This
accords with the Second Circuit’s decision in Bah v.
Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2008), where the court stated
that “the fact that an applicant has undergone female genital
mutilation in the past cannot, in and of itself, be used to rebut
the presumption that her life or freedom will be threatened in
the future.”  In Matter of A-T-, 25 I&N Dec. 4 (BIA 2009),
the Board stated that requests for asylum or withholding of
removal based on past persecution related to FGM must be
adjudicated within the framework established by Matter of A-
T-, 24 I&N Dec. 617 (A.G. 2008).
(e) In a case involving a mother and daughter from Somalia who
were subjected to FGM, the Board found that both
respondents suffered past persecution on account of
membership in a particular social group.  Further, asylum on
humanitarian grounds was merited, regardless of whether the
respondents established well-founded fears of future
persecution, because the respondents “suffered an atrocious
form of persecution that results in continuing physical pain
and discomfort.”  Matter of S-A-K- & H-A-H-, 24 I&N Dec.
464 (BIA 2008).
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(2) The Eighth Circuit found that Iranian women do not qualify as a
“particular social group” within the meaning of the Act merely by
virtue of their gender and the harsh restrictions placed upon them
in Iran.  The Court deemed the classification as overbroad in that
no fact finder could reasonably conclude that all Iranian women
have a well-founded fear of persecution based solely on their
gender.  The Court noted that a group of women who refuse to
conform to customs and whose opposition is so profound that they
would choose to suffer the severe consequences of noncompliance
may satisfy the definition.  However, the Court found that the
respondent failed to demonstrate that she was a member of such a
group for although she had taken some affirmative steps to
articulate her opposition to Iranian customs relating to women's
rights, it could not conclude that for her, compliance with the
gender-specific laws would be “so profoundly abhorrent that it
could aptly be called persecution.” Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636 (8th
Cir. 1994), superceded by statute on other grounds recognized by
Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 2004). 
(3) The Ninth Circuit held that Board erred in dismissing alien's appeal
solely on the ground that “all women in Guatemala” could not
constitute a cognizable social group.  Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d
662 (9th Cir. 2010).  The Board had affirmed the IJ’s denial of
asylum, finding that a social group consisting of “all women in
Guatemala” is over-broad and “a mere demographic division of the
population rather than a particular social group.”  The court noted
that it had found other broad and internally diverse social groups
that shared innate characteristics, such as homosexuals and
Gypsies, to be particular social groups for purposes of asylum. Id. 
(citing Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that all alien homosexuals are members of a particular
social group) and Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that Gypsies are a particular social group)).  The
court remanded for the Board to determine in the first instance
whether women in Guatemala constitute a particular social group,
and, if so, whether the alien demonstrated a fear of persecution “on
account of” her membership in such a group. 
(4) A woman with liberal Muslim beliefs who wore short skirts and
makeup and refused to wear a veil, has suffered past persecution
and has a well-founded fear of future persecution at the hands of
her father who beat and physically punished her on account of her
religious beliefs, which differ from her father’s orthodox Muslim
views concerning the proper role of women in Moroccan society;
Matter of S-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000).  The Board held
that the persecution was actually on account of the respondent’s
religion, not her gender.
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(5) The First Circuit upheld the Board’s determination that the
proposed social group of “women who had a child out of
wedlock/are considered adulterers because they gave birth to a
child allegedly not their husband’s/have been abused by their
husbands” lacked social visibility and sufficient particularity to
constitute a particular social group.  See Faye v. Holder, 580 F.3d
37 (1st Cir. 2009).
(6) The Seventh Circuit held that the group of “women in Jordan who
had allegedly flouted repressive moral norms, and thus faced a high
risk of honor killing” qualified as a particular social group. Sarhan
v. Holder, --- F.3d ----, No. 10-2899, 2011 WL 3966151 (7th Cir.
Sept. 2, 2011).
r. Sexual preference
(1) The Board held that an applicant for admission who testified that
he was registered as a homosexual with a government office in
Cuba, that he was called in for examination by that office every 2
or 3 months for 13 years, and that he was required to leave Cuba in
the Mariel Boatlift or face four years in prison, has established his
membership in a particular social group in Cuba, has demonstrated
that his freedom was threatened on account of his membership in
that group, and is eligible for withholding of deportation.  Matter
of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I&N Dec. 819 (BIA 1990).
(2) The Ninth Circuit has held that “all alien homosexuals are
members of a ‘particular social group.’” Karouni v. Gonzales, 399
F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005).  The Third Circuit has impliedly
recognized that homosexuals constitute a “particular social group.” 
See Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 2003).  The Eighth
Circuit has assumed for purposes of an appeal, that “homosexuals
are a particular social group.” Molathwa v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 551,
554 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th
Cir. 2000).  The Eleventh Circuit has impliedly recognized that
sexual orientation constitutes a “particular social group.” Ayala v.
Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941 (11th Cir. 2010). 
(3) In Castro-Martinez v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2011), the
Ninth Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the IJ and
Board’s decision denying asylum to an alien who claimed that he
had experienced past persecution in Mexico as a homosexual male
and that if removed to Mexico he would face persecution and
torture on account of his homosexuality and his HIV-positive
status. The alien testified that he was raped brutally and repeatedly
by two male teenagers when he was between six and ten years old,
and he never told his parents or the police. The court determined
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that substantial evidence supported the Board's conclusion that the
alien failed to demonstrate past persecution because the sexual
abuse he experienced was not inflicted by government actors, he
failed to demonstrate that the government was unable or unwilling
to control his attackers, and he failed to sufficiently explain why
reporting the sexual abuse to the authorities would have been futile
or would have put him at risk of harm. Substantial evidence
supported the conclusion that the alien failed to demonstrate a
well-founded fear of future persecution because the record did not
compel the conclusion that the Mexican government systematically
harmed gay men and failed to protect them from violence. 
s. Health Conditions
(1) HIV/AIDS.  The INS recognized that “in certain circumstances . . .
persons with HIV or AIDS may constitute a particular social group
under refugee law.” Memorandum from David A. Martin, INS
Office of General Counsel (Feb. 16, 1996), reported in 73
Interpreter Releases 909, 909 (July 8, 1996). Shortly thereafter, the
INS formally adopted the “position . . . that homosexuals do
constitute a particular social group.” Memorandum from David A.
Martin, INS General Counsel, to All Regional and District Counsel
(Apr. 4, 1996).
(2) Parents of a disabled child.  The Ninth Circuit has held that
disabled children and their parents constituted a statutorily
protected group, and a parent who provided care for a disabled
child could seek asylum and withholding of removal on the basis
of persecution the child had suffered on account of his disability.
Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005). 
However, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded this decision
in light of its decision in Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183
(2006).
t. Domestic Violence
(1) In Matter of R-A-, the Board held that an asylum applicant who
claims persecution on the basis of a group defined as “Guatemalan
women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male
companions, who believe that women are to live under male
domination” must demonstrate, inter alia, that her persecutor
husband targeted and harmed her because he perceived her to be a
member of this particular social group.  22 I&N Dec. 906 (BIA
1999).  The Attorney General subsequently vacated the Board’s
decision and remanded the case for reconsideration following final
publication of the proposed rule published at 65 Fed. Reg. 76588
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000).  Matter of R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 906 (BIA
page 178 of 365
1999; A.G. 2001).  The proposed rule provides guidance in the
assessment of claims made by applicants who have suffered or fear
domestic violence.  65 Fed. Reg. 76588.  The final rule has yet to
be published and in January 2005, Attorney General Ashcroft again
remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration following
publication of the final rule.  Matter of R-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 694
(A.G. 2005).
(2) In Matter of R-A-, 24 I&N Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008), the Attorney
General instructed the Board to “revisit the issues in Matter of R-
A- and related cases and issue new decisions,” despite the fact that
the rule referenced above had yet to be published.  In the 2008
decision, the Attorney General noted that the proposed rule (which
“would have amended the asylum regulations relating to the
meaning of the terms ‘persecution,’ ‘on account of,’ and ‘particular
social group) has not been finalized, but that “both the Board and
courts of appeals have issued numerous decisions relating to
various aspects of asylum law under existing statutory and
regulatory provisions.”  Further, some of these decisions “have
addressed, for example, the terms ‘persecution,’ ‘on account of,’
and ‘particular social group,’ and thus may have relevance to the
issues presented with respect to asylum claims based on domestic
violence.”  The Attorney General also stated that, to the extent the
Board will be addressing questions involving the “interpretation of
ambiguous statutory language, the Board is free to exercise its own
discretion and issue a precedent decision nationwide.”  For this, the
Attorney General cited, in part, to National Cable & Telecomms.
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005), with the
Attorney General stating that “the Supreme Court has made clear
that administrative agencies are not bound by prior judicial
interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions.”
u. Former noncriminal drug informants.  The group “former noncriminal
drug informants working against the Cali drug cartel” does not have the
requisite social visibility to constitute a “particular social group.”  Matter
of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951 (BIA 2006).
v. Affluent Guatemalans.  In Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, the Board held
that the respondents failed to establish that their status as affluent
Guatemalans gave them sufficient social visibility to be perceived as a
group by society or that the group was defined with adequate
particularity to constitute a particular social group.  24 I&N Dec. 69
(BIA 2007).
(1) Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U- was followed by the Second Circuit in
Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007).  In Ucelo-
Gomez, the Second Circuit ruled that “affluent Guatemalans who
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suffer persecution fueled by class rivalry in an impoverished
society” do not belong to a particular social group.
w. Gang recruitment, threats by gangs, and former gang members
(1) In the first precedent Board or circuit court decision directly
addressing former gang membership as grounds for asylum, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that tattooed former gang members do not
belong to a particular social group.  Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d
940 (9th Cir. 2007).
(2) The Seventh Circuit, however, held that former gang members may
be members of a particular social group.  Ramos v. Holder, 589
F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing Arteaga by reasoning that
Arteaga dealt with current gang members, not former members like
Ramos and criticizing the Board’s “social visibility” theory). See
Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding
same).
(3) In Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 2008), the Board
ruled that “persons resistant to gang membership” in Honduras are
not members of a particular social group as this group “lacks the
social visibility that would allow others to identify its members.” 
The Board further ruled that “young persons [in Honduras] who are
perceived to be affiliated with gangs” are not members of a
particular social group.  In this regard, the Board stated that
“because we agree [with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Arteaga v.
Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2007)] that membership in a
criminal gang cannot constitute a particular social group, the
respondent cannot establish particular social group status based on
the incorrect perception by others that he is such a gang member.” 
In addition, the Board ruled that “the respondent’s refusal to join [a
gang in Honduras], without more, does not constitute a ‘political
opinion,’” and that “no evidence, either direct or circumstantial,
has been produced to show that gangs in Honduras would
persecute the respondent because of any political opinion, real or
imputed, that he holds.”  Id.; see also Marroquin-Ochoma v.
Holder, 574 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 2009).  
(4) In Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA 2008), the Board ruled
that “Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to recruitment
efforts by MS-13 and who have rejected or resisted membership in
the gang based on their own personal, moral, and religious
opposition to the gang’s values and activities, ” are not members of
a particular social group.  In addition, the Board ruled that family
members of such individuals are not members of a particular social
group.  The Board reasoned that these groups fail to satisfy the
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Board’s standards for “particularity” and “social visibility.”  The
Board further found “that the respondents failed to demonstrate
that they were persecuted or have a well-founded fear of
persecution based on actual or imputed political opinion.”  In this
regard, the Board stated that “[t]he respondents did not establish
what political opinion, if any, they held, and they have provided no
evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the MS-13 gang in El
Salvador imputed, or would impute to them, an anti-gang political
opinion.  Nor have they established that the gang persecuted or
would persecute them on the basis of such opinion.  There is no
indication that the MS-13 gang members who pursued the
respondents had any motives other than increasing the size and
influence of their gang.”
(5) Citing to Matter of S-E-G-, the Ninth Circuit ruled that “young
men in El Salvador resisting gang violence” are not members of a
particular social group.  Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738
(9th Cir. 2008). See also Ramos Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849
(9th Cir. 2009).  Similarly, in Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440  (4th
Cir. 2011), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the IJ and Board’s
determination that a social group of young, Americanized, well-off
Salvadoran male deportees with criminal histories who opposed
gangs was not narrow or enduring enough to clearly delineate its
membership or readily identify its members, and, thus, an alien
who claimed membership in that group failed to show probability
of persecution if he were removed to El Salvador.
(6) In Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011), the
Fourth Circuit held that the aliens’ proposed social group of
“family members of those who actively oppose gangs in El
Salvador by agreeing to be prosecutorial witnesses” qualified as a
“particular social group” for purposes of asylum.  Id. (finding that
the Board misstated the alien’s claimed social group when it
concluded that “those who actively oppose gangs in El Salvador by
agreeing to be prosecutorial witnesses” does not constitute a
cognizable social group but failed to consider that family members
of those witnesses constitute a social group).  The Fourth Circuit
specifically found that the aliens’ proposed social group met both
the social visibility and particularity requirements.  Id.  The court
further held that the alien had established an objectively reasonable
fear of future persecution.  Id.  (“The Board thus erred in rejecting
the IJ’s conclusion that the unrebutted evidence of death threats
against Crespin and his family members, combined with MS-13's
penchant for extracting vengeance against cooperating witnesses,
gave rise to a reasonable fear of future persecution.”)
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(7) Citing to Matter of S-E-G- and Matter of E-A-G-, the First Circuit
affirmed the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
relief, finding that the particular social group, “young women
recruited by gang members who resist such recruitment” is neither
sufficiently particular nor socially visible to constitute a particular
social group.  See Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21 (1st Cir.
2010). See also Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2010).
(8) In Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, --- F.3d ----, No.10-9527, 2011 WL
3907119 (10th Cir. Sept. 7, 2011), the Tenth Circuit found Matter
of S-E-G- controlling and affirmed the IJ’s decision holding that
while the group of “young Salvadoran women between the ages of
12 and 25 who resisted gang recruitment” is sufficiently particular,
it did not meet the social visibility requirement.
x. Former Colombian truckers who resisted FARC. In Escobar v. Holder,  
--- F.3d ----, No. 10-3751, 2011 WL 4349403 (7th Cir. Sept. 7, 2011),
the Seventh Circuit held that the alien’s articulated social group of
“former truckers who resisted the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (“FARC”) and collaborated with authorities” could be
considered a particular social group, since FARC was persecuting the
alien because he and those like him shared several characteristics, such
as skills as a trucker, support of the government, and opposition to
FARC, and the alien could not shed his status as a former trucker by no
longer engaging in trucking.
5. Evidence.
a. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2) states that an alien shall be found to have a well-
founded fear of persecution if he establishes the following:
(1) He has a fear of persecution in his country of nationality or last
habitual residence on account of one of the 5 reasons enumerated
in the Act;
(2) There is a reasonable possibility of actually suffering such
persecution if he were to return to that country;
(3) That he is unable or unwilling to return to or avail himself of the
protection of that country because of such fear.
(4) The alien need not establish to the Asylum Officer or IJ that he
would be singled out for persecution if:
(a) He establishes that there is a pattern or practice in his country
of nationality or last habitual residence of groups of persons
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similarly situated to the applicant on account of one of the 5
reasons;
(b) The alien establishes his own inclusion in and identification
with such group of persons such that his fear of persecution
upon return is reasonable.
(5) The Asylum Officer or IJ shall give due consideration to evidence
that the government of the country in which persecution is feared
persecutes its nationals or residents if:
(a) They leave the country without authorization, or
(b) seek asylum in another country.
(6) Regarding withholding of deportation, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)
provides the same as 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2) does for asylum
except that “the applicant's life or freedom” shall be found to be
threatened if it is more likely than not that he would be persecuted
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.
b. Background evidence (in the form of newspaper of magazine articles or
reports prepared by government agencies) relating to general or specific
conditions in the country of feared persecution is admissible in a hearing
if it is relevant, material, and noncumulative, and an IJ’s rejection of all
background evidence, even on general conditions in the country,
deprives the alien of a full and fair hearing and necessitates a remand by
the Board.  Matter of Exame, 18 I&N Dec. 303 (BIA 1982). 
c. Corroborating evidence is not required in all cases.  An alien's own
testimony, without corroborative evidence, may be sufficient proof if
that testimony is believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to
provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis for his fear of
persecution.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a); Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec.
439 (BIA 1987).  For applications affected by the REAL ID Act of 2005,
where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide
evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence
must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and
cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.  INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii).
d. When the basis of a persecution claim becomes less focused on specific
events involving the alien personally and instead is more directed to
broad allegations regarding general conditions in the country of feared
persecution, it may well be essential for the alien to present
corroborative background evidence that establishes a plausible context
for the persecution claim.  Matter of Dass, 20 I&N Dec. 120 (BIA 1989).
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(1) In such cases, background evidence should be presented if it is
available or an acceptable explanation should be given for its
absence.  Id. 
(2) Since the alien bears the evidentiary burden of proof and
persuasion, applications will be denied for failure of proof where
there are significant, meaningful evidentiary gaps.  Id.
e. An alien must demonstrate that the threat of persecution exists
throughout the country in which he alleges persecution, not merely in a
particular area within the country. Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211
(BIA 1985) overruled in part by Matter of Mogharrabi 19 I&N Dec. 439
(BIA 1987).
f. Even if an asylum claim is otherwise demonstrated, eligibility for asylum
based on nongovernmental action may not be adequately established
where the evidence of danger is directed to a very local area in the
country of feared persecution. Matter of Fuentes, 19 I&N Dec. 658 (BIA
1988).
g. If an alien claims that he received persecutive punishment at the hands of
local officials, he must normally show that redress from higher officials
was unavailable or that he had a well-founded fear that it would be
unavailable. Matter of Chang, 20 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 1989) superseded
by statute, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-208, as recognized in Li v. Ashcroft, 312 F.3d
1094 (9th Cir. 2002).
h. The reasonableness of an alien's fear of persecution is reduced when his
family remains in his native country unharmed for a long period of time
after his departure. Matter of A-E-M-, 21 I&N Dec. 1157 (BIA 1998).
i. Where evidence from the U.S. Dept. of State indicates that country
conditions have changed after an alien's departure from his native
country and that the Peruvian government has reduced the Shining Path's
ability to carry out persecutory acts and the alien fails to rebut such
evidence, the alien failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. 
Matter of A-E-M-, 21 I&N Dec. 1157 (BIA 1998).
j. Country profiles submitted by the Department of State’s Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor are entitled to considerable
deference.  Matter of T-M-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 775 (BIA 1997). Matter of
H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I&N Dec. 209, 213 (BIA 2010).
k. Credibility.
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(1) For applications made on or after May 11, 2005, the REAL ID Act
of 2005 provides that considering the totality of the circumstances,
and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
determination on the demeanor, candor or responsiveness of the
applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or
witness’ account, the consistency between the applicant’s or
witness’ written and oral statements (whenever made and whether
or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which
the statements were made), the internal consistency of each such
statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence
of record (including the reports of the Department of State on
country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such
statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy
or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim or any other
relevant factor.  There is no presumption of credibility, however, if
no adverse credibility determination is explicitly made, the
applicant or witness shall have a rebuttable presumption of
credibility on appeal.  INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii).
(a) The Board held that, for asylum cases governed by the REAL
ID Act, a trier of fact may, after considering the totality of the
circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum
applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of his or her account,
and inconsistencies in statements, without regard to whether
they go to the heart of the asylum claim.  In this case, the
Board held that the IJ properly considered the totality of the
circumstances in finding that the respondent lacked
credibility based on his demeanor, his implausible testimony,
the lack of corroborating evidence, and his inconsistent
statements, some of which did not relate to the heart of the
claim.  Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 260 (BIA 2007).
Under the REAL ID Act, inconsistencies will support an
adverse credibility finding, regardless of whether they relate
to the heart of the claim.  See El-Moussa v. Holder, 569 F.3d
250 (6th Cir. 2009); Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531 (5th Cir.
2009); Krishnapillai v. Holder, 563 F.3d 606, 616-17 (7th
Cir. 2009); Qun Lin v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 22, 26-27 (1st Cir.
2008); Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-68 (2d Cir. 2008);
Chen v. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1228, 1231-33 (11th Cir. 2006).
(b) Circuit courts have split as to whether the REAL ID Act
revived the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false
in one thing, false in all things) with respect to the applicant’s
credibility.  This doctrine permits a trier of fact to cite a
witness’s false statement relating to one subject to conclude
that the witness testified falsely relating to another subject. 
In a footnote to a pre-REAL ID Act case, the First Circuit
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stated that the Act revived this doctrine.  Castaneda-Castillo
v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2007).  However, in Kadia
v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2007), the Seventh
Circuit stated that it was “dubious” that the REAL ID Act
did, in fact, revive the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus. 
(c) The Seventh Circuit held that the IJ’s adverse credibility
finding was supported by substantial evidence; namely, new
assertions not previously stated in the respondent’s asylum
application and the respondent’s failure to provide a
satisfactory explanation as to why he omitted certain events.
Hassan v. Holder, 571 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2009). The court
found that although the events the IJ relied on to discredit the
respondent’s claim did not directly contradict his written
application and are arguably not central to his asylum claim,
the omitted events are not trivial, and under the REAL ID
Act, considering all the relevant factors in this case, the IJ
could rely on these material omissions to conclude the
respondent’s omissions were an attempt to embellish his
asylum claim.  Id.
(d) The Eighth Circuit upheld an adverse credibility
determination, finding that even if the petitioner’s
explanations could plausibly account for the significant
inconsistencies in her asylum applications, the IJ did not err
by rejecting them.  Fesehaye v. Holder, 607 F.3d 523 (8th
Cir. 2010).
(e) Where an alien did not offer a reasonable and plausible
explanation for the discrepancies, which went to the heart of
his claim, either individually or in the aggregate, even though
he had ample opportunity to do so, the IJ’s adverse credibility
finding is supported and it is not necessary to make an
“express, point-by-point rejection of [the alien’s]
explanations.” Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2011).
(f) The Ninth Circuit held that an IJ’s perception of the alien's
ignorance of religious doctrine was not a proper basis for an
adverse credibility finding.  Lei Li v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1154
(9th Cir. 2011) (where the IJ had found a Chinese asylum
applicant incredible largely because the applicant thought that
Thanksgiving was a Christian holiday and knew little about
the differences between the Old and New Testaments). 
(g)  The Eleventh Circuit held that the IJ and Board’s adverse
credibility finding was not supported by any of the three
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“perceived inconsistencies” between the alien’s written
statement and his testimony, and the record compelled
reversal.  Kueviakoe v. Att’y Gen., 567 F.3d 1301, 1306
(11th Cir. 2009).  The court explained how each of the three
perceived inconsistencies were actually not inconsistencies
when viewed a different way.  
(h) Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should
provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible
testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the
applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably
obtain the evidence.  INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii).
(2) Presentation by an asylum applicant of an identification document
that is found to be counterfeit by forensic experts not only
discredits the applicant's claim as to the critical elements of identity
and nationality, but, in the absence of an explanation or rebuttal,
also indicates an overall lack of credibility regarding the entire
claim.  Matter of O-D-, 21 I&N Dec. 1079 (BIA 1998), overruled
in part as stated in Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694 (7th Cir.
2006).
(3) Although the Board has de novo review authority, the Board
accords deference to an IJ’s findings regarding credibility and
credibility-related issues.  The Board defers to an adverse
credibility finding based on inconsistencies and omissions
regarding facts central to an alien's asylum claim where a review of
the record reveals that (1) the discrepancies and omissions
described by the IJ are actually present; (2) these discrepancies and
omissions provide specific and cogent reasons to conclude that the
alien provided incredible testimony; and (3) a convincing
explanation for the discrepancies and omissions has not been
supplied by the alien.  Matter of A-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 1106 (BIA
1998).
(4) An asylum applicant does not meet his burden of proof by general
and meager testimony.  Specific, detailed, and credible testimony
or a combination of detailed testimony and corroborative
background evidence is necessary to prove a case for asylum.  The
weaker an applicant's testimony, the greater the need for
corroborative evidence.  Matter of Y-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 1136 (BIA
1998).
(5) An alien who did not provide any evidence to corroborate his
purported identity, nationality, claim of persecution, or his former
presence or his family's current presence at a refugee camp, where
it was reasonable to expect such evidence, failed to meet his
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burden of proof to establish his asylum claim.  Matter of M-D-, 21
I&N Dec. 1180 (BIA 1998), vacated by Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d
279 (2d Cir. 2000).
J. The Convention Against Torture
1. Article 3 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
2. History lesson - The Convention Against Torture has been in effect in the U.S.
since November 20, 1994.  However, there was no statutory provision to
implement Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture in United States
domestic law.  Therefore, the Board held that it lacked jurisdiction to
adjudicate a claim for relief from deportation pursuant to Article 3 of the
United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as there had been no specific legislation
to implement the provisions of Article 3,  no regulations had been
promulgated with respect to Article 3, and the United States Senate has
declared that Article 3 is a non-self-executing treaty provision.  Matter of H-
M-V-, 22 I&N Dec. 256 (BIA 1998).  On October 21, 1998, the President
signed into law legislation which required that “[n]ot later than 120 days after
the date of enactment of this Act, the heads of the appropriate agencies shall
prescribe regulations to implement the obligations of the United States under
Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms
of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, subject to any
reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos contained in the
United States Senate resolution of ratification of the Convention.”  The
regulations took effect March 22, 1999.
3. Definition of “torture.” 
a.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) states, “Torture is defined as any act by which
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act
he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.”
(1) An applicant for protection under Article 3 of the Convention
against Torture must establish that the torture feared would be
inflicted by or with the acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity; therefore, protection does not
extend to persons who fear entities that a government is unable to
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control.  Matter of S-V-, 22 I&N Dec. 1306 (BIA 2000) overruled
on other grounds by Hakim v. Holder, 628 F.3d 151 (5th Cir.
2010); Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003).
b. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2) states, “Torture is an extreme form of cruel and
inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment that do not amount to torture.”
c. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(3)states, “Torture does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
Lawful sanctions include judicially imposed sanctions and other
enforcement actions authorized by law, including the death penalty, but
do not include sanctions that defeat the object and purpose of the
Convention Against Torture to prohibit torture.”
d. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(4) provides that, in order to constitute torture,
mental pain or suffering must be prolonged mental harm caused by or
resulting from:
(1) The intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical
pain or suffering;
(2) The administration or application, or threatened administration or
application, of mind altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
(3) The threat of imminent death; or
(4) The threat that another person will imminently be subjected to
death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or
application of mind altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the sense or personality.
e. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(5) provides that, in order to constitute torture, an
act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain
or suffering.  An act that results in unanticipated or unintended severity
of pain and suffering is not torture.
f. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(6) states, “In order to constitute torture an act
must be directed against a person in the offender's custody or physical
control.”
g. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7) states that acquiescence of a public official
requires that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture,
have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.
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h. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(8) states, “Noncompliance with applicable legal
procedural standards does not per se constitute torture.”
4. Eligibility in spite of frivolous asylum application.  Section 208(d)(6) of the
Act provides that if the Attorney General determines that an alien has
knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum and the alien has received
the notice under section 208(d)(4)(A) of the consequences of knowingly filing
a frivolous application for asylum, the alien shall be permanently ineligible for
any benefits under the Act, effective as of the date of a final determination of
such application.  However 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20 provides that a finding that an
alien filed a frivolous asylum application shall not preclude the alien from
seeking withholding of removal.
5. Withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture.
a. Differences between withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of
the Act and withholding of removal under Article 3 of the Convention
Against Torture.
(1) Several categories of individuals, including persons who assisted in
Nazi persecution or engaged in genocide, persons who have
persecuted others, persons who have been convicted of particularly
serious crimes, persons who are believed to have committed
serious non-political crimes before arriving in the United States,
and persons who pose a danger to the security of the United States,
are ineligible for withholding of removal under 241(b)(3)(B) of the
Act.  Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture does not exclude
such persons from its scope.
(2) Section 241(b)(3) applies only to aliens whose life or freedom
would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, or
membership in a particular social group or political opinion. 
Article 3 covers persons who fear torture that may not be motivated
by one of those five grounds.
(3) The definition of torture does not encompass all types of harm that
might qualify as a threat to life or freedom.  Thus, the coverage of
Article 3 is different from that of section 241(b)(3): broader in
some ways and narrower in others.
b. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) provides that the burden of proof is on the
applicant for withholding of removal under the Convention Against
Torture to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be
tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.  That regulation
also provides that the testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be
sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.
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c. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3) provides that in assessing whether it is more
likely than not that an applicant would be tortured in the proposed
country of removal, all evidence relevant to the possibility of future
torture shall be considered, including, but not limited to:
(1) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant;
(2) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country
of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured;
(3) Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights
within the country of removal, where applicable; and
(4) Other relevant information regarding conditions in the country of
removal.
d. Specific decisions.
(1) The indefinite detention of criminal deportees by Haitian
authorities does not constitute torture within the meaning of 8
C.F.R. § 1208.18(a) where there is no evidence that the authorities
intentionally and deliberately detain deportees in order to inflict
torture.  Matter of J-E-, 23 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 2002).
(2) Substandard prison conditions in Haiti do not constitute torture
within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. 1208.18(a) where there is no
evidence that the authorities intentionally create and maintain such
conditions in order to inflict torture. Matter of J-E-, 23 I&N Dec.
291 (BIA 2002); Pierre v. Holder, 528 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2008). 
The First Circuit has also held that Haiti’s substandard detention
conditions did not amount to torture under the Convention Against
Torture, even though detainees faced overcrowding, physical
striking by Haitian authorities, unsanitary conditions, and
deprivation of food, water, and medical care.  See Gourdet v.
Holder, 587 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009). The Eighth Circuit upheld the
Board’s reversal of CAT relief grant for an alien who was returning
to indefinite imprisonment in Haiti, stating that torture requires a
“specific intent” on the part of the government to inflict severe
physical or mental pain or suffering on the returned alien. 
Cherichel v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1002 (8th Cir. 2010).  
(3) An Iranian Christian of Armenian descent demonstrated that it is
more likely than not he will be tortured if returned to Iran based on
a combination of factors, including his religion, his ethnicity, the
duration of his residence in the U.S., and his drug-related
convictions in the U.S. Matter of G-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 366 (BIA
2002).
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(4) In Matter of M-B-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 474 (BIA 2002), the Board held
that in an application for deferral of removal under Article 3 of the
Convention Against Torture, it is not sufficient for a respondent
simply to cite the existence of Decree No. 33 in Nigeria which
provides that a Nigerian citizen who is convicted of a narcotic drug
offense in a foreign country, or who is detected carrying a narcotic
drug into a foreign country after a journey originating from Nigeria
shall be liable for imprisonment for a term of five years. The Board
stated, “The respondent must provide some current evidence, or at
least more meaningful historical evidence, regarding the manner of
enforcement of the provisions of Decree No. 33 on individuals
similarly situated to herself.  The respondent’s eligibility for
deferral of removal rests upon a finding that it is more likely than
not that she will be identified as a convicted drug trafficker upon
her return to Nigeria; that, as a result, she will be detained on
arrival; that, when detained, she will be held in detention without
access to bail or judicial oversight; that she will be detained for a
significant period of time; and that, as a result of this detention, she
will suffer mistreatment that rises to the level of torture at the
hands of prison guards or authorities. Given the evidence of harsh
and life-threatening prison conditions in Nigeria and the serious
drug trafficking problems that Nigerian authorities are attempting
to address, the respondent’s fear of return to her home country is
understandable. On the record before us, however, we find that the
respondent’s case is based on a chain of assumptions and a fear of
what might happen, rather than evidence that meets her burden of
demonstrating that it is more likely than not that she will be
subjected to torture . . . .”
e. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(4) states that in considering an application for
withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture, the IJ
shall first determine whether the alien is more likely than not to be
tortured in the country of removal.  If the IJ determines that the alien is
more likely than not to be tortured in the country of removal, the alien is
entitled to protection under the Convention Against Torture.  Protection
under the Convention Against Torture will be granted either in the form
of withholding of removal or in the form of deferral of removal.  An
alien entitled to such protection shall be granted withholding of removal
unless the alien is subject to mandatory denial of withholding of removal
under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) or (d)(3).  If an alien entitled to such
protection is subject to mandatory denial of withholding of removal
under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) or (d)(3), the alien's removal shall be
deferred under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a).
6. Deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture.
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a. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a) provides that an alien who: (1) has been ordered
removed; (2) has been found under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3) to be
entitled to protection under the Convention Against Torture; and (3) is
subject to the provisions for mandatory denial of withholding of removal
under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) or (d)(3), shall be granted deferral of
removal to the country where he or she is more likely than not to be
tortured. 
b. Notice which IJ must give to respondent.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(b) requires
an IJ who orders an alien described in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a) removed, to
inform the alien that his or her removal to the country where he or she is
more likely than not to be tortured shall be deferred until such time as
the deferral is terminated under this section.  The IJ shall inform the
alien that deferral of removal:
(1) does not confer upon the alien any lawful or permanent
immigration status in the United States;
(2) will not necessarily result in the alien being released from the
custody of the Service if the alien is subject to such custody;
(3) is effective only until terminated; and
(4) is subject to review and termination if the IJ determines that it is
not likely that the alien would be tortured in the country to which
removal has been deferred, or if the alien requests that deferral be
terminated.
c. The IJ shall also inform the alien that removal has been deferred only to
the country in which it has been determined that the alien is likely to be
tortured, and that the alien may be removed at any time to another
country where he or she is not likely to be tortured.
d. An alien’s eligibility for deferral of removal under the Convention
Against Torture cannot be established by stringing together a series of
suppositions to show that it is more likely than not that torture will result
where the evidence does not establish that each step in the hypothetical
chain of events is more likely than not to happen.  Matter of J-F-F-, 23
I&N Dec. 912 (A.G. 2006).
7. Termination of deferral of removal.
a. Termination at the request of the Service.
(1) 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(d)(1) provides that at any time while deferral of
removal is in effect, the INS District Counsel for the District with
jurisdiction over an alien whose removal has been deferred under 8
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C.F.R. § 1208.17(a) may file a motion with the Immigration Court
having administrative control pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.11 to
schedule a hearing to consider whether deferral of removal should
be terminated.  The Service motion shall be granted if it is
accompanied by evidence that is relevant to the possibility that the
alien would be tortured in the country to which removal has been
deferred and that was not presented at the previous hearing.  The
Service motion shall not be subject to the requirements for
reopening in 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2 and 1003.23.
(2) 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(d)(2) provides that the Immigration Court shall
provide notice to the alien and the Service of the time, place, and
date of the termination hearing.  Such notice shall inform the alien
that the alien may supplement the information in his or her initial
application for withholding of removal under the Convention
Against Torture and shall provide that the alien must submit any
such supplemental information within 10 calendar days of service
of such notice (or 13 calendar days if service of such notice was by
mail).  At the expiration of this 10 or 13 day period, the
Immigration Court shall forward a copy of the original application,
and any supplemental information the alien or the Service has
submitted, to the Department of State, together with notice to the
Department of State of the time, place and date of the termination
hearing.  At its option, the Department of State may provide
comments on the case, according to the provisions of 8 C.F.R. §
1208.11.
(3) 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(d)(3) provides that the IJ shall conduct a
hearing and make a de novo determination, based on the record of
proceeding and initial application in addition to any new evidence
submitted by the Service or the alien, as to whether the alien is
more likely than not to be tortured in the country to which removal
has been deferred.  This determination shall be made under the
standards for eligibility set out in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c).  The
burden is on the alien to establish that it is more likely than not that
he or she would be tortured in the country to which removal has
been deferred.
(4) 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(d)(4) provides that if the IJ determines that the
alien is more likely than not to be tortured in the country to which
removal has been deferred, the order of deferral shall remain in
place.  If the IJ determines that the alien has not established that he
or she is more likely than not to be tortured in the country to which
removal has been deferred, the deferral of removal shall be
terminated and the alien may be removed to that country.  Appeal
of the IJ’s decision shall lie to the Board.
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b. Termination at the request of the alien.
(1) 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(e)(1) provides that at any time while deferral of
removal is in effect, the alien may make a written request to the
Immigration Court having administrative control pursuant to 8
C.F.R. § 1003.11 to terminate the deferral order.  If satisfied on the
basis of the written submission that the alien's request is knowing
and voluntary, the IJ shall terminate the order of deferral and the
alien may be removed.
(2) 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(e)(2) allows an IJ, if necessary, to calendar a
hearing for the sole purpose of determining whether the alien's
request is knowing and voluntary.  If the IJ determines that the
alien's request is knowing and voluntary, the order of deferral shall
be terminated.  If the IJ determines that the alien's request is not
knowing and voluntary, the alien's request shall not serve as the
basis for terminating the order of deferral.
c. Termination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(c), which provides that at
any time while deferral of removal is in effect, the Attorney General may
determine whether deferral should be terminated based on diplomatic
assurances forwarded by the Secretary of State pursuant to the
procedures in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(c). 
K. Adjustment of status - Section 245 of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1, et seq.
1. Introduction.  Adjustment of status allows an alien who is not an immigrant
(or deportable immigrant, if qualified) who is in the U.S. to adjust status to
that of a lawful permanent resident (LPR) without leaving the U.S. to obtain
an immigrant visa and re-entering the U.S. as an immigrant.  The date of
adjustment of status may be considered an admission in some circumstances.
See Matter of Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA 2011).
a. If adjustment of status is denied by a DD or IJ, either for failure to
establish statutory eligibility or as a matter of discretion, the denial
simply means that the alien cannot seek consular processing abroad by
applying for a visa at an American Consulate.  The Consul will
determine if the alien is eligible to receive a visa.  If the alien receives a
visa, he may then apply for admission to the U.S.  At that time, if he is
believed to be inadmissible under section 212(a), his admissibility may
be determined in removal proceedings.
2. Jurisdiction.
a. In the case of an any alien who has been placed in deportation
proceedings or removal hearings (other than an arriving alien), the IJ
hearing the proceeding has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate any
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application for adjustment of status.  8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(1) (amended
71 Fed. Reg. 27585 (May 12, 2006)).
b. Arriving Aliens
.
(1) History lesson - There was a split of the Circuit Court of Appeals
regarding the validity of 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(c)(8) which precluded
an arriving alien from adjusting status before an IJ.  The First,
Third, and Ninth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuits held that this
regulation was invalid.  Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.
2005); Zheng-Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 2005);
Bona v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2005); Scheerer v.Att’y
Gen., 445 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2006).  The Fifth and Eighth
Circuits concluded that 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(c)(8) was valid.  Momin
v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2006), vacated and remanded,
462 F.3d 497 (5th Cir. 2006); Mouelle v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 923
(8th Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S.Ct. 2964 (2006).
(2) PRESENT LAW - On May 12, 2006, the Attorney General
amended the regulations by removing 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(c)(8) to
resolve the circuit conflict.  71 Fed. Reg. 27585 (May 12, 2006). 
Further, 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(1)(ii) was amended to read as
follows: “Arriving aliens.  In the case of an arriving alien who is
placed in removal proceedings, the immigration judge does not
have jurisdiction to adjudicate any application for adjustment of
status . . . .”  Id.  The new regulation retains a narrow exception for
an alien who leaves the United States while an adjustment
application is pending with USCIS, and then returns under a grant
of advance parole; an IJ would have jurisdiction to adjudicate the
alien’s renewed adjustment application if that application had been
denied by USCIS.  Id. See Matter of Silitonga, 25 I&N Dec. 89
(BIA 2009).
c. No appeal lies from a district director’s denial of adjustment.  However,
the application may be renewed before the IJ if the alien (other than an
arriving alien) is placed in proceedings.  8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(5)(ii). 
d. Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act– Immigration judges do not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate an application filed by an arriving alien seeking
adjustment of status under the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of
November 2, 1966 (Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161) unless the alien
has been placed in removal proceedings after returning to the United
States pursuant to a grant of advance parole to pursue a previously filed
application. Matter of Martinez-Montalvo, 24 I&N Dec. 778 (BIA 2009)
(noting that Matter of Artigas, 23 I&N Dec. 99 (BIA 2001) was
superseded by regulations).
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(1) The fact that an IJ does not have jurisdiction over applications for
adjustment under the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act does not
negate his or her jurisdiction over the removal proceedings of
arriving Cuban aliens under section 240 of the Act. Matter of E-R-
M- & L-R-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2011).
e. If both parties agree, an IJ may use a form I-471 to remand an
application for adjustment of status to the district director for his
adjudication.  However, an IJ is not permitted to remand a case without
the district director’s consent.  Matter of Roussis, 18 I&N Dec. 256 (BIA
1982).
f. Immigration judges have authority to determine whether the validity of
an alien’s approved employment-based visa petition is preserved under
section 204(j) after the alien’s change in jobs or employers. Matter of
Marcal Neto, 25 I&N Dec. 169 (BIA 2010) (overruling Matter of Perez
Vargas, 23 I&N Dec. 829 (BIA 2005)).
3. Substantive requirements.  In order to qualify for adjustment of status, section
245(a) of the Act states that a respondent must prove that he or she:
a. has been inspected and admitted (or paroled when the application is
before the DD);
(1) An alien who was released from custody on conditional parole
pursuant to section 236(a)(2)(B) of the Act has not been “paroled
into the United States” for purposes of establishing eligibility for
adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act.  Matter of
Castillo-Padilla, 25 I&N Dec. 257 (BIA 2010); Delgado-
Sobalvarro v. Att’y Gen., 625 F.3d 782 (3d Cir. 2010).
(2) For purposes of establishing adjustment of status under section
245(a) of the INA, an alien seeking to show that he or she has been
“admitted” to the United States pursuant to section 101(a)(13)(A)
of the Act, need only prove procedural regularity in his or her
entry, which does not require the alien to be questioned by
immigration authorities or be admitted in a particular status. 
Matter of Quilantan, 25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010).
(3) To be eligible for adjustment of status, an alien must have been
inspected and admitted or paroled, even if he has been granted
TPS. Serrano v. Att’y Gen., --- F.3d ----, No. 10-12990, 2011 WL
4345670 (11th Cir. Sept. 16, 2011).
b. is admissible under section 212(a) of the Act;
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(1) A respondent who is inadmissible under section 212(a) may apply
for any available waiver of the ground of inadmissibility in
conjunction with the application for adjustment of status.  8 C.F.R.
§ 1245.1(f).  Matter of Gabryelsky, 20 I&N Dec. 750 (BIA 1993).  
(2) The “futility doctrine.”  The Board has determined that the rule in
Matter of V-, 1 I&N Dec. 293 (BIA 1942), which held that
notwithstanding lack of a specific statutory ground of exclusion, an
alien who upon entry would immediately become subject to
deportation should be found excludable is not appropriate in the
adjustment of status context and held that it is the Board’s practice
to interpret the requirement of admissibility in section 245(a) with
reference only to the inadmissibility grounds set forth in the Act.
See Matter of Rainford, 20 I&N Dec. 598 (BIA 1992).
c. has an immigrant visa number immediately available to him.  
(1) A respondent cannot adjust status unless he is the beneficiary of a
valid unexpired visa petition.  INA § 245(a).  Jurisdiction to
adjudicate visa petitions is vested solely in the DD.  An IJ has no
authority to approve or deny a visa petition.  Matter of Ching, 15
I&N Dec. 772 (BIA 1976).
(a) Fraudulent marriages.  Section 204(c) of the Act provides
that no visa petition shall be approved if: (1) the alien has
previously been accorded, or has sought to be accorded,
immediate relative or preference status as the spouse of a
USC or LPR by reason of a marriage determined by the
Attorney General to have been entered into for the purpose of
evading the immigration laws or (2) the Attorney General has
determined that the alien has attempted or conspired to enter
into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration
laws.
(b) Section 204(c) of the Act does not preclude approval of a
second marital visa petition filed by the petitioner on behalf
of the same beneficiary.  Matter of Isber, 20 I&N Dec. 676
(BIA 1993).
(c) However, a petitioner who has previously withdrawn a visa
petition and admitted that the marriage was not bona fide
bears a heavy burden of explaining the prior withdrawal. 
Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983).  Where a
visa petition has once been withdrawn under these
circumstances, any subsequently filed visa petition must
include an explanation of the prior withdrawal and evidence
supporting the bona fides of the parties' relationship.  Id.
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(2) Children.  Section 201(f)(1) of the Act, which allows the
beneficiary of an immediate relative visa petition to retain his
status as a “child” after he turns 21, applies to an individual whose
visa petition was approved before the August 6, 2002, effective
date of the Child Status Protection Act (“CSPA”), but who filed an
application for adjustment of status after that date.  Matter of
Avila-Perez, 24 I&N Dec. 78 (BIA 2007).  Such a beneficiary
would therefore remain an immediate relative.  Id.
(a) The CSPA enacted on August 6, 2002, added several
provisions to the Act to protect children from losing their visa
eligibility by aging-out (turning 21 years of age) while their
visa petition or adjustment application was pending. 
See Child Status Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-208, 116
Stat. 927 (2002), INA § 203(h).  If an alien seeking to adjust
status was under twenty-one years of age when his visa
petition was filed and no final decision was made on the
petition prior to August 6, 2002, the applicant may qualify for
protection under the CSPA.  The Act sets forth a
mathematical formula for determining the CSPA age of
children of lawful permanent residents who qualify for
protection under the CSPA.  INA § 203(h)(1).
(b) In Matter of Wang, 25 I&N Dec. 28 (BIA 2009), the Board
clarified the application of the automatic conversion and
priority date retention provisions of the Child Status
Protection Act, Pub L. No. 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (2002)
found at section 203(h)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. The Board held that the beneficiary of a second-
preference petition filed by her father could not take
advantage of the automatic conversion and priority date
retention provisions where she had aged out of eligibility for
an immigrant visa as the derivative beneficiary of a fourth-
preference visa petition filed by her aunt on behalf of her
father. The Board found that “[w]hen she aged out from her
status as a derivative beneficiary on a fourth-preference
petition, there was no other category to which her visa could
convert because no category exists for the niece of a United
States citizen.” Id. at 35. The Board found that the retention
language of section 203(h) was meant to apply only where
the visa petitions were filed by the same family member and
that, therefore, she could not retain the priority date from the
petition filed by her aunt for the petition filed by her father.
Id. at 35-36. See Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, --- F.3d ----,
Nos. 09-56796, 09-56846, 2011 WL 3873797 (9th Cir. Sept.
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2, 2011) (holding that Board reasonably interpreted
ambiguous provision of CSPA). 
i) In Khalid v. Holder, --- F.3d ----, No. 10-60373, 2011
WL 3925337 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011), the Fifth Circuit
declined to follow Matter of Wang, 25 I&N Dec. 28
(BIA 2009), holding that section 203(h)(3) of the Act
was not ambiguous because the issue of which petitions
qualify for automatic conversion and retention of
priority dates was answered directly by section
203(h)(2). Because the court found the statute to be
unambiguous, it did not afford Chevron deference to the
Board’s interpretation of that section. Id.
(c) The Child Status Protection Act does not apply to applicants
of the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. 
Midi v. Holder, 566 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 2009).
(d) The Eleventh Circuit held that the phrase “sought to acquire”
in the CSPA is broad enough to encompass substantial steps
taken toward the filing of the relevant application during the
relevant time period, but does not require that the alien
actually file or submit the application.  Tovar v. Att’y Gen.,
646 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2011).
(e) An individual who applies for an adjustment of status under
section 245(d) as a K-2 visa holder (minor child of a fiancé of
a U.S. citizen) must be under twenty-one years of age on the
date that he or she seeks to enter the U.S., but need not be
under twenty-one when his or her application for adjustment
of status is adjudicated.  Carpio v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1091
(10th Cir. 2010). “The date that the individual ‘seeks to enter
the United States’ may be plausibly read as either (a) the date
that the United States citizen files a petition for K-1 or K-2
visas with the Secretary of Homeland Security under INA §
214(d)(1) or (b) the date that the K-1 or K-2 visa applications
are filed with the consular officer in the country of origin.”
Id.  The court concluded that the date-of-adjudication
approach was fundamentally unfair.
(f) The Seventh Circuit held that the effective date of the CSPA
applies to an alien whose mother’s classification petition was
approved prior to the enactment of the CSPA and whose
adjustment applications were denied after the enactment of
the CSPA. Arobelidze v. Holder, 653 F.3d 513 (7th Cir.
2011).
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(3) Adopted children.
(a) An adopted child, as defined by section 101(b)(1)(E) of the
Act, may not confer immigration benefits upon a natural
parent without regard to whether the adopted child has been
accorded or could be accorded immigration benefits by virtue
of his or her adopted status.  Matter of Li, 20 I&N Dec. 700
(BIA 1993).
(b) An adopted child under the immigration laws may not confer
immigration benefits upon his natural sibling because their
common natural parent no longer has the status of parent of
the adopted child for immigration purposes.  Matter of Li, 20
I&N Dec. 700 (BIA 1993).
(c) If the provisions of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act have been
invoked to confer an immigration benefit by virtue of an
adoptive relationship, the natural relationship will not
therefore be recognized for immigration purposes even if it is
established that the adoptive relationship has been legally
terminated.  Matter of Li, 21 I&N Dec. 13 (BIA 1995).  A
natural parent-child relationship may again be recognized for
immigration purposes following the legal termination of an
adoption that meets the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E)
if the petitioner can establish the following 4 criteria:
i) That no immigration benefit was obtained or conferred
through the adoptive relationship;
ii) That a natural parent-child relationship meeting the
requirements of section 101(b) once existed;
iii) That the adoption has been legally terminated under
applicable law; and
iv) That the natural relationship has been reestablished by
law.  Id. at 17-18.
(d) The Board has ruled that a child who was adopted while
under the age of 18, and whose natural sibling was adopted
by the same parents while under the age of 16, can qualify as
a “child” under section 101(b)(1)(E) regardless of the order in
which the two children were adopted.  The Board rejected
DHS’s argument that, for an older sibling to qualify as a
“child” under these circumstances, the older sibling’s
adoption must have preceded that of the younger child. 
Matter of Anifowoshe, 24 I&N Dec. 442 (BIA 2008).
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d. It is improper for an IJ to enter a “conditional” grant of adjustment of
status which is effective upon the happening of a future event, such as a
visa petition being approved, or a visa number becoming available. 
Fulgencio v. INS, 573 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1978); Matter of Reyes, 17
I&N Dec. 239 (BIA 1980).  However, in Matter of Reyes, the Board
implied that the presence of a condition does not void the IJ’s order.  The
Board considered the order to be final and stated that if the INS wished
to attack the adjustment, it should institute rescission proceedings under
section 246 of the Act.
e. A respondent is also ineligible to adjust status if the approval of the visa
petition has been revoked prior to the deportation hearing in spite of the
language of section 245(a)(3), “a visa immediately available at the time
the application is filed.”  Kalezic v. INS, 647 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1981).
(1) Visa petitions may be revoked automatically (through withdrawal
by the petitioner, death of the petitioner, divorce, etc.) or by the DD
on notice to the petitioner.  INA § 205; 8 C.F.R. § 1205.1 et seq.
(2) At the discretion of the DD, the petitioner's death may not 
automatically terminate the petition.  8 C.F.R. § 1205.1(a)(3)(i)(C). 
Neither IJ’s nor the Board have jurisdiction to review the DD’s
decision in such a case.  Matter of Aurelio, 19 I&N Dec. 458 (BIA
1987).
(3) A DD’s decision to revoke a visa petition on notice is appealable to
the Board. 8 C.F.R. § 1205.2(d).  However, IJs do not appear to
have authority to review the DD's decision.
f. Respondent must merit a favorable exercise of discretion.
(1) The grant of an application for adjustment of status is a matter of
administrative grace and an applicant has the burden of showing
that discretion should be exercised in his favor.  Matter of Patel, 17
I&N Dec. 597 (BIA 1980); Matter of Marques, 16 I&N Dec. 314
(BIA 1977); Matter of Leung, 16 I&N Dec. 12 (BIA 1976); Matter
of Arai, 13 I&N Dec. 494 (BIA 1970); Matter of Ortiz-Prieto, 11
I&N Dec. 317 (BIA 1965).  Where adverse factors are present, it
may be necessary for the applicant to offset those factors by a
showing of unusual or even outstanding equities.  Matter of Patel,
17 I&N Dec. 597 (BIA 1980); Matter of Arai, 13 I&N Dec. 494
(BIA 1970).
(2) In the absence of substantial equities, adjustment of status is
denied, as a matter of discretion, to an alien who, in an effort to
accelerate his immigration following marriage in his native country
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to a lawful permanent resident, entered the U.S. as a nonimmigrant
visitor with the preconceived plan of joining his wife here and
remaining permanently, thereby circumventing the normal
immigrant visa issuing process by the U.S. consul abroad.  Matter
of Rubio-Vargas, 11 I&N Dec. 167 (BIA 1965).
(3) Adjustment of status is denied as a matter of discretion to a
nonimmigrant visitor who, by his conflicting and evasive
testimony, failed to establish that he did not intend to circumvent
the normal immigrant visa issuing process by the U.S. consul
abroad.  Matter of Diaz-Villamil, 10 I&N Dec. 494 (BIA 1964).
(4) An applicant for adjustment of status is not required by the statute
or the regulations to establish GMC.  Therefore, the provisions of
section 101(f) of the Act are not literally applicable to an applicant
for adjustment.  However, GMC is a factor which must be
considered in determining whether a favorable exercise of
discretion is warranted in a particular case.  Matter of Francois, 10
I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 1963); Matter of Pires Da Silva, 10 I&N Dec.
191 (BIA 1963), modified by Matter of Krastman, 11 I&N Dec.
720 (BIA 1966).  In order to merit a favorable exercise of
discretion, GMC must exist for a reasonable period of time.  Matter
of Francois, 10 I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 1963); Matter of Pires Da
Silva, 10 I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1963).  Therefore, an alien convicted
fairly recently of a CIMT who is at liberty only upon the restraint
exercised by the terms of his probation and who has been married
only a short time does not merit a favorable exercise of discretion
on an application for adjustment of status.  Matter of Francois, 10
I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 1963).
(5) A respondent’s application for adjustment was denied as a matter
of discretion where he had worked without authorization during the
3 year period in which he was classified as a nonimmigrant student
knowing that his employment was unlawful and on 3 separate
occasions had made false statements about that employment in
applications for benefits under the Act.  Matter of Patel, 17 I&N
Dec. 597 (BIA 1980).
(6) In applications for adjustment of status, the Act makes immediate
relative status a special and weighty equity which should prevail in
the absence of significant adverse factors.  Matter of Ibrahim, 18
I&N Dec. 55 (BIA 1981); Matter of Cavazos, 17 I&N Dec. 215
(BIA 1980).
4. Aliens who are ineligible to adjust.
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a. Because section 245(a) states that an alien must be inspected and
admitted or paroled in order to adjust status, an alien who is present in
the U.S. without being inspected and admitted (previously called an
alien who entered without inspection) is ineligible to adjust.  However,
such an alien may adjust if he or she is the beneficiary of a visa petition
or labor certification filed on his or her behalf on or before April 30,
2001 and pays the amount set forth in section 245(i) of the Act.
b. Adjustment of status is not available to an alien who entered the U.S. as
a crewman.  INA § 245(c)(1).  However, such an alien may adjust if he
or she is the beneficiary of a visa petition or labor certification filed in
his or her behalf on or before April 30, 2001 and pays the amount set
forth in section 245(i) of the Act.
(1) The term “crewman” is defined in section 101(a)(10) of the Act. 
As one of the nonimmigrant classes, it is discussed in section
101(a)(15)(D).  For purposes of suspension of deportation and
adjustment of status, an alien may be considered a “crewman” even
if he was not admitted to the U.S. as a D-1.  The Board decisions
on this point are confusing and contradictory.  A good history of
this point and a discussion of each case addressing the issue may
be found in Matter of Loo, 15 I&N Dec. 601 (BIA 1976).
(2) Perhaps in an effort to bring order out of the confusing decisions,
the regulations state that an alien is ineligible to adjust status if, on
arrival in the U.S., he was serving in any capacity on board a vessel
or aircraft or was destined to join a vessel or aircraft in the U.S. to
serve in any capacity thereon. 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(b)(2).
c. Adjustment of status is not available to an alien who entered as a transit
without a visa.  INA § 245(c)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(b)(1).  However,
such an alien may adjust if he or she is the beneficiary of a visa petition
or labor certification filed in his or her behalf on or before April 30,
2001 and pays the amount set forth in section 245(i) of the Act.
d. Adjustment of status is not available to an alien who was admitted
through the Visa Waiver Program (“VWP”).  Bayo v. Napolitano, 593
F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2010).  Non-Visa Waiver Program aliens are held to
VWP program requirements if they are admitted through the VWP.  Id.
However, the adjustment of status statute contains a limited exception,
providing that discretionary adjustment of status relief is available to an
alien admitted under the VWP program on one ground, as “an immediate
relative.” INA § 245(c)(4).  See Lang v. Napolitano, 596 F.3d 426, 428
(8th Cir. 2010). 
e. Adjustment of status is not available to an alien who continues in or
accepts unauthorized employment (i.e. employed without the DHS’s
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permission) prior to filing the application for adjustment of status,
except immediate relatives under section 201(b) of the Act or special
immigrants described in section 101(a)(27)(H), (J), (K) or (I).  INA §
245(c)(2).  However, such an alien may adjust if he or she is the
beneficiary of a visa petition or labor certification filed in his or her
behalf on or before April 30, 2001 and pays the amount set forth in
section 245(i) of the Act.  Also, the Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998,
H.R. 2267 (Public Law 105-119) amended section 245(c) to provide that
employment-based immigrants are allowed to apply for adjustment even
if they failed to continuously maintain status, engaged in unauthorized
employment, or otherwise violated the terms and conditions of their
admission for an aggregate period which did not exceed 180 days.
(1) The provision regarding unauthorized employment was added to
section 245 by an amendment in 1976. Although section 245(c)(2)
does not state an effective date, the regulations provide that aliens
(other than immediate relatives and the special immigrants
exempted by the statute) who were employed without authorization
on or after January 1, 1977 are ineligible for adjustment. 8 C.F.R. §
1245.1(b)(4).
(2) The term “employment” includes self-employment and is not
limited to acting as an employee for another.  Matter of Tong, 16
I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1978).
(3) An alien’s employment is unauthorized when it has not been
approved by DHS.  Since a labor certification is approved by the
Department of Labor, an approved labor certification does not
operate to authorize employment.  Matter of Raol, 16 I&N Dec.
466 (BIA 1978).
(4) A respondent who engages in fund-raising activities as part of
missionary work for a church in which he is a minister is
considered employed and not an unpaid volunteer if he receives his
full support from the church.  Matter of Hall, 18 I&N Dec. 203
(BIA 1982).
(5) A respondent who, without permission, engages in purely religious
activities on behalf of a church and is compensated for these
activities, is considered to be employed.  Matter of Bennett, 19
I&N Dec. 21 (BIA 1984).
f. Adjustment of status is not available to an alien who was not in legal
immigration status on the date of filing the adjustment application or
who has failed to maintain a legal status since entry, except immediate
relatives under section 201(b) of the Act and special immigrants
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described in section 101(a)(27)(H), (J), (K) or (I).  INA § 245(c)(2). 
However, such an alien may adjust if he or she is the beneficiary of a
visa petition or labor certification filed in his or her behalf on or before
April 30, 2001 and pays the amount set forth in section 245(i) of the Act. 
Also, the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, H.R. 2267 (Public Law
105-119) amended section 245(c) to provide that employment-based
immigrants are allowed to apply for adjustment even if they failed to
continuously maintain status, engaged in unauthorized employment, or
otherwise violated the terms and conditions of their admission for an
aggregate period which did not exceed 180 days.
(1) The requirement of maintaining a legal status was added to section
245 by an amendment on November 6, 1986.  The wording of the
statute does not indicate an effective date, but the regulations
provide that any alien who on or after November 6, 1986 is not in
lawful immigration status on the date of filing an application for
adjustment is ineligible to adjust (except immediate relatives and
the special immigrants exempted by the statute).  8 C.F.R. §
1245.1(b)(5).
g. Adjustment of status is unavailable to an alien (other than an immediate
relative defined in section 201(b)) who was admitted as a nonimmigrant
visitor without a visa under section 212(l) or section 217.  INA §
245(c)(4).  However, such an alien may adjust if he or she is the
beneficiary of a visa petition or labor certification filed in his or her
behalf on or before April 30, 2001 and pays the amount set forth in
section 245(i) of the Act.
h. Adjustment of status is unavailable to an alien admitted as a
nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(S) of the Act [one who is to
provide information about a criminal or terrorist organization].  INA §
245(c)(5).  However, such an alien may adjust if he or she is the
beneficiary of a visa petition or labor certification filed in his or her
behalf on or before April 30, 2001 and pays the amount set forth in
section 245(i) of the Act.  In addition to section 245(i), such an alien
should also be able to adjust under section 245(j).
i. Adjustment of status is not available to an alien who is an alien lawfully
admitted to the U.S. for permanent residence on a conditional basis
under sections 216 or 216A of the Act.  INA § 245(d), (f).
(1) While the statutory language leaves open the question of whether
the bar to adjustment of status extends to an alien whose status as a
conditional permanent resident has been terminated, the Board
found that the DHS’s regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(b)(12) (1991)
[now 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(c)(5)] clearly applied the bar only to aliens
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currently holding conditional permanent resident status.  Therefore,
the Board held that section 245(d) of the Act does not prohibit an
alien whose conditional permanent resident status has been
terminated from adjusting status under section 245(a).  Matter of
Stockwell, 20 I&N Dec. 309 (BIA 1991).
j. Adjustment of status is not available to an alien who entered the U.S. as
a K-1 or a K-2, except if the K-1 marries the USC petitioner, the status
of the K-1 and/or the K-2 may be adjusted to that of an alien lawfully
admitted on a conditional basis under section 216.  INA § 245(d).
(1)  A K-1 visa holder can only adjust status based on the marriage to
the fiancé(e) petitioner. Matter of Sesay, 25 I&N Dec. 431, 437
(BIA 2011). A K-1 visa holder is not subject to the provision for
conditional resident status under section 216 of the Act if that K-1
visa holder’s bona fide marriage to the fiancé(e) petitioner is more
than two years old at the time the adjustment application is
adjudicated. Id. at 440-41. The K-1 visa holder satisfies the visa
eligibility and visa availability requirements of section 245(a) of
the Act on the date the K-1 visa holder is admitted to the United
States as a K-1 nonimmigrant so long as the K-1 visa holder enters
into a bona fide marriage with the fiancé(e) petitioner within 90
days of that date. Id. at 440. If the K-1 visa holder can demonstrate
that he or she entered into a bona fide marriage to the fiancé(e)
petitioner within the 90-day period, the K-1 visa holder may be
granted adjustment of status under sections 245(a) and (d) of the
Act, even if the marriage to the fiancé(e) petitioner does not exist
at the time that the application for adjustment is adjudicated. Id. at
441.
(2) A derivative child of a K-1 visa holder is not ineligible for
adjustment of status simply by virtue of having turned 21 after
admission to the United States on a K-2 nonimmigrant visa. Matter
of Le, 25 I&N Dec. 541 (BIA 2011).
k. Adjustment of status is not available to an alien who seeks to receive an
immigrant visa on the basis of a marriage entered into during the period
in which administrative or judicial proceedings are pending regarding
the alien's right to enter or remain in the U.S.  INA § 245(e)(2).
(1) However, section 245(e)(3) of the Act provides that an alien may
apply for adjustment of status based on a marriage contracted
during proceedings if he establishes by clear and convincing
evidence the following:
(a) That the marriage was entered into in good faith;
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(b) That the marriage was in accordance with the laws of the
place where the marriage took place;
(c) That the marriage was not entered into for the purpose of
procuring the alien's entry as an immigrant;
(d) That no fee (other than attorney's fees) was given for the
filing of a visa petition.
(2) Section 245(e)(3) was added to the Act by the Immigration Act of
1990.  Although the Immigration Act of 1990 was effective on
November 29, 1990, section 702(c) of that Act provided that the
addition of section 245(c)(3) would apply to marriages entered into
before, on, or after the effective date of the Immigration Act of
1990.
(3) 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(c)(8)(i) provides that the period during which
administrative proceedings are pending begins with
(a) the issuance of Form I-221, Order to Show Cause and Notice
of Hearing prior to June 20, 1991;
(b) the filing of Form I-221, Order to Show Cause and Notice of
Hearing, issued on or after June 20, 1991, with the
Immigration Court;
i) An earlier regulation stated that the period began with
the issuance of the charging document and made no
distinction regarding the date it was issued.  This
appeared to be in conflict with 8 C.F.R. § 3.14(a) [now
8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a)] which states that proceedings
before an IJ commence when a charging document is
filed with the Office of the Immigration Judge (OIJ)
[now the Immigration Court].  The Board addressed the
conflict between former 8 C.F.R. § 3.14(a) and former 8
C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(2)(iii) which defines the period
during which proceedings are pending for approval of a
visa petition as commencing with the issuance of a
charging document rather than its filing with the OIJ
and held that, at least for purposes of section 204(h) of
the Act, the most recent regulation by the Attorney
General controls and a visa petition may not be
approved after issuance of an OSC unless the facts
required by section 245(e)(3) are established.  Matter of
Fuentes, 20 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 1991).  Subsequent to
the decision in Fuentes, the regulation was amended to
provide that the period during which the alien is in
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deportation or exclusion proceedings commences with
the filing with the IJ of an OSC issued on or after June
20, 1991. Therefore, the Board found the Fuentes
decision superceded by the change in the regulation. 
Matter of Casillas, 22 I&N Dec. 154 (BIA 1998).
(c) the issuance of Form  I-122, Notice to Applicant for
Admission Detained for Hearing Before Immigration Judge,
prior to April 1, 1997;
(d) the filing of a Form I-862, Notice to Appear, with the
Immigration Court;
(e) the issuance and service of Form I-860, Notice and Order of
Expedited Removal.
(4) 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(c)(8)(ii) provides that the period in which the
alien is in proceedings terminates:
(a) when the alien departs from the U.S. while an order of
exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding or before
the expiration of the voluntary departure time granted in
connection with an alternate order of deportation or removal;
(b) when the alien is found not to be inadmissible or deportable
from the U.S.;
(c) when the Form I-122, I-221, I-860, or I-862 is canceled;
(d) when proceedings are terminated by the IJ or Board; or
(e) when a petition for review or an action for habeas corpus is
granted by a Federal court on judicial review.
(f) Before these regulations were enacted, the Board held that
once deportation proceedings are instituted, they are
considered to be pending until the respondent departs the
U.S.  Therefore, if an alien marries a USC after a final order
of deportation or during a period of voluntary departure after
the hearing, he is not eligible for adjustment of status. Matter
of Enriquez, 19 I&N Dec. 554 (BIA 1988).
5. Section 245(i).
a. Section 506(b) of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1995 added
section 245(i) to the Act.  It was effective on October 1, 1994 through
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September 30, 1997 and provided that aliens who entered the U.S.
without inspection or who are within the classes enumerated in section
245(c) of the Act may apply for adjustment of status if they remit with
their application a sum equaling five times the fee plus the regular fee. 
The IIRIRA raised the fee to $1,000.  The fee was not required from a
child under the age of 17 or an alien who is the spouse or unmarried
child of an individual who obtained temporary or permanent resident
status under section 210, section 245A, or section 202 of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 who was the spouse or
unmarried child as of May 5, 1988, who entered the U.S. before that
date, resided in the U.S. on that date, is not a LPR, and applied for the
benefits of section 301(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990.
b. Section 245(i) explicitly exempts aliens adjusting under that section
from the unauthorized employment restrictions of sections 245(c) and
does not mention the provisions of section 245(k) regarding
unauthorized employment.  The Board held that neither section 245(c)
nor section 245(k) bar an alien from adjusting under section 245(i). 
Matter of Alania-Martin, 25 I&N Dec. 231 (BIA 2010).  The Board
explained that section 245(k) of the Act provides a limited exception to
the bars to adjustment of status under section 245(a) set forth in sections
245(c)(2), (7), and (8); whereas, section 245(i) operates as a total waiver
of any section 245(c) bar for aliens who have the qualifying section
245(i) priority date.  Id. at 234.  
c. Therefore, the benefit of section 245(i) was available to the following: 
(1) aliens who entered the U.S. without inspection;
(2) alien crewmen;
(3) aliens employed without authorization; 
(4) aliens in unlawful immigration status on the date the application is
filed or who have failed to maintain a lawful status since entry;
(5) aliens admitted in transit without a visa;
(6) aliens admitted as nonimmigrant visitors without a visa;
(7) aliens admitted under section 101(a)(15)(S).
d. Through inadvertence by Congress, there was another section 245(i),
which should have been designated as section 245(j).  It was added by
section 130003(c)(i) of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 and is effective with respect to aliens against whom
deportation proceedings are initiated after September 13, 1994.  Under
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that section 245(i), a nonimmigrant admitted under section
101(a)(15)(5)(i) of the Act to provide information about a criminal or
terrorist organization may adjust status to that of a LPR if the alien meets
the criteria set forth in section 245(i)(1) or (2).  Notwithstanding the
clerical error in the redundant designation of section 245(i) of the Act,
IJs had jurisdiction to entertain applications for relief based on both
sections.  Matter of Grinberg, 20 I&N Dec. 911 (BIA 1994).  The
IIRIRA corrected the designation of the second section 245(i) to section
245(j).
e. The remittance required by section 245(i) is by definition a statutorily
mandated “sum” and a requirement separate and apart from the fee
required by the regulations.  The “statutory sum” may not be waived by
an IJ pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.24 and 1103.7.  Matter of Fesale, 21
I&N Dec. 114 (BIA 1995).
f. The Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, H.R. 2267 (Public Law
105-119) amended section 245(i) to provide that it applies only to aliens
for whom a visa petition or labor certification was filed on or before
January 14, 1998.
g. The Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act amended section
245(i) to extend the sunset date to April 30, 2001.  Under the LIFE Act
amendments, all aliens seeking to adjust status under section 245(i) of
the Act on the basis of a visa petition or application for labor
certification filed after January 14, 1998 must have been physically
present in the United States on December 21, 2000.  INA § 245(i)(C). 
However, an alien who is the beneficiary of a visa petition filed on or
before January 14, 1998 need not establish that he or she was physically
present on December 21, 2000.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(n)(1).  
(1) 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(i) states that “[t]he denial, withdrawal, or
revocation of the approval of a qualifying immigrant visa petition,
or application for labor certification, that was properly filed on or
before April 30, 2001, and that was approvable when filed, will not
preclude its grandfathered alien (including the grandfathered
alien’s family members) from seeking adjustment of status under
section 245(i) of the Act on the basis of another approved visa
petition, a diversity visa, or any other ground for adjustment of
status under the Act, as appropriate.”  The Board has ruled that an
alien seeking to establish eligibility for adjustment of status under
section 245(i) on the basis of a marriage-based visa petition must
show that the marriage was bona fide at its inception in order to
show that the visa petition was “approvable when filed” under 8
C.F.R. § 1245.10(i).  Matters of Jara Riero and Jara Espinol, 24
I&N Dec. 267 (BIA 2007).
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(2) The regulations provide that “[a]n alien who was substituted for
the previous beneficiary of the application for the labor
certification after April 30, 2001, will not be considered to be a
grandfathered alien.” 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(j). 
h. An alien whose application for adjustment pursuant to the Chinese
Student Protection Act of 1992 was denied as a result of the alien’s entry
without inspection may not amend or renew the application in
immigration proceedings in conjunction with section 245(i) of the INA. 
Matter of Wang, 23 I&N Dec. 924 (BIA 2006).
i. The Board ruled that aliens who are inadmissible under section
212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) (aliens who have “been unlawfully present in the
United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year . . . and who
enter or attempt to reenter the United States without being admitted”) are
ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245(i).  In doing so, the
Board ruled that the bar on adjustment of status for aliens who are
inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) does not render meaningless
the provision in section 245(i)(1)(A) that an alien is eligible for
adjustment of status even if he or she “entered the United States without
inspection,” as section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) only applies to a small subset
(recidivist offenders) of aliens who enter without inspection.  Matter of
Briones, 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007).  See Matter of Diaz & Lopez, 25
I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 2010) (reaffirming Matter of Briones and holding
that the IJ and the Board are no longer bound by Acosta v. Gonzales, 429
F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 2006) in light of the subsequent issuance of Matter of
Briones and Gonzales v. Department of Homeland Security, 508 F.3d
1227 (9th Cir. 2007)).  Several Circuit Courts of Appeal have considered
the issue and accorded Chevron deference to the Board’s decision in
Matter of Briones.  See Padilla-Caldera v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1140 (10th
Cir. 2011); Mora v. Mukasey, 550 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 2008); Ramirez-
Canales v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 904 (6th Cir. 2008); Ramirez v. Holder,
609 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2010); Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 649 F.3d 942
(9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the BIA’s ruling that aliens who were
inadmissible due to reentry after accruing more than one year of unlawful
presence could not apply for adjustment of status was not an
implementation of new policy or exercise of regulatory authority to adopt
new rule, but rather was an interpretation of a statute, and thus applied
retroactively, even though the Board's interpretation overrode prior
judicial precedent).   
j. The Seventh Circuit reversed the IJ’s and the Board’s holding that aliens
who are  inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (for having
accrued more than one year of unlawful presence) are ineligible for
adjustment of status under section 245(i).  Lemus-Losa v. Holder, 576
F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2009) (asserting that the Board erred in equating the
inadmissibility of someone under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) with the
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inadmissibility of someone under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)).  The Tenth
Circuit, however, found that the Board’s interpretation of sections 245(i)
and 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) in Matter of Lemus-Losa, 24 I&N Dec. 373 (BIA
2007) was permissible.  Herrera-Castillo v. Holder, 573 F.3d 1004 (10th
Cir. 2009).  The Tenth Circuit held that aliens who are inadmissible under
section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) are ineligible for adjustment of status under
section 245(i).
6. Deportable LPRs may adjust status.  A lawful permanent resident who becomes
deportable (usually due to a criminal conviction or for having been
inadmissible at entry) is not precluded from establishing eligibility for
adjustment of status by the fact that he already is an LPR.  Tibke v. INS, 335
F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1964); Matter of Krastman, 11 I&N Dec. 720 (BIA 1966).
a. Any respondent seeking to adjust status must be the beneficiary of an
approved visa petition.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(2)(B).  An LPR
applying for adjustment of status probably has been the beneficiary of an
approved visa petition in order to obtain status as an LPR.  However, it is
necessary for a new visa petition to be filed in his behalf and approved
before he may adjust status for the original visa petition ceased to convey
a priority date or visa classification once the respondent/beneficiary used
it to obtain LPR status.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(g)(2).
b. If the LPR respondent is deportable because he was inadmissible at the
time of entry, he may have to apply for a waiver of the ground of
inadmissibility which existed at entry.
c. If the LPR respondent is deportable because of a criminal conviction for a
CIMT, he will have to qualify for a 212(h) waiver in order to be eligible
for adjustment of status.
d. If the LPR respondent is deportable because of a criminal conviction for a
drug offense, he may be ineligible to adjust status because there is no
waiver available to an immigrant for a drug conviction other than simple
possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana.
7. Miscellaneous cases on adjustment of status.
a. There is no authority to grant adjustment of status under section 245 on a
retroactive or nunc pro tunc basis. Matter of Hernandez-Puente, 20 I&N
Dec. 335 (BIA 1991).  Since an alien is assimilated to the position of an
applicant for entry when applying for adjustment of status, he must be
eligible, at the time his application is acted on, for the preference category
relied on when the application was filed.  Id.  Although the Attorney
General has discretion to admit applicants, he has no authority to act
retroactively on an application.  Id.  Matter of Hernandez-Puente is
limited to those aliens adjusted under section 245 of the Act as the
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beneficiary of an approved visa petition.  There are certain categories of
applicants, such as refugees and those seeking adjustment as a
Cuban/Haitian applicant, whose status as an LPR is acquired retroactively
to a certain date fixed by the statute or the regulations.  This is called a
“roll-back” date.
b. An application for adjustment of status cannot be based on an approved
visa petition that the applicant has already used to adjust his status to that
of a lawful permanent resident.  Matter of Villarreal-Zuniga, 23 I&N Dec.
886 (BIA 2006); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(h)(2).
c. While a court order remains the preferred method of establishing the
dissolution of a customary tribal marriage under Ghanaian law, affidavits
executed by the heads of household, i.e., the fathers of the couple, that
meet specified evidentiary requirements may be sufficient to establish a
divorce for immigration purposes.  Matter of Kodwo, 24 I&N Dec. 479
(BIA 2008).
d. The Third Circuit has held that section 246(a) of the Act acts as a five-
year statute of limitations proscribing untimely rescission of an alien’s
adjustment of status to permanent resident through the initiation of
deportation or removal proceedings. Bamidele v. INS, 99 F.3d 557 (3d
Cir. 1996); Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 553 F.3d 724 (3d Cir. 2009).
(1) The Board has found that the five year statute of limitations in
Garcia does not apply to rescission of LPR status for aliens admitted
with an immigrant visa. Matter of Cruz de Ortiz, 25 I&N Dec. 601
(BIA 2011). The Third Circuit subsequently held that the five year
statute of limitations on rescission of LPR status does not apply to
aliens admitted as LPRs through the consular process. Malik v.
Att’y Gen., --- F.3d ----, No. 08-3874, 2011 WL 4552466 (3d Cir.
Sept. 23, 2011).
L. Waivers
1. A respondent cannot “bootstrap” eligibility from one waiver to the another
where he or she is not separately eligible for either.  Matter of Roman, 19 I&N
Dec. 855 (BIA 1988).
2. A waiver for inadmissible refugees.  Section 207(c)(3) provides that certain
grounds of inadmissibility are not applicable to aliens seeking admission to the
U.S. as refugees and allows the Attorney General to waive certain other
grounds of inadmissibility.
a. Under section 207(c)(3), the following grounds of inadmissibility are not
applicable to aliens seeking admission as refugees:
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(1) Section 212(a)(4) - aliens likely to become a public charge;
(2) Section 212(a)(5) - aliens not in possession of a labor certification;
(3) Section 212(a)(7)(A) - immigrants not in possession of a valid,
unexpired immigrant visa or other entry document.
b. Section 207(c)(3) allows the Attorney General to waive all other grounds
of inadmissibility EXCEPT the following:
(1) Section 212(a)(2)(C) - aliens believed to be traffickers in controlled
substances;
(2) Section 212(a)(3)(A) - aliens seeking to enter to perform activities
which threaten the security of the U.S.;
(3) Section 212(a)(3)(B) - aliens engaged in terrorist activities;
(4) Section 212(a)(3)(C) - aliens inadmissible for their effect on the
foreign policy of the U.S.;
(5) Section 212(a)(3)(E) - aliens who participated in persecution by the
Nazis.
c. Under section 207(c)(3), the grant of a waiver should be made:
(1) for humanitarian purposes,
(2) to assure family unity, or
(3) when it is otherwise in the public interest.
3. A waiver of passport, immigrant visa, or other entry documents for returning
residents.  Section 211(b) provides that, notwithstanding section 212(a)(7)(A),
returning resident immigrants, defined in section 101(a)(27)(A), may be
readmitted to the U.S. in the Attorney General’s discretion without being
required to obtain a passport, immigrant visa, reentry permit, or other
documentation.
a. Section 101(a)(27)(A) defines the term “special immigrant.”  Included in
that definition at 101(a)(27)(A) is “an immigrant, lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, who is returning from a temporary visit abroad.”
b. This waiver is discussed at 8 C.F.R. § 1211.4.
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c. Some of the cases discussing this waiver as well as the meaning of
“temporary visit” are as follows:
(1) Matter of G-, 8 I&N Dec. 249 (BIA 1959);
(2) Matter of Salviejo, 13 I&N Dec. 557 (BIA 1970);
(3) Matter of Castro, 14 I&N Dec. 492 (BIA 1973), aff’d Castro-
Guerrero v. INS, 515 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1975);
(4) Matter of Quijencio, 15 I&N Dec. 95 (BIA 1974);
(5) Matter of Martinez, 15 I&N Dec. 230 (BIA 1975);
(6) Matter of Kane, 15 I&N Dec. 258 (BIA 1975);
(7) Matter of Huang, 19 I&N Dec. 749 (BIA 1988);
(8) Matter of Abdoulin, 17 I&N Dec. 458 (BIA 1980).
4. Permission to reapply after deportation, exclusion or removal - 8 C.F.R.
§ 1212.2.
a. An IJ does not have authority to grant advance permission to reapply.
Matter of Vrettakos, 14 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1974).
b. An IJ does have authority to grant nunc pro tunc permission to reapply,
but only where the grant of the application will conclude the proceedings,
i.e.:
(1) where the only ground of inadmissibility would be eliminated, or
(2) where the alien would receive a grant of adjustment of status in
conjunction with any other waivers of inadmissibility.
c. The cases supporting these propositions are:
(1) Matter of Vrettakos, 14 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1973 & 1974);
(2) Matter of Ducret, 15 I&N Dec. 620 (BIA 1976);
(3) Matter of Martinez, 15 I&N Dec. 563 (BIA 1976);
(4) Matter of Ng, 17 I&N Dec. 63 (BIA 1979); 
(5) Matter of Roman, 19 I&N Dec. 855 (BIA 1988).
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5. A waiver for nonimmigrants coming to provide information about criminal
activity.  Section 212(d)(1) provides that the Attorney General, in the exercise
of discretion, may waive any ground of inadmissibility (other than section
212(a)(3)(E) [aliens involved in Nazi persecutions]) in the case of a
nonimmigrant described in section 101(a)(15)(S), if the Attorney General
considers it to be in the national interest to do so.
a. Section 212(d)(1) also provides that it does not prohibit the INS from
instituting removal proceedings against  an “S” nonimmigrant for conduct
committed after the alien's admission or for conduct or a condition that
was not disclosed to the Attorney General.
b. This waiver is also discussed in the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 1212.4(i).
6. A general waiver for nonimmigrants.  Section 212(d)(3)  provides that an
inadmissible nonimmigrant may be issued a visa and/or admitted temporarily in
the Attorney General’s discretion.
a. Section 212(d)(3) has 2 parts.  Part (A) is applicable to aliens applying for
a nonimmigrant visa before a consular officer.  Part (B) is applicable to
aliens applying for admission.
b. Under both parts, the following grounds of inadmissibility may not be
waived:
(1) 212(a)(3)(A)(i)(I) - espionage or sabotage;
(2) 212(a)(3)(A)(ii) - any unlawful activity;
(3) 212(a)(3)(A)(iii) - overthrow of U.S. government;
(4) 212(a)(3)(C) - adverse effect on foreign policy;
(5) 212(a)(3)(E) - Nazi persecutors.
c. Under Matter of Hranka, 16 I&N Dec. 491 (BIA 1978), a decision on a
212(d)(3) waiver requires a weighing of at least 3 factors:
(1) the risk of harm to society if the alien is admitted;
(2) the seriousness of the alien's immigration or criminal violations, if
any; and
(3) the nature of the alien's reasons for wishing to enter the U.S.
d. A waiver under section 212(d)(3) could be granted in exclusion
proceedings, but was unavailable nunc pro tunc in deportation
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proceedings because the regulations provided for the renewal of an
application denied by the DD only in proceedings under sections 235 and
236.  Matter of Fueyo, 20 I&N Dec. 84 (BIA 1989).
e. Section 212(d)(3) waivers are also discussed at 8 C.F.R. § 1212.4.
7. A waiver of documents for nonimmigrants.  Section 212(d)(4) provides that
either or both of the requirements of section 212(a)(7)(B)(i), relating to a
nonimmigrant's lack of passport and/or visa, may be waived by the Attorney
General and the Secretary of State acting jointly:
a. on the basis of unforeseen emergency in individual cases, or
b. on the basis of reciprocity with respect to nationals of foreign contiguous
territory or adjacent islands, or
c. in the case of aliens proceeding in immediate and continuous transit
through the U.S. under contracts authorized in section 238(c).
d. An IJ has authority to grant a 212(d)(4) waiver.  Matter of Kazemi, 19
I&N Dec. 49 (BIA 1984), overruling Matter of Ketema, 18 I&N Dec. 266
(BIA 1982).
8. A waiver of alien smuggling - Section 212(d)(11).
a. History lesson - Former section 212 (a) (31) of the Act, which dealt with
the inadmissibility of alien smugglers, required that the smuggling had to
be “for gain” in order to render an alien excludable.  The Immigration Act
of 1990 eliminated the element of gain.  It also created a discretionary
waiver under section 212 (d)(11) of the Act for LPRs who attempted to
smuggle their spouse, parent, son, or daughter.  Section 307 (d) of the
Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization
Amendments of 1991 amended section 212(d)(11) to make its provisions
available to aliens seeking admission or adjustment of status as
immediate relatives or immigrants under section 203(a) of the Act
(family-sponsored immigrants).
b. Section 212(d)(11) of the Act authorizes the Attorney General to waive
section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) relating to alien smuggling.
(1) A section 212(d)(11) waiver is available only to:
(a) a LPR who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not
under an order of deportation or an alien applying for
admission or adjustment of status as an immediate relative or
family-sponsored immigrant under section 203 (a) of the Act;
page 218 of 365
(b) who is otherwise admissible as a returning resident under
section 211(b) of the Act;
(c) who smuggled only an individual who at the time of the
smuggling was his spouse, parent, son, or daughter.
i) The requirement of “at the time of” was added to the Act
by section 351 of the IIRIRA, apparently to overrule the
decision in Matter of Farias-Mendeza, 21 I&N Dec. 269
(BIA 1996), in which the Board held that the familial
relationship did not have to exist at the time of the
smuggling incident as long as it existed at the time of the
application for relief.
(2) The only other requirements are as follows:
(a) The alien must merit a favorable exercise of discretion, and
(b) The Attorney General’s waiver must be for humanitarian
purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the
public interest.
(3) Section 212(d)(11) of the Act does not create two separate classes
of aliens with separate requirements for eligibility.  Both an LPR
alien returning from a temporary trip abroad and an alien seeking
admission or adjustment of status as an immediate relative or
family-sponsored immigrant must show that the object of the alien's
smuggling attempt was the alien's spouse, parent, son, or daughter. 
Matter of Compean-Guevara, 21 I&N Dec. 51 (BIA 1995).
9. Waiver for document fraud - Section 212(d)(12).
a. History lesson - Section 274C, which imposes civil penalties for
document fraud, was added to the Act by section 544(c) of the
Immigration Act of 1990.  When section 212(a)(6)(F), which makes
inadmissible any alien subject to a final order under section 274C, was
added, there was no waiver provided in the statute.  In Matter of Lazarte-
Valverde, 21 I&N Dec. 214 (BIA 1996), the Board held that there is no
waiver for section 212(a)(6)(F) and that a 212(i) fraud waiver is not
applicable to waive that ground of inadmissibility.  The IIRIRA added
section 212(d)(12) to the Act to provide a waiver.
b. Aliens who are eligible.
(1) An LPR who proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order
of deportation or removal and who is otherwise admissible to the
U.S. as a returning resident under section 211(b), or
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(2) An alien seeking admission or adjustment of status under section
201(b)(2)(A) [immediate relative] or section 203(a) [family
sponsored immigrants].
c. Substantive law.
(1) Section 212(d)(12) provides that the Attorney General may waive a
finding of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(F)(i) if:
(a) no previous civil money penalty was imposed against the alien
under section 274C and
(b) the offense was committed solely to assist, aid, or support the
alien's spouse or child (and not another individual).
(2) The only other requirements are that:
(a) The alien must merit a favorable exercise of discretion, and
(b) The Attorney General’s waiver must be for humanitarian
purposes or to assure family unity.
10. A waiver of the 2-year foreign residence requirement imposed on exchange
nonimmigrants under section 101(a)(15)(J).  A section 212(e)  waiver may be
granted only by a District Director (with favorable recommendation by the
Director of USIA).  Therefore, an IJ has no authority to grant a 212(e) waiver
or to overrule a denial of a waiver by the District Director. Matter of
Rosenblatt, 10 I&N Dec. 154 (BIA 1963); Matter of Irie, 10 I&N Dec. 372
(BIA 1963); Matter of Han, 10 I&N Dec. 53 (BIA 1962).
a. However, an IJ may decide whether an alien is subject to the foreign
residence requirement of section 212(e). Matter of Baterina, 16 I&N Dec.
127 (BIA 1977).
b. An alien who acquired J-1 status through fraud and who never
participated in the exchange program is still subject to the foreign
residence requirement.  Matter of Park, 15 I&N Dec. 436 (BIA 1975).
11. A waiver of inadmissibility for disease, mental illness, etc., under section
212(a)(1)(A).  Section 212(g) contains 3 waivers:
a. Section 212(g)(1) allows the Attorney General to waive inadmissibility
under section 212(a)(1)(A)(i) [alien determined to have a communicable
disease of public health significance] in the case of an alien who is:
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(1) the spouse of, the unmarried son or daughter of, the minor
unmarried lawfully adopted child of, or who has a son or daughter
who is a USC, an LPR, or an alien who has been issued an
immigrant visa;
b. Section 212(g)(2) allows the Attorney General to waive inadmissibility
under section 212(a)(1)(A)(ii) [alien not presenting documentation of
vaccinations] in the case of any alien:
(1) who receives vaccination against the disease(s) for which the alien
has failed to present documentation of previous vaccination, or
(2) for which a civil surgeon, medical officer, or panel physician (as
defined in 42 C.F.R. § 34.2) certifies that such vaccination would
not be medically appropriate, or
(3) under such circumstances as the Attorney General provides by
regulation, with respect to whom the requirement of such a
vaccination would be contrary to the alien's religious beliefs or
moral convictions.
c. Section 212(g)(3) allows the Attorney General to waive inadmissibility
under section 212(a)(1)(A)(iii) [involving aliens determined to have a
physical or mental disorder] in the case of any alien with such terms,
conditions, and controls, including giving bond, as the Attorney General
(after consultation with the Secretary of Health & Human Services) may
prescribe by regulation.
d. These waivers are also discussed in 8 C.F.R. § 1212.7(b).
12. A waiver of criminal activity - Section 212(h).
a. History lesson - Before amendment by the Immigration Act of 1990, the
waiver under section 212(h) was available to immigrants who were the
spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a USC or LPR who could establish
that his exclusion (or deportation) would result in extreme hardship to the
USC or LPR relative.  The amendment did away with the extreme
hardship requirement, but made the waiver available only to immigrants
whose excludable activities occurred more than 15 years before
application.  This amendment was highly criticized, so in the Immigration
Technical Corrections Act of 1991, Congress restored the waiver's
availability upon a showing of extreme hardship as an alternative to the
15 year requirement.
(1) Before it was amended by the Immigration Act of 1990, section
212(h) contained a requirement that the immigrant be “otherwise
admissible,” i.e. not excludable on any other ground than one which
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212(h) may waive.  This requirement was removed by amendment
and has not been restored.
b. Section 212(h) provides that the Attorney General may waive the
following grounds of inadmissibility:
(1) 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) - aliens convicted of or admitting the commission
of a CIMT;
(2) 212(a)(2)(B) - aliens convicted of 2 or more offenses (other than
purely political) with an aggregate sentence of 5 years;
(3) 212(a)(2)(D) - aliens involved in prostitution or commercialized
vice;
(4) 212(a)(2)(E) - aliens involved in serious criminal activity who have
asserted immunity from prosecution;
(5) 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) - aliens convicted of or admitting drug offenses
as that section relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30
grams or less of marijuana.
(a) The Board ruled that this exception is not available where the
alien was convicted under a statute containing, as an element,
a requirement that the possession occur in a prison or other
correctional setting.  Matter of Moncada-Servellon, 24 I&N
Dec. 62 (BIA 2007).
(b) In Matter of Martinez-Zapata, the Board ruled that this
exception is not available where the respondent’s conviction
was enhanced by virtue of the possession of marijuana
occurring in a “drug-free zone,” where the enhancement factor
increased the maximum penalty for the underlying offense and
had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.  The
Board further ruled that any fact (including a fact contained in
a sentence enhancement) that serves to increase the maximum
penalty for a crime and that is required to be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt, if not admitted by the defendant, is
to be treated as an element of the underlying offense, so that a
conviction involving the application of such an enhancement
is a conviction for the enhanced offense.  Matter of Martinez-
Zapata, 24 I&N Dec. 424 (BIA 2007).
(c) In Matter of Martinez Espinoza, 25 I&N Dec. 118, 125 (BIA
2009), the Board held that an alien who is inadmissible under
section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Act may apply for a 212(h)
waiver if he demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence
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that the conduct that made him inadmissible was either a
single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of
marijuana or an act that related to such an offense.
c. Aliens who are ineligible.
(1) Section 212(h)(2) provides that no waiver shall be provided in the
case of an alien who has been convicted of (or who has admitted
acts that constitute) murder or criminal acts involving torture or an
attempt or conspiracy to commit murder or a criminal act involving
torture.
(2) Section 348 of IIRIRA amended section 212(h)(2) to provide: “No
waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien
who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence if either since the date of
such admission the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony
or the alien has not lawfully resided continuously in the United
States for a period of not less than 7 years immediately preceding
the date of initiation of proceedings to remove the alien from the
United States.”  This amendment was discussed by the Board in
Matter of Yeung, 21 I&N Dec. 610 (BIA 1997).
(a) An alien who has not previously been admitted to the U.S. as
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence is
statutorily eligible for a 212(h) waiver despite his conviction
for an aggravated felony. Matter of Michel, 21 I&N Dec. 1101
(BIA 1998).
(b) The Board held that an alien who entered the United States
without inspection and later obtained lawful permanent
resident status through adjustment of status has “previously
been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence” and must therefore satisfy
the 7-year continuous residence requirement of section 212(h)
to be eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility.  Matter of
Koljenovic, 25 I&N Dec. 219 (BIA 2010); but see Lanier v.
Att’y Gen.,631 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2011)(finding no
ambiguity in the statutory text and declining to defer to the
Board’s interpretation of section 212(h), the Eleventh Circuit
found that the provision barring persons who have been
convicted of an aggravated felony from seeking 212(h) relief
does not apply to someone who adjusted to LPR status while
living in the United States).  
(c) Section 348(b) of the IIRIRA provides that the amendments to
section 212(h) apply to aliens in exclusion or deportation
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proceedings as of September 30, 1996, unless a final order of
deportation has been entered as of such date.  This precluded
the applicability of the new restrictions to an administratively
final grant of a 212(h) waiver.  However, an alien convicted of
an aggravated felony who had a final administrative order of
deportation as of September 30, 1996, would be subject to the
restrictions on eligibility for a 212(h) waiver if his proceedings
were thereafter reopened and the case returned to the status of
a pending proceeding.  Therefore, his motion to reopen
deportation proceedings to apply for adjustment of status in
conjunction with a 212(h) waiver was properly denied.  Matter
of Pineda, 21 I&N Dec. 1017 (BIA 1997).
(d) The lawfulness of the alien’s status as a LPR is not relevant. 
Therefore, an alien who has previously been admitted as a
LPR but later claims that such admission was not lawful
because he concealed criminal activities from the INS cannot
qualify for a 212(h) waiver if he has not resided continuously
in the U.S. for 7 years or has been convicted of an aggravated
felony.  Matter of Ayala, 22 I&N Dec. 398 (BIA 1998).
(e) A returning LPR seeking to overcome a ground of
inadmissibility is not required to apply for adjustment of status
in conjunction with a waiver under section 212(h) of the Act. 
Matter of Abosi, 24 I&N Dec. 204 (BIA 2007).  
(f) The Board has ruled that a respondent did not “lawfully
reside” in the U.S., for purposes of eligibility for a waiver
under section 212(h) of inadmissibility for certain criminal
convictions, “during those periods in which he was an
applicant for asylum or for adjustment of status and lacked any
other basis for claiming lawful residence.”  Matter of Rotimi,
24 I&N Dec. 567 (BIA 2008). See also Vila v. Att’y Gen., 598
F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2010); Rotimi v. Holder, 577 F.3d 133
(2d Cir. 2009).  
d. Substantive requirements.  A section 212(h) waiver is available to 2
classes of immigrants: those related to a USC or LPR and all other
immigrants.  Matter of Alarcon, 20 I&N Dec. 557 (BIA 1992).
(1) Immigrants who are the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a USC
or LPR must establish the following:
(a) That the alien's exclusion would result in extreme hardship to
the alien's USC or LPR spouse, parent, son, or daughter;
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i) In interpreting the pre-amendment version of section
212(h), the Board held that the hardship to the alien
himself may not be considered.  Matter of Shaughnessy,
12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968).  
ii) In the same case, the Board held that the term “extreme
hardship” encompasses both present and future hardship.
iii) By use of the term “extreme hardship,” Congress
intended a showing of more than the mere hardship
caused by family separation.  Matter of W-, 9 I&N Dec.
1 (BIA 1960).
iv) Only in cases of great actual or prospective injury to a
qualifying party will a waiver be granted.  Matter of
Ngai, 19 I&N Dec. 245 (Comm. 1984).
v) In Osuchukwu v. INS, 744 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1984),
the 5th Circuit strongly implied that the “extreme
hardship” to be demonstrated in a 212(h) case is the
same as the “extreme hardship” required in suspension
of deportation cases under former section 244(a).
(b) That the alien merits a favorable exercise of discretion;
i) In interpreting the pre-amendment version of section
212(h), the Board held that when an alien has been
convicted of serious crimes, there should be a reasonable
showing of rehabilitation before there can be a finding
that his admission would not be contrary to the national
welfare, safety, or security of the U.S.  Matter of
Shaughnessy, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968).  Neither the
“welfare, safety, or security” requirement or the
“rehabilitation” requirement of amended section 212(h)
is applicable to an immigrant seeking the waiver on the
basis of his relationship to a USC or LPR.  A discussion
of the Board’s view on the subject since amendment is
set forth below.
ii) Establishing extreme hardship and eligibility for section
212(h)(1)(B) relief does not create any entitlement to
that relief.  Extreme hardship is a requirement for
eligibility, but once established it is but one favorable
discretionary factor to be considered.  Matter of Mendez,
21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).  In assessing whether an
applicant has met his burden that he merits a favorable
exercise of discretion, the IJ must balance the adverse
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factors of record evidencing an alien's undesirability as a
permanent resident with the social and humane
considerations presented in his behalf to determine
whether the grant of relief in the exercise of discretion is
in the best interest of this country.  Id.  The factors
adverse to the applicant include the nature and
underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground at
issue, the presence of additional significant violations of
this country's immigration laws, the existence of a
criminal record and, if so, its nature, recency,
seriousness, and the presence of other evidence
indicative of a respondent's bad character or
undesirability as a permanent resident of this country. 
Id.  The favorable considerations include family ties in
the United States, residence of long duration in this
country (particularly where the alien began his residency
at a young age), evidence of hardship to the alien and his
family if he is excluded and deported, service in this
country's Armed Forces, a history of stable employment,
the existence of property or business ties, evidence of
value and service to the community, evidence of genuine
rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and other
evidence attesting to a respondent's good character (such
as affidavits from family, friends, and responsible
community representatives).  Id.  The equities that an
applicant for section 212(h)(1)(B) relief must bring
forward to establish that he merits a favorable exercise
of discretion will depend in each case on the nature and
circumstances of the ground of exclusion sought to be
waived and on the presence of any additional adverse
factors.  As the negative factors grow more serious, it
becomes incumbent upon the applicant to introduce
additional offsetting favorable evidence.
iii) The underlying significance of the adverse and favorable
factors is also to be taken into account.
a) If the alien has relatives in the U.S., the quality of
their relationship must be considered in
determining the weight to be awarded this equity.
b) The equity of a marriage and the weight given to
any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the
parties married after the commencement of
deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the
alien might be deported.
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c) If the alien has a history of employment, it is
important to consider the type of employment and
its length and stability.
d) When looking at the length of the alien's presence
in the U.S., the nature of his presence during this
period must be evaluated.  For example, a period of
residency marked by a term of imprisonment
diminishes the significance of the period of
residency.
iv) While the IJ may not go behind the record of conviction
to determine the guilt or innocence of the alien, it is
proper to look to probative evidence outside the record
of conviction in inquiring as to the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime in order to
determine whether a favorable exercise of discretion is
warranted. Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 303 n.1
(BIA 1996).  Taking responsibility and showing remorse
for one’s criminal behavior does constitute some
evidence of rehabilitation, although an alien who claims
innocence and does not express remorse is not precluded
from ever presenting persuasive evidence of
rehabilitation by other means.  Id.  While the lack of
persuasive evidence of rehabilitation may not in itself be
an adverse factor, the absence of this equity in the alien's
favor may ultimately be determinative in a given case
concerning the exercise of discretion under section
212(h)(1)(B) of the Act, particularly where an alien has
engaged in serious misconduct and there are questions
whether the alien will revert to criminal behavior.  Id.
Conversely, evidence of rehabilitation in some cases
may constitute the factor that raises the significance of
the alien's equities in total so as to be sufficient to
counterbalance the adverse factors in the case and
warrant a favorable exercise of discretion.  Id.
v) As of December 19, 2002, 8 C.F.R. § 212.7 [now 8
C.F.R. § 1212.7(d)]  was added which provides as
follows: “The Attorney General, in general, will not
favorably exercise discretion under section 212(h)(2) of
the Act to consent to an application or reapplication for a
visa, or admission to the United States, or adjustment of
status, with respect to immigrant aliens who are
inadmissible under section 212(a)(2) of the Act in cases
involving violent or dangerous crimes, except in
extraordinary circumstances, such as those involving
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national security or foreign policy considerations, or
cases in which an alien clearly demonstrates that the
denial of the application for adjustment of status or an
immigrant visa or admission as an immigrant would
result in exceptional or extremely unusual hardship. 
Moreover, depending on the gravity of the alien’s
criminal offense, a showing of extraordinary
circumstances might still be insufficient to warrant a
favorable exercise of discretion under section 212(h)(2)
of the Act.”
(2) Immigrants not having the requisite relationship to a USC or LPR
must establish the following:
(a) That the alien is inadmissible only under sections
212(a)(2)(D)(i) or (ii) [all grounds involving prostitution,
except coming to the U.S. to engage in any other
commercialized vice as described in section 212(a)(2)(D)(iii)]
or that the activities for which the alien is inadmissible
occurred more than 15 years before the date of application;
(b) The alien must also establish that his admission to the U.S.
would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or
security of the U.S.;
(c) The alien must also establish that he has been rehabilitated;
(d) The alien must also establish that he merits a favorable
exercise of discretion;
i) An application for discretionary relief, including a
waiver under section 212(h), may be denied in the
exercise of discretion without express rulings on the
question of statutory eligibility.  INS v. Bagamasbad,
429 U.S. 24 (1976).
13. A waiver of inadmissibility for fraud or misrepresentation.  Section 212(i) of
the Act allows the Attorney General to waive section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) relating to
fraud or misrepresentation of a material fact in procuring a visa, admission into
the U.S., or other benefit under the Act.
a. Under section 212(i)(1), the waiver is available to an immigrant who is
the spouse, son, or daughter of a USC or LPR if it is established that the
refusal of admission to the U.S. of the immigrant would result in extreme
hardship to the USC or LPR spouse or parent.  Section 212(i)(1) also
requires that the immigrant merit a favorable exercise of discretion.
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b. Section 212(i) waivers are discussed in 8 C.F.R. § 1212.7.
c. Section 212(i) of the Act is not available to waive inadmissibility under
section 212(a)(6)(F) of the Act which makes inadmissible aliens subject
to a final order under section 274C of the Act involving document fraud. 
Matter of Lazarte, 21 I&N Dec. 214 (BIA 1996).
d. The provisions of section 212(i) of the Act which require that an alien
establish extreme hardship to his or her United States citizen or
permanent resident alien spouse or parent in order to qualify for a waiver
of inadmissibility, are applicable to pending cases.  Matter of Cervantes,
22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999), following Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec.
516 (BIA 1996, A.G. 1997).
e. The factors to be used in determining whether an alien has established
extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act include, but are not
limited to, the following: the presence of lawful permanent resident or
United States citizen family ties to this country; the qualifying relative’s
family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or
countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of
the qualifying relative’s ties to such countries; the financial impact of
departure from this country; and, finally, significant conditions of health,
particularly when tied to the unavailability of suitable medical care in the
country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. Matter of
Cervantes, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999).
f. The underlying fraud or misrepresentation for which an alien seeks a
waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act may be
considered as an adverse factor in adjudicating the waiver application in
the exercise of discretion. Matter of Cervantes, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA
1999).
14. A waiver of inadmissibility under sections 212(a)(5)(A) [no labor certification]
and 212(a)(7)(A)(i) [no valid entry document].  Section 212(k) provides that
any alien inadmissible under section 212(a)(5)(A) [no labor certification] or
section 212(a)(7)(A)(i) [immigrant not in possession of valid immigrant visa]
who is in possession of an immigrant visa may, if otherwise admissible, be
admitted in the Attorney General’s discretion if the Attorney General is
satisfied that “exclusion was not known to, and could not have been ascertained
by the exercise of reasonable diligence by, the immigrant before the time of
departure of the vessel or aircraft from the last port outside the United States
and outside foreign contiguous territory or, in the case of an immigrant coming
from foreign contiguous territory, before the time of the immigrant's
application for admission.”
a. This waiver is also discussed at 8 C.F.R. § 1212.10.
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b. The only case in recent years dealing with 212(k) waivers is Matter of
Aurelio, 19 I&N Dec. 458 (BIA 1987).
15. A waiver of inadmissibility as a public charge - Section 213.
a. Immigration judges have jurisdiction to grant a waiver of inadmissibility
under section 213 of the Act and are required to advise an alien found to
be inadmissible as a public charge under section 212(a)(4)(B) of the Act
of his or her right to apply for a waiver.  Matter of Ulloa, 22 I&N Dec.
725 (BIA 1999).
b. Section 213 provides that an alien inadmissible under section 212(a)(4)
[likely to become a public charge] may be admitted if:
(1) bond is posted;
(2) alien is otherwise admissible; and 
(3) alien merits a favorable exercise of discretion.
16. A waiver of the requirement to file joint petition for removal of conditions -
Section 216(c)(4).
a. Introduction and in general.
(1) The Act provides two means by which the conditional basis of a
conditional permanent resident's (CPR) status may be removed: (1)
the alien and the citizen spouse may file a joint petition to remove
the conditional basis of the alien's permanent resident status under
section 216(c)(1) of the Act, or (2) the alien may file an application
for a waiver of the requirement to file a joint petition under section
216(c)(4). Matter of Mendes, 20 I&N Dec. 833 (BIA 1994); Matter
of Anderson, 20 I&N Dec. 888 (BIA 1994); Matter of Balsillie, 20
I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1992).
(2) A conditional permanent resident under section 216(a) who is
seeking to remove the conditional basis of that status and who has
timely filed the petition and appeared for the interview required
under section 216(c)(1), does not need a separate section 216(c)(4)
hardship waiver if the petitioning spouse died during the 2-year
conditional period. Matter of Rose, 25 I&N Dec. 181 (BIA 2010).
(3) When an alien in removal proceedings seeks “review” of the DHS’s
denial of a waiver under section 216 of the Act, of the requirement
to file a joint petition to remove the conditional basis of lawful
permanent resident status, he or she may introduce, and the IJ
should consider, any relevant evidence without regard to whether it
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was previously submitted or considered in proceedings before the
DHS.  Matter of Herrera del Orden, 25 I&N Dec. 589 (BIA 2011).
(4) The 1986 amendment which created CPR status contained the word
“or” between the extreme hardship ground for waiver and the good
faith ground which follows it.  A 1990 amendment removed the
word “or,” but added a third ground for waiver available to battered
spouses or children.  The third ground is preceded by the word “or.” 
These changes were for the purposes of syntax only and not to
combine the first 2 grounds for a waiver. There are 3 separate
waivers which a CPR may file. Matter of Balsillie, 20 I&N Dec. 486
(BIA 1992).
(a) A CPR who seeks to remove the conditional basis of that
status by means of a waiver under section 216(c)(4) of the Act
should apply for any applicable waiver provided under that
section.  Matter of Anderson, 20 I&N Dec. 888 (BIA 1994).
(b) An alien whose application for a specific waiver under section
216(c)(4) of the Act has been denied by the INS may not seek
consideration of an alternative waiver under that section in
deportation proceedings before an IJ.  Id.
(c) Where an alien becomes eligible for an additional waiver
under section 216(c)(4) of the Act due to changed
circumstances, the deportation proceedings may be continued
in order to give the alien a reasonable opportunity to submit an
application to the Service.  Id.
(d) Inasmuch as the Board only has authority to review a waiver
application after the INS and the IJ have considered it, an alien
may not apply for a waiver under section 216(c)(4) on appeal. 
Id.
(e) In order to preserve an application for relief under section
216(c)(4) of the Act, an alien must request during deportation
proceedings before an IJ a review of the Service's denial of
such application.  Matter of Gawaran, 20 I&N Dec. 938 (BIA
1995).
(f) Only circumstances occurring during the period the alien was
admitted for conditional residence will be considered.  Matter
of Singh, 24 I&N Dec. 331 (BIA 2007).  There is no conflict
between section 216(c)(4) and the implementing regulation at
8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(e)(1) where both provide the same start date
for the circumstances to be considered and only the statute
provides an end date.  Id. 
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b. The extreme hardship waiver.  In order to qualify for this waiver, the CPR
must establish that extreme hardship would result if he or she is deported. 
Neither the statute nor the regulations specify to whom the extreme
hardship must result.
(1) The regulations emphasize that hardship results from any
deportation and that the waiver should be granted only in those
cases in which the hardship is extreme.  8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(e)(1).
(a) In determining extreme hardship, only circumstances
occurring after the alien acquired CPR status may be
considered.  INA § 216(c)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(e)(1).
c. The “good faith” waiver.  In order to qualify for this waiver, the alien
must establish that he/she entered into the qualifying marriage in good
faith, but the qualifying marriage was terminated (other than by death of a
spouse) and the alien was not at fault in failing to meet the petition and
interview requirements.
(1) The 1986 amendment which created CPR status contained the
requirement that the qualifying marriage had to be terminated “by
the alien spouse for good cause.”  This led to some inequitable
situations in which aliens who had entered into the qualifying
marriage in good faith and were not at fault in failing to meet the
requirements of petition and interview were ineligible for a waiver
because their spouse had been the plaintiff in the divorce.  A 1990
amendment to the Act removed the requirement that the marriage be
terminated by the alien spouse. The amendment removing this
requirement is applicable to marriages entered into before, on, or
after the effective date of the amendment (Nov. 29, 1990). 
Therefore, the amendment is considered to be retroactive.
d. The battered spouse or child waiver.  In order to qualify for this waiver, it
must be shown that the alien entered into the qualifying marriage in good
faith, was battered by or the subject of extreme cruelty by his or her
spouse or parent, and was not at fault in failing to meet the petition and
interview requirements.  INA § 216(c)(4)(C).
(1) The battered spouse or child ground for waiver was added by a 1990
amendment applicable to marriages entered into before, on, or after
the effective date of the amendment (Nov. 29, 1990).  Therefore, the
amendment is considered to be retroactive.
17. A waiver of fraud in removal proceedings.  Section 237(a)(1)(H) provides that
an alien subject to removal as inadmissible at the time of application for
admission under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) because of either willful or innocent
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fraud or misrepresentation of a material fact in obtaining a visa, entry, or other
benefit may be granted a waiver of the fraud or misrepresentation and any
ground of inadmissibility at time of application for admission which resulted
from the fraud or misrepresentation.
a. In order to qualify for the waiver, the respondent must demonstrate the
following:
(1) The respondent must be the spouse, parent, son or daughter of a
USC or LPR;
(a) The Board has ruled that, for an alien to qualify for a waiver of
inadmissibility under section 237(a)(1)(H)(i), the alien’s
qualifying relative must be living.  The Board rejected the
respondent's argument that he qualified for a waiver of
inadmissibility under section 237(a)(1)(H)(i) based on his
deceased U.S.-citizen mother.  Matter of Federiso, 24 I&N
Dec. 661 (BIA 2008).  The Ninth Circuit overruled the
Board’s decision in Matter of Federiso, and held that an
individual whose United States citizen parent has died remains
the son of a U.S. citizen and is therefore eligible for a waiver
of removal under section 237(a)(1)(H).  Federiso v. Holder,
605 F.3d 695 (9th Cir. 2010).
(2) The respondent must have been in possession of an immigrant visa
at the time of entry;
(3) The respondent must have been otherwise admissible at the time of
entry except for sections 212(a)(5)(A) [no labor certification] and
212(a)(7)(A) [no valid, unexpired immigrant visa] which were a
direct result of the fraud or misrepresentation;
(4) The respondent must merit a favorable exercise of discretion.
b. Section 237(a)(1)(H) provides that “a waiver of deportation for fraud or
misrepresentation granted under this subparagraph shall also operate to
waive deportation based on the grounds of inadmissibility directly
resulting from such fraud or misrepresentation.”  
(1) Section 237(a)(1)(H) authorizes a waiver of removability under
section 237(a)(1)(A) based on charges of inadmissibility at the time
of admission under section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for lack of a valid
immigrant visa or entry document, as well as under section
212(a)(6)(C)(i) for fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material
fact, where there was a misrepresentation made at the time of
admission, whether innocent or not.  Matter of Fu, 23 I&N Dec. 985
(BIA 2006).
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(2) An alien who is charged with removability under sections
237(a)(1)(A) and (D), based upon a determination of marriage
fraud, is eligible for a waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H) of the Act
to waive both charges because the charges are predicated on the
same event – the entry into the United States through a fraudulent
marriage.  Vasquez v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2010).  
c. Section 237(a)(1)(H) states that its waiver is unavailable to any alien
described in section 241(a)(4)(D) [Nazi persecutors].
d. Former section 241(f)(1) of the Act was held to be unavailable to waive
an alien’s deportability under former section 241(a)(9)(B) of the Act (an
alien with LPR status on a conditional basis whose status on a conditional
basis is terminated) because termination of the alien’s conditional
permanent resident status constitutes a basis for deportability which is
separate and distinct from the charge that the alien is “excludable at the
time of entry” within the meaning of former section 241(f)(1).  Matter of
Gawaran, 20 I&N Dec. 938 (BIA 1995).  Section 237(a)(1)(H) appears
subject to the same interpretation.
e. Former section 241(f) was held to waive grounds of excludability existing
only at the time of an alien's entry to the U.S. and was unavailable to
waive frauds committed while adjusting status because an adjustment was
not an “entry.”  Matter of Connelly, 19 I&N Dec. 156 (BIA 1984).
f. Former section 241(f) was held to be available only in deportation
proceedings and not in rescission proceedings.  Matter of Pereira, 19 I&N
Dec. 169 (BIA 1984).
g. In making the discretionary determination on a waiver of deportability
pursuant to former section 241(a)(1)(H) of the Act, an IJ should consider
the alien’s initial fraud or misrepresentation in the overall assessment of
positive and negative factors.  Matter of Tijam, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA
1998).  In that decision, the Board specifically declined to follow the
policy set forth by the Commissioner of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service in Matter of Alonzo, 17 I&N Dec. 292 (Comm.
1979), that the underlying fraud or misrepresentation for which the alien
seeks a waiver should be disregarded.
18. A waiver of passport and visa for certain nonimmigrant visitors seeking
admission to Guam - Section 212(l).
a. This waiver is discussed in the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 1212.1(e).
M. Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA).
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1. Adjustment of status by nationals of Nicaragua or Cuba.  Section 202 of
NACARA provides that the status of an alien shall be adjusted to that of a LPR
if the alien:
a. Is a national of Nicaragua or Cuba who has been physically present in the
U.S. for a continuous period , beginning not later than December 1, 1995
and ending not earlier than the date the application for adjustment is filed. 
NACARA § 202(a)(b)(1).
(1) Section 202(b)(2) of NACARA provides that, for purposes of
establishing that the period of continuous physical presence
commenced not later than December 1, 1995, an alien shall
demonstrate that prior to December 1, 1995, he:
(a)  applied to the Attorney General for asylum;
(b) was issued an OSC under former section 242 or 242B of the
Act (as in effect prior to April 1, 1997);
(c) was placed in exclusion proceedings under former section 236
of the Act (as in effect prior to April 1, 1997);
(d) applied for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act;
(e) performed service, or engaged in a trade or business, within
the U.S. which is evidenced by records maintained by the
Commissioner of Social Security;
(f) applied for any other benefit under the Act by means of an
application establishing the alien’s presence in the U.S. prior
to December 1, 1995; or
(g) shall make such other demonstration of physical presence as
the Attorney General may provide for by regulation.
b. Applies for NACARA adjustment before April 1, 2000;
c. Is otherwise eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is otherwise
admissible to the U. S. for permanent residence;
(1) The following grounds of inadmissibility shall not apply:
(a) Section 212(a)(4) - public charge;
(b) Section 212(a)(5) - labor certification;
(c) Section 212(a)(6)(A) - present without admission or parole;
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(d) Section 212(a)(7)(A) - not in possession of a valid entry
document.
d. Application in lieu of MTR.  Section 202(a)(2) of NACARA provides
that an alien present in the U.S. who has been ordered excluded, deported,
removed, or ordered to depart voluntarily from the U.S. under any
provision of the Act may, notwithstanding such order, apply for
adjustment of status under section 202(a)(1) of NACARA.  Such an alien
may not be required, as a condition of submitting or granting such
application, to file a separate motion to reopen, reconsider, or vacate such
order.  If the Attorney General grants the application, the Attorney
General shall cancel the order.  If the Attorney General renders a final
administrative decision to deny the application, the order shall be
effective and enforceable to the same extent as if the application had not
been made.
(1) Section 202(g) of NACARA provides that when an alien’s status is
adjusted to that of an LPR, the Secretary of State is not required to
reduce the number of immigrant visas available to be issued.
2. Special rule for cancellation of removal for Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and
aliens from Soviet bloc countries.  Section 203(b) of NACARA amended
section 309 of IIRIRA to add section 309(b) which provides that, subject to the
provisions of the Act in effect after IIRIRA, other than sections 240A(b)(1),
240A(d)(1), and 240A(e) [but including section 242(a)(2)(B)], the Attorney
General may cancel removal and adjust to the status of an LPR an alien who is
inadmissible or deportable from the U.S. who:
a. Applies for such relief;
b. Is described in section 203(a)(5)(C)(i) of NACARA;
(1) Has not been convicted of an aggravated felony;
(2) Was not apprehended after December 19, 1990; and
(3) Is a Salvadoran national who first entered the U.S. on or before
September 19, 1990 and who registered for benefits pursuant to the
settlement agreement in American Baptist Churches, et al v.
Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) on or before
October 31, 1991 or applied for TPS on or before October 31, 1991;
or
(a) For guidance on what constitutes evidence of registration for
benefits under the ABC settlement agreement, see Chaly-
Garcia v. United States, 508 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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USCIS implemented a new nationwide policy in light of this
decision.
(4) Is a Guatemalan national who first entered the U. S. on or before
October 1, 1990, and who registered for benefits pursuant to the
settlement agreement in American Baptist Churches, et al v.
Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) on or before
October 31, 1991; or
(a) For guidance on what constitutes evidence of registration for
benefits under the ABC settlement agreement, see Chaly-
Garcia v. United States, 508 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2007). 
USCIS implemented a new nationwide policy in light of this
decision.
(5) Is a Guatemalan or Salvadoran national who filed an application for
asylum with the INS on or before April 1, 1990; or
(6) Is the spouse or child (as defined in section 101(b)(1) of the Act) of
an individual described in this clause at the time the individual is
granted suspension or cancellation; or
(7) Is the unmarried son or daughter of an alien parent described in this
subclause at the time suspension or cancellation is granted the
parent - if the unmarried son or daughter is 21 years of age or older
at the time the decision is rendered, the son or daughter must have
entered the U.S. on or before October 1, 1990; or
(8) Is an alien who entered the U.S. on or before December 31, 1990
and who filed an application for asylum on or before that date, and
who was, at the time of filing the application, a national of the
Soviet Union, Russia, any republic of the former Soviet Union,
Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania,
Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, East Germany, Yugoslavia, or any state
of the former Yugoslavia.
c. The alien is not inadmissible or deportable under section 212(a)(2) or (3),
or section 237(a) (2), (3), or (4);
d. Is not an alien described in section 241(b)(3)(B)(i) of the Act;
e. Has been physically present in the U.S. for a continuous period of not less
than 7 years immediately preceding the date of application;
(1) The Board held that, as an application for special rule cancellation
of removal is deemed to be a “continuing” application, an applicant
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can continue to accrue physical presence until a final administrative
decision is issued.  Matter of Garcia, 24 I&N Dec. 179 (BIA 2007).
(2) The Ninth Circuit held that a minor who seeks NACARA relief as
derivative must personally satisfy the requirement of seven years of
continuous physical presence; and the parent's physical presence in
United States was not imputable to minor.  Barrios v. Holder, 581
F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009).  
f. Has been a person of GMC during such period, and
g. Establishes that removal would result in extreme hardship to the alien or
the alien’s spouse, parent, or child who is a USC or LPR, or
h. If the alien is inadmissible or deportable under section 212(a)(2),
237(a)(2) [other than 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)], or 237(a)(3), and
i. Is not an alien described in section 241(b)(3)(B)(i) or section 101(a)(43)
[an alien convicted of an aggravated felony], and
j. Has been physically present in the U.S. for a continuous period of not less
than 10 years immediately following the commission of an act, or the
assumption of a status, constituting a ground for removal, and
k. Establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to the alien or the alien’s spouse, parent, or child who is
a USC or LPR.
3. Section 309(f)(2) of IIRIRA was amended to provide that section 240A(d)(2)
of the Act shall apply for purposes of calculating any period of continuous
physical presence, except that “reference to subsection (b)(1) in such section
shall be considered to be a reference to paragraph (1) of this section.”
4. Motions to reopen.  Section 203(g) of NACARA provides that,
notwithstanding any limitation imposed by law on motions to reopen removal
or deportation proceedings (except limitations premised on an alien’s
conviction of an aggravated felony), any alien who has become eligible for
cancellation of removal or suspension of deportation as a result of the
amendments made by section 203 of NACARA may file one motion to reopen
removal or deportation proceedings to apply for cancellation of removal or
suspension of deportation.  It also provides that the Attorney General shall
designate a specific time period in which all such motions to reopen are
required to be filed.  The period shall begin not later than 60 days after the date
of enactment of NACARA and shall extend for a period not to exceed 240
days.
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5. Calculation of physical presence for Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and aliens
from Soviet bloc countries.  Section 203(a)(5)(C)(i) of NACARA provides
that, for purposes of calculating the period of continuous physical presence
under former section 244(a) of the Act (suspension of deportation) and section
240A of the Act (cancellation of removal for non-LPRs), subparagraph (A) and
sections 240A(d)(1) and (2) [relating to termination of and breaks in residence
or physical presence] shall not apply in the case of an alien, regardless of
whether in exclusion or deportation proceedings, who:
a. Has not been convicted of an aggravated felony;
b. Was not apprehended after December 19, 1990; and
(1) Is a Salvadoran national who first entered the U.S. on or before
September 19, 1990 and who registered for benefits pursuant to the
settlement agreement in American Baptist Churches, et al v.
Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) on or before
October 31, 1991 or applied for TPS on or before October 31, 1991;
or
(a) For guidance on what constitutes evidence of registration for
benefits under the ABC settlement agreement, see Chaly-
Garcia v. United States, 508 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2007). 
USCIS implemented a new nationwide policy in light of this
decision.
(2) Is a Guatemalan national who first entered the U. S. on or before
October 1, 1990, and who registered for benefits pursuant to the
settlement agreement in American Baptist Churches, et al v.
Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) on or before
October 31, 1991; or
(a) For guidance on what constitutes evidence of registration for
benefits under the ABC settlement agreement, see Chaly-
Garcia v. United States, 508 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2007). 
USCIS implemented a new nationwide policy in light of this
decision.
(3) Is a Guatemalan or Salvadoran national who filed an application for
asylum with the INS on or before April 1, 1990; or
(4) Is the spouse or child (as defined in section 101(b)(1) of the Act) of
an individual described in this clause at the time the individual is
granted suspension or cancellation; or
(5) Is the unmarried son or daughter of an alien parent described in this
subclause at the time suspension or cancellation is granted the
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parent - if the unmarried son or daughter is 21 years of age or older
at the time the decision is rendered, the son or daughter must have
entered the U.S. on or before October 1, 1990; or
(6) Is an alien who entered the U.S. on or before December 31, 1990
and who filed an application for asylum on or before that date, and
who was, at the time of filing the application, a national of the
Soviet Union, Russia, any republic of the former Soviet Union,
Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania,
Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, East Germany, Yugoslavia, or any state
of the former Yugoslavia.
N. Advance parole
1. Advance parole is a mechanism by which a DD can, as a humanitarian
measure, advise an alien who is in the U.S., but who knows or fears that he will
be inadmissible if he leaves and tries to return, that he can leave with the
assurance that he will be paroled back into the U.S. upon return, under
prescribed conditions, if he cannot establish that he is admissible at that time;
Matter of G-A-C-, 22 I&N Dec. 83 (BIA 1998).  In that same decision, the
Board pointed out that the term “advance parole” is something of a misnomer. 
An alien in the U.S. may request an advance authorization of parole and, if the
request is approved, the alien is not at that point paroled.  Rather, the alien is
advised in advance of a departure that, if he meets certain requirements, he will
be paroled into the U.S. when he returns.
VIII. Defenses to removability available to aliens convicted of crimes
A. Introduction
1.  The term “defense” is used to describe facts or law put forward to show that a
respondent is not removable.  The term is used to distinguish it from “relief” in
which the alien is subject to removal but seeks a remedy which will prevent
removal, and from “waiver,” in which the alien is removable but seeks to have
the ground of removal overlooked or waived.
B. The charge requires a conviction and the conviction does not support the charge
1. Categorical and Modified Categorical Approach and Matter of Silva-Trevino
a. Aggravated Felonies - Categorical and Modified Categorical Approach
(1) To determine whether an alien’s conviction constitutes an
aggravated felony, the IJ must first apply the formal categorical
approach set forth by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States,
495 U.S. 575 (1990).  Under the formal categorical approach, the IJ
must look only to the statutory definition of the offense and not the
page 240 of 365
evidence surrounding the defendant’s conviction to determine
whether the alien’s conviction constitutes an aggravated felony. See
id. at 600. If the statute of conviction is phrased in the disjunctive or
is divisible and contains some elements which constitute an
aggravated felony and others which do not, the IJ must apply the
modified categorical approach to determine which elements form
the basis for the underlying conviction. Evanson v. Att’y Gen., 550
F.3d 284, 291 (3d Cir. 2008); Larin-Ulloa v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d
456 (5th Cir. 2006); Chang v. INS, 307 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir.
2002). In conducting a modified categorical analysis, the IJ should
consider the “statutory definition, charging document, written plea
agreement, transcript of the plea colloquy, and any explicit factual
finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.” Shepard
v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 20-23 (2005)). See Nijhawan v.
Holder, 129 S.Ct. 2294 (2009).
(a) In United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, --- F.3d ----, No.
05-50170, 2011 WL 3506442 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2011), the
Ninth Circuit held that the modified categorical approach may
be applied not only to divisible statues, but also to statutes
which are missing some element of the generic offense.
Examples of such statutes include statutes which are over-
inclusive (for example, prohibiting assault with a weapon
where the generic offense prohibits assault with a gun) and
those which are under-inclusive (for example, prohibiting
aggravated assault where the generic offense prohibits
aggravated assault with a gun). Id. at *8-21.
b. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude - Matter of Silva-Trevino
(1) In Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. 687, 704 (A.G. 2008), the
Attorney General ruled that, in determining whether an alien’s
offense constitutes a CIMT, “adjudicators should: (1) look first to
the statute of conviction under the categorical inquiry . . . ; (2) if the
categorical inquiry does not resolve the question, look to the alien’s
record of conviction, including documents such as the indictment,
the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea,
and the plea transcript; and (3) if the record of conviction does not
resolve the inquiry, consider any additional evidence the adjudicator
determines is necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the
moral turpitude question.” The second step of this process is
sometimes referred to as the modified categorical approach. Id. at
688. Absent otherwise controlling authority, IJs and the Board are
bound to apply these three steps. Matter of Guevara Alfaro, 25 I&N
Dec. 417 (BIA 2011).  But see Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d
462 (3d Cir. 2009) (declining to follow the Board’s approach in
determining CIMTs, and instead adhering to a purely categorical
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and modified categorical approach); Fajardo v. Att’y Gen., --- F.3d -
---, Nos. 09-12962, 09-14845, 2011 WL 4808171 (11th Cir. Oct.
12, 2011) (agreeing with Third Circuit). See also, Guardado-Garcia
v. Holder, 615 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that, where Silva-
Trevino is inconsistent with circuit law, circuit law will be
followed). 
(a) The record of conviction may include the contents of a police
report where they were specifically incorporated into the guilty
plea or were admitted by the alien during the criminal
proceedings. Matter of Milian-Dubon, 25 I&N Dec. 197 (BIA
2010).
(b) An IJ may only consider evidence outside of an alien’s record
of conviction if the conviction record itself does not
conclusively demonstrate whether the alien was convicted of
engaging in conduct that constitutes a crime involving moral
turpitude. Matter of Ahortalejo-Guzman, 25 I&N Dec. 465
(BIA 2011).
(c) The previous standard for determining whether an offense was
a CIMT was as follows:
i) In determining whether a crime involves moral
turpitude, it is the nature of the offense itself which
determines moral turpitude.  Matter of Esfandiary, 16
I&N Dec. 659 (BIA 1979).
ii) The statute under which the conviction occurred
controls.  If it defines a crime in which turpitude
necessarily inheres, then the conviction is for a CIMT. 
United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399 (2d
Cir. 1939); United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F.
860 (2d Cir. 1914).
iii) Only where the statute under which the respondent was
convicted includes some offenses which involve moral
turpitude and some which do not involve moral turpitude
is the record of conviction consulted to determine for
which offense the respondent was convicted.  The record
of conviction consists of the indictment, plea, verdict,
and sentence. Matter of Esfandiary, 16 I&N Dec. 659
(BIA 1979); Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I&N Dec. 269 (BIA
1975), modified on other grounds by Matter of Franklin,
20 I&N Dec. 867 (BIA 1994); Matter of Lopez, 13 I&N
Dec. 725 (BIA 1971), modified on other grounds by
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Matter of Franklin, 20 I&N Dec. 867 (BIA 1994); Matter
of S-, 2 I&N Dec. 353 (BIA 1945).
iv) When the record of conviction does not establish under
which section of a divisible statute the respondent was
convicted, the offense is assumed to be the minimum
defined by the statute and moral turpitude cannot be
found. Matter of N-, 8 I&N Dec. 466 (BIA 1959).
v) Where an indictment or information charged a particular
offense but the respondent entered a plea of guilty to a
lesser offense, the allegations in the indictment which
pertain only to the greater offense are disregarded and
the remaining allegations to which the plea has been
taken are considered to determine whether there has been
a conviction of a CIMT.  Matter of Beato, 10 I&N Dec.
730 (BIA 1964); Matter of W-, 4 I&N Dec. 241 (BIA
1951); Matter of M-, 2 I&N Dec. 525 (BIA 1946).
2. Crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT).  “Moral turpitude” does not have a
clear definition.  Individual decisions of the Board and the courts must be
reviewed before reaching a conclusion. See pages 21-25 above for discussion
of CIMT as ground of inadmissibility and pages 49-53 above for discussion of
CIMT as grounds of deportability.
a. Some of the more esoteric definitions mentioned by the Board are:
“anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals,”
“an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private social duties
which man owes to his fellow man or to society,” “a crime involves
moral turpitude when its nature is such that it manifests upon the part of
its perpetrator personal depravity or baseness.”  Matter of Awaijane, 14
I&N Dec. 117 (BIA 1972); Matter of Sloan, 12 I&N Dec. 840 (BIA 1966;
A.G. 1968); Matter of E-, 2 I&N Dec. 134 (BIA 1944).
b. Perhaps the most practical definition is from a Dec. 5, 1922 opinion of
the Solicitor of the Department of Labor.  It is quoted by the Board in
Matter of E-, 2 I&N Dec. 134 (BIA 1944), “A crime involving moral
turpitude may be either a felony or a misdemeanor, existing at common
law or created by statute, and is an act or omission which is malum in se
and not merely malum prohibitum; which is actuated by malice or
committed with knowledge and intention and not done innocently or
without inadvertence or reflection; which is so far contrary to the moral
law, as interpreted by the general moral sense of the community, that the
offender is brought to public disgrace, is no longer generally respected, or
is deprived of social recognition by good living persons; but which is not
the outcome merely of natural passion, of animal spirits, of infirmity of
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temper, of weakness of character, of mistaken principles, unaccompanied
by a vicious motive or corrupt mind.”
c. The Board has adopted the requirement of intent and holds that a test in
determining what crimes involve moral turpitude is whether the act is
accompanied by a “vicious motive” or “corrupt mind.”  A crime must by
its very nature and at its minimum, as defined by statute, involve an evil
intent before a finding of moral turpitude would be justified.  Malicious
and mischievous intention, or what is equivalent to such intention, is the
broad boundary between right and wrong and between crimes involving
moral turpitude and those which do not.  Matter of Awaijane, 14 I&N
Dec. 117 (BIA 1972); Matter of P-, 3 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 1948); Matter of
E-, 2 I&N Dec. 134 (BIA 1944).
(1) The Board has held that an “evil intent” (actually its equivalent)
may be found in a statute based on “recklessness” rather than
specific criminal intent, such as manslaughter defined as recklessly
causing the death of another.  The Board held that recklessness is
evidenced when a person is “aware of and consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk” and the risk “constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
would observe in the situation.” Matter of Franklin, 20 I&N Dec.
867 (BIA 1994); Matter of Wojtkow, 18 I&N Dec. 111 (BIA 1981).
(2) Statutory rape has been found to involve moral turpitude even
though it is a strict liability offense.  Castle v. INS, 541 F.2d 1064
(4th Cir. 1976); Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1971);
Matter of Dingena, 11 I&N Dec. 723 (BIA 1966).  
d. The Board has also suggested, on occasion, that part of the test for the
existence of moral turpitude in connection with the violation of a law
requires the doing of an act which is malum in se rather than malum
prohibitum.  Matter of A-, 5 I&N Dec. 52 (BIA 1953); Matter of E-, 2
I&N Dec. 134 (BIA 1944).
e. General considerations
(1) Moral turpitude does not depend on felony or misdemeanor
distinction. Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1929);
Matter of Short, 20 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1989).
(2) Neither the seriousness of a criminal offense nor the severity of the
sentence imposed is determinative of whether a crime involves
moral turpitude.  Matter of Serna, 20 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA 1992).
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(3) Conduct must be deemed criminal under U. S. law. Matter of
McNaughton, 16 I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 1978), aff'd McNaughton v.
INS, 612 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1980).
(4) Moral turpitude is judged by U.S. standards.  Id.
(5) The Board of Immigration Appeals and the IJ are bound by the
record of conviction and may not retry the criminal case. 
Giammario v. Hurney, 311 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1962).
(6) If an offense involves moral turpitude, then an attempt to commit
that crime involves moral turpitude.  United States ex rel. Meyer v.
Day, 54 F.2d 336 (2nd Cir. 1931); Matter of Awaijane, 14 I&N Dec.
117 (BIA 1972).  If the substantive offense underlying an alien’s
conviction for an attempt offense is a crime involving moral
turpitude, the alien has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.  Matter of Vo, 25 I&N Dec. 426 (BIA 2011)
(7) If an offense involves moral turpitude, then a conspiracy to commit
that offense also involves moral turpitude.  Matter of E-, 9 I&N
Dec. 421 (BIA 1961).
(8) If a crime involves moral turpitude, then a conviction for aiding in
the commission of that crime or otherwise acting as an accessory
before the fact also involves moral turpitude.  Matter of Short, 20
I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1989); Matter of F-, 6 I&N Dec. 783 (BIA
1955).
(9) An assault with intent to commit a felony is not per se a CIMT
without regard to whether the underlying felony involves moral
turpitude.  There must be a finding that the felony intended as a
result of the assault involves moral turpitude. Matter of Short, 20
I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1989).
(10) Any intentional sexual conduct by an adult with a child involves
moral turpitude, as long as the perpetrator knew or should have
known that the victim was a child. Matter of Guevara Alfaro, 25
I&N Dec. 417 (BIA 2011).
f. Specific offenses:
(1) Money laundering under New York Penal Law § 470.10(1) is a
CIMT.  Matter of Tejwani, 24 I&N Dec. 97 (BIA 2007), rev’d by
Tejwani v. Att’y Gen., 349 F. App’x 719 (3d 2009).
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(2) Trafficking in counterfeit goods or services in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2320 is a CIMT.  Matter of Kochlani, 24 I&N Dec. 128
(BIA 2007).
(3) Willful failure to register as a sex offender by an individual who has
previously been apprised of the obligation to register, in violation of
section 290(g)(1) of the California Penal Code, is a CIMT.  Matter
of Tobar-Lobo, 24 I&N Dec. 143 (BIA 2007).  However, in
Plasencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2008), the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the Nevada offense of failing to register as a
sex offender, under Nev. Rev. Stat. 179D.550, is not a CIMT;
see also Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2011)(finding
that the Board’s interpretation of “moral turpitude” as
encompassing the misdemeanor offense of “failure to register” was
“not a ‘reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.’”)  
(4) Third degree assault under New York Penal Law § 102.00(1) is a
CIMT.  A person is guilty of this offense when, "[w]ith intent to
cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to
such person or to a third party."  Matter of Solon, 24 I&N Dec. 239
(BIA 2007).  Similarly, criminal reckless conduct under Ga. Code.
Ann. § 16-5-60(b) (which is a lesser-included offense to aggravated
assault), is categorically a CIMT where (1) there was a conscious
disregard of substantial and unjustifiable risk to the safety of others
coupled with a culpable mental state, (2) there was a gross deviation
from a reasonable standard of care, and (3) the person caused actual
bodily harm to or endangered the bodily safety of another.  Keungne
v. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2009). 
(5) Assault and battery against a family or household member under
Virginia Code § 18.2-57.2 is not categorically a CIMT.  A person is
guilty of this offense if he or she "commits an assault and battery
against a family or household member."  Matter of Sejas, 24 I&N
Dec. 236 (BIA 2007).
(6) Burglary of an occupied dwelling in violation of Florida Statutes §
810.02(3)(a) is categorically a CIMT. Matter of Louissaint, 24 I&N
Dec. 754 (BIA 2009).
(7) Fraudulent use of a social security number or identifying
information is a crime involving moral turpitude.  See Guardado v.
Holder, 615 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2010); Lateef v. DHS, 592 F.3d 926
(8th Cir. 2010); Serrato-Soto v. Holder, 570 F.3d 686 (6th Cir.
2009)(citing Matter of Kochlani, 24 I&N Dec. 128, 130 (BIA
2007)); Hyder v. Keilser, 506 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2007); but see
Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2000)(holding that
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use of a false social security number to establish credit and work in
the United States did not involve moral turpitude).  
(8) Fraud -“[A] crime in which fraud is an ingredient involves moral
turpitude.” Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951).  The
Ninth Circuit held that a conviction for providing false information
to obtain credit cards and using the cards to obtain goods, in
violation of Cal. Penal Code § 532(a)(1), constitutes a CIMT
because it involves fraud.  Tijani v. Holder, 598 F.3d 647 (9th Cir.
2010), superseded by Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir.
2010). 
(9) Theft - Theft or larceny offenses generally involve moral turpitude. 
Matter of Louissaint, 24 I&N Dec. 754 (BIA 2009) (burlary); Matter
of Jurado-Delgado, 24 I&N Dec. 29 (BIA 2006) (retail theft);
Matter of Kim, 17 I&N Dec. 144 (BIA 1979) (robbery).  Circuit
courts have generally agreed that theft offenses involve moral
turpitude.  See, e.g., Fitzgerald ex rel. Miceli v. Landon, 238 F.2d
864, 865-66 (1st Cir. 1956); Garcia-Padron v. Holder, 558 F.3d 196,
198 (2d Cir. 2009); Tassari v. Schmucker, 53 F.2d 570, 572-73 (4th
Cir. 1931); Cina v. INS, 989 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1993)
(unpublished); United States v. Martinez-Gonzales, 916 F.2d 715
(7th Cir. 1990) (unpublished); Costello v. Ramsey, 88 F.2d 622,
623 (8th Cir. 1937); Mendoza v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.
2010); Camacho-Salinas v. Att’y Gen., 460 F.3d 1343, 1345 (11th
Cir. 2006). 
(10) Certain Aggravated DUIs - Deferring to the Board, the Ninth Circuit
held that a conviction for aggravated DUI (DUI while license
suspended, cancelled, etc.), which involved actual driving was a
CIMT, based on the reasoning in Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22 I&N
Dec. 1188 (BIA 1999).  Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d
903 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).  The court found that an aggravated
DUI involved the presence of a culpable mental state – that is, the
defendant knew at the time of the DUI that his/her license was
suspended. Id. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held that child
endangerment resulting in bodily injury pursuant to Iowa Code
sections 321J.2, 726.6(1)(a), and 726.6(2) is a CIMT. The court
reasoned that while the underlying offense of driving under the
influence is not normally a CIMT by itself, the respondent’s
conviction for conscious disregard of a substantial risk of harm to a
child is an aggravating factor implicating moral turpitude. 
Hernandez-Perez v. Holder, 569 F.3d 345 (8th Cir. 2009). 
g. Determination of moral turpitude. 
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(1) See pages 240-242 above for discussion of Matter of Silva-Trevino,
24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), and the categorical approach.
(2) Where the record of conviction does not clearly establish whether a
crime involves moral turpitude, and the alien has the burden of
proof (for purposes of demonstrating eligibility for relief), there is a
Circuit Split as to the outcome.  See Sandoval-Lua v. Gonzales, 499
F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding  that an alien can satisfy
his burden of demonstrating eligibility for cancellation of removal
by producing record of conviction that is inconclusive as to whether
his crime would disqualify him for that relief). See also Rosas-
Castaneda v. Holder, 630 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding
that Sandoval-Lua applies to applications for relief submitted under
the REAL ID Act), superseded on rehearing by Rosas-Castaneda v.
Holder, --- F.3d ----, No. 10-70087, 2011 WL 4014321 (9th Cir.
Sept. 12, 2011); Young v. Holder, 653 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011). But
see Garcia v. Holder, 584 F.3d 1288 (10th Cir. 2009) (affirming the
Board’s decision and finding that the alien failed to establish that he
was eligible for relief from removal because it was unclear from the
record of conviction whether his assault offense was a CIMT);
Salem v. Holder, 647 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that an alien
applying for cancellation of removal cannot satisfy his burden of
proving eligibility by presenting an inconclusive record of
conviction where he was convicted under a statute that encompasses
aggravated felony theft offenses and offenses that would not be an
aggravated felony). 
3. The conviction is not final due to an appeal.
a. A conviction pending direct appeal is not final.  Pino v. Landon, 349 U.
S. 901 (1955) (per curiam); Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.
1988); Will v. INS, 447 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1971); Morales-Alvarado v.
INS, 655 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1981).
b. This means an appeal as of right and not where there is discretion to
accept or reject the appeal or where the alien is making a collateral attack
on the conviction.  Morales-Alvarado v. INS, 655 F.2d 172 (9th Cir.
1981); Matter of Polanco, 20 I&N Dec. 894 (BIA 1994).  The possibility
or pendency of post-conviction motions or other forms of collateral
attack, not constituting direct appeals, do not serve to negate the finality
of a conviction or the charge of deportability for immigration purposes,
unless and until the conviction is overturned pursuant to such motions. 
Marino v. INS, 537 F.2d 686 (2nd Cir. 1981); Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d
994, 1009 (5th Cir. 1999)(concluding that there is nothing in the text or
legislative history of section 1101(a)(48)(A) indicating “that the finality
requirement imposed by Pino, and this court, prior to 1996, survives the
new definition of ‘conviction’.”); Okabe v. INS, 671 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.
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1982); Aquilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975);
Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004)(per
curiam)(relying on plain language of § 1101(a)(48)(A) to dismiss alien’s
contention that he was unlawfully ordered removed while he still had
direct appeals pending); Morales-Alvarado v. INS, 655 F.2d 172, (9th
Cir. 1981); Matter of Polanco, 20 I&N Dec. 894 (BIA 1994); see also
Griffiths v. INS, 243 F.3d 45, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2001)(observing that
finality is not required under the deferred-adjudication portion of §
101(a)(48)(A)). 
(1) In Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense
counsel to advise a noncitizen client of the risk of deportation
arising from a guilty plea.  The Court held the two-pronged test in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) was appropriate to
determine whether defense counsel’s failure to advise, or misadvice,
regarding the immigration consequences of the plea constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1476, citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694.  Specifically, the Court held that
when the risk of removal resulting from a guilty plea is “clear,”
counsel must advise his or her client that “deportation [is]
presumptively mandatory”; whereas, when the risk is less clear,
counsel need only advise the defendant “that pending criminal
charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.” 
Padialla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.  However, as noted above, the fact that
an alien may be pursuing post-conviction relief in the form of a
collateral (for immigration purposes) attack on a conviction in state
criminal court does not affect the conviction’s finality for federal
immigration purposes. Matter of Adetiba, 20 I&N Dec. 506 (BIA
1992).  The conviction is final, unless and until it is overturned by
the criminal court. See Matter of Ponce de Leon, 21 I&N Dec. 154
(A.G. 1997; BIA 1997, 1996);  see also Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528
F.3d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Garcia-Echaverria,
374 F.3d 440, 445-46 (6th Cir. 2004); Jimenez-Guzman v. Holder,
642 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2011)(finding IJ’s denial of motion to
continue was “eminently rational”). 
(a) Immigration judges may encounter adjournment requests and
motions for continuance asserted under Padilla.  Such requests
should be carefully considered as to whether or not the
conviction will be overturned for immigration purposes is
speculative. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 and 8 C.F.R. § 1240.6,
the IJ may grant a motion for a continuance or an adjournment
request for good cause shown.  See Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N
Dec. 785 (BIA 2009); Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127 (BIA
2009); Matter of Perez-Andrade, 19 I&N Dec. 433 (BIA
1987).  
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c. An alien who has waived or exhausted the right to a direct appeal of a
conviction is subject to deportation, and the potential for discretionary
review on direct appeal will not prevent the conviction from being
considered final for immigration purposes. Matter of Polanco, 20 I&N
Dec. 894 (BIA 1994).  In that case, the respondent had failed to appeal
the conviction within the time allowed but, under the New Jersey Rules
of Court, he had submitted a late appeal which the court treated as an
application for leave to file a nunc pro tunc appeal.  The court could then
consider whether to allow the appeal but there were no time constraints
for the decision to be made.  Nor was there a limit to the period during
which a defendant could request permission to take a nunc pro tunc
appeal.  The Board held that to find a conviction not final because the
respondent had the right at any time to apply for a late appeal could delay
deportation proceedings indefinitely.
d. Following the rationale of Matter of Polanco, 20 I&N Dec. 894 (BIA
1994), the Board held that a pending late-reinstated appeal of a criminal
conviction, filed pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law, did not
undermine the finality of the conviction for immigration purposes. Matter
of Cardenas Abreu, 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009).  The Board noted that
the New York Criminal Procedure Law had deadlines for making a
request to file a late appeal, but that the resolution of such a motion had
no time limit. Id. at 800-01. The Board cited congressional intent to
prevent the immigration laws from being “dependent on the vagaries of
State law” when it defined “conviction” as support for its conclusion that
the alien’s conviction was final. Id. at 802.
e. Following the rationale of Morales-Alvarado v. INS, 655 F.2d 172 (9th
Cir. 1981), the Board held that an alien who failed to file a timely appeal
from a conviction in New Jersey has a final conviction for immigration
purposes, despite the potential for seeking a nunc pro tunc appeal
because, under New Jersey law, the decision to allow a nunc pro tunc
appeal is discretionary and not routinely granted.  Matter of Polanco, 20
I&N Dec. 894 (BIA 1994).  The Board noted that the New Jersey Rules
of Court contain no time constraints to limit the period during which a
defendant may request permission to take a nunc pro tunc appeal and
stated that to hold that a conviction in New Jersey is not final simply
because an alien has a right to apply for a late appeal would postpone
indefinitely his deportation proceedings, a result that Congress did not
intend.
f. The Board has held that while a conviction on direct appeal may not
support a finding of deportability, it may still be considered in the
exercise of discretion.  Matter of Gonzalez, 16 I&N Dec. 134 (BIA 1977);
Matter of Turcotte, 12 I&N Dec. 206 (BIA 1967).
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(1) An alien's extensive criminal history, which included an expunged
felony conviction for assaulting a police officer, may be considered
in deciding whether voluntary departure is merited as a matter of
discretion.  Villanueva-Franco v. INS, 802 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1986).
(2) An alien's arrest on a drug charge may be considered as a
discretionary factor in a 212(c) application, even though the arrest
never resulted in a conviction because the charges were dismissed
following the alien's completion of a pre-trial diversion program. 
Paredes-Urrestarazu v. INS, 36 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1994).
(3) Criminal charges which were placed “on file” by a state court under
a procedure peculiar to Massachusetts law and which therefore did
not constitute convictions may still be considered as “some
evidence weighing against discretionary relief,” particularly where
the alien had pleaded guilty to one charge and was found guilty to
one charge and was found guilty by a jury on another. White v. INS,
17 F.3d 475 (1st Cir. 1994).
(4) In determining whether a favorable exercise of discretion is
warranted on an alien's application for a waiver under section 212(i)
of the Act, the Board could consider not only his foreign in absentia
convictions for criminal association, forgery, and possession of
firearms, but also murder charges pending against him and the
extradition proceedings spawned by those charges.  Esposito v. INS,
936 F.2d 911 (7th Cir. 1991).
(5) In determining whether or not voluntary departure is merited as a
matter of discretion, felony arson charges pending against the
respondent may be considered. Parcham v. INS, 769 F.2d 1001 (4th
Cir. 1985).  The court stated that although the alien was acquitted of
the charges during the pendency of the circuit court appeal, this fact
did not alter its decision and stated that evidence of an alien's
conduct, without a conviction, may be considered in denying the
discretionary relief of voluntary departure and the Attorney General
is entitled to consider the facts as they exist at the time he acts and
does not have to wait for the disposition of pending criminal
charges.
(6) Where an alien's conduct results in his having had contact with the
criminal justice proceedings, the nature of those contacts and the
stage to which those proceedings have progressed should be taken
into account and weighed accordingly.  Hence, the probative value
of and corresponding weight, if any, assigned to evidence of
criminality will vary according to the facts and circumstances of
each case and the nature and strength of the evidence presented. 
Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20 (BIA 1995).
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(7) Where an alien has been convicted following a jury trial of several
crimes but the convictions are not final due to an appeal, the fact
that he has been so convicted constitutes significant evidence that
he has committed the crimes and the conduct underlying those
convictions is a significant adverse factor to be weighed in deciding
whether he merits VD as a matter of discretion. Matter of Thomas,
21 I&N Dec. 20 (BIA 1995).
(8) Where an alien has been imprisoned only as a result of non-final
convictions, his conduct while in prison is independent of that
which resulted in his convictions and any disciplinary infractions he
may have committed while in prison may be considered as adverse
factors in the exercise of discretion.  Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N
Dec. 20 (BIA 1995).
(9) Evidence of an alien's arrest bears upon whether he might have
engaged in the underlying conduct and is probative of relevant
discretionary factors.  Paredes-Urrestarazu v. INS, 36 F.3d 801 (9th
Cir. 1994).
(10) An alien's in absentia convictions may at the very least constitute
probable cause to believe he is guilty of the crimes in question. 
Esposito v. INS, 936 F.2d 911 (7th Cir. 1991).
(11) Pending murder charges against an alien are indicative of probable
cause that he committed the murders and that “reasonable minds
suspect that he is guilty of the crimes charged.”  Id.
(12) Police reports implicating a respondent in criminal activity but
which never resulted in prosecution due to a lack of sufficient
evidence are not probative.  Sierra-Reyes v. INS, 585 F.2d 762 (5th
Cir. 1978).
(13) A non-final conviction resulting from an alien's own guilty plea or a
conviction following a trial by jury is entitled to substantial weight
in the exercise of discretion.  Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20
(BIA 1995).
(14) The admission into evidence of police reports concerning the
circumstances of an alien's arrest is especially appropriate in cases
involving discretionary relief, where all relevant factors regarding
an alien's arrest and conviction should be considered.  Matter of
Grijalva, 19 I&N Dec. 713 (BIA 1988).
(15) In Matter of Arreguin, 21 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 1995), the Board held
that it is “hesitant” to give substantial weight to an arrest report
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absent a conviction or corroborating evidence of the allegations
contained therein.  The alien conceded that the arrest took place but
admitted to no wrongdoing.  Considering that prosecution was
declined and there was no corroboration, from the alien or
otherwise, the Board gave the arrest report little weight in the
exercise of discretion.
4. Pardons
a. Pardons of crimes involving moral turpitude.
(1) History lesson - Former section 241(b) which provided that an alien
who has received a pardon is not deportable under former section
241(a)(4) was repealed by the Immigration Act of 1990.  Former
section 241(e) was redesignated as section 241(b).  However, the
Immigration Act of 1990 also enacted section 241(a)(2)(A)(iv)
which provided that the provisions of section 241(a)(2)(A)(i)
[relating to aliens convicted of a CIMT] shall not apply in the case
of an alien who, after the conviction, has been granted a full and
unconditional pardon by the President of the U.S. or by the
Governor of any state.
(2) As added by IIRIRA, section 237(a)(2)(A)(v) of the Act now
provides that clauses (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) [of section 237(a)(2)(A)]
shall not apply in the case of an alien with respect to a criminal
conviction if the alien subsequent to the criminal conviction has
been granted a full and unconditional pardon by the President of the
U.S. or by the Governor of any state.  The clauses listed are as
follows:
(a) 237(a)(2)(A)(i) - CIMT w/in 5 years of admission;
(b) 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) - 2 CIMTs not arising out of a single scheme;
(c) 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) - aggravated felony;
(d) 237(a)(2)(A)(iv) - high speed flight.
(3) A presidential or gubernatorial pardon waives only the grounds of
removal specifically set forth in section 237(a)(2)(A)(v) of the Act,
and no implicit waivers may be read into the statute.  Therefore, a
respondent’s pardon of a conviction for sexual battery of a minor
did not waive his removability as an alien convicted of a crime of
domestic violence or child abuse under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of
the Act, because that section is not specifically included in section
237(a)(2)(A)(v).  Matter of Suh, 23 I&N Dec. 626 (BIA 2003).
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(4) Only an executive pardon will prevent deportation; a legislative
pardon is no bar to deportability.  Matter of R-, 6 I&N Dec. 444
(BIA 1954); Matter of R-, 5 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1954).
(5) However, if a state has a constitutional provision which allows
pardon authority to be exercised by a board or by a commission,
such a pardon is considered an executive pardon.  Matter of Tajer,
15 I&N Dec. 125 (BIA 1974), Matter of D-, 7 I&N Dec. 476 (BIA
1957).
(6) An executive pardon must be unconditional in order to prevent
deportation.  It may not be dependent upon a condition precedent or
a condition subsequent.  Matter of C-, 5 I&N Dec. 630 (BIA 1954).
(7) A foreign pardon (or amnesty, expungement, or extinction) is not
effective to prevent deportation.  Matter of G-, 5 I&N Dec. 129
(BIA 1953); Matter of F-y G-, 4 I&N Dec. 717 (BIA 1952).
(8) The availability of a pardon under state or federal law, or the
existence or nonexistence of a qualifying pardoning authority, is not
determinative of whether an offense constitutes a crime for
immigration purposes. Matter of Nolan, 19 I&N Dec. 539 (BIA
1988).
b. Pardons of drug offenses
(1) The provisions of former section 241(b) regarding pardons were
applicable only to aliens deportable under former section
241(a)(4)(A) and the statute specifically provided that the
provisions regarding pardons were not applicable in the case of an
alien deportable under former section 241(a)(11) for a drug
conviction. 
(2) Former section 241(b) was repealed by the Immigration Act of 1990
and former section 241(e) was redesignated as section 241(b).
(3) Former section 241(a)(2)(B) and present section 237(a)(2)(B)
dealing with the deportability of aliens convicted of drug offenses
do not provide an exception for aliens who receive a pardon.
Therefore, an alien convicted of an offense relating to controlled
substances is deportable even if he is granted a pardon.
c. Pardons of aggravated felonies
(1) The amendments contained in the Immigration Act of 1990 brought
about a confusing situation regarding pardons granted to aliens
convicted of an aggravated felony.
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(2) Section 505 of the Immigration Act of 1990 amended section
241(b) to provide that its provisions which prevented the
deportation of an alien receiving a pardon would not apply to aliens
convicted of an aggravated felony.  This amendment took effect on
November 29, 1990 and applied to convictions entered before, on,
or after that date.
(3) Section 602(b) of the Immigration Act of 1990 repealed section
241(b) and redesignated former section 241(e) as 241(b).  This
amendment was not applicable to deportation proceedings for which
notice was provided before March 1, 1991.
(4) Section 602(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990 amended section
241(a) to include section 241(a)(2)(A)(iv) which provided that
clauses (i) [aliens convicted of a CIMT committed within 5 years of
entry and sentenced to a year or longer], (ii) [aliens convicted of 2
or more CIMTs], and (iii) [aliens convicted of an aggravated felony]
of section 241(a)(2)(A) shall not apply to aliens who have been
granted a full and unconditional pardon by the President of the U.S.
or by the Governor of any state.  This amendment was not
applicable to deportation proceedings for which notice was
provided before March 1, 1991.
(5) The only way to make sense of these amendments would be to view
the situation as follows:
(a) Aliens convicted of an aggravated felony who received notice
of their deportation hearing before March 1, 1991 and were
therefore deportable  under former section 241(a)(4)(B) are
deportable even if they are granted a pardon.
(b) Aliens convicted of an aggravated felony who received notice
of their deportation hearing on or after March 1, 1991 and are
deportable under current section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) are not
deportable if they have received a full and unconditional
pardon from the President of the U.S. or the Governor of any
state.
5. The criminal proceeding did not result in a “conviction” within the meaning of
the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
a. Section 322 of the IIRIRA added section 101(a)(48)(A) to the Act.  It
reads as follows: “The term ‘conviction’ means, with respect to an alien,
a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by the court, or if
adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where
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(1) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to
warrant a finding of guilt, and
(2) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint
on the alien's liberty to be imposed.”
b. The Board has noted that section 322(c) of IIRIRA, which added section
101(a)(48)(A) to the Act, specifically states that its amendments “shall
apply to convictions and sentences entered before, on, or after the date of
enactment of this Act.”  Therefore the date when a conviction took place
is of no consequence. Matter of Punu, 22 I&N Dec. 224 (BIA 1998).
c. The Board has held that the imposition of costs and surcharges in the
criminal sentencing context constitutes a form of “punishment” or
“penalty” for purposes of establishing that an alien has suffered a
“conviction” within the meaning of section 101(a)(48)(A).  Matter of
Cabrera, 24 I&N Dec. 459 (BIA 2008).
d. The Board has ruled that a judgement of guilt entered by a general court-
martial of the U.S. Armed Forces qualifies as a “conviction” within the
meaning of section 101(a)(48)(A).  Matter of Rivera-Valencia, 24 I&N
Dec. 484 (BIA 2008).
e. State convictions of a minor who was tried as an adult.  The First,
Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that an alien’s conviction
as an adult in state court is a conviction for immigration purposes, even
though the alien was a minor at the time and would not have been eligible
for transfer to a federal adult court under the Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act (“FJDA”) standards.  Vieira Garcia v. INS, 239 F.3d
409 (1st Cir. 2001); Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 122 (2nd Cir.
2008); Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 922-23 (9th Cir.
2007); Singh v. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). 
f. Deferred Adjudication Statutes.
(1) In Crespo v. Holder, 631 F.3d 130 (4th Cir. 2011), the Fourth
Circuit held that an alien’s prior deferred adjudication for
possession of marijuana, under Virginia law applying to first
offenders, did not qualify as “conviction,” within meaning of
section 101(a)(48)(A), because the alien pled not guilty and the
adjudication lacked sufficient finding of guilt.
6. Expungements of criminal convictions.
a. Prior to the enactment of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, a conviction
which was expunged would not support an order of deportation.  See e.g.,
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Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988), superseded by INA §
101(a)(48)(A).  However, an expungement of a conviction for a
controlled substances offense would not eliminate the conviction for
immigration purposes because the manner in which a state deals with a
person after his conviction is not controlling in a deportation proceeding. 
Rehman v. INS, 544 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1976), superseded by statute as in
Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2001); Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998
F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1993); Gonzalez de Lara v. INS, 439 F.2d 1316 (5th
Cir. 1971); Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975); Will
v. INS, 447 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1971); de la Cruz-Martinez v. INS, 404
F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1968).  The expungement of drug offenses was later
found to eliminate a conviction for immigration purposes when
expungement was pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Youth
Corrections (which has since been repealed) or the first offender
provisions of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 844(b)(1). 
Matter of Werk, 16 I&N Dec. 234 (BIA 1977); Matter of Zingis, 14 I&N
Dec. 621 (BIA 1974).  In Matter of Manrique, the Board expanded the
elimination of controlled substances convictions for immigration
purposes to include expungements under a state rehabilitative statute if
the alien would have been eligible for federal first offender treatment if
he had been prosecuted under federal law.  21 I&N Dec. 58 (BIA 1995).
 
b. With the passage of the IIRIRA, Congress provided a statutory definition
for the term, adding section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act which states: 
(1) The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien, a formal
judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication
of guilt has been withheld, where
(a) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has
entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and
(b) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or
restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.
(2) Section 322(c) of the IIRIRA states that the definition applies “to
convictions and sentences entered before, on, or after the date of the
enactment” of the Act.
c. In light of this definition, the Board held that no effect is to be given in
immigration proceedings to a state action which purports to expunge,
dismiss, cancel, vacate, discharge, or otherwise remove a guilty plea or
other record of guilt or conviction by operation of a state rehabilitative
statute and once an alien is subject to a “conviction” as that term is
defined at section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, the alien remains convicted
for immigration purposes notwithstanding a subsequent state action
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purporting to erase the original determination of guilt through a
rehabilitative procedure Matter of Roldan, 22 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1999). 
Therefore, an alien, who has had his guilty plea to the offense of
possession of a controlled substance vacated and his case dismissed upon
termination of his probation pursuant to section 19-2604(1) of the Idaho
Code, is considered to have a conviction for immigration purposes.  Id.
d. The Board also stated, “Our decision is limited to those circumstances
where an alien has been the beneficiary of a state rehabilitative statute
which purports to erase the record of guilt.  It does not address the
situation where the alien has had his or her conviction vacated by a state
court on direct appeal, wherein the court determines that vacation of the
conviction is warranted on the merits, or on grounds relating to a
violation of a fundamental statutory or constitutional right in the
underlying criminal proceedings.  We also do not reach the issue of the
effect of noncollateral challenges to a conviction on these grounds that
are pending in state court while an alien is in deportation proceedings.”
e. All of the circuits agreed with the Board’s decision in Matter of Roldan,
while initially the Ninth Circuit disagreed. See, e.g., Wellington v.
Holder, 623 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2010); Lujan-Armendariz v INS, 222 F.3d
728 (9th Cir. 2000).  The Ninth Circuit in Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646
F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) noted that eight other circuits and the
Board (in Matter of Salazar) disagreed with its holding in Lujan-
Armendariz.  The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Congress had a
rational basis for distinguishing between expungement of federal and
state convictions.  Nunez-Reyes applies prospectively only; thus, Lujan-
Armendariz remains the controlling law for those aliens convicted before
the publication dated of Nunez-Reyes (July 14, 2011).  Because Lujan-
Armendariz still applies in some cases, the holding and case law is
summarized below.
(1) The court in Lujan-Armendariz specifically rejected the Board’s
decision in Matter of Roldan, 22 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1999), insofar
as that decision  held that treatment under the Federal First
Offenders Act or state counterparts will not be given effect for
immigration purposes.  Lujan-Armendariz v INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th
Cir. 2000).  The Ninth Circuit adopted the test set forth in Matter of
Manrique, 21 I&N Dec. 58 (BIA 1995), finding that an alien will
not be removable if he or she establishes that: (1) the alien has not
previously been convicted of violating any federal or state law
relating to controlled substances; (2) the alien has pled to or been
found guilty of the offense of simple possession of a controlled
substance; (3) the alien has not previously been accorded first
offender treatment under any law; and (4) the court entered an order
pursuant to a state rehabilitative statute under which the alien’s
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criminal proceedings have been deferred pending successful
completion of probation.  
(2) The Board later held that Matter of Roldan, 22 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA
1999), will not be applied in cases arising within the jurisdiction of
the 9th Circuit, but everywhere else an alien whose adjudication of
guilt was deferred following a plea of guilty to possession of a
controlled substance is considered to have been convicted of the
offense.  Matter of Salazar, 23 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA 2002).
(3) Lujan-Armendariz, is limited to controlled substances violations. 
See Matter of Marroquin-Garcia, 23 I&N Dec. 705 (A.G. 2005).
(4) The Ninth Circuit held that the crime of possession of drug
paraphernalia is a lesser offense than simple possession and thus
qualifies for FFOA treatment if expunged under state law.
Cardenas-Uriarte v. INS, 227 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2000).  See also
Ramirez-Altamirano v. Holder, 563 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2009),
superseding 554 F.3d  786 (9th Cir. 2009).  Similarly, the court held
that an individual convicted for the first time in state court of using
or being under the influence of a controlled substance was eligible
for the same immigration treatment as individuals convicted of drug
possession under the FFOA.  Rice v. Holder, 597 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.
2010), Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). 
(a) Relief under the Federal First Offender Act is unavailable
when an offender has violated a condition of probation. 
Estrada v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2009).  
f. In all other cases, if a court vacates an alien’s conviction for reasons
solely related to rehabilitation or immigration hardships, rather than on
the basis of a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal
proceedings, the conviction is not eliminated for immigration purposes.
Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), rev’d on other
grounds, 454 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 2006), amended and superseded, 465
F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006).
(1) In Renteria-Gonzales v. INS, 322 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 2002), the Fifth
Circuit held that a conviction vacated on any grounds remains a
conviction under section 101(a)(48)(A).  This holding contradicts
the Board’s ruling in Matter of Pickering.  However, as practical
matter, the Matter of Pickering standard may still apply in the Fifth
Circuit.  Specifically, the government has announced (in its
response to a petition for en banc review in a case involving a
vacated criminal conviction) that, in Fifth Circuit cases involving
vacated convictions, it will seek to remand to the Board for a ruling
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under Matter of Pickering.  See Gaona-Romero v. Gonzales, 497
F.3d 694 (5th Cir. 2007)
g. An alien seeking to reopen proceedings to establish that a conviction has
been vacated bears the burden of proving that the conviction was not
vacated solely for immigration purposes.  Matter of Chavez, 24 I&N Dec.
272 (BIA 2007).
h. A conviction vacated pursuant to section 2943.031 of the Ohio Revised
Code for failure of the trial court to advise the alien defendant of the
possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea is no longer a valid
conviction for immigration purposes.  Matter of Adamiak, 23 I&N Dec.
878 (BIA 2006). 
7. Reduction in sentence.  A trial court’s decision to modify or reduce an alien’s
criminal sentence nunc pro tunc is entitled to full faith and credit by the IJ and
the Board.  Such a modified or reduced sentence is recognized as valid for
purposes of the immigration law without regard to the trial court’s reasons for
effecting the modification or reduction.  Matter of Cota-Vargas, 23 I&N Dec.
849 (BIA 2005), clarifying Matter of Song, 23 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2001) and
distinguishing Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003). 
8. Naturalized citizen at time of conviction.  The Board has held that a
denaturalized citizen who committed crimes while a lawful permanent resident
and concealed them during the naturalization process is removable on the basis
of the crimes, even though the alien was a naturalized citizen at the time of
conviction.  Matter of Gonzalez-Munro, 24 I&N Dec. 472 (BIA 2008).
 
C. Judicial Recommendations Against Deportation (“JRADS”)
1. An amendment to the Act, made by the Immigration Act of 1990 and effective
on November 29, 1990, eliminated section 241(b)(2). Although the amendment
took effect on November 29, 1990, it applied to convictions entered before, on,
or after that date. There is no procedure for a recommendation against
deportation in the deportation provisions created by the Immigration Act of
1990. Therefore, it would seem that recommendations against deportation are
no longer available to aliens in deportation proceedings and that any
recommendations previously made would have no effect.  
a. The INS took the position that recommendations against deportation
granted before November 29, 1990 were still valid as a defense to
deportability.  The Commissioner amended 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(c) [now
found at 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.10(c) and 1240.48(c)] as of November 29,
1990 to provide the following:
(1) No recommendation against deportation is effective against a charge
of deportability under section 241(a)(11) of the Act.
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(2) No recommendation against deportation granted on or after
November 29, 1990, is effective.
(3) The respondent shall provide a court-certified copy of a
recommendation against deportation to the IJ when the
recommendation will be the basis of denying any charge made by
the Service.
D. Juvenile delinquency
1. An act of juvenile delinquency is not a crime in the United States.  Therefore,
an adjudication of delinquency is not a crime within the meaning of the
immigration laws.  Matter of Ramirez-Rivero, 18 I&N Dec. 135 (BIA 1981);
Matter of C-M-, 5 I&N Dec. 327 (BIA 1953).
2. A juvenile delinquency proceeding results in the adjudication of a status rather
than conviction for a crime.  An adjudication of youthful offender status
pursuant to Article 720 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law, which
corresponds to a determination of juvenile delinquency under the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1994 & Supp. II 1996),
does not constitute a judgment of conviction for a crime within the meaning of
section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act.  Matter of Devison, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA
2000).
3. Once a youthful offender determination has been made, that decision cannot be
changed as a consequence of the offender’s subsequent behavior.  Therefore,
the resentencing of a youthful offender in New York following a violation of
probation does not convert the youthful offender adjudication into a judgment
of conviction.  Matter of Devison, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000).
4. Foreign convictions of juveniles.  In order for a foreign conviction to serve as a
basis for a finding of inadmissibility, the conviction must be for conduct which
is deemed criminal by U.S. standards. Matter of McNaughton, 16 I&N Dec.
569 (BIA 1978), aff'd McNaughton v. INS, 612 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1980).  
a. Conduct underlying a foreign conviction which constitutes an act of
juvenile delinquency under U.S. standards (no matter how the case was
treated by a foreign court) is not a crime for purposes of the Act.  Matter
of De La Nues, 18 I&N Dec. 140 (BIA 1981). 
b. In order to determine whether a foreign conviction is to be treated as an
adjudication of delinquency, the Board relies on the Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act (FJDC), 18 U.S.C. § 5031 et seq.. Matter of Ramirez-
Rivero, 18 I&N Dec. 135 (BIA 1981); Matter of De La Nues, 18 I&N
Dec. 140 (BIA 1981). 
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IX. Evidence
A. In general
1. Immigration proceedings are not bound by the strict rules of evidence.  Dallo v.
INS, 765 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1985); Longoria-Castaneda v. INS, 548 F.2d 233
(8th Cir. 1977); Baliza v. INS, 709 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1983); Matter of
Devera, 16 I&N Dec. 266 (BIA 1977).
2. The general rule with respect to evidence in immigration proceedings favors
admissibility as long as the evidence is shown to be probative of relevant
matters and its use is fundamentally fair so as not to deprive the alien of due
process of law.  Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1978); Baliza v. INS,
709 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1983); Trias-Hernandez v. INS, 528 F.2d 366 (9th Cir.
1975); Marlowe v. INS, 457 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1972); Matter of Toro, 17 I&N
Dec. 340 (BIA 1980); Matter of Lam, 14 I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 1972).
3. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7(a) provides that an IJ “may receive in evidence any oral or
written statement which is material and relevant to any issue in the case
previously made by the respondent or any other person during any
investigation, examination, hearing, or trial.”
a. However, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) provides that consideration by an IJ of
an application or request regarding custody or bond shall be separate and
apart from, and shall form no part of, any deportation hearing or
proceeding.  Therefore, it would seem that an IJ is precluded from
considering any evidence from a bond hearing in the course of a hearing
on deportability or relief from deportation unless, of course, the evidence
is reintroduced and received in the deportation hearing.
b. The opposite is not true, however.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) provides that
the determination of the IJ as to custody status or bond may be based
upon any information available to the IJ (such as information from the
deportation hearing) or that is presented during the bond hearing by the
respondent or the Service.  When an IJ bases a bond determination on
evidence presented in the underlying merits case, it is the responsibility of
the parties and the IJ to ensure that the bond record establishes the nature
and substance of the specific factual information considered by the IJ in
reaching the bond determination.  Matter of Adeniji, 22 I&N Dec. 1102
(BIA 1999).
4. Since the rules of evidence are not applicable and admissibility is favored, the
pertinent question regarding most evidence in immigration proceedings is not
whether or not it is admissible, but what weight the fact finder should accord it
in adjudicating the issues on which the evidence has been submitted.
B. Burden of proof and presumptions
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1. In deportation proceedings.
a. The INS bears the burden to establish deportability.  Deportability must
be established by evidence which is clear, convincing and unequivocal. 
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
(1) An exception to the “clear, convincing and unequivocal” standard
exists in deportation proceedings in which the alien is charged with
deportability pursuant to section 241(a)(9)(B) [now section
237(a)(1)(D)(i)] as an alien whose status as a conditional permanent
resident has been terminated under section 216(b) of the Act. 
section 216(b)(2) of the Act states that the INS bears the burden of
demonstrating “by a preponderance of the evidence” that a
condition described in section 216(b)(1)(A) is met.  Matter of
Lemhammad, 20 I&N Dec. 316 (BIA 1991).
b. However, the burden is on the respondent to show the time, place, and
manner of entry. INA § 291.  If this burden of proof is not sustained, the
respondent is presumed to be in the U. S. in violation of law.  Id.  In
presenting his proof, the respondent is entitled to the production of his
visa or other entry document, if any, and of any other documents and
records pertaining to his entry which are in the custody of the INS and not
considered confidential by the Attorney General.  Id.
(1) This burden and presumption is applicable to any charge of
deportability which brings into question the time, place, and manner
of entry.  Matter of Benitez, 19 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 1984).
(a) The 9th Circuit disagrees and holds that the presumption of
section 291 applies only in cases involving illegal entry.  Iran
v. INS, 656 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1981).
(2) Therefore, in a case in which the charge involves time, place, and
manner of entry, the INS's burden is often reduced to establishing
alienage.
(a) In deportation proceedings there is no presumption of
citizenship similar to the presumption of innocence which
exists in criminal cases. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
1032 (1984).
(b) A person born abroad is presumed to be an alien until he or
she shows otherwise.  United States ex rel. Rongetti v. Neelly,
207 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1953); Corona-Palomera v. INS, 661
F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1981); Matter of Ponco, 15 I&N Dec. 120
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(BIA 1974); Matter of Tijerina-Villarreal, 13 I&N Dec. 327
(BIA 1969); Matter of A-M-, 7 I&N Dec. 332 (BIA 1956).
(3) Although section 291 of the Act places the burden of proof on the
respondent to establish the time, place, and manner of entry, it
cannot serve as a basis on which to predicate a charge of
deportability, i.e. the respondent may not be charged under section
291 as an alien who has failed to establish the time, place, and
manner of entry.  A charge of deportability must be under one of the
provisions of section 241 of the Act.  Matter of Li, 12 I&N Dec. 293
(BIA 1967).
c. In applications for relief from deportation, the burden of proof is on the
respondent.  If the evidence indicates that one or more of the grounds for
mandatory denial of the application for relief may apply, the alien has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such grounds
do not apply.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d).  
2. In exclusion proceedings.
a. The burden of proof in exclusion proceedings is on the applicant to show
that he is not subject to exclusion under any provision of the Act.  INA §
291.
(1) Except when the applicant has a “colorable” claim to status as a
returning resident.  In that case the burden of proof to establish
excludability is on the INS.  Matter of Kane, 15 I&N Dec. 258 (BIA
1975).
(a) The INS burden in such a case is to show by “clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence” that the applicant
should be deprived of LPR status.  Matter of Huang, 19 I&N
Dec. 749  (BIA 1988).
(b) An alien “commuter” is not returning to an actual
unrelinquished permanent residence in the U.S., therefore he
is not entitled to a hearing at which the INS bears the burden
of proof.  Matter of Moore, 13 I&N Dec. 711 (BIA 1971).
(c) If the LPR contends that exclusion proceedings are not proper
under the Fleuti doctrine, he bears the burden to prove that he
comes within the Fleuti exception to the entry definition. 
Molina v. Sewell, 983 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1993).
(2) In exclusion proceedings where the applicant has no “colorable
claim” to LPR status and alleges that  exclusion proceedings are
improper because he made an entry and should therefore be in
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deportation proceedings, the burden is on the applicant to show that
he has effected an entry. Matter of Z-, 20 I&N Dec. 707 (BIA
1993); Matter of Matelot, 18 I&N Dec. 334 (BIA 1982); Matter of
Phelisna, 18 I&N Dec. 272 (BIA 1982).  In a case where there is no
clear evidence of the facts determinative of the entry issue, the case
ultimately must be resolved on where the burden of proof lies. 
Matter of G-, 20 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1993).
b. Under section 214(b) of the Act, every alien is presumed to be an
immigrant.  The burden of proof is on the alien to establish nonimmigrant
status under section 101(a)(15) of the Act.
c. In cases in which the applicant bears the burden of proof, the burden of
proof never shifts and is always on the applicant.  Matter of Rivero-Diaz,
12 I&N Dec. 475 (BIA 1967); Matter of M-, 3 I&N Dec. 777 (BIA 1949). 
Where the evidence is of equal probative weight, the party having the
burden of proof cannot prevail.  Id.
(1) An applicant for admission to the U.S. as a citizen of the U.S. has
the burden of proving citizenship.  Tillinghast v. Flynn ex rel. Chin
King, 38 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1930), cert. denied 281 U.S. 768 (1930);
Mah Ying Og v. Wixon, 124 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1942); Lum Mon
Sing v. United States, 124 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1941); Matter of G-R-,
3 I&N Dec. 141 (BIA 1948).
(2) Once the applicant establishes that he was once a citizen and the
INS asserts that he lost that status, then the INS bears the burden of
proving expatriation.  Id.
(3) The standard of proof to establish expatriation is less than the
“clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence test as applied in
denaturalization cases but more than a mere preponderance of
evidence.  The proof must be strict and exact.  Id.
3. In rescission proceedings.
a. In rescission proceedings the burden of proof is on the INS.
b. The burden is “clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence.” Waziri v.
INS, 392 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1968); Matter of Vilanova-Gonzalez, 13 I&N
Dec. 399 (BIA 1969) .
c. This is the same burden as the INS bears in deportation proceedings.
4. In removal proceedings involving arriving aliens or aliens alleged to be present
in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled.
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a. If the alien is an applicant for admission, the alien has the burden of
establishing that he is clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted
and is not inadmissible under section 212 or by clear and convincing
evidence, that he is lawfully present in the U.S. pursuant to a prior
admission.  INA § 240(c)(2).  In meeting the burden that he is lawfully
present in the U.S., the alien shall have access to the alien's visa or other
entry document, if any and any other records and documents, not
considered by the Attorney General to be confidential, pertaining to the
alien's admission or presence in the U.S.  Id.
b. The Government has the burden of proof to show that an applicant with a
“colorable” claim to status as a returning resident should be deprived of
LPR status.  Katebi v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 463 (1st Cir. 2005); Singh v.
Reno, 113 F.3d 1512 (9th Cir. 1997).
5. In removal proceedings involving aliens who have been admitted.
a. In the  case of an alien who has been admitted to the U.S., the Service has
the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the alien
is deportable.  No decision on deportability shall be valid unless it is
based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.  INA §
240(c)(3).
b. However, it is the alien’s burden of proof to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that he is lawfully in the United States pursuant to a
prior admission.  INA § 240(c)(2)(B).
C. Documents.
1. Certification.
a. Domestic documents.
(1) 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6(a) provides that an official record, when
admissible for any purpose, shall be evidenced by an official
publication thereof, or by a copy attested by the official having legal
custody of the record or by an authorized deputy.
(2) Proof of criminal convictions. Section 240(c)(3)(B) of the Act and 8
C.F.R. § 1003.41(a) provide that in any proceeding under the Act,
any of the following documents or records (or a certified copy of
such an official document or record) shall constitute proof of a
criminal conviction:
(a) An official record of judgment and conviction;
(b) An official record of plea, verdict, and sentence;
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(c) A docket entry from court records that indicates the existence
of the conviction;
(d) Official minutes of a court proceeding or a transcript of a court
hearing that indicates the existence of the conviction;
(e) An abstract of a record of conviction prepared by the court in
which the conviction was entered or by a State official
associated with the State's repository of criminal justice
records which indicates the charge or section of law violated,
the disposition of the case, the existence and date of
conviction, and the sentence;
(f) Any document or record prepared by, or under the direction
of, the court in which the conviction was entered that indicates
the existence of a conviction; 
(g) Any document or record attesting to the conviction that is
maintained by an official of a State or Federal penal
institution, which is the basis for that institution's authority to
assume custody of the individual named in the record.
(3) 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(b) provides that any document or record listed
in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(a) may be submitted if:
(a) it complies with the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 287.6(a), i.e.
attested by the custodian of the document or his authorized
deputy, or
(b) it is attested by an immigration officer to be a true and correct
copy of the original.
(4) Section 240(c)(3)(C) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(c) provide that any
record of conviction or abstract submitted by electronic means to
the Service from a state or court shall be admissible as evidence to
prove a criminal conviction if:
(a) it is certified by a state official associated with the state's
repository of criminal justice records as an official record from
its repository or by a court official from the court in which
conviction was entered as an official record from its repository
(section 240(c)(3)(C) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(c)(1) provide
that the certification may be by means of a computer-
generated signature and statement of authenticity) and
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(b) it is certified in writing by a Service official as having been
received electronically from the state's record repository or the
court's record repository.
(5) 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(d) provides that any other evidence that
reasonably indicates the existence of a criminal conviction may be
admissible as evidence thereof.
b. Foreign documents.
(1) Documents from Canada.  8 C.F.R. § 1287.6(d) provides that an
official record or entry therein issued by a Canadian government
entity within the geographical boundaries of Canada, when
admissible for any purpose, shall be evidenced by a certified copy of
the original record attested by the official having legal custody of
the record or by an authorized deputy.
(2) Documents from countries signatory to the Convention Abolishing
the Requirement of Legislation for Foreign Public Document.
(a) 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6(c) provides that a public document or entry
therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication or by a copy properly certified under
the Convention.
(b) No certification is needed from an officer in the Foreign
Service of public documents.  8 C.F.R. § 1287.6(c)(2).  But to
be properly certified, the copy must be accompanied by a
certificate in the form dictated by the Convention.  This
certificate must be signed by a foreign officer so authorized by
the signatory country and it must certify (1) the authenticity of
the signature of the person signing the document, (2) the
capacity in which that person acted, and (3) where appropriate,
the identity of the seal or stamp the document bears.
(c) 8 C.F.R.§ 1287.6(c)(3) provides that in accordance with the
Convention, the following documents are deemed to be public
documents:
i) documents emanating from an authority or an official
connected with the courts or tribunals of the state,
including those emanating from a public prosecutor, a
clerk of a court, or a process server;
ii) administrative documents;
iii) notarial acts;
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iv) official certificates which are placed on documents
signed by persons in their private capacity, such as
official certificates recording the registration of a
document or the fact that it was in existence on a certain
date, and official and notarial authentication of
signatures.
(d) 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6(c)(4) provides that in accordance with the
Convention, the following documents are deemed not to be
public documents and are subject to the more stringent
requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6(b):
i) documents executed by diplomatic or consular agents;
ii) administrative documents dealing directly with
commercial or customs operations.
(3) Documents from countries not signatory to the Convention.
(a) 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6(b) provides that an official record or entry
therein, when admissible for any purpose, shall be evidenced
by an official publication thereof, or by a copy attested by an
officer so authorized; 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6(b)(1).  This attested
copy, with the additional foreign certificates if any, must be
certified by an officer in the Foreign Service of the U.S.,
stationed in the country where the record is kept.  8 C.F.R. §
1287.6(b)(2).  The Foreign Service officer must certify the
genuineness of the signature and the official position either of
either:
i) the attesting officer, or
ii) any foreign officer whose certification of genuineness of
signature and official position relates directly to the
attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness
of signature and official position relating to the
attestation. (8 C.F.R. § 1287.6(a)(1) provides that the
copy attested by an authorized foreign officer may, but
need not, be certified in turn by any authorized foreign
officer both as to the genuineness of the signature of the
attesting officer and as to his/her official position.  The
signature and official position of this certifying officer
may then likewise be certified by any other foreign
officer so authorized, thereby creating a chain of
certificates.  In that situation, the officer of the Foreign
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Service of the U.S. may certify any signature in the
chain.)
2. Translation.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.33 provides that any foreign language document
offered by a party in a proceeding shall be accompanied by an English language
translation and a certification signed by the translator that must be printed
legibly or typed.  Such certification must include a statement that the translator
is competent to translate the document and that the translation is true and
accurate to the best of the translator's abilities.
3. Service.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.32(a) provides that, except in absentia hearings, a
copy of all documents (including proposed exhibits or applications) filed with
or presented to the IJ shall be simultaneously served by the presenting party on
the opposing party or parties.
a. Service of copies shall be in person or by first class mail to the most
recent address contained in the ROP.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.32(a).
b. Any documents or applications not containing a certificate certifying
service on the opposing party on a date certain will not be considered by
the IJ unless service is made on the record during a hearing.  8 C.F.R. §
1003.32(a).
4. Size and format of documents
a. Unless otherwise permitted by the IJ, all written material presented to
IJs must be on 8 ½" x 11" size paper.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.32(b).
b. An IJ may require that exhibits or other written material presented be
indexed and paginated and that a table of contents be provided. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.32(b).
5. Presumption of regularity of Government documents.  The Board held that
government documents are entitled to a presumption of regularity.  Matter of
P-N-, 8 I&N Dec. 456 (BIA 1959).
6. Similarity of names.  When documentary evidence bears a name identical to
that of the respondent, an IJ may reasonably infer that such evidence relates
to the respondent in the absence of evidence that it does not relate to him. 
United States v. Rebon-Delgado, 467 F.2d 11 (9th Cir. 1972); Matter of
Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1980); Matter of Leyva, 16 I&N
Dec. 118 (BIA 1977); Matter of Li, 15 I&N Dec. 514 (BIA 1975); Matter of
Cheung, 13 I&N Dec. 794 (BIA 1971).
7. Cases regarding specific documents.
a. Form I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien.
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(1) Absent proof that a form I-213 contains information that is
incorrect or was obtained by coercion or duress, that document is
inherently trustworthy and admissible as evidence to prove
alienage and deportability.  Matter of Barcenas, 19 I&N Dec. 609
(BIA 1988); Matter of Mejia, 16 I&N Dec. 6 (BIA 1976).
(2) In fact, the document would be admissible even under the Federal
Rules of Evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule as a public
record or report.  Matter of Mejia, 16 I&N Dec. 6 (BIA 1976).
(3) A form I-213 is admissible and ordinarily sufficient “for a prima
facie case of deportability,” whereupon the “burden shifts to the
alien to prove that he is here legally” under section 291 of the Act. 
Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1990); see
also Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308 (9th Cir. 1995); Matter of
Benitez, 19 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 1984).
(4) The Immigration and Naturalization Service met its burden, in an
in absentia removal proceeding, of establishing a minor
respondent’s removability by clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence, where (1) a Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien
(Form I-213) was submitted, documenting the respondent’s
identity and alienage; (2) the respondent, who failed without good
cause to appear at her removal hearing, made no challenge to the
admissibility of the Form I-213; (3) there were no grounds for a
finding that the admission of the Form I-213 would be
fundamentally unfair; and (4) no independent evidence in the
record supported the IJ’s conclusion that the respondent may not
have been the child of the adult who claimed to be the
respondent’s parent and who furnished the information regarding
her foreign citizenship; Matter of Gomez-Gomez, 23 I&N Dec.
522 (BIA 2002); see also Matter of Ponce-Hernandez, 22 I&N
Dec. 784 (BIA 1999).
b. Sworn statement by respondent.  Where an alien in deportation
proceedings admits his name and then stands mute, his sworn statement
may be relied upon as evidence of deportability and need not be
identified by the officer to whom the statement was made although it
represented the sole evidence of deportability other than the inference to
be drawn from the alien’s silence.  Matter of P-, 7 I&N Dec. 133 (BIA
1956); Matter of V-, 7 I&N Dec. 308 (BIA 1956).
c. Form I-130, visa petition.  A form I-130 and accompanying documents
(birth certificate, marriage certificate, etc.) are admissible, even without
identification of the I-130 by its maker, if there is an identity of name
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with the name of the respondent. Matter of Gonzalez, 16 I&N Dec. 44
(BIA 1976).
d. Police reports.  Inasmuch as all relevant factors regarding an alien's
arrest and conviction should be considered in cases involving
discretionary relief, police reports concerning circumstances of arrest
are appropriately admitted into evidence.  Matter of Grijalva, 19 I&N
Dec. 713 (BIA 1988); Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20 (BIA 1995).
Since the question posed in an application for discretionary relief is
whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted, a police report
may be helpful in answering that question because it bears on the issue
of the alien's conduct where he was arrested and this in turn is germane
to whether he merits discretionary relief.  Matter of Teixeira, 21 I&N
Dec. 316 (BIA 1996).  However, a police report should not be
considered for the purpose of determining deportability where the
statute mandates a focus on a criminal conviction, rather than on
conduct.  Id.
e. Admissions made by counsel.  Absent egregious circumstances, a
distinct and formal admission made before, during, or even after a
proceeding by an attorney acting in his professional capacity binds his
client as a judicial admission.  Matter of Velasquez, 19 I&N Dec. 377
(BIA 1986).  Thus, when an admission (of deportability) is made as a
tactical decision by an attorney in a deportation proceeding, the
admission is binding on his alien client and may be relied upon as
evidence of deportability.  Id.  There is a strong presumption that an
attorney's decision to concede an alien's deportability in a motion for
change of venue was a reasonable tactical decision, and, absent a
showing of egregious circumstances, such a concession is binding upon
the alien as an admission.  Id.  It is immaterial whether an alien actually
authorized his attorney to concede deportability in a motion to change
venue, for so long as the motion was prepared and filed by an attorney
on behalf of his alien client, it is prima facie regarded as authorized by
the alien and is admissible as evidence.  Id.  An allegation that an
attorney was authorized to represent an alien only to the extent
necessary to secure a reduction in the amount of bond does not render
inadmissible the attorney's concession of deportability in a pleading
filed in regard to another matter (a motion for change of venue filed in
the deportation hearing) for there is no “limited” appearance of counsel
in immigration proceedings.  Id.
f. State Department reports of investigations.  Reliance on reports of
investigations that do not provide sufficient information about how the
investigation was conducted are fundamentally unfair because, without
that information, it is nearly impossible for the immigration court to
assess the report's probative value and the asylum applicant is not
allowed a meaningful opportunity to rebut the investigation’s
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allegations. See Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 257 (4th Cir. 2008);
Banat v. Holder, 557 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2009).  “The Department of
Justice itself has recognized the need for a detailed [investigation]
report.” Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 459 F.3d 255, 270 (2d Cir. 2006). 
D. Testimony
1. Calling the alien to testify
a. The INS may call the respondent as a witness to establish deportability. 
Requiring the respondent to testify does not violate due process, absent
a claim of self-incrimination.  Matter of Laqui, 13 I&N Dec. 232 (BIA
1969), aff’d Laqui v. INS, 422 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1970).
b. A valid claim to privilege against compulsory self-incrimination under
the 5th amendment may be raised only as to questions that present a real
and substantial danger of self-incrimination.  Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).  Therefore, an IJ does not err in compelling
non-incriminating testimony.  Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397 (7th
Cir. 1975); Wall v. INS, 722 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984); Matter of
Santos, 19 I&N Dec. 105, 109 n.2 (BIA 1984) (no crime is implicated
when a nonimmigrant overstays his allotted time of admission).
c. Neither the IJ nor the Trial Attorney is in a position to offer immunity
from criminal prosecution.  This is an action which can only be
authorized by the Attorney General or certain officials designated by
him.  Matter of Carrillo, 17 I&N Dec. 30 (BIA 1979); Matter of King
and Yang, 16 I&N Dec. 502 (BIA 1978); Matter of Exantus and Pierre,
16 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA 1977).
2. Refusal by the alien to testify
a. On the issue of deportability
(1) Refusal to testify without legal justification in deportation
proceedings concerning the questions of alienage, time, place, and
manner of entry is reliable, substantial, and probative evidence
supporting a finding of deportability.  Matter of Pang, 11 I&N
Dec. 489 (BIA 1966), aff’d Ah Chiu Pang v. INS, 368 F.2d 637
(3d Cir. 1966); Matter of R-S-, 7 I&N Dec. 271 (BIA 1956, A.G.
1956).
(2) It is also proper to draw an unfavorable inference from refusal to
answer pertinent questions where such refusal is based upon a
permissible claim of privilege as well as where privilege is not a
factor.  Matter of O-, 6 I&N Dec. 246 (BIA 1954).  The
prohibition against the drawing of an unfavorable inference from a
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claim of privilege arises in criminal proceedings, not civil
proceedings.  Id.  The logical conclusion to be drawn from the
silence of one who claims his answers may subject him to
possible prosecution or punishment is that the testimony withheld
would be adverse to the interests of the person claiming privilege. 
Id.  Even if the refusal to testify is based on the 5th Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, the refusal forms the basis of
an inference and such inference is evidence.  United States v.
Alderete-Deras, 743 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1984); Matter of M-, 8
I&N Dec. 535 (BIA 1960); Matter of P-, 7 I&N Dec. 133 (BIA
1956); Matter of V-, 7 I&N Dec. 308 (BIA 1956).
(3) Although it is proper to draw an unfavorable inference from a
respondent's refusal to answer pertinent questions, the inference
may only be drawn after a prima facie case of deportability has
been established.  Matter of J-, 8 I&N Dec. 568 (BIA 1960);
Matter of O-, 6 I&N Dec. 246 (BIA 1954).  In deportation
proceedings, the respondent's silence alone, in the absence of any
other evidence of record, is insufficient to constitute prima facie
evidence of the respondent's alienage and is therefore also
insufficient to establish the respondent's deportability.  Matter of
Guevara, 20 I&N Dec. 238 (BIA 1991).  Also, the record should
show that the respondent was requested to give testimony, that
there was a refusal to testify, and the ground of refusal. Matter of
J-, 8 I&N Dec. 568 (BIA 1960).
b. On the issue of relief
(1) In the case of an alien who refused to answer the questions of a
congressional committee on the grounds that the answers might
incriminate him, the Board held that it might well be inferred that
what would be revealed by the answers to such questions would
not add to the alien's desirability as a resident.  Therefore, he was
found not to be a desirable resident of the U.S. and his application
for suspension of deportation was denied as a matter of discretion. 
Matter of M-, 5 I&N Dec. 261 (BIA 1953).
(2) An applicant for the exercise of discretion has the duty of making
a full disclosure of all pertinent information.  If, under a claim of
privilege against self-incrimination pursuant to the 5th
amendment, an applicant refuses to testify concerning prior false
claims to U.S. citizenship, denial of his application is justified on
the ground that he has failed to meet the burden of proving his
fitness for relief.  Matter of Y-, 7 I&N Dec. 697 (BIA 1958).
(3) A respondent's refusal to answer questions pertaining to his
application for voluntary departure prevented a full examination
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of his statutory (or discretionary, depending on the questions)
eligibility for the relief sought and such relief is properly denied. 
Matter of Li, 15 I&N Dec. 514 (BIA 1975).  Since the grant of
voluntary departure is a matter of discretion and administrative
grace, a respondent's refusal to answer questions directed to him
bearing on his application for voluntary departure is a factor
which an IJ may consider in the exercise of discretion.  Matter of
Mariani, 11 I&N Dec. 210 (BIA 1965).  The same applies to an
application for registry under section 249 of the Act. Matter of
DeLucia, 11 I&N Dec. 565 (BIA 1966).
(4) An alien seeking a favorable exercise of discretion cannot limit
the inquiry to the favorable aspects of the case and reserve the
right to be silent on the unfavorable aspects.  Matter of DeLucia,
11 I&N Dec. 565 (BIA 1966); Matter of Y-, 7 I&N Dec. 697 (BIA
1958).
(5) A respondent has every right to assert his 5th Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.  However, as an applicant for
adjustment of status, he also is required to provide information
relevant to the exercise of discretion.  In refusing to disclose such
information, the respondent prevents an IJ from reaching a
conclusion as to the respondent's entitlement to section 245 relief. 
Therefore, the respondent has failed to sustain the burden of
establishing that he is entitled to the privilege of adjustment of
status and his application is properly denied.  Matter of Marques,
16 I&N Dec. 314 (BIA 1977).
E. Hearsay
1. Hearsay evidence is admissible in deportation proceedings unless its use is
fundamentally unfair to an alien.  Matter of Grijalva, 19 I&N Dec. 713 (BIA
1988).
2. Hearsay evidence may be admitted and relied upon in administrative
hearings.  Therefore, the finder of fact in an administrative adjudication may
consider relevant and material hearsay.  Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389
(1971).
3. Hearsay evidence is not only admissible, but may be relied on, even if
contradicted by direct evidence.  Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971);
Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1980).
F. Evidence from an application to adjust an alien’s status to that of a lawful
temporary resident under section 210 of the Act
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1. Information provided in an application to adjust an alien’s status to that of a
lawful temporary resident under section 210 of the Act is confidential and
prohibited from use in rescission proceedings under section 246 of the Act, or
for any purpose other than to make a determination on an application for
lawful temporary residence, to terminate such temporary residence, or to
prosecute the alien for fraud during the time of application.  Matter of Masri,
22 I&N Dec. 1145 (BIA 1999).
G. The exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings and motions to suppress
1. Burdens
 
a. Whenever an alien in removal proceedings questions the legality of
evidence, he must provide proof establishing a prima facie case that the
DHS’s evidence was unlawfully obtained before the burden will shift to
the DHS to justify the manner in which it obtained the evidence. Matter
of Wong, 13 I&N Dec. 820, 822 (BIA 1971); Matter of Barcenas, 19
I&N Dec. 609, 611 (BIA 1988). The motion to suppress must
enumerate the articles to be suppressed. Wong, 13 I&N Dec. at 822.
The motion must be supported by an affidavit containing specific and
detailed statements based on personal knowledge. Matter of Ramirez-
Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 505 (BIA 1980); Matter of Tang, 13 I&N
Dec. 691 (BIA 1971). The mere offering of an affidavit is not sufficient
to sustain an alien’s burden, but if the affidavit is such that the facts
alleged, if true, could support a basis for excluding the evidence, then
the claims must be supported by testimony to establish a prima facie
case. Barcenas, 19 I&N Dec. at 611. At the suppression hearing, the
alien must present testimony supporting his or her case for the illegality
of the DHS’s conduct. Id. If the alien satisfies this burden, DHS will be
called upon to justify the manner in which it obtained the evidence.
Wong, 13 I&N Dec. at 822. If DHS fails to do so, the evidence must be
suppressed. Id.
2. Invoking the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
a. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination “applies
alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend
to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it.” McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
(1) Section 275(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a), provides that it is a
crime for an alien to enter the United States without inspection.
b. A Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination must be
asserted on a question-by-question basis, and, as to each question asked,
the party has to decide whether or not to raise his Fifth Amendment
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right. See, e.g., Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1019 (9th
Cir. 2006).
c. See pages 272-274 above for discussion on refusal to testify.
3. Grounds for Suppression: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Violations,
Regulatory Violations
a. Fourth Amendment
(1) Generally, the exclusionary rule does not apply in removal
proceedings. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
However, the exclusionary rule may apply where there are
“egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment or other liberties
that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and
undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained” or if
“there developed good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment
violations by INS officers were widespread.” Id. at 1050-51. See
Matter of Toro, 17 I&N Dec. 340, 343 (BIA 1980) (finding that
circumstances surrounding an arrest and interrogation in violation
of Fourth Amendment may result in evidence, the admission of
which would be fundamentally unfair and violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
(2) Seizure
(a) “[A]n initially consensual encounter between a police officer
and a citizen can be transformed into a seizure or detention
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, ‘if, in view of
all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’” 
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (quoting United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Where an
individual’s freedom of movement is restricted by a factor
independent of law enforcement conduct, such as being a
passenger on a bus, the proper analysis is “whether a
reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991). “Examples of
circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the
person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an
officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen,
or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.”
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. “[W]henever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
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away, he has ‘seized’ that person.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 16 (1968). A request for identification does not, by itself,
constitute a seizure. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216. 
(3) Violation of Fourth Amendment
(a) To lawfully stop a person, the officer must have a reasonable
suspicion that the person is unlawfully present in the United
States and must be able to articulate objective facts to
support that suspicion. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 887 (1975); Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 497
(9th Cir. 1994).
i) Proximity to the border and the suspect’s behavior may
be considered. United States v. Garcia-Barron, 116
F.3d 1305, 1308 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Tehrani, 49 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1995).
ii) Speaking a foreign language may be considered along
with the person’s inability to speak English, but that
factor alone will not justify a stop. United States v.
Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2006).
iii) Race and appearance may be considered as a factor,
but that factor alone does not give rise to a reasonable
suspicion of unlawful presence. United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
iv) Nervous or evasive behavior may be considered.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). Flight
from law enforcement officers, standing alone,
provides a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. Id.
at 124-25.
v) Failure to acknowledge a law enforcement officer may
be considered as a factor. United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 275-76 (2002).
(b) To lawfully execute a warrantless arrest, the officer must
have a reason to believe that the person is unlawfully present
in the United States and that the individual is likely to
escape before a warrant can be obtained. See INA §
287(a)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). 
i) A standard of proof which relies on reasonable belief
may be equated to a probable cause standard. See
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003); Matter
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of A-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 774, 788 (A.G. 2005). Probable
cause exists where a combination of facts exist which
are sufficient to create a reasonable belief that a
violation of law has occurred. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (quoting Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
(4) Standards for an Egregious Violation of the Fourth Amendment
(a) Second & Eighth Circuits: An egregious violation exists
where (1) the violation transgressed notions of fundamental
fairness or (2) the violation - regardless of the egregiousness
or unfairness - undermined the probative value of the
evidence obtained. Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d
231, 234-35 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032 (1984)); Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771,
778 (8th Cir. 2010).
i) A violation transgresses the notions of fundamental
fairness when the violating conduct is gross or
unreasonable in addition to being without a plausible
legal ground. Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 235.
ii) Factors to consider include the length of the illegal
stop, whether there was a use or show of force,
whether the stop was based on race or some other
grossly improper consideration, or whether the officers
invaded private property and detained individuals with
no articulable suspicion whatsoever. Almeida-Amaral,
461 F.3d at 235; Puc-Ruiz, 629 F.3d at 779.
(b) Ninth Circuit: An egregious violation of the Fourth
Amendment occurs where the violation is a bad faith
violation. Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1449 n.5
(9th Cir. 1994). 
i) A bad faith violation occurs where evidence is
obtained (1) by a deliberate violation of the Fourth
Amendment or (2) by conduct a reasonable officer
should have known is in violation of the Constitution.
Id. at 1449 (quoting Adamson v. Comm’r, 745 F.2d
541, 545 (9th Cir. 1984)). See Martinez-Medina v.
Holder, --- F.3d ----, No. 06-75778, 2011 WL 855791,
at *5 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2011).
(c) Cases finding egregiousness: Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey,
536 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2008) (nonconsensual
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warrantless entry into home); Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d
488, 493-94 (9th Cir. 1994) (nonconsensual warrantless
search based on alien’s foreign-sounding name).
(d) Cases not finding egregiousness: Melnitsenko v. Mukasey,
517 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2008) (three hour detention at
checkpoint near border); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461
F.3d 231, 236-37 (2d Cir. 2006) (arrest after displaying
Brazilian passport as form of identification); Puc-Ruiz v.
Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 777-79 (8th Cir. 2010) (warrantless
arrest by local police during search of restaurant in violation
of municipal ordinance); Martinez-Medina v. Holder, ---
F.3d ----, No. 06-75778, 2011 WL 855791 at *5 (9th Cir.
Mar. 11, 2011) (warrantless arrest by local police based on
alien’s admitted unlawful status).
b. Fifth Amendment 
(1) The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment entitles non-
citizens to fair removal proceedings and mandates that evidence
be used in a fundamentally fair manner. See Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945); United States ex rel. Vajtauer v.
Comm’r, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927); Matter of Toro, 17 I&N Dec.
340, 343 (BIA 1980). Evidence obtained in violation of the Due
Process Clause is suppressible. See Matter of Sandoval, 17 I&N
Dec. 70, 83 n.23 (BIA 1979) (citing Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d
781 (5th Cir. 1978)); Valeros v. INS, 387 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.
1967); Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1977),
superseded on other grounds by statute as recognized in Samayoa-
Martinez v. Holder, 558 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2009); Bong Youn
Choy v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1960)).
(2) Due process requires that statements which are coerced or
involuntarily given be excluded from the record. Matter of Garcia,
17 I&N Dec. 319, 321 (BIA 1980); Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d
803, 811 (1st Cir. 1977); Singh v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 207, 214-16
(2d Cir. 2009).
(a) Where the immigration officer fails to provide the advisals
at 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(c), such a failure is a factor to consider
in determining whether the alien’s statements were
involuntarily given. Matter of Garcia, 17 I&N Dec. 319, 321
(BIA 1980); Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 811 (1st
Cir. 1977); Sing v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 207, 214-16 (2d Cir.
2009). However, a failure to provide the advisals would not
render an otherwise voluntary statement inadmissible.
Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2004).
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It should be noted that the above cases addressed 8 C.F.R. §
287.3(c) before Matter of E-R-M-F- & A-S-M-, 25 I&N
Dec. 580 (BIA 2011) made clear that the advisals are not
required to be given until the NTA is filed.
  
(b) Interference with an individual’s exercise of the right to
counsel will render a statement involuntary. Matter of
Garcia, 17 I&N Dec. 319, 321 (BIA 1980).
(3) 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(vii) prohibits immigration officers from
using threats, coercion, or physical abuse to induce a suspect to
waive his or her rights or to make a statement. Therefore,
statements obtained through coercion should be suppressed as a
regulatory violation as well as a Fifth Amendment violation.
(4) Factual scenarios to consider generally.
(a) Denial of food or drink. Mineo v. INS, 19 F.3d 11 (4th Cir.
1994) (unpublished).
(b) Threats of inevitable deportation or promised preferential
treatment. Navia-Duran, 568 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1977).
(c) Length and time of day of the interrogation. Navia-Duran,
568 F.2d at 804, 810.
c. Regulations 
(1) Evidence obtained in violation of federal regulations may also be
suppressed if (1) the violated regulation is promulgated to serve “a
purpose of benefit to the alien” and (2) the violation “prejudiced
interests of the alien which were protected by the regulation.”
Matter of Garcia-Flores, 17 I&N Dec. 325, 328 (BIA 1980).  But
see Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1991).
(a) To demonstrate prejudice, the alien must establish that the
outcome of the case would be different if the regulatory
provision had not been violated. Martinez-Camargo, 282
F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2002).
(b) Prejudice is presumed where (1) compliance with the
regulation is mandated by the Constitution or (2) a
procedural framework designed to ensure the fair processing
of an action affecting an individual is created, but not
followed by an agency. Garcia-Flores, 17 I&N Dec. at 329.
See Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 2010).
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(2) Relevant Regulatory Provisions
(a) Interrogation - “An immigration officer, like any other
person, has the right to ask questions of anyone as long as
the immigration officer does not restrain the freedom of an
individual, not under arrest, to walk away.” 8 C.F.R. §
287.8(b)(1). See INA § 287(a)(1). Section 287(a)(1) of the
act requires that immigration officers possess a “reasonable
suspicion of alienage” before questioning individuals about
their immigration status, even where the individuals are not
being detained. Matter of King and Yang, 16 I&N Dec. 502,
504-05 (BIA 1978).
(b) Brief Detentions - “If the immigration officer has a
reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that
the person being questioned is, or is attempting to be,
engaged in an offense against the United States or is an alien
illegally in the United States, the immigration officer may
briefly detain the person for questioning.” 8 C.F.R. §
287.8(b)(2). 
(c) Arrests - An immigration officer authorized by 8 C.F.R. §
287.5(c)(1) has the power to arrest aliens for immigration
violations. See INA § 287(a)(2). An officer may arrest a
person only when he has reason to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed an offense against the United
States or is an alien illegally in the United States. 8 C.F.R. §
287.8(c)(2)(i). “A warrant of arrest shall be obtained except
when the designated immigration officer has reason to
believe that the person is likely to escape before a warrant
can be obtained.” 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii).
(d) Arrests without warrant - The Act empowers immigration
officers authorized by regulation to arrest aliens whom the
officers have reason to believe is in the United States in
violation of any law or regulation made in pursuance of law
regulating the admission, exclusion, expulsion or removal of
aliens. INA § 287(a)(2). 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(c)(1) authorizes a
specified list of immigration officers to conduct these
arrests. 
(e) Examination of Aliens Arrested Without Warrant - “An
alien arrested without a warrant of arrest under the authority
contained in section 287(a)(2) of the Act will be examined
by an officer other than the arresting officer. If no other
qualified officer is readily available and the taking of the
alien before another officer would entail unnecessary delay,
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the arresting officer . . . may examine the alien.” 8 C.F.R. §
287.3(a).
i) The Constitution does not mandate compliance with
this section, nor is there any evidence that this section
was promulgated to protect fundamental statutory or
constitutional rights. See Martinez-Camargo, 282 F.3d
487, 492 (7th Cir. 2002).
 
(f) Determination of Proceedings After Examination - If the
examining officer is satisfied that prima facie evidence
exists demonstrating that the arrested alien was entering,
attempting to enter, or is present in the United States in
violation of the immigration laws, the examining officer will
(1) refer the case to an immigration judge; (2) order the alien
removed; or (3) take whatever other action may be
appropriate or required by the applicable laws or regulations.
8 C.F.R. § 287.3(b).
(g) Provision of Advisals - “. . . [A]n alien arrested without a
warrant and placed in formal proceedings under section 238
or 240 of the Act will be advised of the reasons for his or her
arrest and the right to be represented at no expense to the
Government. The examining officer will provide the alien
with a list of the available free legal services . . . The officer
will also advise the alien that any statement made may be
used against him or her in a subsequent proceeding.” 8
C.F.R. § 287.3(c). In Matter of E-R-M-F- & A-S-M-, 25
I&N Dec. 580 (BIA 2011), the Board held that this
regulation does not require immigration officers to provide
these advisals until after the alien who has been arrested
without a warrant is placed in formal proceedings by the
filing of a Notice to Appear.
i) 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(c) was intended to serve a purpose of
benefit to the alien. Garcia-Flores, 17 I&N Dec. at 329.
(h) Alien’s Right to Counsel - 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) states that
“[w]henever an examination is provided for in this chapter,
the person involved shall have the right to be represented by
an attorney or representative . . . .”
i) ICE refers to post-arrest questioning of aliens as
“examination” in its regulations. See 8 C.F.R. §
287.3(a). Therefore, aliens have a right to counsel at
those examinations. See Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464
F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2006). However, the alien is not
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entitled to be advised of this right until the NTA is
filed with the immigration court. See E-R-M-F- & A-
S-M-, 25 I&N Dec. at 584. 
ii) Where the alien is denied the opportunity to exercise
this right, the alien’s statements are considered
involuntary and must be excluded. See Matter of
Garcia, 17 I&N Dec. 319 (BIA 1980). 
d. Common issues
(1) Alleged Violations Involving non-ICE Law Enforcement Officers
(a) Fourth Amendment violations
i) Two unpublished Board decisions indicate that
motions to suppress based on violations of the Fourth
Amendment by non-immigration officers lack
adequate grounds to suppress evidence later gathered
by duly authorized immigration agents. See Jose
Ramiro Hernandez Avendano, A75 464 934, 2006 WL
2427873 (BIA July 18, 2006); Jorge Angel Puc-Ruiz,
A200 096 033, 2009 WL 263131 (BIA Jan. 13, 2009).
(b) Regulatory violations
i) In Samayoa-Martinez v. Holder, 558 F.3d 897, 900-01
(9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit found that the
military police officer who arrested Samayoa was not
an agent of INS and, therefore, was not required to
comply with INS regulations. The court also noted that
the military police officer had authority to arrest
Samayoa “for on-base violations of civil law.” Id. at
901.
(c) 287(g)(10)
i) Pursuant to section 287(g)(1) of the Act, state and local
law enforcement may perform certain immigration
officer functions if they enter into an agreement with
DHS.
ii) Section 287(g)(10) of the Act states that “Nothing in
this subsection shall be construed to require an
agreement under this subsection in order for any
officer or employee of a State or political subdivision
of a State – (A) to communicate with the Attorney
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General regarding the immigration status of any
individual, including reporting knowledge that a
particular alien is not lawfully present in the United
States; or (B) otherwise to cooperate with the Attorney
General in the identification, apprehension, detention,
or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United
States.”
iii) DHS may argue that, pursuant to section
287(g)(10)(B), a state or local police officer is
authorized to arrest, detain, and/or transport an alien.
Courts have interpreted this section of the Act in
different ways.
a) The Sixth Circuit has stated that this section
stands for the proposition that local law
enforcement officers cannot enforce completed
violations of civil immigration law (i.e., illegal
presence) unless specifically authorized to do so
by the Attorney General . . . .” United States v.
Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 575 (6th Cir. 2008). See
Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v.
Deal, --- F. Supp. 2d ----, No. 1:11-CV-1804-
TWT, 2011 WL 2520752 (N.D. Ga. June 27,
2011) (quoting Urrieta, 520 F.3d at 575).
b) The Eighth Circuit has interpreted section
287(g)(10)(B) to authorize state law enforcement
to, at the request of ICE, take into custody,
transport, and detain overnight an individual who
had been ticketed for speeding. United States v.
Quintana, 623 F.3d 1237, 1242 (8th Cir. 2010).
 
c) The Ninth Circuit interprets the “otherwise to
cooperate” language of  § 1357(g)(10)(B) to
mean that “when the Attorney General calls upon
state and local law enforcement officers – or such
officers are confronted with the necessity – to
cooperate with federal immigration enforcement
on an incidental and as needed basis, state and
local officers are permitted to provide this
cooperative help without the written agreements
that are required for systematic and routine
cooperation.” United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d
339, 349 (9th Cir. 2010)  (emphasis in original).
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d) The Tenth Circuit has found that this section
“evinces a clear invitation from Congress for
state and local agencies to participate in the
process of enforcing federal immigration laws.”
United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d
1294, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999).
(d) A violation of state law by a state or local police officer does
not amount to a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
See Martinez-Medina,, --- F.3d ----, No. 06-75778, 2011
WL 855791, at *8 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2011). 
(e) An authorized immigration officer may issue a detainer
which serves to advise another law enforcement agency that
ICE seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that
agency for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien. 8
C.F.R. § 287.7(a).
(f) Custodial transfers from state or local law enforcement to
ICE do not constitute new arrests. United States v. Laville,
480 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 2007). 
(2) Independent Source Doctrine
(a) An alien’s identity is never suppressible, even if it was
obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest, search, or
interrogation. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039
(1984).
i) This has led some courts to find that pre-existing
governmental records are not suppressible under
Lopez-Mendoza because they are related to identity.
United States v. Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d 1181, 1189
(11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bowley, 435 F.3d
426, 430-41 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Roque-
Villanueva, 175 F.3d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1999).
However, other courts have held that such records can
be excluded. United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d
224, 227-30 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Olivares-
Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1111-12 (10th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d 864, 865
(9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Guevara-Martinez,
262 F.3d 751, 753-55 (8th Cir. 2001).
(b) Evidence of alienage is treated as separate from evidence of
identity and is suppressible. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
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U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461
F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2006); Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d
771, 777 n.1 (8th Cir. 2010); Matter of Sandoval, 17 I&N
Dec. 70, 79 (BIA 1979). But see United States v. Garcia-
Garcia, 633 F.3d 608, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).
(c) Any evidence obtained independently of a deficient search
may be relied upon. Matter of Cervantes-Torres, 21 I&N
Dec. 351, 353 (BIA 1996).
i) If the alien admits factual allegations or fails to object
to documents sufficient to establish to removability,
the IJ may determine that removability has been
established by clear and convincing evidence,
notwithstanding the existence of inadmissible prior
statements. See Miguel v. INS, 359 F.3d 408, 410-11
(6th Cir. 2004); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.8(a), 1240.10(c)
(2008).
ii) DHS may use the alien’s identity to obtain information
regarding prior entries or immigration violations from
official files maintained by DHS or other entities.
United States v. Guzman-Bruno, 27 F.3d 420 (9th Cir.
1994); United States v. Orozco-Rico, 589 F.2d 433,
435 (9th Cir. 1978). See Cervantes-Torres, 21 I&N
Dec. at 353-54.
(3) Reliability of the I-213
(a) “[A]bsent any evidence that a Form I-213 contains
information that is inaccurate or obtained by coercion or
duress, that document, although hearsay, is inherently
trustworthy and admissible as evidence to prove alienage or
deportability.” Matter of Gomez-Gomez, 23 I&N Dec. 522,
524 (BIA 2002). An I-213 may be suppressed if the officer
completing it relied on the hearsay statements of a non-
governmental third party who is not the respondent and that
third party is not made available for cross-examination. See
Murphy v. INS, 54 F.3d 605, 610 (9th Cir. 1995).
(b) An I-213 will only be suppressed based on incorrect factual
information where that factual information is material to the
purpose for which the form was admitted. See Espinoza v.
INS, 45 F.3d 308, 309 (9th Cir. 1995).
(4) Waiver or Collateral Estoppel
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(a) A guilty plea in criminal court does not preclude a
respondent from moving to suppress evidence in removal
proceedings. See United States v. Gregg, 463 F.3d 160, 164
(2d Cir. 2006).
H. The doctrine of equitable estoppel.
1. Equitable estoppel is a judicially devised doctrine which precludes a party to
a lawsuit, because of some improper conduct on that party's part, from
asserting a claim or defense, regardless of its substantive validity.  Matter of
Hernandez-Puente, 20 I&N Dec. 335 (BIA 1991).
2. The Supreme Court has recognized the possibility that the doctrine of
equitable estoppel might be applied against the Government in a case where
it is established that its agents engaged in “affirmative misconduct.”  INS v.
Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961). 
However, the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether even “affirmative
misconduct” is sufficient to estop the Government from enforcing the
immigration laws.  INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14 (1982).
3. Some federal courts have found “affirmative misconduct” and applied
estoppel against the Government.  Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301
(2d Cir. 1976); Fano v. O'Neill, 806 F.2d 1262 (5th Cir. 1987).
4. Estoppel is an equitable form of action and only equitable rights are
recognized.  By contrast, the Board can only exercise such discretion and
authority conferred upon the Attorney General by law.  The Board's
jurisdiction is defined by the regulations and it has no jurisdiction unless it is
affirmatively granted by the regulations.  Therefore, the Board and IJs are
without authority to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the INS
so as to preclude it from undertaking a lawful course of action that it is
empowered to pursue by statute and regulation.  Matter of Hernandez-Puente,
20 I&N Dec. 335 (BIA 1991).
I. The doctrine of collateral estoppel or res judicata
1. In general
a. The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes parties to a judgment on
the merits in a prior suit from relitigating in a subsequent suit issues
that were actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the prior
suit.  Matter of Fedorenko, 19 I&N Dec. 57 (BIA 1984).
b. The doctrine of collateral estoppel generally applies to the Government
as well as to private litigants.  Id.
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c. The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be applied to preclude
reconsideration of an issue of law, as well as fact, so long as the issue
arises in both the prior and subsequent suits from virtually identical
facts and there has been no change in the in the controlling law.  Id.
d. The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in deportation proceedings
when there has been a prior judgment between the parties that is
sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect, the parties had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issues resolved by and necessary to
the outcome of the prior judgment, and the use of collateral estoppel is
not unfair.  Id.
e. The language in section 240(a)(3) of the Act, which provides that a
removal proceeding shall be “the sole and exclusive procedure for
determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or, if
the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States,” does
not preclude the use of collateral estoppel in a deportation proceeding. 
Rather, this language was intended to exempt deportation proceedings
from the provisions of any other law, most particularly the
Administrative Procedure Act of June 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 237, repealed
by Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (1966).  Id.
f. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a prior judgment conclusively
establishes the "ultimate facts" of a subsequent deportation proceeding,
i.e. those facts upon which an alien's deportability and eligibility for
relief from deportation are to be determined, and precludes
reconsideration of issues of law resolved by the prior judgment, so long
as the issues in the prior suit and the deportation proceeding arise from
virtually identical facts and there has been no change in the controlling
law.  Id.
2. Decisions in criminal proceedings.
a. The adverse judgment of a court in a criminal proceeding is binding in a
deportation proceeding in which the respondent was the defendant in
the criminal case and in which the issue is one which was also an issue
in the criminal case.  Matter of Z-, 5 I&N Dec. 708 (BIA 1954).
b. Where a respondent has been convicted in a criminal proceeding of a
conspiracy to violate 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (entry without inspection or by
willfully false or misleading representation or the willful concealment
of a material fact) but the indictment does not contain an allegation that
the respondent procured a visa by fraud, his conviction will not, under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, establish his deportability as an alien
who procured a visa by fraud.  Matter of Marinho, 10 I&N Dec. 214
(BIA 1962, 1963).
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c. An alien attempting to enter the U.S. by presenting a false Alien
Registration Card who was paroled for prosecution and thereafter
convicted in a criminal proceeding of a violation of section 275 of the
Act (8 U.S.C. § 1325 - illegal entry) is not properly placed in exclusion
proceeding.  Although the applicant was paroled into the U.S., he was
prosecuted and convicted of illegal entry.  Therefore, an exclusion
proceeding will be terminated because, under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, the Service is prevented from denying that the applicant made
an entry.  Matter of Barragan-Garibay, 15 I&N Dec. 77 (BIA 1974).
d. The definition of the term “entry” in section 101(a)(13) of the Act
applies to both the criminal provisions of section 275 of the Act and the
deportation provisions of (former) section 241(a)(2).  The definition of
“entry” in section 101(a)(13) was interpreted in Rosenberg v. Fleuti,
374 U.S. 449 (1963).  Since the respondent was convicted in a criminal
proceeding of illegal entry, that decision is dispositive of any possible
Fleuti issue, and the respondent is collaterally estopped from relitigating
the issue of illegal entry in a subsequent deportation proceeding.  Matter
of Rina, 15 I&N Dec. 346 (BIA 1975).
e. The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents respondent, who was
convicted of entry without inspection under section 275 of the Act (8
U.S.C. 1325), from relitigating the illegal entry in subsequent
deportation proceedings.  Matter of Rina, 15 I&N Dec. 453 (BIA 1975).
f. Where a respondent has been acquitted on a criminal charge, one of the
essential elements of which was alienage, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel does not preclude litigation of the question of his alienage in a
subsequent deportation proceeding because of the difference in the
burden of proof applicable to criminal proceedings and to deportation
proceedings.  Matter of Perez-Valle, 17 I&N Dec. 581 (BIA 1980).
g. An applicant in exclusion proceedings is estopped from contending that
he was brought to the U.S. against his will where, in criminal
proceedings for attempted smuggling of heroin into the U.S., the court
considered the same contention and found that the applicant came to the
U.S. voluntarily.  An applicant in possession of a visa for entry into the
U.S., destined to the U.S., voluntarily arriving in the U.S., and
submitting his luggage for inspection by Customs officials, must be
considered an applicant for admission.  Matter of Grandi, 13 I&N Dec.
798 (BIA 1971).
h. Ordinarily a court decision may be res judicata or operate as a collateral
estoppel in a subsequent administrative proceeding, but when a
respondent presented a fraudulent offer of employment with his
application for an immigrant visa and was later convicted in a criminal
proceeding of a conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (making false
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statements or using false writings), the doctrine of collateral estoppel
does not estop the respondent from denying that he was excludable at
entry under former section 212(a)(19) of the Act [procured visa by
fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact] or former section
212(a)(20) of the Act [immigrant not in possession of a valid immigrant
visa] because of the issue of materiality.  In the deportation proceeding,
the test of materiality is whether the matter concealed concerned a
ground of inadmissibility or a probable inadmissibility.  See Matter of
S- and B-C-, 9 I&N Dec. 436 (BIA 1960; A.G.1961).  In the criminal
case (in those jurisdictions where materiality is required), the test of
materiality is merely whether the false statement could affect or
influence the exercise of a Governmental function.  An offer of
employment is not legally required as an absolute condition for the
issuance of an immigrant visa.  The purpose of such a document is
merely to assist the Counsel in his determination of whether to issue the
visa.  Therefore, the respondent's misrepresentation was not material
and he is not deportable for being excludable at entry. Matter of
Martinez-Lopez, 10 I&N Dec. 409 (BIA 1962; A.G. 1964).
3. Decisions in denaturalization cases.
a. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a prior denaturalization
judgment conclusively establishes the “ultimate facts” of a subsequent
deportation proceeding, i.e. those facts upon which an alien's
deportability and eligibility for relief from deportation are to be
determined, and precludes reconsideration of issues of law resolved by
the prior judgment, so long as the issues in the prior suit and the
deportation proceeding arise from virtually identical facts and there has
been no change in the controlling law.  Matter of Fedorenko, 19 I&N
Dec. 57 (BIA 1984).
b. Where one of the principal issues in a denaturalization suit was whether
the respondent had been a member of the Communist Party from 1930
to 1936 and this issue was litigated and was essential to the court's
determination which resulted in a judgment revoking citizenship, by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel the finding by the court in the
denaturalization suit was conclusive in the subsequent deportation
proceeding involving a charge based upon a like period of membership
in the Communist Party.  Matter of C-, 8 I&N Dec. 577 (BIA 1960).
c. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a finding by a denaturalization
court which was essential to its judgment that the respondent was a
member of the Communist Party from 1937 to 1945 is conclusive in a
subsequent deportation proceeding.  Matter of T-, 9 I&N Dec. 127 (BIA
1960).
4. Decisions in extradition proceedings.
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a. Decisions resulting from extradition proceedings are not entitled to res
judicata effect in later proceedings.  The parties to an extradition
proceeding are not the same as in a deportation proceeding since the
real party at interest in extradition proceedings is the foreign country
seeking the respondents extradition, not the U.S.  Also, the res judicata
bar goes into effect only where a valid, final judgment has been
rendered on the merits.  It is well established that decisions and orders
regarding extraditability embody no judgment on the guilt or innocence
of the accused, but serve only to insure that his culpability will be
determined in another forum.  While the function of a deportation
proceeding also is not to decide an alien's guilt or innocence of a crime,
those cases holding that extradition decisions do not bind judicial
bodies in later criminal proceedings are as applicable to subsequent
deportation proceedings.  The issues involved in a deportation hearing
differ from those involved in an extradition case, and resolution of even
a common issue in one proceeding is not binding in the other. 
Therefore, a magistrate's decision in extradition proceedings that the
crimes committed by the respondent in a foreign country were political
crimes which bar his extradition does not bind the Board.  Matter of
McMullen, 17 I&N Dec. 542, 548 (BIA 1980), rev’d on other grounds,
658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981), on remand, Matter of McMullen, 19
I&N Dec. 90 (BIA 1984), aff’d, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled
in part on other grounds by Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th
Cir. 2005).
5. Decisions in prior deportation proceedings or other administrative decisions.
a. Based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pearson v. Williams,
202 U.S. 281 (1906) and other federal courts which held that the
doctrine of res judicata has no application in administrative
proceedings, the Board held that the doctrine is not applicable to
deportation proceedings.  Matter of M-, 8 I&N Dec. 535 (BIA 1960);
Matter of K-, 3 I&N Dec. 575 (BIA 1949).
b. The Supreme Court stated that when an administrative agency is acting
in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly
before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,
the doctrine of res judicata may apply.  United States v. Utah Constr. &
Min. Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1982) (citing Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S.
281 (1906) as an example of where a court used language that was too
broad in stating that res judicata principles do not apply to
administrative proceedings), superseded by statute on other grounds as
recognized by Essex Electro Engineers, Inc. v. United States, 702 F.2d
998 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456
U.S. 461 (1982) (requiring a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
claim or issue).
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c. In Medina v. INS, 993 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1993), the 5th Circuit
specifically held that res judicata may be applied to decisions in
deportation proceedings provided (1) the case in which the valid, final
judgment was rendered involved the same parties and issues and (2)
there was an opportunity to reach the merits on those issues.  See also
United States v. Shanbaum, 10 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1994).  The 9th
Circuit has also given res judicata effect to an IJ’s decision.  Ramon-
Sepulveda v. INS, 824 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1987).
6. Miscellaneous cases.
a. The fact that a respondent was inspected and erroneously admitted to
the U.S. by a Service officer does not operate to estop the Service from
instituting a deportation proceeding against the respondent if it is later
discovered that he was excludable at the time of his admission.  Matter
of Khan, 14 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA 1973), aff’d sub nom. Santiago v. INS,
526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975); Matter of Polanco, 14 I&N Dec. 483
(BIA 1973).
b. A respondent admitted for permanent residence in possession of an
immigrant visa issued to him as the spouse of a U.S. citizen upon the
basis of a visa petition approved by the Service subsequent to the
commencement but prior to the conclusion of deportation proceedings
instituted against his wife which resulted in a determination, ultimately
sustained by the U.S. Court of Appeals, that she was not in fact a citizen
of the U.S. is not immune to deportation proceedings.  Notwithstanding
the visa petition approval may have been an erroneous act, there was no
“affirmative misconduct” and the Service is not estopped in subsequent
deportation proceedings against respondent from showing that his wife
was not a citizen.  The fact that a formal decision was made on the visa
petition does not, by itself, give substantial weight to respondent's
estoppel argument.  The approval of the petition was by no means a
final determination of the citizenship claim of the respondent's wife. 
Matter of Morales, 15 I&N Dec. 411 (BIA 1975).  This decision was
based on a lack of equitable estoppel rather than on the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.  Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the
respondent was not a party to the previous visa petition proceeding.  As
to the deportation proceeding brought against his wife, the doctrine of
collateral estoppel might not apply because the burden of proof may be
different in visa petition proceedings than in deportation proceedings.
c. Since applicants are not entitled to immediate relative status on the
basis of claimed adoption in the Yemen Arab Republic (which does not
recognize the practice of adoption), the Service is not estopped from
excluding them under former section 212(a)(20) of the Act as
immigrants not in possession of valid immigrant visas notwithstanding
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the erroneous approval of visa petitions according them immediate
relative status.  Not only is the Service empowered to make a
redetermination of an applicant's admissibility upon arrival at a port of
entry with an immigrant visa, it is under an absolute duty to do so under
sections 204(e) and 235(b) of the Act.  Matter of Mozeb, 15 I&N Dec.
430 (BIA 1975).
J. Classified information.
1. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.33(c)(4) provides that counsel for the Service may call
witnesses and  present evidence for the record, including information
classified under  the applicable Executive Order, provided the IJ or the 
Board has determined that such information is relevant to the hearing. 
(Although 8 C.F.R. § 1240.33 deals specifically with applications for asylum,
the rules cited below appear applicable anytime classified material is
presented.)
a. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.33(c)(4) also provides that the applicant shall be
informed when the IJ receives such  classified information.
b. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.33(c)(4) also states that the agency that provides the
classified information to the IJ may provide an unclassified summary 
of the information for release to the applicant whenever it determines it
can do so consistently with safeguarding both the classified nature of
the information and its source. The summary should be as detailed as
possible, in order that the applicant may have an opportunity to offer
opposing evidence.
c. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.33(c)(4) also provides that a decision based in whole or
in part on classified information shall state that such information is
material to the decision.
K. Protective orders
1. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46(a) provides that in any immigration or bond proceeding,
an IJ may issue a protective order barring disclosure of information upon a
showing by the Department of Homeland Security of a substantial likelihood
that specific information submitted under seal or to be submitted under seal
will, if disclosed, harm the national security as defined in section 219(d)(2) of
the Act or law enforcement interests of the U.S.
a. Section 219(d)(2) of the Act defines the term “national security” as the
national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United
States.
2. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46(b) provides that the Department of Homeland Security
may at any time after filing a NTA or other charging document with the IJ,
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file a motion for an order to protect specific information it intends to submit
or is submitting under seal.
a. The motion shall describe, to the extent practical, the information that
the Department of Homeland Security seeks to protect from disclosure.
b. The motion shall specify the relief requested in the protective order.
c. The motion shall be served upon the respondent.
d. The respondent may file a response to the motion within 10 days after
the motion is served.
e. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46(c) provides that, in the Department of Homeland
Security’s discretion, DHS may file the specific information as a sealed
annex to the motion, which shall not be served upon the respondent. If
DHS files a sealed annex, or the IJ, in his or her discretion, instructs
that the information be filed as a sealed annex in order to determine
whether to grant or deny the motion, the IJ shall consider the
information only for the purpose of determining whether to grant or
deny the motion.
3. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46(d) provides that the IJ shall give appropriate deference to
the expertise of senior officials in law enforcement and national security
agencies in any averments in any submitted affidavit in determining whether
the disclosure of information will harm the national security or law
enforcement interests of the U.S.
4. Denied motions.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.46(e) provides that if the motion is denied,
any sealed annex shall be returned to the Department of Homeland Security,
and the IJ shall give no weight to such information.  DHS may immediately
appeal denial of the motion to the Board, which shall have jurisdiction to hear
the appeal, by filing a Notice of Appeal and the sealed annex with the Board.
The IJ shall hold any further proceedings in abeyance pending resolution of
the appeal by the Board.
5. Granted motions.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.46(f) provides that if the motion is
granted, the IJ shall issue an appropriate protective order.
6. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46(f)(1) provides that the IJ shall ensure that the protective
order encompasses such witnesses as the respondent demonstrates are
reasonably necessary to the presentation of his case.  If necessary, the IJ may
impose the requirements of the protective order on any witness before the IJ
to whom such information may be disclosed.
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7. The protective order may require that the respondent, and his or her attorney
or accredited representative, if any, to do any of the following (8 C.F.R. §
1003.46(f)(2)):
a. Not divulge any of the information submitted under the protective
order, or any information derived therefrom, to any person or entity,
other than authorized personnel of EOIR, the Department of Homeland
Security, or such other persons approved by DHS or the IJ;
b. When transmitting any information under a protective order, or any
information derived therefrom, to EOIR or the Department of
Homeland Security, include a cover sheet identifying the contents of the
submission as containing information subject to a protective order
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46;
c. Store any information under a protective order, or any information
derived therefrom, in a reasonably secure manner, and return all copies
of such information to the Department of Homeland Security upon
completion of proceedings, including judicial review; and 
d. Such other requirements as the IJ finds necessary to protect the
information from disclosure.
8. Upon issuance of a protective order, the Department of Homeland Security
shall serve the respondent with the protective order and the sealed
information. Once a protective order is issued, it shall remain in effect until
vacated by the IJ. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46(f)(3).
9. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46(f)(4) provides that further review of the protective order
before the Board shall only be had pursuant to review of an order of the IJ
resolving all issues of removability and any applications for relief pending in
the matter pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b). It also provides that, notwithstanding
any other provision the regulation, the IJ shall retain jurisdiction to modify or
vacate a protective order upon motion of the Department of Homeland
Security or the respondent. An IJ may not grant a motion by the respondent to
modify or vacate a protective order until either: DHS files a response to such
motion or 10 days after service of such motion on DHS.
10. Admissibility as evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46(g) provides that the issuance
of a protective order shall not prejudice the respondent’s right to challenge
the admissibility of the information subject to a protective order. The IJ may
not find the information inadmissible solely because it is subject to a
protective order.
11. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46(h) provides that any submission to the IJ including any
briefs referring to information subject to a protective order shall be filed
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under seal. Any information submitted subject to a protective order shall
remain under seal as part of the administrative record.
12. Failure to comply with protective order.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.46(i) provides that
if the Department of Homeland Security establishes that a respondent, or the
respondent’s attorney or accredited representative, has disclosed information
subject to a protective order, the IJ shall deny all forms of discretionary relief,
except bond, unless the respondent fully cooperates with DHS or other law
enforcement agencies in any investigation relating to the noncompliance with
the protective order and disclosure of the information; and establishes by
clear and convincing evidence either that extraordinary and extremely
unusual circumstances exist or that failure to comply with the protective
order was beyond the control of the respondent and his or her attorney or
accredited representative.  Failure to comply with a protective order may also
result in the suspension of an attorney’s or an accredited representative’s
privilege of appearing before EOIR or before DHS.
13. The consequence of breaching a protective order is discussed in Matter of R-
S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 629 (BIA 2003).  That case holds that the presence of
federal employees, including court personnel or Department of Justice
attorneys, at a closed hearing in which a protective order is discussed does
not violate the protective order regulations.
L. Constitutional issues
1. Neither the Board nor an IJ may rule on the constitutionality of the statutes
they administer or the regulations properly promulgated under the provisions
of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  Matter of Patel, 19 I&N Dec. 774
(BIA 1988); Matter of Valdovinos, 18 I&N Dec. 343 (BIA 1982); Matter of
Bogart, 15 I&N Dec. 552 (BIA 1975, 1976; A.G. 1976); Matter of Chery and
Hasan, 15 I&N Dec. 380 (BIA 1975); Matter of Santana, 13 I&N Dec. 362
(BIA1969); Matter of L-, 4 I&N Dec. 556 (BIA 1951).
M. Administrative notice
1. Although immigration proceedings are not bound by the strict rules of
evidence or by the Federal Rules of Evidence, reference is made herein to the
Federal Rules of Evidence for the purposes of definition and background.
a. Rule 201(b) provides that a judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.
b. Rule 201(c) provides that judicial notice is discretionary and a court
may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.  Rule 201(d)
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discusses when it is mandatory and provides that a court shall take
judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary
information.
c. Rule 201(e) discusses the opportunity to be heard and states that a party
is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed.  It
goes on to state that in the absence of prior notification, the request may
be made after judicial notice has been taken.
2. The Board has held that it is well established that administrative agencies and
the courts may take judicial (or administrative) notice of commonly known
facts.  Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23 (BIA 1998); Matter of H-M-,
20 I&N Dec. 683 (BIA 1993); Matter of R-R-, 20 I&N Dec. 547, 551 n.2
(BIA 1992) (citing Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,
301 U.S. 292 (1937)).
3. The issue of administrative notice arises most often in the asylum context and
the Board has held that it may take administrative notice of changes in
foreign governments.  Matter of R-R-, 20 I&N Dec. 547 (BIA 1992).  
4. There is a circuit split regarding the extent to which an alien must be afforded
an opportunity to respond when the Board takes administrative notice of
facts.
a. The Ninth Circuit has held that it is improper for the Board to take
administrative notice of “controversial or individualized facts, such as
whether a particular group remains in power after an election, and
whether the election has vitiated any previously well-founded fear of
persecution,” unless the alien is given “an opportunity to rebut the
extra-record facts or show cause why administrative notice should not
be taken of those facts.”  Getachew v. INS, 25 F.3d 841, 846 (9th Cir.
1994). See also Circu v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2006);
Gomez-Vigil v. INS, 990 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1993); Castillo-Villagra v.
INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1992). 
b. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that “where the BIA noticed facts
and made disputable inferences based on those facts which not only
contradicted the findings of the immigration judge but were dispositive
of Petitioners’ appeal, we hold that due process requires the BIA to give
Petitioners advance notice and an opportunity to be heard.”  de la Llana-
Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1099 (10th Cir. 1994).
c. The Second Circuit recently published two decisions that were in
accord with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.  In reversing the Board’s
denial (based solely on administratively-noticed facts) of a motion to
reopen, the Second Circuit held that the Board “exceeded its discretion
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in failing to provide [the alien] with an opportunity to rebut the
significance of those facts before issuing its decision.”  Chhetry v.
Dep’t of Justice, 490 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2007).  Similarly, in
reversing the Board’s denial (based solely on administratively noticed
facts) of an asylum application, the Second Circuit stated that “the BIA
erred by failing to give [the alien] advance notice of its intention to
consider this extra-record fact. . . . [and] the opportunity to rebut this
fact’s significance before issuing its decision.”  Burger v. Gonzales, 498
F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2007).
d. The Seventh Circuit has disagreed with the above circuits, with that
court stating that “the motion to reopen procedure allows asylum
petitioners an opportunity to introduce evidence rebutting officially
noticed facts which is sufficient to satisfy” due process requirements. 
Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 597 (7th Cir. 1991).  Similarly, the
Fifth Circuit has held that “[t]he motion to reopen provides [aliens who
have applied for asylum] with an opportunity to be heard regarding
facts officially noticed and to present contrary evidence.”  Rivera-Cruz
v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 968 (5th Cir. 1991).  Finally, the D.C. Circuit has
ruled that, where the Board took official notice of a change in
government while an asylum application was before the Board on
appeal, “[t]he availability of a petition to reopen secures [the alien’s]
due process right to a meaningful hearing.”  Gutierrez-Rogue v. INS,
954 F.2d 769, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
N. Items which are not evidence
1. The arguments of counsel and statements made in a brief or on a Notice of
Appeal are not evidence and therefore not entitled to any evidentiary weight. 
INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984), superseded by statute on other
grounds as recognized by INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85 (1986); Matter of
Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1980); Matter of M/V "Runaway",
18 I&N Dec. 127 (BIA 1981).
2. Evidence first submitted on appeal and not offered at the trial level is not
considered by the Board.  Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA
1988); Matter or Arias, 19 I&N Dec. 568 (BIA 1988); Matter of Soriano, 19
I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988); Matter of Estime, 19 I&N Dec. 450 (BIA 1987).
O. An IJ’s duties regarding evidence.
1. Under regulations effective September 25, 2002, the Board has limited fact-
finding ability on appeal.  This heightens the need for IJs to include in their
decisions clear and complete findings of fact that are supported by the record
and are in compliance with controlling law.  Matter of S-H-, 23 I&N Dec.
462 (BIA 2002).
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X. Aggravated felonies
A. Background
1. The concept of an “aggravated felony” was first created and added to the
Immigration and Nationality Act by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 which
became effective on November 18, 1988.  Section 501 of the Immigration
Act of 1990 (effective November 29, 1990) amended the definition and
added 2 new crimes (money laundering and crime of violence) to it.  A few
corrections were made by the Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and
Naturalization Amendments of 1991 (enacted December 12, 1991).  Section
222(a) of the Immigration and Technical Corrections Act of 1994 again
amended the definition and added many new crimes to it.  It was again
amended by section 321(a)(3) of the IIRIRA in 1996.
2. The term “aggravated felony” is defined in section 101(a)(43) of the Act as
the following crimes committed within the U. S. or a foreign country. It
applies to violations of both state and federal law.  The original definition
provided that if the offense is a violation of foreign law, the offense must
have been committed after the effective date of the Immigration Act of 1990
(November 29, 1990) and the term of imprisonment must have been
completed within the previous 15 years.  The definition now provides that it
includes an offense in violation of the law of a foreign country for which the
term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years.
B. Murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor
1. A victim of sexual abuse who is under the age of 18 is a “minor” for purposes
of determining whether an alien has been convicted of sexual abuse of a
minor within the meaning of section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Act.  Matter of V-
F-D-, 23 I&N Dec. 859 (BIA 2006).
a. The offense of indecency with a child by exposure pursuant to section
21.11(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code Annotated constitutes sexual abuse
of a minor and is therefore an aggravated felony within the meaning of
section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Matter of
Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I&N Dec. 991 (BIA 1999).
(1) In seeking to define the term “sexual abuse of a minor”, the Board
referred to the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the term
stating that it is commonly defined as “[i]llegal sex acts performed
against a minor by a parent, guardian, relative, or acquaintance.” 
The Board also used the definition of the term found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3509(a) which defines “sexual abuse” as “the employment, use,
persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to
engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexually explicit
conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form of
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sexual exploitation of children, or incest with children.” 
18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8).  Sexually explicit conduct includes
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person or
animal.  18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(9)(D); Matter of Rodriguez-
Rodriguez, 22 I&N Dec. 991 (BIA 1999); see Restrepo v. Att’y
Gen., 617 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 2010)(affording Chevron deference to
the Board’s interpretation of “sexual abuse of a minor” and
rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “sexual abuse of a
minor” in Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc).
(2) The Board also stated “Abuse is defined in relevant part as
physical or mental maltreatment.”  This definition suggests that
the common usage of the term includes a broad range of
maltreatment of a sexual nature, and it does not indicate that
contact with the minor is a limiting factor.  Matter of Rodriguez-
Rodriguez, 22 I&N Dec. 991 (BIA 1999).
(3) A conviction under California Penal Code section 288(a), for lewd
or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years, qualifies as
a conviction for “sexual abuse of a minor” and is an aggravated
felony.  United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir.
1999).  In reaching that conclusion, the court stated, “We look
solely to the statutory definition of the crime, not to the name
given to the offense or to the underlying circumstances of the
predicate conviction.”
(4) The Ninth Circuit addressed the generic definition of “sexual
abuse of a minor” in two decisions: Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey,
546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), and United States v.
Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507 (9th Cir. 2009). In Estrada-Espinoza,
the court explained that a statutory rape statute of conviction
qualifies as the generic offense of “sexual abuse of a minor” if it
includes the following elements: (1) a mens rea of knowingly
engaging in; (2) a sexual act; (3) with a minor who is at least
twelve but not yet sixteen years of age; and (4) an age difference
of at least four years between the defendant and the minor. 546
F.3d at 1152, 1158 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2243).  In Medina-Villa,
the court held that a crime that is not a statutory rape crime may
meet the federal generic offense of “sexual abuse of a minor” if:
(1) the conduct prohibited by the criminal statute is sexual, (2) the
statute protects a minor, and (3) the statute requires abuse. A
criminal statute includes the element of “abuse” if it expressly
prohibits conduct that causes “physical or psychological harm in
light of the age of the victim in question.”  Id.  
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(5) The Board originally held that a conviction for “murder, rape, or
sexual abuse of a minor” must be for a felony offense in order for
the crime to be considered an aggravated felony under section
101(a)(43)(A) of the Act. Matter of Crammond, 23 I&N Dec. 9
(BIA 2001).  It later vacated that decision because the alien had
departed the U.S. during the pendency of the appeal.  Matter of
Crammond, 23 I&N Dec. 179 (BIA 2001).  The Board now holds
that a misdemeanor offense of sexual abuse of a minor constitutes
an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Act. 
Matter of Small, 23 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 2002).  The Board stated
that the change in its position was based on decisions of Circuit
Courts in  United States v. Gonzales-Vela, 276 F.3d 763 (6th Cir.
2001); Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2001), reh’g
denied, Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 256 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Marin-Navarette, 244 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 941 (2001).
(a) Under federal law, an offense is defined as a felony if it is
one for which the maximum term of imprisonment
authorized is, at a minimum, “more than 1 year.”  An
offense is classified as a misdemeanor if the maximum
authorized term of imprisonment is “one year or less,” and
the minimum authorized term of imprisonment is 5 days.
C. Illicit trafficking in any controlled substance
1. (Defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), including any
drug trafficking crime as defined in 18 U.S.C. section 924(c)(2) - Section
101(a)(43)(B).
a. The term “drug trafficking crime” referenced in the aggravated felony
definition is defined in section 924(c) of title 18, United States Code as
“any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
§ 801 et seq.) (CSA), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act
(21 U.S.C. § 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
(46 U.S.C. App. § 1901 et seq.).”  Matter of Yanez, 23 I&N Dec. 390,
393 (BIA 2002).
(1) An offense in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws §
333.7401(2)(d)(iii) is categorically an aggravated felony pursuant
to section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act. Garcia v. Holder, 638 F.3d
511 (6th Cir. 2011).
b. The Controlled Substances Act defines the term “felony” at 21 U.S.C. §
802(13) as “any Federal or State offense classified by applicable
Federal or State law as a felony.”  This definition also applies to the
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Controlled Substances Import and Export Act and the Maritime Drug
Law Enforcement Act.  See 21 U.S.C. § 951(b); 46 U.S.C. App. §
1903(i); Matter of Yanez, 23 I&N Dec. 390 (BIA 2002).
c. Absent contrary controlling precedent, a state law misdemeanor offense
of conspiracy to distribute marijuana qualifies as an aggravated felony
under INA section 101(a)(43)(B) where its elements correspond to the
elements of the Federal felony offense of conspiracy to distribute an
indeterminate quantity of marijuana.  Matter of Aruna, 24 I&N Dec.
452 (BIA 2008).
d. Conduct treated as a felony under state law but as a misdemeanor by the
CSA.
(1) History lesson - Circuits were split on the issue of whether a non-
trafficking state drug felony constituted a “felony punishable
under the Controlled Substances Act,” and thus, an aggravated
felony.  The 1st, 4th, 5th, 8th, 10th and 11th Circuits all concluded
that a state law felony that is a misdemeanor under the CSA does
constitute an aggravated felony for immigration purposes.  United
States v. Wilson, 316 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Simon, 168 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d 308 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Restrepo-Aguilar, 74 F.3d 361 (1st Cir. 1996).  The 2nd, 3rd, 6th,
7th, and 9th Circuits held that such a state law felony would not
constitute an aggravated felony.  Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim, 441
F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Palacios-Suarez, 418
F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2005); Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d
905 (9th Cir. 2004); Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297 (3d Cir.
2002); Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1996).  The Board,
recognizing the circuit split, held that the determination whether a
state drug offense constitutes a “drug trafficking crime” under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2000), such that it may be considered an
“aggravated felony” under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act shall
be made by reference to decisional authority from the federal
circuit courts of appeals, and not by reference to any separate legal
standard adopted by the Board.  Matter of Yanez, 23 I&N Dec.
390 (BIA 2002) (overruling Matter of K-V-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1163
(BIA 1999)).
(2) PRESENT LAW - In Lopez v. Gonzales, the Supreme Court held
that a state offense constitutes a “felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act” only if it proscribes conduct
punishable as a felony under that federal law.  549 U.S. 47, 60
(2006).  That case involved an alien who had been convicted in
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South Dakota of aiding and abetting another person’s possession
of cocaine (the equivalent of possession in South Dakota), a
felony South Dakota.  Id. at 51.  The Eighth Circuit upheld the
Board’s decision affirming the IJ’s decision finding that the alien
had been convicted of an aggravated felony under the INA.  Id. at
52. The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, reasoning that
mere possession could not be considered “trafficking” in the
commonsense meaning of the word.  Id. at 58-60.
e. Recidivism
(1) The Board has held that, where an alien is convicted of a simple
drug possession offense under state law, this conviction is only
deemed to be an aggravated felony as a recidivist drug trafficking
offense if, during the criminal proceedings, the alien either
admitted his or her status as a recidivist drug offender or this
status was determined by a judge or jury.  Matter of Carachuri-
Rosendo, 24 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA 2007), overruled on other
grounds by Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 2577 (2010);
see also Matter of Thomas, 24 I&N Dec. 416 (BIA 2007).
(2) The Supreme Court overruled the Fifth Circuit and held that
second or subsequent simple possession offenses are not
aggravated felonies under 101(a)(43) when the state conviction is
not based on the fact of a prior conviction.  Carachuri-Rosendo v.
Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010), overruling Carachuri-Rosendo,
570 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2009) and abrogating Fernandez v.
Mukasey, 544 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2008); Matter of Thomas, 24
I&N Dec. 416 (BIA 2007); see Espinal v. Holder, 636 F.3d 703
(5th Cir. 2011).   
f. For a state offense to constitute an aggravated felony as a “drug
trafficking crime,” the offense must be a felony under federal law, as
opposed to state law. Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006)
g. An alien convicted under 18 U.S.C. section 924(c)(1) for use of a
firearm during a drug trafficking crime is deportable under section
241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act [now section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)] as an alien
convicted of an aggravated felony as well as under section 241(a)(2)(C)
of the Act as an alien convicted of a firearm violation.  Matter of K-L-,
20 I&N Dec. 654 (BIA 1993).
D. Illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices 
1. Defined in 18 U.S.C. section 921 or in explosive materials as defined in 18
U.S.C. section 841(c) -  Section 101(a)(43)(C). See pages 58-63 above for
discussion of ground of deportability.
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a. 18 U.S.C. section 921 defines “firearms” as:
(1) any weapon which will or may be converted to expel a projectile
by explosive action;
(2) the frame or receiver of any such weapon;
(3) any firearm muffler or silencer;
(4) any destructive device, but does not include antique firearms.
b. 18 U.S.C. section 921 defines “destructive device” as:
(1) any bomb, grenade, rocket, missile, mine, or similar device which
is explosive, incendiary, or contains poison gas;
(2) any weapon (other than shotgun shells for sporting use) which
will or may be converted to expel a projectile by explosive or
other propellant and which has a barrel with a bore of more than
one-half inch in diameter; 
(3) any combination of parts from which a destructive device may be
assembled.
c. 18 U.S.C. section 841(c) defines “explosive materials” as explosives,
blasting agents, and detonators.
E. Laundering of monetary instruments
1. Any offense described in 18 U.S.C. section 1956 relating to laundering of
monetary instruments or an offense described in 18 U.S.C. section 1957
relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from
specific unlawful activity if the amount of the funds exceeded $10,000 -
Section 101(a)(43)(D).
a. Proof that all of the money was gained through unlawful activity is not
required. Hakim v. Holder, 628 F.3d 151 (5th Cir. 2010).
F. Explosive materials and firearms offenses
1. An offense described in 18 U.S.C. section 842(h) or (i) or 18 U.S.C.
section 844(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) relating to explosive materials offenses
- Section 101(a)(43)(E)(i).
a. 18 U.S.C. section 842(h) provides that it is unlawful for any person to
receive, conceal, transport, ship, barter, sell, or dispose of any explosive
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materials knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such
materials were stolen.
b. 18 U.S.C. section 842(i) provides that it is unlawful for any explosive
to be shipped in or received from interstate or foreign commerce by any
person who:
(1) is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of,
a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one
year;
(2) is a fugitive from justice;
(3) is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance as
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. § 802);
(4) has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been
committed to a mental institution.
c. 18 U.S.C. section 844(d) makes it unlawful to transport or receive in
interstate or foreign commerce any explosive with the knowledge or
intent that it will be used to kill, injure, or intimidate any individual or
to unlawfully damage any property.
d. 18 U.S.C. section 844(e) makes it unlawful to use the mail, telephone,
etc. to make a bomb scare.
e. 18 U.S.C. section 844(f) makes it unlawful to damage federal property
by fire or explosive.
f. 18 U.S.C. section 844(g) makes it unlawful to possess an explosive in
an airport or federal building.
g. 18 U.S.C. section 844(i) makes it unlawful to damage by fire or
explosive any property used in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce.
h. Attempted arson in the third degree in violation of sections 110 and
150.10 of the New York Penal Law is an aggravated felony under
section 101(a)(43)(E)(i) of the Act, even though the state crime lacks
the jurisdictional element in the applicable federal arson offense. Matter
of Bautista, 25 I&N Dec. 616 (BIA 2011).
2. An offense described in 18 U.S.C. sections 922(g)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5), (j),
(n), (o), (p), or (r) or 18 U.S.C. section 924(b) or (h) relating to firearms
offenses - Section 101(a)(43)(E)(ii).
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a. 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(1) - (5) provides that it is unlawful for any
firearm or ammunition to be shipped in or received from interstate or
foreign commerce by any person who:
(1) has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;
(2) is a fugitive from justice;
(3) is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance as
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. § 802);
(4) has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been
committed to a mental institution;
(5) is an alien illegally or unlawfully in the U.S.;
(6) 18 U.S.C. section 922(g) also has a part (6) and a part (7), but
convictions for these offenses are not aggravated felonies.
b. An offense defined by state or foreign law may be classified as an
aggravated felony as an offense “described in” a federal statute
enumerated in section 101(a)(43) of the Act even if lacks the
jurisdictional element of “affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” 
Matter of Vasquez-Muniz 23 I&N Dec. 207 (BIA 2002); see also
Hernandez v. Holder, 592 F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 2009).  Therefore,
possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of section 12021(a)(1) of
the California Penal Code (and perhaps any other similar state crime) is
an aggravated felony under  section 101(a)(43)(E)(ii) of the Act because
it is an offense “described in” 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(1).  Matter of
Vasquez-Muniz 23 I&N Dec. 207 (BIA 2002).
(1) 18 U.S.C. section 922(j) makes it unlawful for any person to
receive, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any stolen
firearm or stolen ammunition, or pledge or accept as security for a
loan any stolen firearm or stolen ammunition which is moving in
interstate or foreign commerce knowing or having reasonable
cause to believe that the firearm or ammunition was stolen.
(2) 18 U.S.C. section 922(n) makes it unlawful for any person under
indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year to ship in or receive from interstate or foreign
commerce any firearm or ammunition.
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(3) 18 U.S.C. section 922(o) makes it unlawful to transfer or possess
a machine gun.
(4) 18 U.S.C. section 922(p) makes it unlawful to manufacture,
import, sell, ship, deliver, possess, transfer, or receive a firearm
not as detectable by a metal detector as the Security Exemplar.
(5) 18 U.S.C. section 922(r) makes it unlawful to assemble from
imported parts any semiautomatic rifle or any shotgun which is
identical to any rifle or shotgun prohibited from importation under
18 U.S.C. § 925(d)(3).
(6) 18 U.S.C. section 924(b) makes it unlawful to ship in or receive
from interstate or foreign commerce a firearm or any ammunition
with intent to commit an offense therewith.
(7) 18 U.S.C. section 924(h) makes it unlawful to transfer a firearm
knowing that it will be used to commit a crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime.
3. An offense described in section 5861 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(relating to firearms offenses - 26 U.S.C. § 5851) - Section 101(a)(43)(E)(iii).
G. A crime of violence
1. (As defined in 18 U.S.C. section 16, not including a purely political offense),
for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year - Section
101(a)(43)(F).
a. 18 U.S.C. section 16 defines a “crime of violence” as:
(1) An offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another, or
(2) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property
of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.
(3) Not necessarily a felony.  Section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act refers
specifically to the federal definition of a “crime of violence” in 18
U.S.C. § 16, which requires that any crime falling within section
16(b) be a felony but contains no such requirement for offenses
falling within section 16(a).  It further provides a specific
minimum sentence of “at least one year” for the offense.  Thus,
this section has been found to include crimes that are not
“felonies” within the federal definition of that term.
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(a) The Second Circuit found that, for sentence enhancement
purposes, a misdemeanor offense for which the alien had
been sentenced to a 1-year suspended sentence was an
aggravated felony.  United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148
(2d Cir. 2000).
(b) The Fourth Circuit found that the plain language of section
101(a)(43)(F) contains no requirement that the offense have
been a felony, and concluded that an alien’s misdemeanor
conviction for sexual battery was for a crime of violence and
an aggravated felony. Wireko v. Reno, 211 F.3d 833 (4th
Cir. 2000).
(c) The fact that an offense of assault was classified as a
misdemeanor under state law did not preclude it from
qualifying as an aggravated felony for purposes of the
enhanced penalty provisions for the offense of illegal
reentry.  United States v. Urias-Escobar, 281 F.3d 165 (5th
Cir. 2002).
(4) Mens rea.  The Supreme Court held that a “crime of violence”
requires a higher mens rea than merely accidental or negligent
conduct.  Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).
(a) In addition, the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits have held that reckless crimes cannot be
crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).  Jimenez-
Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d 1110 (10th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Portela, 469 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2006);
Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc); Garcia v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 465 (4th Cir. 2006);
Oyebanji v. Gonazles, 418 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2005).  
(b) Relying on United States v. Springfield, 829 F.2d 860 (9th
Cir. 1987), the Board held that the legislative history of 18
U.S.C. section 16 indicates that Congress did not limit the
term “crime of violence” to crimes of specific intent.  Matter
of Alcantar, 20 I&N Dec. 801 (BIA 1994).
(5) Where the state statute under which an alien has been convicted is
divisible, meaning it encompasses offenses that constitute crimes
of violence as defined under 18 U.S.C. section 16 and offenses
that do not, it is necessary to look to the record of conviction, and
to other documents admissible as evidence in proving a criminal
conviction, to determine whether the specific offense of which the
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alien was convicted constitutes an aggravated felony as defined in
section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act.  Matter of Sweetser, 22 I&N
Dec. 709 (BIA 1999). 
(a) For purposes of determining whether an offense is a crime of
violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. section 16(b), it is
necessary to examine the criminal conduct required for
conviction, rather than the consequence of the crime, to find
if the offense, by its nature, involves “a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property of another may
be used in the course of committing the offense.”  Id. To
find that a criminal offense is a crime of violence under 18
U.S.C. section 16(b), a causal link between the potential for
harm and the “substantial risk” of “physical force” being
used must be present.  Id.
(b) Analysis under 18 U.S.C. section 16(b) requires first that the
offense be a felony and, if it is, that the nature of the crime
as elucidated by the generic elements of the offense is such
that its commission would ordinarily present a risk that
physical force would be used against the person or property
of another irrespective of whether the risk develops or harm
actually occurs.  While this generic or categorical approach
to 18 U.S.C. section 16(b) might occasionally include
consideration of the charging papers or jury instructions in
order to identify the “offense,” it does not extend to
consideration of the underlying facts of the conviction.
Matter of Alcantar, 20 I&N Dec. 801 (BIA 1994).
(6) Indeterminate sentences.  Under Massachusetts law, an
indeterminate sentence is considered to be a sentence for the
maximum term imposed.  Therefore, an alien convicted of a crime
of violence and sentenced to prison for a minimum of four and a
half years to a maximum of seven years is convicted of an
aggravated felony.  Matter of D-, 20 I&N Dec. 827 (BIA 1994).  
(7) Modification of sentences. Where an alien’s sentence has been
modified to include a term of imprisonment following a violation
of probation, the resulting sentence is considered to be part of the
penalty imposed for the original underlying crime. Matter of Perez
Ramirez, 25 I&N Dec. 203 (BIA 2010).
(8) Manslaughter
(a) Involuntary Manslaughter - A respondent's conviction for
involuntary manslaughter under Illinois Rev. Stat. ch. 38.
para. 9-3(a), for which he was sentenced to 10 years in
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prison, is a "crime of violence" and, therefore, an aggravated
felony.  Matter of Alcantar, 20 I&N Dec. 801 (BIA 1994). 
The Fourth Circuit has held that involuntary manslaughter
under Virginia law is not a crime of violence because it
requires only a mens rea of recklessness.  Bejarano-Urrutia
v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 444 (4th Cir. 2005).
(b) 2nd Degree Manslaughter - Second-degree manslaughter
under New York law, which required only that the
perpetrator recklessly cause the death of another, was not a
crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. section 16(b).  Jobson v.
Ashcroft, 326 F.3d 367 (2d Cir. 2003).  Focusing on the verb
“use” in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), the court stated that the statute
contemplates only the risk of an intentional use of force. Id.
(c) 1st Degree Manslaughter - Because first-degree
manslaughter requires proof of intent to cause serious
physical injury or death, it differs significantly from the
reckless conduct required for second-degree manslaughter,
which the Jobson court found “encompasse[d] many
situations”, the offense of manslaughter in the first degree in
violation of section 125.20 of the New York Penal Law is a
crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. section 16(b) and is
therefore an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(F)
of the Act.  Matter of Vargas, 23 I&N Dec. 651 (BIA 2004).
(d) Vehicular Manslaughter -In Oyebanji v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d
260 (3rd Cir. 2005), the parties agreed that vehicular
manslaughter under New Jersey law is not a crime of
violence under 18 U.S.C. section 16(a). The court held that
the reasoning in Leocal, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), suggests that the
offense is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. section
16(b) as the offense requires recklessness. The Ninth Circuit
held in Lara-Cazares v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir.
2005), that pursuant to the reasoning in Leocal, a conviction
under section 191.5(a) of the California Penal Code for
gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is not a
crime of violence, because the mens rea is gross negligence
and the intentional use of a vehicle to cause injury is not an
element of the offense.
(9) Arson - An alien who was convicted of arson in the first degree
under the law of Alaska and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment
with 3 years suspended was convicted of a “crime of violence”
within the meaning of section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act, and
therefore is deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act
as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.  Matter of Palacios,
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22 I&N Dec. 434 (BIA 1998).  In its analysis, the Board stated,
“We find that the respondent’s act of arson in the first degree, by
its very nature, requires a substantial risk of physical force against
another person or property.  (Citations omitted).  First, we note
that the intentional starting of a fire or causing an explosion
ordinarily would lead to the substantial risk of damaging property
of another.  Not only is there a risk to items belonging to others
that are on or in the property, i.e., such as items left in a store,
there always exists the risk that the fire will spread beyond the
original intended property.  Secondly, since there is a risk that the
fire or explosion will encroach upon another structure and that
structure may be occupied, arson involves a substantial risk to
another person.  Moreover, there is a real risk that the people
responding to the fire, i.e., public employees who respond to
emergencies, will be injured while extinguishing the fire or
investigating the fire scene.  Accordingly, we find that the
respondent’s conviction for arson in the first degree under Alaska
law is a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the 18 U.S.C.
section 16, and correspondingly, an aggravated felony under
section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act.”
(10) Assault - The offense of third-degree assault in violation of
section 53a-61(a)(1) of the Connecticut General Statutes, which
involves the intentional infliction of physical injury upon another,
is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. section 16(a).  Matter of
Martin, 23 I&N Dec. 491 (BIA 2002).  But see Chrzanoski v.
Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2003)(finding that an offense
under section 53a-61(a)(1) of the Connecticut General Statutes is
not a crime of violence).  In United States v. Heron-Salinas, 566
F.3d 898, (9th Cir. 2009), the court, in the criminal context, found
that a conviction for assault with a firearm under Cal. Penal Code
section 245(a)(1) is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a),
and (b).
(11) Willful infliction of corporal injury - A misdemeanor conviction
for willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse in violation of
section 273.5(a) of the California Penal Code which resulted in a
sentence to a term of imprisonment for one year qualifies
categorically as a conviction for a “crime of violence” within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2006). Matter of Perez Ramirez, 25
I&N Dec. 203 (BIA 2010).
(12) Solicitation to commit assault - The Ninth Circuit found that
solicitation to commit assault by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury, in violation of California Penal Code section
653f(a), and solicitation to commit rape by force, in violation of
California Penal Code section 653f(c), are crimes of violence. 
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Prakash v. Holder, 579 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2009).  The definition
of crime of violence in 18 U.S.C. section 16(b) turns on the risk of
physical force as a consequence of the criminal conduct at issue,
not on the timing of the force. The risk of violence is created and
exists from the time of the solicitation.  Id.  
(13) Drunk Driving
(a) History lesson - The Board originally held that the use of
physical force is not an element of drunk driving, but driving
under the influence vastly increases the probability that the
driver will injure someone in an accident.  Therefore, drunk
driving, by its nature, presents a serious risk of physical
injury and therefore qualifies as a crime of violence. 
Various circuit courts disagreed with these decisions,
finding that there must be a substantial likelihood that the
perpetrator will intentionally employ physical force against
another’s person or property in the course of committing the
offense. United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140
(9th Cir. 2001).
(b) Present law - In Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), the
Supreme Court held that the alien's DUI offense was not a
crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. section 16(a) as the
statute's key phrase, the use of physical force against the
person or property of another, suggested a higher degree of
intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct. The DUI
conviction was not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.
section 16(b) for similar reasons: it required a higher mens
rea than the merely accidental or negligent conduct involved
in a DUI offense. The ordinary meaning of the term “crime
of violence,” combined with 18 U.S.C. section 16's
emphasis on the use of physical force against another person
(or the risk of having to use such force in committing a
crime), suggested a category of violent, active crimes that
did not include DUI offenses. Thus, 18 U.S.C. section 16
could not be read to include the alien's conviction for DUI
causing serious bodily injury under Florida law.
i) Leocal left open the question of whether an offense
that requires proof of the reckless use of force against a
person or property of another qualifies as a crime of
violence. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 13 (2004). 
(14) Intoxication Assault - The 5th Circuit found that intentional use of
force was not an element of the crime of Texas intoxication
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assault and this offense did not qualify as a “crime of violence”
for sentence enhancement purposes.  United States v. Vargas-
Duran, 356 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2004).
(15) Criminally Negligent Child Abuse - An alien convicted of
criminally negligent child abuse under sections 18-6-401(1) and
(7) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, whose negligence in leaving
his stepson alone in a bathtub resulted in the child’s death, was
not convicted of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)
because there was not “substantial risk that physical force” would
be used in the commission of the crime.  Matter of Sweetser, 22
I&N Dec. 709 (BIA 1999).
(16) Sexual Abuse of a Child - When an adult attempts to sexually
touch a child under the age of consent, there is always a
substantial risk that physical force will be used to ensure the
child's compliance and crimes of sexual abuse of a child or child
molestation are crimes of violence.  See United States v. Bauer,
990 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Rodriguez, 979
F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d
377 (10th Cir. 1993).  The Board has held that statutory rape is a
crime of violence for the same reason. Matter of B-, 21 I&N Dec.
287 (BIA 1996).
(a) The Ninth Circuit held that felony unlawful sexual
intercourse with person under 18 did not qualify as a “crime
of violence,” because it does not “‘by its nature, involve [] a
substantial risk that [violent] physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.’”  Valencia v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d
1046 (9th Cir. 2006), replacing 431 F.3d 673 (9th Cir.
2005).
(b) Conviction of child molestation under Georgia Code section
16-6-4(a) constitutes a crime of violence under U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). United States v.
Olalde-Hernandez, 630 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2011).
(17) Burglary
(a) Burglary of a Habitation - In an appeal of a sentence in a
criminal case, the 5th Circuit held that burglary of a
habitation (Texas Penal Code section 30.02) is per se a
crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. section 16(b). United
States v. Guadardo, 40 F.3d 102 (5th Cir. 1994).
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(b) Burglary of a Vehicle or Nonresidential Structure - The
burglary of a nonresidential building or the burglary of a
vehicle under the Texas Penal Code often involves the
application of destructive physical force to the property of
another.  Therefore, both offenses are crimes of violence
under 18 U.S.C. section 16(b). United States v. Rodriguez-
Guzman, 56 F.3d 18 (5th Cir. 1995); overruling recognized
by United States v. Turner, 305 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2002)
(describing new analysis of “crime of violence” established
in United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 2002). 
The Seventh Circuit has held that burglary of an automobile
under Illinois law is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.
section 16(b).  Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869 (7th
Cir. 2000).  The Ninth Circuit has held that vehicular
burglary under California law is not a crime of violence
under 18 U.S.C. section 16(b) because it can be
accomplished without physical force.  Sareang Ye v. INS,
214 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2000).
(18) Trespass - A trespass conviction under Colorado law, under which
a “person commits the crime of first degree criminal trespass if he
knowingly and unlawfully enters or remains in a dwelling or if he
enters any motor vehicle with intent to steal anything of value” is
a crime of violence because entering or remaining in the dwelling
of another creates a substantial risk that physical force will be
used against the residents in the dwelling.  Even when the
perpetrator has illegally entered a nonresidential building, there is
a substantial risk of physical force being used against the property
of another.  United States v. Delgado-Enriquez, 188 F.3d 592 (5th
Cir. 1999).
(19) Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle - The Fifth Circuit stated, “the
unauthorized use of a vehicle likewise carries a substantial risk
that the vehicle might be broken into, ‘stripped,’ or vandalized, or
that it might become involved in an accident” and concluded that
the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle constitutes a “crime of
violence” under 18 U.S.C. section 16(b). United States v. Galvan-
Rodriguez, 169 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 1999); Matter of Brieva-Perez,
23 I&N Dec. 766 (BIA 2005).  The Ninth Circuit held that a
conviction for carjacking, in violation of California Penal Code
section 215, is categorically an aggravated felony crime of
violence under 18 U.S.C. section 16(a).  Nieves-Medrano v.
Holder, 590 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2010). The Fifth Circuit held that
a Texas conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle
pursuant to Texas Penal Code Ann. section 31.07 is not an
aggravated felony, crime of violence.  United States v.
Armendariz-Moreno, 571 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2009).  See also
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Nguyen v. Holder, 571 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2009)(finding that a
conviction under California Penal Code section 487, for grand
theft of an automobile, is not for an aggravated felony/crime of
violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. section 16(b); United States v.
Sanchez-Garcia, 501 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2007)(Arizona
unlawful use of means of transportation is not a Crime of
Violence).  
(20) Carrying a Firearm - Although unlawfully carrying a firearm on
premises which have been licensed to sell alcoholic beverages is a
felony under Texas Penal Code section 46.02, the Fifth Circuit
found that it is not a crime of violence.  U. S. v. Hernandez-
Neave, 291 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2001).
(21) Stalking - A stalking offense for harassing conduct in violation of
section 646.9(b) of the California Penal Code, which proscribes
stalking when there is a temporary restraining order, injunction, or
any other court order in effect prohibiting the stalking behavior, is
a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. section 16(b) and, if a
sentence of a year or longer is imposed, is an aggravated felony
under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act.  Matter of Malta, 23 I&N
Dec. 656 (BIA 2004), rev’d by Malta-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 47 8
F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2007).  The Board noted that the statute in
question prohibited “following or harassing another person,”
found that it was divisible, and therefore looked to the record of
conviction to determine that the respondent conviction was for
conduct involving harassing, rather than following.  It found that a
substantial risk of the use of force exists when a person makes a
credible threat that places another in fear for his or her safety
through a course of action that “seriously alarms, annoys,
torments, or terrorizes the person.”  While it is possible to violate
the stalking statute without the use of force, such as through the
use of a computer, a telephone, or mail, the Board observed that
when a “course of conduct” that is both serious and continuing in
nature is coupled with a “credible threat” to another’s “safety,”
there is a substantial risk that physical force may be used, at least
recklessly, over the duration of the commission of the crime.  The
Board added, “the fact that the respondent violated the California
stalking statute despite the existence of a court order prohibiting
the behavior demonstrates a level of determination that further
increases the severity of the interaction and the risk of the use of
physical force.  Moreover, when a person engages in stalking,
there is a substantial risk that the individual being stalked will
take exception and, as a result, cause the perpetrator to use force
in self-defense or to further effectuate the harassment.
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(22) Menacing. The Tenth Circuit has upheld the Board’s finding that
a conviction for a violation of Colorado’s menacing statute is a
conviction for a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), and,
therefore, an aggravated felony. Damaso-Mendoza v. Att’y Gen.,
653 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2011).
H. Theft, burglary, and receipt of stolen property
1. A theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for
which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least one year.
a. Section 101(a)(43)(G) defines as aggravated felonies theft or burglary
offenses for which the sentence is “at least 1 year” without further
qualification.  Therefore, it seems to include crimes that are not
“felonies” within the federal definition of that term.
(1) The Third Circuit found, for sentence enhancement purposes, that
a misdemeanor theft conviction for which the term of
imprisonment is 1 year is an aggravated felony. United States v.
Graham, 169 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 1999).
b. Theft.
(1) Although “theft” is a “popular name” for larceny, the term “theft”
is generally considered in federal law “to be broader than
‘common law larceny.’” Under the common law, “larceny”
requires the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession
or use of his property.  Congress’ use of the term “theft” is
therefore broader than the common-law definition of that term. 
Specifically, a “theft offense” under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the
Act does not require as a statutory element the specific intent to
permanently deprive an owner of his property, an element that
was present in the common-law definition of larceny.  Rather, a
taking of property constitutes a “theft” whenever there is criminal
intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of
ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or
permanent.  Matter of V-Z-S-, 22 I&N Dec. 1338 (BIA 2000). 
Not all takings of property, however, will meet this standard
because some takings entail a de minimis deprivation of
ownership interests.  Id.
(2) A conviction for unlawful driving and taking of a vehicle in
violation of section 10851 of the California Vehicle Code, which
makes guilty a person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her
own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent
either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of
his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or
page 317 of 365
without intent to steal the vehicle, is a “theft offense” under
section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act.  Matter of V-Z-S-, 22 I&N Dec.
1338 (BIA 2000).
(3) The Ninth Circuit has held that a conviction for grand theft, in
violation of California Penal Code section 487(a), is not
categorically an aggravated felony because it defines grand theft
as the taking of “money, labor, or real or personal property . . .
exceeding four hundred dollars” and the generic theft definition
does not include theft of labor.  Ramirez-Villalpando v. Holder,
601 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the alien’s conviction
was an aggravated felony under the modified categorical approach
because the criminal record indicated that he was convicted of
theft of personal property, not labor), opinion amended and
superseded on denial of hearing en banc by Ramirez-Villalpando
v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2011). 
(4) A conviction for welfare fraud in violation of section 40-6-15 of
the General Laws of Rhode Island is not a theft offense.  Matter of
Garcia-Madruga, 24 I&N Dec. 436, 441 (BIA 2008).  The Board
narrowed the definition of “theft,” finding that it requires a taking
of property without consent whereas fraud involves fraudulently
obtained consent.  Id.; see also Carrillo-Jaime v. Holder, 572 F.3d
747 (9th Cir. 2009). 
(5) Aiding and abetting theft.  The Supreme Court held that a theft
offense under INA section 101(a)(43)(G) includes the crime of
“aiding and abetting” a theft offense.  Gonzales v. Duenas-
Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007).  In this case, the Court vacated a
Ninth Circuit case, Penuliar v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1037 (2005), in
which the Ninth Circuit concluded that a conviction for unlawful
driving or taking of a vehicle in violation of California Vehicle
Code section 10851(a) is not categorically a theft offense under
section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act because the California provision,
which includes accomplice liability, is broader than the generic
definition of “theft offense.”  The Supreme Court observed that all
states and the federal government have “expressly abrogated the
distinction” among principals and aiders and abettors.  Id. at 820.
c. Stolen property.
(1) In Matter of Bahta, 22 I&N Dec. 1381 (BIA 2000), the Board
found that the “receiving stolen property” parenthetical in section
101(a)(43)(G) of the Act was intended to clarify that the term
“theft” was not being used in its limited, traditional sense to
require proof that the offender was involved in the actual taking of
the property at issue.  First, the Board noted that the modern view
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of theft generally treats as equivalent those who knowingly
receive and those who knowingly possess stolen property.  The
commentaries to the Model Penal Code explain that whether the
term used is receiving, possessing, buying, or concealing, “[i]t
seems clear that the essential idea behind these and other terms is
acquisition of control, whether in the sense of physical dominion
or of legal power to dispose.” Model Penal Code section 223.6,
cmt. 2, at 235.  Accordingly, the Model Penal Code definition of
“receiving” is “broad” and includes “the retention of possession
[of stolen property].”  Id.  Moreover, under the Model Penal Code,
one “is guilty of theft if he ‘receives, retains, or disposes of
movable property of another’ with the requisite culpability.” Id.
cmt. 1, at 234.  Second, the Board observed that nearly all of the
federal “receipt” of stolen property provisions reflect an
application of this well-understood meaning of “receiving” stolen
property and include “possession” offenses within their scope. 
Finally, the Board stated that the focus is not just on the
parenthetical in section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act, but also on
whether an offense is a “theft” offense within this provision.  To
read the parenthetical in a restricted manner would be to assume
that Congress intended to apply a technical distinction within the
“theft” definition set forth in section 101(a)(43)(G) that is
inconsistent both with the modern view of “theft” offenses and
with the consolidation and definition of theft and related offenses
in Chapters 31 and 113 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  The
Board concluded that the reference to “receipt of stolen property”
in section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act was intended in a generic
sense to include the category of offenses involving knowing
receipt, possession, or retention of property from its rightful
owner.  Therefore, a conviction for attempted possession of stolen
property, in violation of sections 193.330 and 205.275 of the
Nevada Revised Statutes, is a conviction for an attempted “theft
offense (including receipt of stolen property),” and therefore an
aggravated felony, within the meaning of sections 101(a)(43)(G)
and (U) of the Act (provided, of course, that a sentence of a year
or more was imposed).
(2) A conviction for receipt of stolen property under California Penal
Code section 496(a) with a sentence of imprisonment of at least 1
year, is categorically a receipt of stolen property aggravated felony
under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act. Matter of Cardiel, 25 I&N
Dec. 12 (BIA 2009). 
d. Burglary
(1) The offense of burglary of a vehicle in violation of section
30.04(a) of the Texas Penal Code Annotated is not a “burglary
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offense” within the definition of an aggravated felony in section
101(a)(43)(G) of the Act.  Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 1325
(BIA 2000).
(2) In this decision, the Board stated that in the absence of a
definition of the term “burglary offense” in the Act, or some other
clear expression of congressional intent, the logical starting point
is the definition of a burglary set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990),
which states that for purposes of sentence enhancement under 18
U.S.C. § 924(e), the term “burglary” as used in 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(2)(B)(ii) means an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or
remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a
crime.  In Taylor, the Supreme Court specifically excluded from
the definition of generic burglary statutes which include breaking
and entering places other than buildings, such as booths, tents,
vehicles, boats, vessels, and railroad cars. In its decision, the
Taylor court noted that Congress must have thought that certain
property crimes, like burglary, so often presented a risk of injury
to persons or were so often committed by career criminals that
they should be included in the enhancement statute even though
they do not necessarily involve the use or threat of force against a
person.  It also noted that Congress presumably realized that “run-
of-the-mill” burglaries involving an unarmed offender, an
unoccupied building, and no use or threat of force presented a
sufficiently “serious potential risk” to count toward enhancement. 
All of this involves a determination that burglary must somehow
pose a substantial risk that physical force will be used against a
person before it can be considered in enhancing a sentence.  The
court concluded that burglaries of places other than buildings
posed much less risk that physical force will be used against a
person and therefore excluded them from the generic definition of
burglary.
(3) The Board concluded Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 1325 (BIA
2000), by saying, “The question of the precise scope of the term
“burglary offense” under section 101(a)(43)(G) has been neither
adequately developed nor fully argued in this appeal.  Here, we
simply hold that burglary of a vehicle under this particular Texas
statute is not a burglary offense under section 101(a)(43)(G).”
I. Demand for or receipt of ransom
1. An offense described in 18 U.S.C. sections 875, 876, 877, or 1202 relating to
the demand for or receipt of ransom - Section 101(a)(43)(H).
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a. 18 U.S.C. section 875(a) makes it a crime to transmit a ransom demand
in interstate or foreign commerce.
b. 18 U.S.C. sections 875(b) & (c) makes it a crime to transmit in
interstate or foreign commerce a threat to kidnap or to injure another. 
Since these offenses do not relate to a demand for ransom, they do not
appear to be aggravated felonies.  However, by reference to the other
portions of the definition, it appears that the words “relating to the
demand for or receipt of ransom” in section 101(a)(43)(H) are
illustrative only and a violation of 18 U.S.C. sections 875(b) or (c)
would be an aggravated felony.
c. 18 U.S.C. section 876 makes it a crime to mail a ransom demand.
d. 18 U.S.C. section 877 makes it a crime to mail a ransom demand from a
foreign country.
e. 18 U.S.C. section 1202 makes it a crime to knowingly receive, possess,
or dispose of money which at any time has been delivered as ransom in
connection with a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1201 (kidnapping).
J. Child pornography
1. An offense described in 18 U.S.C. sections 2251, 2251A, or 2252 (relating to
child pornography) - Section 101(a)(43)(I).
a. 18 U.S.C. section 2251 makes it unlawful to make or advertise child
pornography.
b. 18 U.S.C. section 2251A makes it unlawful to buy or sell children for
child pornography.
c. 18 U.S.C. section 2252 makes it unlawful to send child pornography or
receive same in interstate or foreign commerce.
K. Racketeering or gambling
1. An offense described in 18 U.S.C. section 1962 (relating to racketeer
influenced corrupt organizations) or an offense described in 18 U.S.C.
section 1084 (if it is a second or subsequent offense) or 18 U.S.C. section
1955 (relating to gambling offenses) for which a sentence of one year or more
may be imposed - Section 101(a)(43)(J).
a. 18 U.S.C. section 1963 provides that a violation of 18 U.S.C. section
1962 may be punished by not more than 20 years (in some
circumstances, life imprisonment).  Therefore, it would appear that one
year or more may be imposed for any violation of 18 U.S.C. section
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1962.  Perhaps the reference to a minimum potential sentence is for the
violation of a state statute that is the equivalent of 18 U.S.C. section
1962.
L. Prostitution, slavery, or involuntary servitude 
1. An offense related to the owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a
prostitution business - Section 101(a)(43)(K)(i).
2. An offense described in 18 U.S.C. sections  2421, 2422, or 2433 (relating to
transportation for the purpose of prostitution) if committed for commercial
advantage - Section 101(a)(43)(K)(ii).
a. The categorical approach to determining whether an offense qualifies as
a removable offense does not apply to a determination of whether a
violation of 18 U.S.C. section 2422(a) was committed for “commercial
advantage” and, therefore, constitutes an aggravated felony under
section 101(a)(43)(K)(ii), where “commercial advantage” is not an
element of the offense and the evidence relating to that issue is not
ordinarily likely to be found in the record of conviction.  Matter of
Gertsenshteyn, 24 I&N Dec. 111 (BIA 2007). But see Gertsenshteyn v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 544 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2008) (overruling Matter of
Gertsenshteyn). 
3. An offense described in 18 U.S.C. sections 1581, 1582, 1583, 1584, or 1588
relating to peonage, slavery, and involuntary servitude - Section
101(a)(43)(K)(iii).
M. Treason or transmitting national defense information
1. An offense described in 18 U.S.C. section 793 relating to gathering or
transmitting national defense information, 18 U.S.C. section 798 relating to
disclosure of classified information, 18 U.S.C. section 2153 relating to
sabotage, or 18 U.S.C. sections 2381 or 2382 relating to treason -  Section
101(a)(43)(L)(i).
2. An offense described in section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. section  421) relating to protecting the identity of undercover
intelligence agents - Section 101(a)(43)(L)(ii).
N. An offense that involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims
exceeds $10,000 or an offense related to tax evasion 
1. An alien who was convicted of submitting a false claim with intent to defraud
arising from an unsuccessful scheme to obtain $15,000 from an insurance
company was convicted of an “attempt” to commit a fraud in which the loss
to the victim exceeded $10,000 within the meaning of section 101(a)(43)(U)
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of the Immigration and Nationality Act and therefore is deportable under
section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act as an alien convicted of an aggravated
felony.  Matter of Onyido, 22 I&N Dec. 552 (BIA 1999). The Board stated,
“We disagree with the respondent’s contention that section 101(a)(43)(U) of
the Act requires that the victim suffer an actual loss which exceeds $10,000. 
By its very nature, an attempt involves an unsuccessful effort to commit a
crime...  Here, the offense for which the respondent was convicted involved
an attempt to obtain $15,000 from the insurance company through fraud and
deceit.  The respondent’s actions support a conviction for attempted fraud
which is a lesser included offense within a conviction for fraud under Indiana
law.  The fact that the respondent failed to obtain the money is of no
consequence under section 101(a)(43)(U) of the Act, which prescribes
deportability as an aggravated felon for aliens convicted of an attempt or
conspiracy to commit an offense described in section 101(a)(43) of the Act.” 
Because of its decision regarding section 101(a)(43)(U), the Board did not
discuss the IJ’s additional finding that the respondent was also deportable as
an aggravated felon under section 101(a)(43)(M)(i), as an alien convicted of a
fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000.  See also
Pierre v. Holder, 588 F.3d 767 (2d Cir. 2009)(holding that removal under
section 101(a)(43)(U) is not necessarily a lesser included offense of section
101(a)(43)(M), and they must be charged separately).
a. Embezzling more than $10,000 from the United States was an
aggravated felony within the meaning of the exception from waiver of
inadmissiblity since the federal government qualified as a “victim”
within the definition of an aggravated felony.  Balogun v. Att’y Gen.,
425 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 2005). 
b. Theft by deception must satisfy the elements of both sections
101(a)(43)(G) and 101(a)(43)(M)(i) to constitute an aggravated felony. 
Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2004).
c. Restitution.  The Third Circuit has held that the amount of restitution is
not controlling to determine the amount of loss, but may be used to
determine the amount of loss if the conviction record is unclear. 
Munroe v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2003). 
d. In a case involving an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(M)(i)
as an “offense that involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the
victim or victims exceeds $10,000,” the Board held that: (1) the
$10,000 loss threshold does not have to be an element of the offense;
and (2), therefore, IJs are not confined to using the categorical or
modified categorical approaches in determining loss to the victim but,
rather, may consider any admissible evidence.  Matter of Babaisakov,
24 I&N Dec. 306 (BIA 2007).
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(1) The Ninth Circuit held that the definition of an aggravated felony
at section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) includes tax offenses other than those
described in 26 U.S.C. section 7201, the provision specifically
enumerated in the aggravated felony definition at
section 101(a)(43)(M)(ii) of the Act.  Kawashima v. Holder, 593
F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2010), opinion withdrawn and superseded on
denial of rehearing by 615 F.3d 1043. The court, applying the
Supreme Court’s holding in Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S.Ct. 2294
(2009), found that the alien’s conviction  for subscribing to a false
statement on a tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C.
section 7206(1), constituted an aggravated felony.  The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Kawashima to determine whether
convictions for filing, and aiding and abetting in filing, a false
statement on a corporate tax return are aggravated felonies under
section 101(a)(43)(M)(I) of the Act.  Kawashima v. Holder, 131
S. Ct. 2900 (May 23, 2011).      
(2) The Board ruled that conspiracy offenses can permissibly be
aggravated felonies under sections 101(a)(43)(M)(i) and (U) of the
Act where the substantive crime that was the object of the
conspiracy was an offense that involved “fraud or deceit” and
where the potential loss to the victim or victims exceeded
$10,000.  Matter of S-I-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 324 (BIA 2007); see also
Pierre v. Holder, 588 F.3d 767 (2d Cir. 2009)(101(a)(43)(U)) for
attempt or conspiracy is not necessarily a lesser included offense
of section 101(a)(43)(M) and they must be charged separately).
2. An offense that is described in section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government
exceeds $200,000; section 101(a)(43)(M)(ii).
O. Alien smuggling
1. An offense related to alien smuggling described in 18 U.S.C. section
274(a)(1)(A) or (a)(2) (relating to alien smuggling), except in the case of a
first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien
committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only
the alien's spouse, child, or parent (and no other person) to violate a provision
of this Act.
a. A conviction for transporting an illegal alien in violation of section
274(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act is an aggravated felony, as defined in section
101(a)(43)(N) of the Act, and, therefore, it supports a finding of
deportability under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act.  The
parenthetical expression “relating to alien smuggling” does not limit
deportable offenses to those involving smuggling.  Matter of Ruiz-
Romero, 22 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1999).
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b. An alien convicted of an offense described in section 275(a) of the Act
(illegal entry)is not convicted of an aggravated felony as that term is
defined in section 101(a)(43)(N) of the Act, which specifically refers to
those offenses relating to alien smuggling described in sections
274(a)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.  Matter of Alvarado-Alvino, 22 I&N
Dec. 718 (BIA 1999).  A violation of section 275(a) may be an
aggravated felony under the circumstances described in section
101(a)(43)(O).  Id.
P. Illegal reentry
1. An offense described in section 275(a) [entering or attempting to enter the
U.S. without inspection or by fraud] or 276 [reentry after exclusion,
deportation, or removal] committed by an alien who was previously deported
on the basis of a conviction described in another subparagraph of section
101(a)(43) -  Section 101(a)(43)(O).
Q. Falsely making, forging, counterfeiting, mutilating, or altering a passport or
instrument
1. An offense which either is falsely making, forging, counterfeiting, mutilating,
or altering a passport or instrument in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1543 or
is described in 18 U.S.C. section 1546(a) (relating to document fraud) and for 
which the term of imprisonment is at least 12 months, except in the case of a
first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien
committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only
the alien's spouse, child, or parent (and no other person) to violate a provision
of this Act - Section 101(a)(43)(P).
R. Failure to appear for service of sentence
1. An offense relating to a failure to appear by a defendant for service of
sentence if the underlying offense is punishable by imprisonment for a term
of 5 years or more - Section 101(a)(43)(Q).
S. Commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles
1. An offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or
trafficking in vehicles the identification numbers of which have been altered
for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year - Section
101(a)(43)(R). 
a. The crime of bribery of a public official in violation of 18 U.S.C.
section 201(b)(1)(A)(2006) is not an offense “relating to” commercial
bribery and is therefore not an aggravated felony under section
101(a)(43)(R).  Matter of Gruenangerl, 25 I&N Dec. 351 (BIA 2010).
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T. Obstruction of justice, perjury, or bribery of a witness
1. An offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of
perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term of imprisonment is at least
one year - Section 101(a)(43)(S).
a. A respondent’s conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 3 (accessory
after the fact) and sentence to at least one year establishes his
deportability as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony because the
offense of accessory after the fact falls within the definition of an
obstruction of justice crime under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act. 
Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I&N Dec. 955 (BIA 1997).
b. A conviction for misprision of a felony under 18 U.S.C. section 4 does
not constitute a conviction for an aggravated felony under section
101(a)(43)(S) of the Act as an offense relating to obstruction of justice
because the crime does not require as an element either active
interference with proceedings of a tribunal or investigation, or action or
threat of action against those who would cooperate in the process of
justice.  Matter of Espinoza, 22 I&N Dec. 889 (BIA 1999).  The Third
Circuit takes a broader reading of  “related to” obstruction of justice and
has found that a “causal connection” may suffice to make the separate
crimes related. Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2011).
c. A conviction for perjury in violation of the California Penal Code
constitutes a conviction for an aggravated felony under section
101(a)(43)(S) of the Act.  Matter of Martinez-Recinos, 23 I&N Dec.
175 (BIA 2001).
d. In Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit
held that an alien’s misdemeanor conviction for rendering criminal
assistance in violation of Washington Revised Code section 9A.76.080
was not a crime related to obstruction of justice. 
U. Failure to appear before a court pursuant to a court order to answer to or dispose of
a charge of a felony 
1. An offense relating to a failure to appear before a court pursuant to a court
order to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony for which a sentence of 2
years imprisonment or more may be imposed - Section 101(a)(43)(T).
V. An attempt or conspiracy to commit any such act described above
1. The term “conspiracy” in section 101(a)(43)(U) of the Act is not limited to
conspiracies that require the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the
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conspiracy by one of the conspirators.  Matter of Richardson, 25 I&N Dec.
226 (BIA 2010). 
2. An alien who was only convicted of conspiracy to commit an aggravated
felony, but was not also convicted of the substantive aggravated felony
offense, may not be found removable for that underlying substantive offense,
even though the record of conviction shows that the conspirators actually
committed the substantive offense.  Matter of Richardson, 25 I&N Dec. 226,
227 (BIA 2010) (finding that the IJ erred in sustaining the charge that the
respondent was convicted of a theft offense under section 101(a)(43)(G) of
the Act, because such an underlying substantive offense is not necessarily
included in a conspiracy).  The alien is removable, however, on the basis of
the conspiracy conviction under section 101(a)(43)(U) of the Act.  Id.  
3. The Seventh Circuit held in Familia-Rosario v. Holder, --- F.3d ----, No. 10-
3433, 2011 WL 3715279 (7th Cir. Aug. 24, 2011), that a conviction for
aiding and abetting conspiracy, the object of which was the importation of
any alien for the purpose of prostitution, or for any other immoral purpose
encompassed conduct other than an offense related to “the owning,
controlling, managing or supervising of a prostitution business,” did not
qualify categorically as an aggravated felony, so that the LPR, who was a
native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, was not ineligible for
cancellation of removal on the basis of that conviction.
W. Limitations by date of conviction, etc.
1. In deportation proceedings
a. The aggravated felony ground of deportation was added to the Act by
section 7344(a) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA) and was
designated as section 241(a)(4)(B) of the Act.  It provided for the
deportability of an alien “convicted of an aggravated felony at any time
after entry.”  Section 7344(b) of the ADAA stated that the amendment
“shall apply to any alien who has been convicted, on or after the date of
enactment of this Act [November 18, 1988]of an aggravated felony.” 
Sec 602(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990 amended and redesignated
the deportation grounds then found at section 241 of the Act.  Section
602(c) of the 1990 Act provided that its provisions “shall apply to all
aliens described in subsection (a) thereof notwithstanding that (1) any
such alien entered the United States before the date of enactment of this
Act, or (2) the facts, by reason of which an alien is described in such
subsection, occurred before the date of the enactment of this Act.”  The
Board held that this provision eliminated the temporal limitation of
section 7344(a) of the ADAA and an alien convicted of an aggravated
felony is subject to deportation regardless of the date of conviction
when the alien is placed in deportation proceedings on or after March 1,
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1991, and the crime falls within the aggravated felony definition. Matter
of Lettman, 22 I&N Dec. 365 (BIA 1998).
2. In removal proceedings
a. Section 101(a)(43) of the Act provides as follows: "Notwithstanding
any other provision of law (including any effective date), the term
applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or
after the date of enactment of this paragraph."  This was placed in the
definition by section 321(b) of IIRIRA which was entitled “Effective
date of definition.”
b. Section 321(c) of IIRIRA, entitled“effective date,” provided as follows:
“The amendments made by this section shall apply to actions taken on
or after the date of the enactment of this Act, regardless of when the
conviction occurred.”  It also stated that the amendments shall apply
under section 276(b) of the Act only to violations of section 276(a)
occurring on or after such date.
c. Various circuit courts have held that, pursuant to IIRIRA, the
amendments to the aggravated felony definition in section 101(a)(43) of
the Act apply retroactively.  See e.g., Sousa v. INS, 226 F.3d 28 (1st
Cir. 2000); Flores-Leon v. INS, 272 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 2001);
Alvarado-Fonseca v. Holder, 631 F.3d 385  (7th Cir. 2011); Aragon-
Ayon v. INS, 206 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2000).
XI. Good moral character (“GMC”) - Section 101(f) of the Act
A. Requirement of Good Moral Character
1. A showing of good moral character is required for several forms of relief,
including voluntary departure, suspension of deportation, and registry.
2. A finding of GMC for a given period is not barred merely because of several
arrests during that period which resulted in subsequent release without
conviction. Matter of V-I-, 3 I&N Dec. 571 (BIA 1949).
3. A conviction which forms a basis for a finding that an alien lacks GMC need
not be the basis upon which the alien is found deportable.  Matter of Correa-
Garces, 20 I&N Dec. 451 (BIA 1992).
B. Persons lacking good moral character as listed in section 101(f)
1. Section 101(f) (as amended by section 822 of the Violence Against Women
and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005) provides that no
person shall be found to be a person of good moral character who, during the
period for which GMC is required, was:
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2. A habitual drunkard [INA § 101(f)(1)];
3. Whether inadmissible or not, persons described in the following paragraphs
of section 212(a):
a. Section 212(a)(10)(A) - miscellaneous (including polygamists);
b. Section 212(a)(2)(D) - prostitutes and commercialized vice;
c. Section 212(a)(2)(A) - persons convicted of or admitting a crime
involving moral turpitude and persons convicted of any law or
regulation relating to a controlled substance.
(1) The phrase “whether excludable or not” which appears in the first
part of section 101(f)(3) does not prevent the application of the
“petty offense” exception at current section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of
the Act.  Matter of M-, 7 I&N Dec. l47 (BIA l956).
(2) Persons convicted of a single offense of simple possession of 30
grams or less of marijuana are not precluded from establishing
good moral character.  INA § 101(f)(3).
d. Section 212(a)(2)(B) - persons convicted of two or more offenses;
(1) Other than purely political offenses;
(2) Regardless of whether the conviction was in a single trial or
whether the offenses arose from a single scheme of misconduct;
(3) Regardless of whether the offenses involved moral turpitude;
(4) BUT, the aggregate sentences to confinement actually imposed
must have been 5 years or more.
e. Section 212(a)(2)(C) - an alien who the consular or immigration officer
knows or has reason to believe is or has been an illicit trafficker in
controlled substances or has been a knowing assister, abettor,
conspirator, or colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in controlled
substances.
f. Section 212(a)(6)(E) - alien smugglers.
4. A person whose income is derived principally from illegal gambling
activities [INA § 101(f)(4)];
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5. A person who has been convicted of 2 or more gambling offenses committed
during the statutory period [INA § 101(f)(5)];
6. A person who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any
benefit under the Act [INA § 101(f)(6)];
a. In order to constitute false testimony under section 101(f)(6) of the Act,
the testimony must be under oath.  Matter of G-, 6 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA
l954).
b. False statements in a written application, whether or not under oath, do
not constitute false “testimony.”  The word “testimony” refers solely to
oral utterances of witnesses under oath.  Matter of L-D-E, 8 I&N Dec.
399 (BIA l959).
c. False information given under oath in a question-and-answer statement
before an INS officer made in connection with a written application is
“testimony.”  Matter of Ngan, 10 I&N Dec. 725 (BIA l964); Matter of
G-L-T-, 8 I&N Dec. 403 (BIA l959).
d. In order to come within the prohibition of section 101(f)(6), it is not
necessary that false testimony be given in order to obtain a benefit
under the Act for oneself.  False testimony given in connection with a
visa petition filed in another’s behalf will preclude a showing of GMC. 
The benefit sought by the petitioner is to have the beneficiary join him
in the U.S.  Matter of Ngan, 10 I&N Dec. 725 (BIA l964); Matter of W-
J-W-, 7 I&N Dec. 706 (BIA l958).
e. It is not a requirement of the statute that a benefit be obtained, only that
the false testimony be given for the purpose of obtaining a benefit. 
Matter of L-D-E-, 8 I&N Dec. 399 (BIA l959).
f. If an alien in an immigration proceeding testifies falsely under oath as
to a material fact but voluntarily and without prior exposure of his false
testimony comes forward and corrects his testimony, he has not
committed perjury and an exclusion charge based on the commission of
perjury is not sustained.  Matter of R-R-, 3 I&N Dec. 823 (BIA l949). 
Following the reasoning of this case, the Board has held that an alien is
not barred from establishing GMC if he has made a voluntary and
timely retraction of attempted false testimony.  Matter of M-, 9 I&N
Dec. 118 (BIA l960).  The recantation must be voluntary and made
without delay in order for the false statement and its withdrawal to be
found to constitute one inseparable incident out of which an intention to
deceive cannot rightly be drawn.  Matter of Namio, l4 I&N Dec. 4l2
(BIA l973).
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g. The Ninth Circuit has held that such oral statements must be made “to a
court or tribunal” in order to constitute false testimony.  Phinpathya v.
INS, 673 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 464 U.S.
183 (1984).
h. The Ninth Circuit has not defined what constitutes “a court or tribunal.” 
However, the Ninth Circuit has held that false statements made under
oath during a naturalization examination constitute false testimony
within the meaning of section 101(f)(6) of the Act.  Bernal v. INS, 154
F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 1998).
i. False oral statements under oath to an asylum officer can constitute
false testimony as defined by the Ninth Circuit in Phinpathya v. INS,
673 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 464 U.S. 183
(1984); Matter of R-S-J-, 22 I&N Dec. 863 (BIA 1999).
j. In a denaturalization case, the Supreme Court has held that there is no
requirement that false testimony under section 101(f)(6) must have been
material (as opposed to visa fraud or misrepresentations under former
section 212(a)(19) [now section 212(a)(6)(C)(i)] which must be
material).  Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988). 
7. A person who, during the period, was confined as a result of conviction to a
penal institution for an aggregate period of 180 days or more, regardless of
whether the offense was committed during the period [INA § 101(f)(7)];
a. Section 101(f)(7) of the Act is concerned with “persons” not “aliens.” 
Therefore an individual who falls within the terms of section 101(f)(7)
of the Act is precluded from establishing GMC regardless of whether he
was a citizen or an alien during the period of confinement to the penal
institution. Matter of B-, 7 I&N Dec. 405 (BIA 1957).
b. An alien whose conviction resulted only in a sentence to a period of
probation with no incarceration is not, as a matter of law, precluded
from a showing of GMC by section 101(f)(7).  Matter of Gantus-
Bobadilla, 13 I&N Dec. 777 (BIA 1971), overruled on other grounds by
Matter of Franklin, 20 I&N Dec. 867 (BIA 1994).
c. Section 101(f)(7) of the Act makes no exception for a prison term
resulting from violation of probation rather than from an original
sentence to incarceration and an alien so confined for an aggregate
period of 180 days or more within the statutory period is barred from
establishing GMC.  Matter of Piroglu, 17 I&N Dec. 578 (BIA 1980).
d. Since pre-sentence confinement is credited in determining the date of
release from custody (under section 2900.5 of the California Penal
Code), such pre-sentence confinement is counted in determining
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whether a respondent has been confined as a result of conviction for an
aggregate period of 180 days.  Matter of Valdovinos, 18 I&N Dec. 343
(BIA 1982).
8. A person who has been convicted of an aggravated felony at any time (even
outside the statutory period) [INA § 101(f)(8)];
a. Prior to an amendment to the Act, effective on November 29, 1990,
section 101(f)(8) made a showing of GMC unavailable to anyone
convicted of the crime of murder, even if the conviction took place
outside the statutory period.
b. The amendment to include aggravated felonies applies to convictions
occurring on or after November 29, 1990.
c. Following the amendment, it was doubtful whether persons convicted
of murder before November 29, 1990 were able to demonstrate GMC. 
As part of the Miscellaneous Technical Immigration and Naturalization
Amendments in 1991, Congress again amended section 101(f)(8) to
provide that a person convicted of murder cannot demonstrate GMC
regardless of the date of the conviction.
d. The Board has acknowledged these amendments and holds that an alien
convicted of murder, regardless of the date of the conviction, is forever
precluded from establishing GMC under section 101(f)(8) of the Act. 
Matter of Reyes, 20 I&N Dec. 789 (BIA 1994).  An alien convicted of
an aggravated felony other than murder is forever barred from
establishing GMC under section 101 (f)(8) of the Act if the aggravated
felony conviction occurred on or after November 29, 1990.  Id.
(1) The Board previously held that a conviction for attempted murder
was not a permanent bar to a showing of GMC and only barred a
showing of GMC under section 101(f)(3) if the offense was
committed within the statutory period for relief.  Matter of
Awaijane, 14 I&N Dec. 117 (BIA 1972).  The alien's sentence was
commuted to less than 180 days, so section 101(f)(7) was not an
issue.
(2) Since the definition of “aggravated felony” includes the offense of
murder and any attempt to commit an enumerated offense, an
alien convicted of attempted murder after November 29, 1990
should be permanently barred from demonstrating GMC as an
alien convicted of an aggravated felony.
C. Catch-all provision of section 101(f)
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1. Section 101(f) concludes as follows: “The fact that any person is not within
any of the foregoing classes shall not preclude a finding that for other reasons
such person is not or was not of good moral character.”  This catch-all
provision also states that a finding that an alien lacks good moral character
cannot be based on “a false statement or claim of citizenship” if “the alien
reasonably believed at the time of such statement . . . that he or she was a
citizen.”  
2. The Board has ruled that a person “who has made a false claim of United
States citizenship may be considered a person who is not of good moral
character.  [INA § 101(f)] does not, however, mandate such an outcome.” 
The Board rejected the analysis that, because an unknowing false claim to
U.S. citizenship cannot be grounds to find a lack of good moral character, a
knowing false claim to U.S. citizenship mandates a finding of no good moral
character.  Matter of Guadarrama, 24 I&N Dec. 625 (BIA 2008).
XII. Temporary protected status (TPS) - Section 244
A. A grant of TPS waives certain grounds of inadmissibility or deportability 
1. These grounds are waived solely to permit an alien to remain and work
temporarily in the U.S. for the period of time that TPS is effective. Matter of
Sosa Ventura, 25 I&N Dec. 391 (BIA 2010).
2. When an application for TPS that has been denied by the USCIS is renewed
in removal proceedings, the IJ may consider any material and relevant
evidence, regardless of whether the evidence was previously considered in
proceedings before the USCIS.  Matter of Figueroa, 25 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA
2011).
B. Designation by the Attorney General
1. The Attorney General may designate any foreign state or any part of such
foreign state under section 244(b) of the Act if:
2. The Attorney General finds that there is an ongoing armed conflict within the
state which would pose a threat to nationals of that state required to return
there [INA § 244(b)(1)(A)];
3. The Attorney General finds that there has been an earthquake, flood, drought,
epidemic, or other environmental disaster in the state resulting in a
substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions in the area affected
[INA § 244(b)(1)(B)(i)];
4. The Attorney General finds that the foreign state is temporarily unable to
adequately handle the return of its nationals [INA § 244(b)(1)(B)(ii)];
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5. The Attorney General finds that the foreign state has officially requested
designation [INA § 244(b)(1)(B)(iii)];
6. The Attorney General finds that there exist extraordinary temporary
conditions in the foreign state that prevent nationals of that state from
returning in safety, unless the Attorney General finds that permitting such
aliens to remain temporarily in the U.S. is contrary to the national interest of
the U.S. [INA § 244(b)(1)(C)].
C. Effective period of designation
1. The designation of a foreign state shall take effect upon the date of
publication of the designation by the Attorney General in the Federal Register
or such later date as the Attorney General may specify.  INA § 244(b)(2)(A).
2. The initial period of designation shall be not less than 6 months and not more
than 18 months.  INA § 244(b)(2)(B).
3. At least 60 days before the end of the initial period or any extended period of
designation, the Attorney General shall review the conditions in the foreign
state.  INA § 244(b)(3)(A).
4. If the Attorney General determines that a foreign state no longer meets the
conditions for designation, he shall terminate the designation by publishing
notice in the Federal Register.  The termination shall not be effective earlier
than 60 days after the date the notice is published or the end of the last
extension, whichever is longer.  INA § 244(b)(3)(B).
5. If the Attorney General determines that the foreign state continues to meet the
conditions for designation, the period of designation is extended for an
additional period of 6 months (or 18 months in the Attorney General’s
discretion).  INA § 244(b)(3)(C).
D. Jurisdiction to consider applications
1. Before the DD.  8 C.F.R. § 1244.7(a) provides that an application for TPS
shall be filed with the DD having jurisdiction over the applicant’s place of
residence.
a. If the application is denied by the DD, the alien has the right to appeal
the denial to the Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU).  8 C.F.R. §
1244.10(c).  However, if the basis for the denial of TPS constitutes a
ground for deportability or excludability which renders the alien
ineligible for TPS, the decision shall include a charging document
which sets forth such ground(s). 8 C.F.R. § 1244.10(c)(1).  If a charging
document is issued, the alien shall not have the right to appeal the DD’s
decision, but the decision shall apprise the alien of the right to a de
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novo determination of his or her eligibility before the IJ.  8 C.F.R. §
1244.10(c)(2).
b. The Board held in Matter of Barrientos, 24 I&N Dec. 100 (BIA 2007)
that section 244(b)(5)(B) permits an alien to seek de novo review of
eligibility for TPS in removal proceedings, even if an appeal was
previously filed and denied by the Administrative Appeals Unit. In
Matter of Lopez-Aldana, 25 I&N Dec. 49 (BIA 2009), the Board
clarified the holding in Barrientos and held that an alien may seek de
novo review of eligibility for TPS in removal proceedings even if he
never filed an appeal with the Administrative Appeals Unit.
 
2. Before an IJ
a. 8 C.F.R. § 1244.7(d) provides that if the alien has a pending case before
an IJ or the Board at the time a state is designated, the alien shall be
given written notice concerning TPS.  The alien shall have an
opportunity to submit an application to the DD during the registration
period unless the basis of the charging document, if established, would
render the alien ineligible for TPS.  In that case, eligibility for TPS shall
be decided by EOIR during the proceedings.
b. Section 244(b)(5)(B) of the INA permits an alien to assert his right to
TPS in removal proceedings for de novo review of his eligibility, even
if his application has previously been denied by the Administrative
Appeals Unit (AAU) and regardless of whether all appeal rights before
the DHS have been exhausted.  Matter of Lopez-Aldana, 25 I&N Dec.
49 (BIA 2009) (clarifying Matter of Barrientos, 24 I&N Dec. 100 (BIA
2007)). 
c. 8 C.F.R. § 1244.11 provides that if a charging document is served on an
alien with a notice of denial or withdrawal of TPS, the alien may renew
the application for TPS in deportation or exclusion proceedings. (The
regulation does not mention removal proceedings, probably due to
oversight.)
d. An IJ may, in the appropriate circumstances, require DHS to provide
the application that the applicant filed with USCIS when the alien is
renewing that application in removal proceedings. Matter of Henriquez
Rivera, 25 I&N Dec. 575 (BIA 2011)
e. 8 C.F.R. § 1244.11 also states that its provisions do not extend the
benefits of TPS beyond the termination of a foreign state’s designation.
f. 8 C.F.R. § 1244.11 also provides that the decision of the IJ as to
eligibility for TPS may be appealed to the Board.
page 335 of 365
g. It is not proper to terminate an alien’s removal proceedings based on a
grant of TPS.  Matter of Sosa Ventura, 25 I&N Dec. 391 (BIA 2010).
E. Aliens eligible for TPS 
1. An alien who is a national (or, having no nationality, is a person who last
“habitually resided” in a designated state) of a state designated under section
244(b)(1) is eligible for TPS only if:
a. The alien has been continuously physically present in the U.S. since the
effective date of the most recent designation of that state.  INA §
244(c)(1)(A)(i).
(1) Absences are allowed if they are brief, casual, and innocent.  INA
§ 244(c)(4)(A).
b. The alien has continuously resided in the U.S. since such date as the
Attorney General may designate.  INA § 244(c)(1)(A)(ii).
(1) Absences are allowed if they are brief, casual, and innocent or due
merely to a brief temporary trip abroad required by emergency or
extenuating circumstances outside the control of the alien.  INA §
244(c)(4)(B).
c. The alien is admissible as an immigrant.  INA § 244(c)(1)(A)(iii).
(1) Section 244(c)(2)(A)(i) provides that the following paragraphs of
section 212(a) shall not apply in determining an alien's
admissibility:
(a) Section 212(a)(5) which makes inadmissible aliens with no
labor certification;
(b) Section 212(a)(7)(A) which makes inadmissible immigrants
not in possession of a valid, unexpired immigrant visa or
other entry document.
(2) Section 244(c)(2)(A)(ii) authorizes the Attorney General to waive
any other provision of section 212(a) [except those listed below] in
individual cases for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity,
or when it is otherwise in the public interest.
(3) Section 244(c)(2)(A)(iii) provides that the following paragraphs of
section 212(a) May NOT be waived:
(a) 212(a)(2)(A) and 212(a)(2)(B)  relating to criminals;
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(b) 212(a)(2)(C) relating to drug offenses, EXCEPT a single
offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana
[section 212(a)(2)(C) actually relates to illicit trafficking in
controlled substances];
(c) 212(a)(3)(A) relating to national security and sabotage, etc.;
(d) 212(a)(3)(B) relating to aliens engaged in terrorist activities;
(e) 212(a)(3)(C) relating to aliens whose entry or proposed
activity in the U.S. may have adverse foreign policy
consequences;
(f) 212(a)(3)(E) relating to those aliens who participated in Nazi
persecution or genocide.
(4) Under section 244(c)(2)(B) of the Act, an alien is also not eligible
for TPS if:
(a) The alien has been convicted of any felony or 2 or more
misdemeanors committed in the U.S., or
(b) The alien is described in section 208(b)(2)(A) which lists the
following:
i) 208(b)(2)(A)(i) - the alien participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion;
ii) 208(b)(2)(A)(ii) - the alien, having been convicted by a
final judgement of a particularly serious crime,
constitutes a danger to the community of the U.S.;
iii) 208(b)(2)(A)(iii) - there are serious reasons for
considering that the alien has committed a serious
nonpolitical crime outside the U.S. prior to arrival in
the U.S.;
iv) 208(b)(2)(A)(iv) - there are reasonable grounds for
regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the
U.S.;
v) 208(b)(2)(A)(v) - the alien is inadmissible under section
212(a)(3)(B)(i)(I) [has engaged in a terrorist activity],
section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II) [Attorney General knows or
has reason to believe alien is engaged in or likely to
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engage in terrorist activity], section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(III)
[has, under circumstances indicating an intention to
cause death or serious bodily harm, incited terrorist
activity], or section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV) [is a
representative of a foreign terrorist organization] unless,
in the case only of a representative, the Attorney
General determines, as a matter of discretion, that there
are not reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a
danger to the security of the U.S.; see Abufayad v.
Holder, 632 F.3d 623  (9th Cir. 2011) (agreeing with a
Board decision finding the alien to be “likely to engage
after entry in any terrorist activity” and denying the
alien CAT protection). 
vi) 208(b)(2)(A)(vi) - the alien was firmly resettled in
another country prior to arriving in the U.S.
d. To the extent and in a manner which the Attorney General establishes,
the alien registers for TPS during a registration period of not less than
180 days.
(1) To be eligible for late initial registration for TPS, an applicant
filing as the “child of an alien currently eligible to be a TPS
registrant” must establish only that he or she qualified as a “child”
at the time of the initial registration period.”  Matter of N-C-M-, 25
I&N Dec. 535 (BIA 2011).
(2) A late initial registrant for TPS must independently meet all initial
registration requirements of TPS.  Matter of Echeverria, 25 I&N
Dec. 512 (BIA 2011).
F. Withdrawal of TPS - Section 244(c)(3) of the Act
1. The Attorney General shall withdraw TPS granted to an alien if:
a. The Attorney General finds that the alien was not in fact eligible for
TPS; or
b. Except for brief, casual, and innocent absences or absences with the
prior consent of the Attorney General under section 244(f)(3), the alien
has not remained continuously physically present in the U.S. from the
date he was first granted TPS; or
c. The alien fails, without good cause, to register with the Attorney General
annually at the end of each 12 month period after the granting of TPS.
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2. 8 C.F.R. § 1244.18 provides that a charging document may be issued against
an alien granted TPS on grounds of deportability or excludability which would
have rendered the alien statutorily ineligible for TPS under 8 C.F.R. §§
1244.3(c) and 1244.4, unless the Service had expressly granted a waiver of
those grounds.  The charging document shall constitute notice to the alien that
his or her status in the U.S. is subject to withdrawal and a final order of
deportation or exclusion shall constitute a withdrawal of TPS status.
3. Section 244(c)(5) of the Act provides that the existence of the statute
authorizing TPS does not authorize an alien to apply for admission to, or to be
admitted to, the U.S. in order to apply for TPS.
G. TPS and cancellation of removal under section 240A(a)
1. Section 244(e) of the Act makes the following provisions:
2. The period of TPS shall not be counted as physical presence in the U.S. for
purposes of cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Act unless
the Attorney General determines that extreme hardship exists.
a. The reference to section 240A(a) appears to be an error since that section
requires continuous residence and LPR status, not continuous physical
presence.  Congress must have meant to refer to cancellation of removal
and adjustment of status under section 240A(b).
3. The period of TPS shall not cause a break in the continuity of residence for
purposes of suspension of deportation under section 244(a) of the Act.  The
period of time before TPS may be added to the period of time after TPS to
determine the period of physical presence.
H. Benefits and status during TPS - Section 244(f) of the Act.
1. During TPS, the alien shall not be considered to be permanently residing in
the U.S. under color of law.  INA § 244(f)(1).
2. During TPS, the alien may be deemed ineligible for public assistance by a
State.  INA § 244(f)(2).
3. During TPS, the alien may travel abroad with the prior consent of the Attorney
General. INA § 244(f)(3).
4. For purposes of adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act or change of
status under section 248 of the Act, an alien in TPS shall be considered as
being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a nonimmigrant.  INA § 244(f)(4).
I. Countries that have been designated for TPS 
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1. Available at www.uscis.gov/tps
2. Currently Designated Countries.
a. El Salvador was designated from March 9, 2001, until September 9,
2002.  On July 11, 2002, it was extended until September 9, 2003.  It
was extended again through September 9, 2006.  Effective September 9,
2006, it was extended to September 9, 2007.  Effective September 10,
2007, TPS status was again extended to March 9, 2009, and then until
September 9, 2010.  El Salvador is currently designated through March
9, 2012.
b. On January 5, 1999, the Attorney General designated Honduras for TPS
for a period of 18 months. Under the terms of the designation, applicants
could apply for TPS during the registration period lasting from January
5, 1999, through July 5, 1999.  In Attorney General order No. 2239-99
the registration period was extended until August 20, 1999.  The
Attorney General’s order specified that it did not extend the period of
designation.  The next extension was November 3, 2004 when it was
extended to July 5, 2006.   On May 29, 2007 DHS announced that TPS
status for Honduras would be further extended to January 5, 2009.  
Honduras is currently designated through January 5, 2012.
c. An extension for TPS for Haiti beneficiaries became effective on July
23, 2011, for an additional 18 months through January 22, 2013.  The
USCIS TPS Bulletin for Haiti should be consulted to determine
registration and re-registration deadlines.
d. On January 5, 1999, the Attorney General designated Nicaragua for
TPS for a period of 18 months. Under the terms of the designation,
applicants could apply for TPS during the registration period lasting
from January 5, 1999, through July 5, 1999. In Attorney General order
No. 2239-99 the registration period was extended until August 20, 1999. 
The Attorney General’s order specified that it did not extend the period
of designation.  On May 29, 2007, DHS announced that TPS status for
Nicaragua would be further extended to January 5, 2009.  Nicaragua is
currently designated through January 5, 2012.
e. TPS was granted to nationals of Somalia on September 16, 1991.  It was
to expire on September 17, 1992 but was extended to September 17,
1993.  On September 20, 1993, it was extended to September 17, 1994. 
Eligibility for an extension of TPS is limited to those Somalis who
already obtained TPS.  A new form I-821 was required to be filed before
October 12, 1993.  TPS was extended several times.  On July 29, 2005,
it was extended to September 17, 2006.  Effective September 17, 2006, it
was extended to March 17, 2008 through September 17, 2006.  Somalia
is currently designated through September 17, 2012
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f. Sudan was designated from November 4, 1997 to November 3, 1998.  It
was extended to November 3, 1999.  It was again extended and
redesignated to November 2, 2000.  The next extension was on March 8,
2007, when TPS status was extended to November 2, 2008, and then
until May 2, 2010.  Sudan’s designation was extended again in October
2011 through May 2, 2013.
g. The newly-independent South Sudan was designated for TPS from
November 3, 2011 through May 2, 2013.
3. Countries for which TPS designation has expired
a. Burundi was designated from November 4, 1997 to November 3, 1998. 
It was extended to November 3, 1999.  It was again extended to
November 2, 2000.  The notice also redesignates Burundi under the TPS
program, thereby expanding TPS eligibility to include nationals of
Burundi (and aliens having no nationality who last habitually resided in
Burundi) who have been “continuously present in the United States” and
who have “continuously resided in the United States” since November 9,
1999.  It has been extended additional times.  On October 29, 2007,
DHS determined that TPS status for Burundi would terminate effective
May 2, 2009. 
b. Angola was designated from March 29, 2000, until March 29, 2001.  It
was extended again.  The last designation was on February 1, 2002,
which extended it to March 29, 2003.  It expired on March 29, 2003.
c. TPS was granted to nationals of (and aliens having no nationality who
last habitually resided in) Bosnia-Herzegovina who have been
continuously physically present and have continuously resided in the
U.S. since August 10, 1992.  The registration period began on August
10, 1992, and ended on August 10, 1993.  TPS was due to expire on
August 10, 1993, but on July 29, 1993, it was extended to August 10,
1994.  Those previously granted TPS were required to re-register by
filing a new application between July 29, 1993, and August 30, 1993.  It
was extended several times, but terminated on February 10, 2001.
d. Guinea-Bissau was designated from March 11, 1999, until March 10,
2000.  The Attorney General later determined that conditions in Guinea-
Bissau no longer support a TPS designation.  However, because this
determination was not made 60 days before the termination date, TPS
was automatically extended by statute to September 10, 2000.  It expired
on that date.
e. The province of Kosovo in the Republic of Serbia in the state of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) was designated
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from June 9, 1998, until June 8, 1999.  It was extended and also
redesignated a few times, but expired on December 8, 2000.
f. TPS was granted to nationals of Kuwait on March 27, 1991.  The period
of TPS expired on March 27, 1992.
g. TPS was granted to nationals of Lebanon on March 27, 1991.  It was to
expire on March 27, 1992, but was extended to March 28, 1993.  Non-
national habitual residents were granted from March 28, 1992, to
September 28, 1992, to apply for TPS.  TPS for Lebanon was terminated
on April 9, 1993.
h. Montserrat was designated in 1998.  It was extended until August 27,
2000.  Eligible nationals of Montserrat (or aliens having no nationality
who last habitually resided in Montserrat) could re-register for TPS and
an extension of employment authorization.  Re-registration was limited
to persons who registered for the initial period of TPS, which ended on
August 27, 1998, or who registered after that date under the late initial
registration provision.  Persons who are eligible for late initial
registration may register for TPS during this extension.  It  was extended
several times, the last was on July 6, 2004, when it was extended to
February 27, 2005.  It expired on that date.
i. TPS was granted to nationals of (and aliens having no nationality who
last habitually resided in) Rwanda.  The registration period began on
June 7, 1994 and was to expire on June 6, 1995.  On November 14,
1996, TPS was extended until June 6, 1997. TPS for Rwanda terminated
on December 6, 1997.
j. Sierra Leone was designated from November 4, 1997 to November 3,
1998.  It was extended several times.  It terminated on May 3, 2004.
4. Deferred Enforced Departure
a. TPS was granted to nationals of Liberia on March 27, 1991.  It expired
in 1999, but the President directed the Attorney General to defer
enforced departure.  The most recent such order is valid through March
31, 2013, for Liberians (and aliens without nationality who last
habitually resided in Liberia) who had TPS as of September 30, 2007. 
XIII. Motions to reopen, reconsider, and remand under the IIRIRA
A. Motion to reopen
1. A motion to reopen (MTR) seeks to reopen proceedings so that new evidence
can be presented and a new decision entered on a different factual record,
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normally after a further evidentiary hearing.  Matter of Cerna, 20 I&N Dec.
399 (BIA 1991). 
a. In Matter of M-S-, 22 I&N Dec. 349 (BIA 1998), the Board
distinguished between motions to reopen in order to rescind an order of
deportation following an in absentia hearing and motions to reopen in
order to apply for a form of relief that was unavailable at the time of the
hearing. In that decision, the Board stated:
(1) Rescission means to annul ab initio.  Thus, by the plain meaning of
the words in section 242B(c)(3) of the Act [now section
240(b)(5)(C)], to “rescind” an in absentia deportation order is to
annul from the beginning all of the determinations reached in the in
absentia hearing.  The only reasons that will support such
rescission are exceptional circumstances which prevented the alien
from appearing, the alien’s incarceration which prevented his or
her appearance, or lack of notice of the hearing. Once an in
absentia order is rescinded, the alien is then given a new
opportunity to litigate the issues previously resolved against him or
her at the in absentia hearing.  In other words, the deportation
proceedings go back to the start, the Service must proceed to prove
deportability under the allegations in the original Order to Show
Cause, and the alien must establish any eligibility for relief.  Matter
of Grijalva, 21 I&N Dec. 472 (BIA 1996).  The alien is returned to
the same status he or she had prior to the in absentia hearing,
namely, an alien charged with deportability and subject to the
already-initiated deportation proceedings.
(2) In contrast, proceedings may be “reopened” when a new question
has arisen that requires a hearing.  8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c),
1003.23(b)(3); Matter of Ku, 15 I&N Dec. 712 (BIA 1976).  An
order reopening proceedings is an interlocutory order allowing for
such a hearing and does not dispose of the merits of the application
for relief from deportation.  Matter of Pena-Diaz, 20 I&N Dec. 841
(BIA 1994); Matter of Ku, 15 I&N Dec. 712 (BIA 1976).  If, after
reopening, the requested relief is denied, the respondent remains
subject to the original finding of deportability and the respondent is
ordered deported from the United States.  When proceedings are
reopened for a purpose other than rescission of an in absentia
order, what transpired at previously conducted proceedings is not
necessarily abrogated.
2. A motion to reconsider is a request that the original decision be reexamined in
light of additional legal arguments, a change of law, or an argument or aspect
of the case that was overlooked. Matter of Cerna, 20 I&N Dec. 399 (BIA
1991). 
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3. A motion to remand is a request to the Board to return an active Record of
Proceeding (“ROP”) to the IJ for receipt of additional evidence.  It is
distinguished from a MTR because a motion to remand is made to the Board
while it is still considering an appeal from an IJ’s decision rather than after the
Board has made its decision.  Since the Board's function is to review a record
rather than create a record, it cannot receive evidence and, if the motion is
granted, it must return the ROP to the IJ for receipt of the evidence at a
hearing.
a. The term “motion to remand” is also used at the trial level to describe a
request to an IJ to remand a case to the jurisdiction of the District
Director (DD) so that the DD can consider a remedy over which he has
exclusive jurisdiction, such as reinstatement of student status, or
concurrent jurisdiction with the IJ, such as adjustment of status.
B. Motion to reconsider
1. The alien may file one motion to reconsider a decision that the alien is
removable from the U.S.  INA § 240(c)(5)(A). The motion must be filed
within 30 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal. 
INA § 240(c)(5)(B). The motion shall specify the errors of law or fact in the
previous order and shall be supported by pertinent authority.  INA §
240(c)(5)(C).
2. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b), “[a] motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider
shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of exclusion,
deportation, or removal proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from
the United States.  Any departure from the United States, including the
deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion,
deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to
reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such
motion.”
3. A motion to reconsider which is based on a legal argument that could have
been raised earlier in the proceedings will not be granted.  Matter of Medrano,
20 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 1990).  This case involved a motion to reconsider
made by INS to the Board.  Before the initial decision, the Board specifically
solicited the views of the INS on a particular issue.  The INS stated a position
that the IJ’s decision was correct.  After the Board rendered its decision, the
INS sought reconsideration and argued that the IJ’s decision was incorrect. 
The Board denied the motion because the INS did not provide an adequate
explanation for its failure to raise its arguments at the earlier stage of the
proceedings.
C. Motions to reopen in general
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1. An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings under section 240.  INA §
240(c)(6)(A). The motion to reopen shall state the new facts that will be
proven if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other
evidentiary material.  INA § 240(c)(6)(B).
2. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), “[a] motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider
shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of exclusion,
deportation, or removal proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from
the United States.  Any departure from the United States, including the
deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion,
deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to
reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such
motion.”  
a. In Matter of Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I&N Dec. 646 (BIA 2008), the
Board ruled that, under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), the Board does not have
the authority to reopen proceedings, either by motion or sua sponte, after
the alien has left the U.S.  The Board disagreed with Lin v. Gonzales,
473 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2007), and Reynoso-Cisneros v. Gonzales, 491
F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2007), in which the Ninth Circuit, citing the
regulation’s present-tense phrasing (“is the subject of . . . removal
proceedings”), ruled that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) does not bar aliens from
filing motions to reopen from outside the U.S. after the proceedings are
complete.  The Board stated that, under Nat’l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005), it would not
follow Lin or Reynoso-Cisneros, including within the Ninth Circuit.  In
addition, the Board disagreed with William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329
(4th Cir. 2007), in which the Fourth Circuit invalidated 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(d) due to what it viewed as an inconsistency between the
regulation and the INA.  The Board stated it would follow William in the
Fourth Circuit, but not in the other circuits.
b.  In William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007), the Fourth Circuit
invalidated 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) as it pertains to motions to reopen,
ruling that motions to reopen may be filed from outside, as well as
inside, the U.S.  The court reasoned that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) conflicts
with section 240(c)(7)(A), which states that “[a]n alien may file one
motion to reopen proceedings,” as the statute does not specify any
restriction on motions to reopen filed outside the U.S.
(1) In Sadhvani v. Holder, 596 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2009), the Fourth
Circuit upheld the Board’s denial of a motion to reopen for asylum
(based on changed country conditions) because the petitioner was
no longer present in the United States.  The court found that
although the Board had jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner’s
motion under William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007),
the Board properly denied relief based on the statutory requirement
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that one must be present in the United States to be eligible for
asylum. 
c. In Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2011) the Sixth Circuit held
that the Board does not lack jurisdiction to consider an alien’s motion to
reopen removal proceedings even though the alien was no longer in the
United States. The Sixth Circuit found that, first, no statutory provision
gives the Board authority to decline the exercise of jurisdiction that is
given to it by section 240(c)(7)(A) and, second, recent Supreme Court
decisions make clear that the departure bar is a mandatory rule and not a
jurisdictional requirement. Id. at 3-5. The Sixth Circuit also pointed to
Matter of Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I&N Dec. 57 (BIA 2009) (holding that
Board maintains jurisdiction over motion to reopen where alien who left
United States claimed not to have received notice of the warrant of
removal), as proof that the departure bar does not deprive the Board of
jurisdiction to handle all matters relating to aliens who have departed the
United States. Id. at 5. See also Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85 (2d Cir.
2011) (citing Pruidze for the proposition that the Board must consider an
alien’s motion to reopen even if the alien is no longer in the United
States); Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) to be “inapplicable” where the petitioner is forcibly
removed).
d. In Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2010) , the
Seventh Circuit disagreed with Matter of Armendarez-Mendez, and held
that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) is untenable as a rule about subject matter
jurisdiction.  The court held that the Act does not support the conclusion
that the Board lacks jurisdiction “to issue decisions that affect the legal
rights of departed aliens.”  Id. at 595.  The Seventh Circuit declined to
follow the approach taken by the Ninth and Sixth Circuits, wherein those
circuits distinguish between motions considered after involuntary
departures and those after voluntary departures, and also disagreed with
the Fourth Circuit’s decision in William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329 (4th
Cir. 2007).  The Court further noted that Matter of Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I.
& N. Dec. 57 (BIA 2009), “ suggests that the Board may be in the
process of abandoning its ‘jurisdictional’ characterization of the
departure rule.”  Id.
e. In Reyes-Torres v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth
Circuit held that the physical removal of an alien seven days after a final
order of removal had been entered did not preclude him from pursuing
motion to reopen because the Attorney General did not have power
under regulatory “departure bar” to unilaterally reduce time in which the
alien could have filed his motion to reopen from statutorily mandated 90
days to seven days.  The court reopened the case for the Board to decide
whether the alien’s 2007 conviction, which had been vacated, was
vacated for reasons related to the alien’s immigration status.
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f. In Prestol Espinal v. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third
Circuit held that the Board does not lack jurisdiction over motions to
reconsider where the alien has been removed from the United States.
The court held that the post-departure bar at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) is
invalid because it is inconsistent with congressional intent in enacting
IIRIRA. Id. at 223. The court specifically cited six reasons for its
holding: (1) the plain text of the statute provides each alien with the right
to file one motion to reopen and one motion to reconsider; (2) the
Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the statutory right to
file a motion to reopen; (3) Congress specifically considered and
included other limitations on the right, but did not include the
geographic limitation; (4) the post-departure bar would eviscerate the
right to reopen or reconsider by allowing the government to remove the
alien before the filing deadline; (5) Congress included a geographic
limitation on the availability of a domestic violence exception to the
filing deadline, but did not include the limitation generally; and (6)
Congress specifically withdrew the statutory post-departure bar to
judicial review, indicating a focus on improving accuracy of decisions.
Id.
g. Other circuits have considered whether the “post-departure bar” on
motions to reopen in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) and motions to reconsider in 8
C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) can be applied without conflicting with statute. 
The Tenth Circuit upheld both regulations, agreeing with the dissent in
the Fourth Circuit’s William v. Gonzales decision. Rosillo-Puga v.
Holder, 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Mendiola v. Holder,
585 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir.2009). The Fifth Circuit upheld 8 C.F.R. §
1003.2(d) on narrower grounds. Ovalles v. Holder, 577 F.3d 288, 295-96
(5th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing facts from William v. Gonzales,  499
F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007)).
3. Time in which to file.  Except for a MTR to rescind an order of removal
rendered in absentia or to apply for asylum and withholding of deportation, the
MTR shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative
order of removal.  INA § 240(c)(6)(C)(i).  The filing of a motion to reopen an
in absentia order entered pursuant to section 240(b)(5) is subject to the
deadline specified in section 240(b)(5)(C). INA § 240(c)(6)(C)(iii).
a. A judicial ruling cannot be considered the final administrative decision,
and the filing of a court action seeking judicialreview does not extend
the time for filing a motion to reopen administrative proceedings. 
Matter of Susma, 22 I&N Dec. 947 (BIA 1999).  A motion to reopen a
decision of the Board following judicial review is untimely if it is filed
more than 90 days after the date of the Board’s decision, even if the
motion is filed within 90 days of the order of the court.  Id.
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b. Where an alien has filed an untimely motion to reopen alleging that the
INS failed to prove the alien’s removability, the burden of proof no
longer lies with the Service to establish removability, but shifts to the
alien to demonstrate that an exceptional situation exists that warrants
reopening by the Board on its own motion. Matter of Beckford, 22 I&N
Dec. 1216 (BIA 2000).  Where an alien seeking to reopen removal
proceedings failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood that the result
in his case would be changed if the proceedings were reopened, by
showing that he was not, in fact, removable, he failed to present an
exceptional situation to warrant a grant of his untimely motion.  Id.
c. The Board held that 90-day time limitation for filing a motion to reopen
in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) applies to motions to reopen in absentia
deportation orders for the purpose of adjusting status, whether filed
before or after the 1996 promulgation of the regulations, where such
motions do not meet any of the exceptions to the time limitations for
motions to reopen. Matter of Monges-Garcia, 25 I&N Dec. 246 (BIA
2010).  The Board further held that the 5-year limitation on discretionary
relief for failure to appear at deportation proceedings under former
section 242B(e)(1) of the Act is not in conflict with, and does not
provide an exception to, the 90-day deadline for filing a motion to
reopen in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1).  Id. 
D. Motion to reopen to apply for asylum or withholding of removal
1. There is no time limit on the filing of a MTR if the basis of the motion is to
apply for relief under sections 208 or 241(b)(3) and is based on changed
country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which
removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available
and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding. 
INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii).
2. The Board held that section 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) (and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)),
bars an alien who is subject to a final order of removal from filing an untimely
motion to reopen removal proceedings to apply for asylum under section
208(a)(2)(D), if the motion is based on changed personal circumstances (as
opposed to changed country conditions).  Matter of C-W-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 346
(BIA 2007). 
3. In Joseph v. Holder, 579 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2009), the Seventh Circuit held
that the Board erred in interpreting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) when it
required the alien to demonstrate a “dramatic change in country conditions”
even though no such inference can be drawn from the regulation or case law. 
The court underscored that merely a material change is required, and also
asserted that the language of the regulation does not restrict the “changed
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circumstance” to only a broad social or political change, but that it could
encompass a personal or local change as well.
4. “[A]n applicant cannot claim changed country conditions based on her own
actions in the United States when the conditions in the country of origin have
not materially changed.”  Lin Xing Jiang v. Holder, 639 F.3d 751 (7th Cir.
2011) (affirming denial of motion to reopen where alien from China with two
United States citizen children offered no evidence that the population control
efforts and one-child policy in China had materially changed since the date of
her initial hearing). 
E. Motion to reopen to rescind a removal order rendered in absentia
1. An in absentia order of removal may be rescinded only
a. upon a MTR filed within 180 days after the date of the order of removal
if the alien demonstrates that the failure to appear was because of
exceptional circumstances [INA § 240(b)(5)(C)(i)];
(1) The term “exceptional circumstances” is defined at section
240(e)(1) and refers to exceptional circumstances (such as serious
illness or death of the spouse, child or parent of the alien, but not
including less compelling circumstances) beyond the control of the
alien.
(2) Cases discussing “exceptional circumstances”
(a) An alien (in deportation proceedings) failed to establish that a
serious headache he suffered on the day of his hearing
amounted to exceptional circumstances to excuse his failure
to appear where he gave no explanation for neglecting to
contact the Immigration Court on the day of the hearing and
did not support his claim with medical records or other
evidence, such as affidavits by persons with knowledge
regarding the extent and seriousness of the alien’s headache
and the remedies he used to treat it.  Matter of J-P-, 22 I&N
Dec. 33 (BIA 1998).
(b) An alien (in deportation proceedings) who claimed that his
failure to appear at his hearing resulted from an “illegible
hearing date” on the OSC and notice of hearing failed to
establish by sufficient evidence that he received inadequate
notice under former section 242B(c)(3)(B) of the Act or that
his absence was the result of exceptional circumstances under
former section 242B(c)(3)(A) of the Act.  Matter of S-M-, 22
I&N Dec. 49 (BIA 1998).
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(c) An alien (in deportation proceedings) failed to establish that a
foot injury he suffered on the day before his hearing
amounted to exceptional circumstances to excuse his failure
to appear where he gave no explanation for neglecting to
contact the Immigration Court on the day of the hearing and
did not support his claim with medical records or other
evidence, such as an affidavit from his employer.  Matter of
B-A-S-, 22 I&N Dec. 57 (BIA 1998).
i) An alien seeking to reopen in absentia proceedings
based on her unsuccessful communications with her
attorney did not establish exceptional circumstances
under former section 242B(c)(3)(A) of the Act where
she failed to satisfy all the requirements for an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim set out in Matter
of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988).  A claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute an
exception to the 180 day statutory limit for the filing of
a MTR to rescind an in absentia order of deportation
under former section 242B(c)(3)(A) of the Act.  Matter
of A-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 140 (BIA 1998); Matter of Lei,
22 I&N Dec. 113 (BIA 1998).
b. or upon a MTR filed at any time if the alien demonstrates that the alien
did not receive notice in accordance with section 239(a)(1) or (2) or the
alien demonstrates that the alien was in Federal or State custody and the
failure to appear was through no fault of the alien [INA §
240(b)(5)(C)(ii)].
(1) A hearing notice which is sent by certified mail to the alien’s last
known address is sufficient to establish clear, unequivocal, and
convincing evidence that the alien received “written notice” of the
deportation hearing. Matter of Grijalva, 21 I&N Dec. 27 (BIA
1995), superseded by statute as stated in Patel v. Holder, 652 F.3d
962 (8th Cir. 2011). To overcome this presumption and establish
nonreceipt an alien “must present substantial and probative
evidence such as documentary evidence from the Postal Service,
third party affidavits, or other similar evidence demonstrating that
there was improper delivery or that nondelivery was not due to the
[alien’s] failure to provide an address where he [or she] could
receive mail. Id. at 37. See Sanchez v. Holder, 627 F.3d 226, 233
(6th Cir. 2010) (deferring to the Board’s interpretation).
(2) An alien who is in Federal or State custody is necessarily unable to
appear through no fault of his own. Matter of Evra, 25 I&N Dec.
79 (BIA 2009). The conduct underlying an alien’s arrest and
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incarceration does not constitute “fault” within the meaning of
section 240(b)(5)(C)(ii). Id. at 81.
2. The filing of the MTR to rescind an in absentia order of removal shall stay the
removal of the alien pending disposition of the motion by the IJ.  INA §
240(b)(5)(C).  The Board has held that the automatic stay of deportation
associated with the filing of a MTR after an in absentia hearing under former
section 242B(C)(3) continued during the pendency of an appeal from the
denial of the MTR. Matter of Rivera, 21 I&N Dec. 232 (BIA 1996).  Section
240(b)(5)(C) appears subject to the same interpretation.
F. Motions to reopen orders that were entered in absentia in deportation proceedings
1. An in absentia deportation order may be rescinded only 
a. upon an MTR filed within 180 days after the date of the order of
deportation if the alien demonstrates that the failure to appear was
because of exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the alien; or
[8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(1)].
b. upon an MTR filed at any time if the alien demonstrates that he or she
did not receive notice or if the alien demonstrates that he or she was in
federal or state custody and the failure to appear was through no fault of
the alien. [8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2)]
(1) A hearing notice which is sent by certified mail to the alien’s last
known address is sufficient to establish clear, unequivocal, and
convincing evidence that the alien received “written notice” of the
deportation hearing. Matter of Grijalva, 21 I&N Dec. 27 (BIA
1995). To overcome this presumption and establish nonreceipt an
alien “must present substantial and probative evidence such as
documentary evidence from the Postal Service, third party
affidavits, or other similar evidence demonstrating that there was
improper delivery or that nondelivery was not due to the [alien’s]
failure to provide an address where he [or she] could receive mail.
Id. at 37. See Sanchez v. Holder, 627 F.3d 226, 233 (6th Cir. 2010)
(deferring to the Board’s interpretation).
G. Motions to reopen orders that were entered in absentia in exclusion proceedings.
1. The regulation that provides exceptions to filing deadlines for motions seeking
to reopen orders that were entered in absentia in deportation or exclusion
proceedings is found at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii).  Although the
subheading at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii) signals that this regulation
provides a time exception for motions to reopen both deportation and
exclusion proceedings conducted in absentia, the regulation itself provides a
time exception only for motions to reopen deportation proceedings conducted
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in absentia.  The regulation is silent as to what specific time exception applies
to motions to reopen exclusion proceedings conducted in absentia.  The
regulation provides only a standard for reopening, stating that “[a] motion to
reopen exclusion hearings on the basis that the Immigration Judge improperly
entered an order of exclusion in absentia must be supported by evidence that
the alien had reasonable cause for his failure to appear.”  8 C.F.R. §
1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(B).  Therefore, the Board held that he regulatory language at
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(B) contains no time or numerical limitations on
aliens who wish to file a motion to reopen exclusion proceedings conducted in
absentia.  Matter of N-B-, 22 I&N Dec. 590 (BIA 1999).  In that decision, the
Board pointed out in a footnote: “We emphasize that our decision in the
instant case “fills in” the regulatory “gap” that exists in the current regulation. 
Nothing prevents the Department of Justice from revising the current
regulation to fill the regulatory gap in a manner that would create specific
restrictions on motions to reopen exclusion proceedings conducted in
absentia.”
H. A motion to reopen or reconsider based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel
1. A motion to reopen or reconsider based upon a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel should comply with the following criteria:
a. The motion should be supported by an affidavit of the allegedly
aggrieved respondent setting forth in detail the agreement that was
entered into with counsel with respect to the actions to be taken and
what representations counsel did or did not make to the respondent in
this regard;
b. Counsel whose integrity or competence is being impugned should be
informed of the allegations leveled against him and be given an
opportunity to respond;
c. The motion should reflect whether a complaint has been filed with
appropriate disciplinary authorities with respect to any violation of
counsel's ethical or legal responsibilities, and if not, why not. Matter of
Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988).
(1) The Ninth Circuit has held that the Lozada requirements need not
be rigidly enforced where their purpose is fully served by other
means.  Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 2000).  
2. Equitable tolling for motions based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
a. Equitable tolling.  Some of the circuits permit the filing deadlines or
numerical limitations for motions to reopen to be tolled upon a showing
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of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Often, a showing of “due diligence”
by the alien is required.
(1) First Circuit: Whether time limits may be tolled remains an open
question under Chen v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 151 (1st  Cir. 2005). 
See also Guerrero-Santana v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 90 (1st Cir.
2007); Boakai v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2006); Jobe v.
INS, 238 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 2001) (en banc).  However, the
court has held that tolling is unavailable where a party fails to
exercise due diligence.  In Nascimento v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 12
(1st Cir. 2008), the court found no due diligence where the alien
was ordered deported on October 11, 2001, but waited until
November 20, 2002, to file a motion to reopen with the IJ.  The IJ
denied the motion and, in February 2004, the Board of Immigration
Appeals affirmed.  The petitioner waited until March 2007 to file
the subsequent motion to reopen that was the subject of the court’s
decision.
(2) Second Circuit: Time limits may be tolled.  Iavorski v. INS, 232
F.3d 124, 129-133 (2d Cir. 2000).  In Iavorski, the court cited lack
of due diligence by the alien in affirming the denial of the motion
to reopen.  In Cekic v. INS, 435 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2006), the
Second Circuit again affirmed the denial of the motion to reopen
for lack of due diligence.  In Cekic, the alien petitioners should
have become aware in 2000 that their counsel provided ineffective
assistance.  However, they waited until 2002 to file a motion to
reopen.  In Wang v. BIA, 508 F.3d 710 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second
Circuit articulated a two-step inquiry for equitably tolling deadlines
for motions to reopen for ineffective assistance of counsel. First,
the court evaluates when the ineffective assistance should have
been discovered by a reasonable person.  Second, the court asks
whether the alien showed due diligence in the period between
discovering the ineffective assistance and filing the motion to
reopen.  The court emphasized that there is no per se time period
within which the motion must be filed. In Wang, the court found
no due diligence where the alien discovered the ineffective
assistance in October 2005 and complied with the Matter of
Lozada requirements for reopening in January 2006, but waited
until June 2006 to file the motion to reopen.
(3) Third Circuit: Time limits may be tolled where fraud is shown. 
Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 406-407 (3d Cir. 2005). In
Borges, the Court also found that the alien acted with requisite due
diligence to resolve his immigration status over the course of five
years.  In contrast, the court found the alien in Mahmood v.
Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248 (3rd Cir. 2005) did not demonstrate due
diligence.  He allowed his case to lapse twice over one year
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intervals, without taking steps to inquire about the status of his
case.
(4) Fourth Circuit: No published cases.
(5) Fifth Circuit: No published cases. 
(6) Sixth Circuit: Time limits may be tolled.  Harchenko v. INS, 379
F.3d 405, 409-10 (6th Cir. 2004). The court found in Tapia-
Martinez v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2007), that waiting
fifteen months after discovery of counsel’s deficient performance
to raise an ineffective assistance claim, does not satisfy the due
diligence requirement.  In a case not relating to ineffective
assistance of counsel, the court ruled the petitioner did not
establish due diligence where (1) on July 5, 2005, the Board
dismissed the petitioner’s appeal from the denial of her asylum
application; and (2) on November 22, 2006, the petitioner filed a
motion to reopen based on a marriage to a U.S. citizen, and argued
that the deadline should be equitably tolled.  Barry v. Mukasey,
524 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 2007).
(7) Seventh Circuit: Tolling of numerical limits permitted.  Joshi v.
Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 2004).  Tolling of time limits
for motions to reopen in in absentia proceedings.  Pervaiz v.
Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2005). Due diligence is
required. Patel v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1011 (7th Cir. 2006). In
Patel, the court found that filing a motion to reopen, two years after
actual knowledge of a deportation order did not constitute due
diligence.  In Gaberov v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2008),
the court found that due diligence existed in a case where, after
trying for several years to ascertain the status of his case, the
petitioner filed a motion to reopen several months after receiving a
“bag and baggage” letter from the Department of Homeland
Security.  In Yuan Gao v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2008),
the court ruled that equitable tolling does not restart the motion to
reopen clock.  Rather, a petitioner who learns the facts necessary to
file a motion to reopen within the deadline must do so by the
deadline.
(8) Eighth Circuit: Equitable tolling of time limits permitted sparingly,
when extraordinary circumstances beyond the alien’s control
prevented timely filing. Hernandez-Moran v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d
496 (8th Cir. 2005). Due diligence is required. Habchy v. Gonzales,
471 F.3d 858, (8th Cir. 2006). In Habchy, the court held that
waiting four months to file a second motion to reopen absent any
explanation for delay, does not constitute due diligence. 
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(9) Ninth Circuit: Time and numerical limits may be equitably tolled
“during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because
of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due
diligence in discovering the deception, fraud or error.”  Iturribarria
v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003).  In Singh v. Gonzales,
491 F.3d 1090 (2d Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit found that due
diligence did not exist when the alien waited six months after
becoming suspicious that his prior counsel acted ineffectively
before consulting another attorney regarding reopening his case on
ineffective assistance grounds.  In Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498
F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007), however, the Ninth Circuit found that the
alien acted with due diligence in filing a motion to reopen.  The
Ghahremani court cited the alien’s “unbroken efforts to retain
competent counsel” in the period before he learned that a previous
attorney acted ineffectively.  Id. See also Sun v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d
802 (9th Cir. 2009).  In addition, the Ninth Circuit has tolled
numerical limits  where a nonlawyer engages in ineffective
assistance.  Fajardo v. INS, 300 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2002).  
(10) Tenth Circuit: Equitable tolling is permitted, and due diligence
required.  Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2002).
(11) Eleventh Circuit: Time limitations can be equitably tolled where
the alien has filed a defective pleading during the statutory period
or where the alien has been induced or tricked by misconduct into
allowing the filing deadline to pass. Abdi v. Att’y Gen., 430 F.3d
1148 (11th Cir. 2005). Time limitations may not be tolled for
motions to reopen in absentia deportation orders, on account of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273
(11th Cir. 1999).
3. A motion to reopen or reconsider based upon a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel was replaced by the Attorney General with a claim based on
deficient performance of counsel.  Matter of Compean, 24 I&N Dec. 710
(A.G. 2009), vacated by Matter of Compean, Bangaly, & J-E-C-, 25 I&N Dec.
1 (A.G. 2009).  
a. To prevail on a deficient performance of counsel claim, the alien bears
the burden of establishing three elements:
(1) The alien must show that his lawyer’s errors were “egregious.”
(2) In cases where the alien files an untimely motion to reopen, the
alien must demonstrate that he exercised due diligence in
discovering and seeking to cure counsel’s alleged deficient
performance.  If the alien demonstrates due diligence, the judge
may toll the filing period in the exercise of discretion.
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(3) The alien must establish prejudice arising from the lawyer’s errors
by showing that, but for the deficient performance, it is more likely
than not that the alien would have been entitled to the ultimate
relief sought.
b. The alien must also comply with certain documentary requirements. In
addition to a detailed affidavit setting forth the facts that form the basis
of the deficient performance of counsel claim, the alien must also
submit:  
(1) A copy of the agreement, if any, the alien had with the lawyer
whose performance the alien alleges was deficient. 
(2) A copy of a letter to the alien’s former lawyer setting forth the
lawyer’s deficient performance and a copy of the lawyer’s
response, if any. 
(3) A completed and signed complaint addressed to the appropriate
State bar or other disciplinary authorities.  There is no requirement
that the complaint actually be filed. 
(4) If the alien’s claim is that his former lawyer failed to submit
something to the IJ, the alien must attach the allegedly omitted
item to the motion.
(5) If the alien is represented by counsel in seeking reopening, the
motion shall contain the following signed statement of the new
attorney: “Having reviewed the record, I express a belief, based on
a reasoned and studied professional judgment, that the performance
of my client’s former counsel fell below minimal standards of
professional competence.” 
4. A motion to reopen or reconsider based upon a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel was replaced by Attorney General Mukasey with a claim based on
deficient performance of counsel.  Matter of Compean, 24 I&N Dec. 710
(A.G. 2009). However, Attorney General Holder vacated Matter of Compean,
24 I&N Dec. 710 (A.G. 2009) pending the outcome of a rulemaking process
and directed the Board and IJs to apply the standards established by Matter of
Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), for reviewing motions to reopen based
on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Matter of Compean, Bangaly &
J-E-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009).
I. Motion to reopen in order to apply for adjustment of status
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1. The Board originally held that an IJ was not required to continue a deportation
case pending the adjudication of a visa petition filed in the respondent’s
behalf.  Matter of Kotte, 16 I&N Dec. 449 (BIA 1978).
2. Following a change in the regulations, the Board held that a MTR in order to
apply for adjustment of status should be granted by an IJ even if the visa
petition which forms the basis for the adjustment is filed simultaneously with
the application for adjustment of status provided a prima facie approvable visa
petition and adjustment application have been submitted; Matter of Garcia, 16
I&N Dec. 653 (BIA 1978).  The Board added, however, that an IJ may still
deny a MTR if the visa petition is frivolous or if the adjustment application
would be denied on statutory or discretionary grounds even if the visa petition
were approved.
3. The Board modified its decision in Matter of Garcia in cases involving
applications for adjustment of status based on marriages entered into during
which administrative or judicial proceedings are pending regarding the alien’s
right to be admitted or remain in the U.S.  After the Garcia decision, Congress
amended sections 204(g) and 245(e) of the Act (in 1986 and again in 1990) to
preclude an alien from adjusting status based on a marriage that was entered
into after the commencement of deportation proceedings and to bar the
approval of a visa petition to accord immediate relative or preference status
based upon such a marriage until the beneficiary of the petition has resided
outside the U.S. for a 2-year period following the marriage, unless the alien
establishes “by clear and convincing evidence to the satisfaction of the
Attorney General that the marriage was entered into in good faith and . . . was
not entered into for the purpose of procuring the alien's entry as an
immigrant.” Matter of Garcia created a presumption that, for the purposes of a
MTR, the relationship claimed in a visa petition supporting the application for
adjustment of status was presumed to be bona fide unless clear ineligibility
was apparent in the record.  The Board stated that the amendments to sections
204(g) and 245(e) created a rebuttable presumption that marriages contracted
after the institution of deportation proceedings are fraudulent.  The decision on
whether that presumption is overcome is up to the DD with whom the visa
petition is filed for DDs have exclusive jurisdiction over visa petitions.  The
Board concluded that an IJ’s inquiry to determine whether the presumption is
overcome would be a substantial and unwarranted intrusion into the DD's
authority over the adjudication of visa petitions and held that all MTRs for
consideration of adjustment of status based on unadjudicated visa petitions
within the ambit of sections 204(g) and 245(e) should be denied.  Matter of
Arthur, 20 I&N Dec. 475 (BIA 1992).  In Matter of H-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 728
(BIA 1999), the Board found that Matter of Arthur was not inconsistent with
the motions to reopen regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.2(c)(2) and 3.23(b)(4)(i)
(effective July 1, 1996) [now 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c) and 1003.23(b)(4)(i)]
which allowed only one MTR which must be filed within 90 days of the
decision.
page 357 of 365
4. Finding that its policy in Matter of Arthur coupled with the regulation limiting
respondents to one MTR filed within 90 days of a final administrative decision
and the Service’s inability to adjudicate visa petitions within that time
deprived a small class of respondents of the opportunity to have applications
for adjustment of status adjudicated by an IJ, the Board withdrew from  Matter
of Arthur.  Based on a revision of the Service’s policy on joining untimely
MTRs for adjustment of status and its no longer requiring “extraordinary and
compelling circumstances” in order to join in such a motion, the Board held in
Matter of Velarde, 23 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 2002), that a properly filed MTR
may be granted, in the exercise of discretion, to provide an alien an
opportunity to pursue an application for adjustment of status where the
following factors are present:
a. The motion is timely filed;
b. The motion is not numerically barred by the regulations;
c. The motion is not barred by Matter of Shaar, 21 I&N Dec. 541 (BIA
1996) [where the respondent lost eligibility for relief by overstaying a
period of voluntary departure] or on any other procedural grounds;
d. The motion presents clear and convincing evidence indicating a strong
likelihood that the respondent’s marriage is bona fide; and
e. The Service either does not oppose the motion or bases its opposition
solely on  Matter of Arthur, 20 I&N Dec. 475 (BIA 1992).
(1) The Second, Ninth, and Sixth Circuits have held that MTRs should
not be denied solely because DHS opposed the motion.  Ahmed v.
Mukasey, 548 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2008); Melnitsenko v. Mukasey,
517 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2008); Sarr v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 354 (6th
Cir. 2007).  However, the Third Circuit has found that, under
Matter of Verlarde, DHS opposition is an appropriate reason for
denying a MTR.  Bhiski v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2004).
The Board has clarified that the fifth factor does not grant DHS a
veto power over an otherwise approvable Velarde motion, but that
the IJ must consider the merits of DHS opposition. Matter of
Lamus, 25 I&N Dec. 61 (BIA 2009).
J. Motion to reopen to apply for cancellation of removal under section 240A of the
Act
1. A motion to reopen for consideration or further consideration of an application
for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) or section 240A(b) of the
Act may be granted only if the alien demonstrates that he or she was
statutorily eligible for such relief, under section 240A(d)(1), prior to the
service of the notice to appear, or prior to the commission of an offense
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referred to in section 212(a)(2) of the Act that renders the alien inadmissible
or removable under section 237(a)(2) of the Act. 
2. The provision in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3) (2005) that an applicant for
cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) (2000), must demonstrate
statutory eligibility for that relief prior to the service of a notice to appear
applies only to the continuous physical presence requirement and has no
bearing on the issues of qualifying relatives, hardship, or good moral
character.  Matter of Bautista-Gomez, 23 I&N Dec. 893 (BIA 2006).
K. Where to file the motion
1. In general
a. The general rule is that the MTR or reconsider is filed with the maker of
the last decision in the case. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1).
b. When the Board dismisses an appeal solely for lack of jurisdiction,
without adjudication on the merits, the appeal is deemed nugatory, and
the IJ retains jurisdiction over any subsequent motion to reopen or
reconsider. Matter of Mladineo, 14 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 1974).
c. However, where the Board dismisses an appeal as untimely, without
adjudication on the merits, the Board retains jurisdiction over a motion
to reconsider its dismissal of the untimely appeal to the extent that the
motion challenges the finding of untimeliness or requests consideration
of the reasons for untimeliness.  Matter of Lopez, 22 I&N Dec. 16 (BIA
1998).
2. Motions to reopen or reconsider decisions of the Board
a. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(g)(2)(i) provides that a MTR or motion to reconsider a
decision of the Board pertaining to proceedings before an IJ shall be
filed directly with the Board.
b. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(g)(2)(ii) provides that a MTR or motion to reconsider
a decision of the Board pertaining to a matter initially adjudicated by an
INS officer shall be filed with the officer of the INS having
administrative control over the record of proceeding.
3. Motions to reopen or reconsider decisions of IJs
a. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(ii) provides that MTRs or reconsider a decision of
an IJ must be filed with the Immigration Court having administrative
control over the ROP.
L. Sua sponte reopening or reconsideration
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1. Although sections 240(c)(5) and (6) of the Act place time limits on motions to
reopen or reconsider, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b) provides that an IJ may reopen or
reconsider a decision on his or her own motion at any time.
2. The Board has this same authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).  However, in a
decision rendered before IIRIRA when motions to reconsider were governed
only by the regulations, the Board held that its power to reopen or reconsider
cases sua sponte is limited to exceptional circumstances and is not meant to
cure filing defects or circumvent the regulations, where enforcing them might
result in hardship.  Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 1997).
3. Where an alien has filed an untimely motion to reopen alleging that the INS
failed to prove the alien’s removability, the burden of proof no longer lies with
the Service to establish removability, but shifts to the alien to demonstrate that
an exceptional situation exists that warrants reopening by the Board on its own
motion.  Matter of Beckford, 22 I&N Dec. 1216 (BIA 2000).  Where an alien
seeking to reopen removal proceedings failed to demonstrate a substantial
likelihood that the result in his case would be changed if the proceedings were
reopened, by showing that he was not, in fact, removable, he failed to present
an exceptional situation to warrant a grant of his untimely motion.  Id.
4. In order for a change in the law to qualify as an exceptional situation that
merits the exercise of discretion by the Board of Immigration Appeals to
reopen or reconsider a case sua sponte, the change must be fundamental in
nature and not merely an incremental development in the state of the law (such
as a Board or court decision).  Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132 (BIA 1999).
XIV. Appeals to the Board from decisions made by an IJ
A. Notice of right to appeal
1. A party affected by a decision who is entitled to appeal to the Board from a
decision of an IJ shall be given notice of the right to appeal.  8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.3(a)(1).
B. Filing the appeal
1. An appeal from a decision of an IJ shall be taken by filing a Notice of Appeal
(Form EOIR-26) directly with the Board within the time specified for an
appeal.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(a)(1).
C. Time limits for appeal
1. The Notice of Appeal must be filed directly with the Board within 30 calendar
days after the stating of an IJ’s oral decision or the mailing of an IJ’s  written
decision.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(b). If the final date for filing falls on a Saturday,
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Sunday or on a legal holiday, the appeal time is extended to the next business
day.  Id.  
a. The 30-day period set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(b) for filing an appeal
to the Board is mandatory and jurisdictional, and it begins to run upon
the issuance of a final disposition in a case.  Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec.
373 (A.G. 2002).
b. Neither the INA nor the regulations grant the Board authority to extend
the thirty-day time limit for filing an appeal to the Board.  Matter of
Liadov, 23 I&N Dec. 990 (BIA 2006).
c. The Board’s authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(c) to certify cases to
itself in its discretion is limited to exceptional circumstances and is not
meant to be used as a general cure for filing defects or to otherwise
circumvent the regulations, where enforcing the regulations might result
in hardship.  Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec. 373 (A.G. 2002).  A short
delay by an overnight service is not a rare or extraordinary event that
would warrant consideration of an untimely appeal on certification. 
Matter of Liadov, 23 I&N Dec. 990 (BIA 2006).
2. The date of filing of the Notice of Appeal is the date the Notice is received by
the Board.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(c).
3. There is no authority in the regulations to extend the time for filing an appeal. 
Matter of Correa-Garces, 20 I&N Dec. 451 (BIA 1992); Matter of G-Z-, 5
I&N Dec. 295 (BIA 1953).  Nor is there authority for an IJ to reopen a case on
his own motion for the sole purpose of permitting a late appeal to be taken. 
Matter of D-, 5 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 1953).
D. The appealing parties 
1. The appeal parties are only those who are covered by the decision and are
named in the Notice of Appeal.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(a)(1).
E. Fee for appeal
1. The Notice of Appeal must be accompanied by a check, money order, or fee
waiver request in satisfaction of the fee requirements of  8 C.F.R. § 1003.8.  8
C.F.R. § 1003.3(a)(1). 
2. Waiver of fees
a. The Board may, in its discretion, authorize the prosecution of any appeal
or motion over which it has jurisdiction without payment of the required
fee.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.8(a)(3).
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b. In any case in which an alien or other party affected is unable to pay the
fee fixed for an appeal or motion, he or she shall file with the Notice of
Appeal or motion, an Appeal Fee Waiver Request (Form EOIR-26A).  8
C.F.R. § 1003.8(a)(3).
c. If the request does not establish the inability to pay the required fee, the
appeal or motion will not be deemed properly filed.  8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.8(a)(3).
F. Representation by counsel
1. If the respondent is represented, a Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney
or Representative Before the Board (Form EOIR-27) must be filed with the
Notice of Appeal.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(a)(1).
G. Proof of service
1. The appeal must reflect proof of service of a copy of the appeal and all
attachments on the opposing party.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(a)(1).
2. An appeal and all attachments must be in English or accompanied by a
certified translation.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(a)(1).
3. An appeal is not properly filed unless it is received at the Board, along with all
required documents, fees or fee waiver requests, and proof of service, within
the time allowed for filing.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(a)(1).
H. Waiving Appeal
1. A notice of appeal may not be filed by any party who has waived appeal
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(a)(1).
2. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39 provides that, except when certified to the Board, the
decision of an IJ becomes final upon waiver of appeal or upon expiration of
the time to appeal if no appeal is taken whichever comes first.
a. Prior to the amendment of an earlier version of this regulation, effective
April 6, 1992, the Board would usually accept a timely filed appeal even
if the alien had waived appeal at hearing.  Because of the addition to the
regulation of the words "whichever occurs first", the Board held that the
decision of an IJ becomes final immediately upon the waiver of an
alien's right to appeal and that the Board is without jurisdiction to
adjudicate an appeal in such a case.  Matter of Shih, 20 I&N Dec. 697
(BIA 1993).
b. Later, the Board held that a party wishing to challenge the validity of an
appeal waiver may file either a motion to reconsider with the IJ or an
page 362 of 365
appeal directly with the Board.  Matter of Patino, 23 I&N Dec. 74 (BIA
2001).
c. However, the Board has held that an unrepresented alien who accepts an
IJ’s decision as “final” does not effectively waive the right to appeal
where the IJ failed to make clear that such acceptance constitutes an
irrevocable waiver of appeal rights; therefore, the Board has jurisdiction
to consider the alien’s appeal. Matter of Rodriguez-Diaz, 22 I&N Dec.
1320 (BIA 2000).
(1) In footnote #2 of the case, the Board suggested the following
colloquy: “You have the right to appeal my decision.  You do not
have to decide today if you want to appeal, but you should decide
soon.  You can also give up your right to appeal by waiving it.  If
you want to appeal my decision, or if you want to think about
appeal and decide later, you must reserve appeal now.  If you
reserve appeal, you will have 30 days from today to file your
appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals.  Your notice of
appeal must actually arrive at and be received by the Board within
30 days. Your appeal right will be lost if the notice of appeal
arrives late.  If you do not want to appeal my decision, you may
waive appeal.  If you waive appeal, my decision becomes final, and
your case is completely finished.  You cannot change your mind
later and try to file an appeal.  Do you understand?  Do you want to
reserve appeal or waive appeal?”
(2) See also Narine v. Holder, 559 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding
that an alien did not waive appeal where his counsel withdrew
before the final hearing, former counsel had advised him about
voluntary departure but not about waiving appeal, and there was no
indication that the petitioner clearly understood what the IJ meant
in reference to a “final decision”).  
d. The Board also held that if an alien wishes to raise the issue regarding
whether his waiver of appeal was knowingly and intelligently made, he
should file a motion to reopen with the IJ. Matter of Shih, 20 I&N Dec.
697 (BIA 1993).
3. Departure from the U.S. of a person who is the subject of deportation (sic)
proceedings, prior to the taking of an appeal from a decision in his or her case
shall constitute a waiver of his or her right to appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e).
I. Standard of review on appeal
1. The Board has held that, under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3), it should defer to the
factual findings of an IJ, unless they are clearly erroneous, but it retains
independent judgment and discretion, subject to applicable governing
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standards, regarding pure questions of law and the application of a particular
standard of law to those facts.  In determining whether established facts are
sufficient to meet a legal standard, such as “well-founded fear,” the Board has
the authority to weigh the evidence in a manner different from that accorded
by the IJ, or to conclude that the foundation for the IJ’s legal conclusions was
insufficient or otherwise not supported by the evidence of record.  Matter of
A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 2008).
a. The Third Circuit held that Matter of A-S-B- incorrectly interprets the
Board’s standard of review for a well-founded fear of future persecution
in asylum cases.  The Third Circuit held that the process of forecasting
future events is a factual inquiry in an asylum case, and the Board should
review an IJ’s forecasting of future events under the clearly erroneous
standard.  Huang v. Holder, 620 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2010).
2. The Board reviews de novo an IJ’s prediction or finding regarding the
likelihood that an alien will be tortured, because it relates to whether the
ultimate statutory requirement for establishing eligibility for relief from
removal has been met and is therefore a mixed question of law and fact, or a
question of judgment.  Matter of V-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 500 (BIA 2008).  The
Third Circuit disagreed, holding that the Board erred in Matter of V-K-, in
finding that an IJ’s assessment of future torture is not a finding of fact because
the events have not occurred.  Rather, when the Board reviews an IJ’s
determination regarding “what is likely to happen to the petitioner if removed”
it is a factual question to be reviewed for clear error, while the IJ’s
determination regarding whether “what is likely to happen” would constitute
torture is a legal determination to be reviewed de novo.  Kaplun v. Att’y Gen.,
602 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2010).
J. Interlocutory appeals
1. As a general rule, the Board does not entertain appeals from interlocutory
decisions of an IJ, such as decisions on change of venue, admissibility of
evidence, etc.  Matter of Victorino, 18 I&N Dec. 259 (BIA 1982); Matter of
Ruiz-Campuzano, 17 I&N Dec. 108 (BIA 1979).
2. Only where a significant issue is raised which affects the administration of the
immigration laws will the Board accept an interlocutory appeal.  Matter of
Victorino, 18 I&N Dec. 259 (BIA 1982); Matter of Alphonse, 18 I&N Dec.
178 (BIA 1981); Matter of Wadas, 17 I&N Dec. 346 (BIA 1980).
K. Appeals from in absentia orders of removal
1. The Board lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an in absentia order in
removal proceedings where section 240(b)(5)(C) of the Act provides that such
an order may only be rescinded by filing a motion to reopen with the IJ. 
Matter of Guzman, 22 I&N Dec. 722 (BIA 1999).
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L. Withdrawal of appeal
1. In any case in which an appeal has been taken, the party taking the appeal may
file a written withdrawal thereof with the office at which the Notice of Appeal
was filed.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.4.  (This may appear to be left over from the time
that Notices of Appeal were filed with the Immigration Court rather than
directly with the Board.  However, it still applies to appeals from decisions by
the INS because those Notices of Appeal are filed with the INS and then
forwarded with the record to the Board.)
a. If the record in the case has not been forwarded to the Board on appeal
(as is the case in appeals from INS decisions), the decision in the case
shall be final as if no appeal had been taken.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.4.
b. If the record has been forwarded to the Board, the withdrawal shall also
be forwarded there and, if no decision on the case has been made by the
Board, the decision in the case shall be final as if no appeal had been
taken.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.4.
2. Departure from the U.S. of a person who is the subject of deportation
proceedings, prior to the taking of an appeal from a decision in his or her case
shall constitute a waiver of his or her right to appeal.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e).
3. Departure from the U.S. by a person who is the subject of deportation or
removal proceedings (other than an arriving alien defined in 8 C.F.R.
§ 1001.1(q)), subsequent to the taking of an appeal, but prior to a decision
thereon, shall constitute a withdrawal of the appeal and the decision in the
case shall be final as if no appeal had been taken.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.4.
a. The exception of arriving aliens seems to be for the purpose of codifying
the Board decision that departure from the U.S. by an applicant for
admission in exclusion proceedings after the taking of an appeal from an
IJ’s order denying admission does not constitute  withdrawal of the
appeal.  Matter of Keyte, 20 I&N Dec. 158 (BIA 1990).
4. A respondent’s departure from the United States is not a constructive
withdrawal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4 of an appeal by the Department of
Homeland Security.  Matter of Luis, 22 I&N Dec. 747 (BIA 1999).  It also
does not render DHS’s appeal moot.  Id.
M. Certification
1. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(c) provides that an IJ may also certify a case to the Board.
2. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.7 provides that when a case is certified to the Board, the alien
or other party affected shall be given notice of certification.
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3. It also provides that an IJ may certify a case only after an initial decision has
been made and before an appeal has been taken.
4. It also provides that if it is known at the time the decision is rendered that the
case will be certified, the notice of certification shall be included in the
decision and no further notice of certification shall be required.
N. Remand from Board for background and security checks.
1. When the Board has remanded the record for completion of background and
security checks and new information that may affect the alien’s eligibility for
relief is revealed, the IJ has discretion to determine whether to conduct an
additional hearing to consider the new evidence before entering an order
granting or denying relief.  Matter of Alcantara-Perez, 23 I&N Dec. 882
(Board 2006).  When a proceeding is remanded for background and security
checks, but no new information is presented as a result of those checks, the IJ
should enter an order granting relief.  Id. 
2. When the Board remands a case to the IJ for the appropriate background
checks, the IJ reacquires jurisdiction over the proceedings and may consider
additional evidence regarding new or previously considered relief if the
evidence meets the requirements for reopening the proceedings.  Matter of M-
D-, 24 I&N Dec. 138 (BIA 2007). When a case is on remand for completion of
background checks, the IJ is required to enter a final order granting or denying
the requested relief.  Id. 
